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This thesis examines the multi-national military 
intervention into the Kurdish crisis in northern 
Iraq from April to July 1991. It traces the events 
of the crisis in Iraq, Turkey, Iran (and reactions 
outside the region) paying particular attention to 
the decision to launch a humanitarian intervention 
operation and the operation itself. It reviews these 
events in the light of additional information not 
available to the authors of the first published 
accounts. It also considers the political and legal 
implications of the actions taken by all the parties 
involved, including the UN, and draws conclusions on 
the status of military intervention as a method of 
conflict resolution. 
The thesis considers the background to the crisis: 
the history of the Kurds, their cultural and 
political cohesion, in the past and the present, 
their aspirations as a people and their relations 
with other peoples and groups in the region. It 
reflects on the policies of the governments of Iraq 
and her neighbours towards the Kurds and their 
aspirations. It also considers the past conduct of 
the leading states who have had an influence on 
political events in the `northern tier' of the 
Middle East throughout the century. 
The thesis concludes that the consensus views of 
academics and journalists at the time of the crisis 
were broadly accurate, both in the reporting of 
significant events and in the assessment of their 
significance. These conclusions are based on new 
evidence and analysis. Some of this new material is 
original and some is drawn from the recent work of 
other authorities. Thus, seven years after the 
crisis, this thesis brings together evidence, 
analysis and conclusions which amount to a new 
assessment of the crisis and the military operation. 
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The revolt of the peoples of northern Iraq began on 
5 March 1991, within days of the ending of the Gulf 
War. ' It coincided with other outbreaks of fighting 
elsewhere in the country, especially in the south- 
east near Basra but also in the area to the south of 
Baghdad. There is no evidence of coordination 
between the revolts in the different areas: they 
occurred as independent uprisings to take advantage 
of Iraq's defeat by the multinational coalition, led 
by the US, in the Gulf War. 
In the north of the country the instigators of the 
revolt were Kurdish fighters (peshmerga - `those who 
face death'). But members of Iraq's other ethnic 
minorities, as well as Arabs who opposed the regime, 
were also involved. In the south-east the rebels 
were predominantly Shia Arabs. 2 Fighting continued 
throughout March and early April. The high point of 
the revolts came on 21 March; on 25 March the Iraqi 
counter-offensive began. On 28 March the flight of 
the defeated rebels (and others who feared 
government reprisals) began: the people in the north 
towards Turkey and the people in the south-east 
towards Iran. By 11 April when an armistice was 
agreed there were nearly 500,000 fugitives on the 
Turkish border and 1.5 million crossing into Iran. 
Media reports of the distress of so many people on 
the Turkish border provoked international action, 
first at the UN and then in the capitals of Western 
states. 
1 An uprising of the Kurdish minority [in Iraq) is imminent" Turkish politicians said at the weekend' Alec 
Russell (from Diyarbakir) The Daily Telegraph 4 Match 1991. 
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When hundreds of thousands of migrants fled towards 
the state borders to escape repression international 
observers began to demand `intervention' to 
forestall `genocide'. Neighbouring states called on 
the UN to take action to avert an `international' 
threat: the possibility of uncontrolled masses of 
refugees (or of actual fighting) crossing into their 
own territory. On 5 April the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 688. Later several states sent a 
multinational force first to Turkey and then into 
northern Iraq to provide `safe havens', places of 
safety inside Iraq where the would-be refugees would 
be provided with humanitarian aid. 
The first relief efforts were achieved by the aid 
agencies. ' The first military action was the delivery 
of relief supplies by air drop, beginning on 8 
April. In the following nine weeks 22,000 soldiers, 
marines and airmen from seven' states deployed to 
Turkey (and then into northern Iraq) to bring relief 
to the people who had been forced to leave their 
homes in the earlier fighting. Working with the aid 
agencies military forces repaired infrastructure, 
provided accommodation and maintained public order 
in the occupied area of north-west Iraq. 
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, as the military activity 
was named, took the lead in distributing aid and 
providing security in northern Iraq until 7 June. 
Thereafter the military handed over responsibility 
for relief to the aid agencies and remained to 
provide protection. The coalition withdrew their 
forces from northern Iraq in the middle of July but 
retained forces in the border area of Turkey to 
deter renewed Iraqi operations against the Kurds. 
Members of other minorities, and other dissident Iraqis, took part in both revolts. 
3 The first to arrive were probably French NGOs, like Medecins Sans Frontie res, which had made contact 
with the Kurds during the revolt in March. Martin Griffiths interview 28.2.94. 
° States providing forces were the US, the UK, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium. Small 
contingents were sent by Australia and Luxembourg. Germany provided non-combat personnel. This small 
number of contributing states contrasts with the 32 states which contributed forces to DESERT STORM. 
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Text cut off in original 
iiie success of PROVIDE COMFORT in providing relief 
for the DPs (displaced people) came about through 
the rapid response of coalition land, sea and air 
forces - and together with aid agencies - in a 
mission which had not been foreseen or planned in 
advance. It was characterised by a strong spirit of 
cooperation amongst all who took part. The second 
success of PROVIDE COMFORT was that it prevented the 
Kurdish issue become even more of a destabilising 
factor in the region than hitherto. 
THIS THESIS 
There exists, as yet, no comprehensive account of 
the Kurdish Crisis in which the events are fully 
explained, analysed and set in their historical 
context. This thesis sets out to redress this gap by 
presenting : 
" an investigation of the historical context of the 
revolt of the Iraqi Kurds (in March) and the 
subsequent flight of up to 2 million Kurds (and 
members of other minorities in northern Iraq) to 
the Turkish (and Iranian) borders. 
"a full account of the international military 
action. 
"a description of the state of international law, 
and the international political consensus (with 
regard to `intervention') prevailing at the time 
of the crisis. 
" analysis and conclusions, tentatively assessing 
the Kurdish Crisis and the international 
intervention as a possible model for future 
multinational `humanitarian intervention' 
operations in intra-state conflicts. 
It will address the following themes: 
" the balance between considerations of sovereignty 
versus the considerations of human rights in the 
international community's approach to intra-state 
crises. 
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" the opportunities and dangers of the international 
community selecting forceful measures, as against 
non-forceful measures, to deal with an intra-state 
crisis. 
" the role and choices facing states like Turkey in 
the post Cold War world. 
" the problems raised by the Kurds and other 
peoples-without-a-state, in 1991 and thereafter, 
as seeds of intra-state conflict. 
The approach of this thesis, therefore, is to 
examine the political, legal and military dimensions 
of the crisis with a view to providing an up-to-date 
statement of its significance. The thesis is in 
three parts: the origins and dimensions of the 
problem, the case study of the Kurdish crisis and 
its resolution, and analysis of the longer-term 
implications of decisions and events. The issues 
raised are legal, political, and military. 
SCOPE, SCALE AND DIRECTION OF THE THESIS 
Since the end of the Cold War the international 
community has been confronted by a succession of 
crises brought about by intra-state conflict. The 
wars in Liberia, northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda and 
Bosnia were cases of intra-state conflict. In his 
book Diplomacy, published in 1994, Henry Kissinger 
identified the resolution of intra-state conflict as 
the greatest challenge of the post-Cold War world. 5 
He, and others6, have pondered the place of 
intervention in US national (and more generally, 
Western) strategy in the future. 
' 'Never before has a new world order had to be assembled from so many different perceptions, 
or on so global a scale. Nor has any previous order had to combine the attributes of the historic 
balance-of-power systems with global democratic opinion and the exploding technology of the 
contemporary period. ' 
HA Kissinger Dplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994) p 26. 
6 'The issue of military intervention in the internal affairs of states is central in a post-Cold 
War international system characterised by many dangerous, troubled, and even murderous 
states. ' 
Stanley Hoffmann 'The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention' Survival Vol 37 No 4 Winter 1995-6 p 
29. 
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Recent intra-state conflicts have created intense 
suffering - amounting to starvation and genocide - 
amongst civilian populations. The international 
community has shown humanitarian concern for the 
victims but it has also been alarmed at the 
possibility of communal fighting spreading across 
borders to create wider, regional crises. 
Robert Kaplan? has argued that the post-Cold War 
world will see a descent into `pre-Westphalian' 
violence as the global population grows and ethnic 
tensions bring `failing and faltering states" to the 
point of collapse. Quoting van Creveld9 Kaplan 
predicts upheavals in Africa, in the Caucasus and in 
the Levant. These disorders will come about through 
urbanisation, disease, deprivation and political 
polarisation. Migrants will move towards havens of 
opportunity and security. Taking issue with 
Huntington Kaplan states that the `clash of 
civilisations' 10 will be overtaken by a mass of 
smaller wars and states of anarchy, as in Somalia 
since 1993: the wars of competing nationalisms will 
be replaced by `cultural war', triggered by disputes 
over resources, especially water. The atmosphere 
surrounding this `coming conflict' debate has been 
described as the `new pessimism'. " 
Conflict inside states prompts a re-assessment of 
the problems of `peoples without states'. Until 
recently the international community addressed these 
problems by developing the political and legal 
concepts of `self-determination' in the context of 
anti-colonialism. Today the international community 
faces groups within states where the dissatisfaction 
7 `The Coming Anarchy' The Atlantic Monthly February 1994. 
e Robert G Heiman and Steven B Ratner 'Saving Failed States' Foreign Affairs Winter 1992-3 pp 3- 
21. Paul Kennedy Preparing for the 21" Century (New York: Random House, 1993) . Richard J Norton 
and James F Miskel 'Spotting Trouble: Identifying Faltering and Failing States' Naval War College 
vie Spring 1997 Vol L, No 2, p 79-91. 
9 Martin Van Creveld The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991). In a more 
recent article he foresees the break-down or decay - if not sudden collapse - of the state system which 
has been developing since 1648. In his words the '300 year period that opened at Westphalia ... is 
coming to an end. ' 'The Fate of the State' Parameters Spring 1996 p 17. 
10 Samuel P Huntington The Clash of Civilisations 7 'Foreign Affairs, Vol VII, No 3 1993 pp 22-49. 
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arises not from oppression by a colonial power but 
from action of a dominant group in the population: 
the abuse of the human or political rights of the 
non-dominant group(s). Kaplan's vision of future 
conflict in the Developing World supposes that the 
clash of opposing `nationalisms' will become more 
widespread, more destructive and will spill over 
into other states. The international community has 
to decide how to manage such conflicts. It might 
require state authorities to recognise the cultural 
identity of non-dominant groups. But the recognition 
of minorities tends to undermine a state's efforts 
at `nation-building' and can encourage dissent. It 
appears likely that the existing state system will 
struggle to contain such `people without state' 
problems for the foreseeable future. Perhaps these 
conflicts will only end when the existing system is 
overtaken by a more flexible international 
structure. 
This thesis is a case-study of an outbreak of intra- 
state conflict involving a dissident ethnic group 
within a state. The revolt of the Iraqi Kurds and 
the subsequent repression by the Iraqi authorities 
led to a multinational intervention known as 
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. This forcible military 
action brought humanitarian aid to the victims of 
the fighting in northern Iraq. 
Existing accounts of the succession of crises 
involving the Kurds (in Iraq and elsewhere) dwell on 
the failure of Kurdish nationalism or separatism. 
Two schools of thought can be defined. For Bulloch 
and Morris the failure is largely due to the 
`betrayal by the Great Powers' . 
12 Gerard Chaliland13, 
writing in the late 1970s, preferred to emphasise a 
11 Charles William Maynes'The New Pessimism' Foreign Policy No 100 Fall 1995 
12 They acknowledge the inadequacy of Kurdish leadership and the other divisive elements in Kurdish 
society (viz. language and religion) which have frustrated efforts to create an effective national 
movement. They nevertheless place much greater weight on the effect of external manipulation to 
explain the failure of the Kurds to achieve statehood in the 20th century. John Bulloch and Harvey Morris 
No Friends but the Mountains: the Tragedy of the Kurds (Harmonsworth: Viking (Penguin), 1992) p 230- 
231. 
13 Gerard Chaliland 'Introduction' in Gerard Chaliland (ed) People without a Country the Kurds and Kurdistan 
(London: Zed Press, 1980) p 15-16. 
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different underlying cause: the `failure of 
leadership' in the Kurdish populations throughout 
the 20th century: 
The leadership never managed to set itself the 
goal of rising above its own society, carrying 
the masses with it, as other revolutionary 
leaderships managed elsewhere. 
The backwardness of the mountain Kurds, the leaders 
as well as the masses, prevented them from seizing 
the opportunities presented by 1918 and 1946. 
Unlike nationalists elsewhere: 
the fundamental values [of the elites] are those 
of yesteryear: tactical cunning instead of 
political analysis, clientist manoeuvrings 
instead of political mobilisation, and a few 
revolutionary slogans rather than real radical 
practice. 
The Chaliland approach, although written after an 
earlier conflict in northern Iraq, is applicable to 
the post-Gulf War situation in northern Iraq. 
This study does not address primarily the questions 
`why did the Kurds revolt? ' and `why did the revolt 
fail? '. The focus is, rather, on the diplomatic and 
military reaction of the international community to 
the events of March to July 1991 rather than the 
actions of the Kurds (and Iraqis) themselves in that 
period (or any other). It contributes to existing 
work which assesses the wider significance of these 
events. 
During and immediately after the Kurdish Crisis of 
1991 journalists and scholarly commentators arrived 
at a set of conclusions over the origins and 
significance of those events. There was a consensus 
over the status of the crisis. It was assessed as an 
upheaval which occurred as an immediate consequence 
of the coalition victory in the Gulf War and as a 
longer-term consequence of the continuing struggles 
for Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and Turkey. The 
intervention was assessed, more broadly, as a result 
of greater cooperation between the Western powers, 
the USSR and China in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
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The consensus might be summarised as follows: 
The Kurdish people have always desired national 
self-determination. In 1991 the revolt of the 
Iraqi Kurds occurred because they wanted to 
exploit the regime's defeat in war. It appeared 
to be an opportunity for them to break free. 
After the defeat of the revolt the Turks resisted 
the inflow of Kurdish refugees. They feared the 
inflow might undermine their efforts to control 
the Kurdish population in Turkey. The coalition 
states sent military forces into northern Iraq 
out of humanitarian concern for the plight of the 
Kurdish people. The Western European coalition 
members acted from the additional motive of 
showing that their own military efforts in the 
post Cold War world need not always be 
overshadowed by those of the US, as they had been 
in the Gulf War. Turkey cooperated with the 
coalition to ensure that the potential refugees 
would remain inside Iraq and did not have to 
enter their territory. The intervention does not 
amount to a legal precedent creating a `right of 
intervention'. The military operation was 
straightforward. The mission was accomplished and 
there was no serious risk of Iraqi resistance. 
This thesis will, broadly, confirm the accuracy of 
these first assessments. However, a closer 
examination of evidence available from wider sources 
and over a longer period now allows a deeper 
analysis and more considered judgements. 
Specifically this study addresses several opposing 
currents in international and regional politics: the 
tension between sovereignty and human rights, 
between the legality of imposed as well as 
consensual intervention into the internal affairs of 
states, between Western and Eastern influences in 
states like Turkey and between the rights of 
minorities vis-a-vis the states in which they live. 
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The Kurdish crisis of 1991 occurred in the period of 
post-Cold War transition. This period has not yet 
ended. A study such as this can only offer a 
preliminary analysis and some tentative conclusions 
to the questions raised. But a review, after seven 
years, is timely and necessary. This crisis provided 
a threshold for the international community: a 
possibly decisive shift in opinion that may lead the 
UN and its member states towards an acceptance of 
humanitarian intervention as a `permanent exception' 
to the well-established rule of non-intervention in 
the `domestic jurisdiction' of states. 
Whatever the longer-term assessment it is clear that 
the success of the intervention in northern Iraq 
contributed to a real, if short-lived, period of 
international confidences' in a more orderly post- 
Cold War scene. One influential commentator has 
since called the mood of those days a `springtime 
for Interventionism'. 15 Another has referred to those 
days as an `Age of Innocencej16 and a third `the 
period of euphoria'. 17 A fourth, famously, even 
proclaimed `the end of History. ' 18 Yet another has 
described the mood of the `new interventionists' as 
`crusading liberal internationalism'. 19 This optimism 
14 Sir David Hannay, UK Permanent Representative at the UN 1990-95, describes the post Cold War 
UN as empowered by the drawing of 'three poisonous thorns' in the years 1989-92. These thorns were: 
the ending of the Cold War itself, the collapse of the apartheid regime in South Africa and the 
establishment of a Middle East peace process. The events liberated the international community from 
the most divisive quarrels of the years since 1945. Lecture at Chatham House, London, 21 November 
1995. 
15 James F Hoge, 'Editor's Note' Foreign Affairs Vol 73, No 6 November-December 1994. 
16 Thomas G Weiss 'Military-Civil Humanitarianism - The 'Age of Innocence' is Over' International 
Peacekeeping Vol 2 Summer 1995, pp 157-74. 
17 David Malone, former Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada at the UN. has described the 
period from the end of the Gulf War to the death of the 18 US Rangers in Somalia (October 1993) as 
the'period of euphoria' of UN peacekeeping. 
'The post-Desert Storm period of euphoria crashed to an end in 1993 when the deaths of 18 Marine 
Rangers in Mogadishu undermined the willingness of the US to risk military casualties in the service 
of the UN. ' 
'Security Council Decision-Making and the Future of UN Peacekeeping' The Oxford International Review 
Spring 1996 p 23. 
is Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992). 
19 Stephen John Steadman 'The New Interventionists' Foreign Affairs 72: 1. Steadman argues that the 
'new interventionist' mood of 1990-2 reflected the reuniting of two stands of American liberalism, until 
recently split by the Cold War. The 'containment' liberals saw the end of the Cold War as a triumph of 
preparedness and confrontation with the USSR. The 'Wilsonian' liberals saw the end of the Cold War as 
a triumph for human rights and an opportunity to strengthen international organisations. Steadman 
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infected international diplomacy: the July 1991 
meeting of the G7 issued a communique which did not 
only endorse the on-going humanitarian intervention in 
northern Iraq but suggested that a new norm for 
international conduct had come into force. The next 
year, following the unprecedented `heads of 
government' session of the Security Council in January 
1992 (and Boutros Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Peace20) 
many felt confident that the international community 
was, for the first time, ready to deal with all manner 
of threats to international peace and security. 
The few months following the intervention in northern 
Iraq proved to be the high water mark of confidence; 
shortly afterwards the failures of interventions in 
Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia led to the adoption of a 
more hesitant, modest and limited agenda for future 
action. The publication of a Supplement to Agenda for 
Peace21 (1995) reflected this decline in confidence. 
The disillusionment also inspired a flood of academic 
and journalistic speculation on the prospect of the 
spread of inter- and intra-state conflict . 
22 
THE MAIN LINES OF ARGUMENT 
This study confirms many elements of the consensus 
view: 
1. The revolt in northern Iraq took place because the 
mainly-Kurdish population saw the Gulf War armistice 
as an opportunity to liberate their territory from the 
regime's control. US propaganda directed at the Iraqi 
population gave encouragement to the revolt. 23 Turkey 
at first prevented the inflow of would-be refugees 
from northern Iraq because the authorities feared that 
the mainly-Kurdish migrants would 
makes a persuasive argument that US policy in the Middle East 1990-2 was founded on the support of these 
groups. 
20 Boutros Boutros-Ghali Agenda for Peace UN Publications, New York 1992. 
21 Boutros Boutros-Ghali Supplement to Agenda for Peace UN Publications, 1995. 
22 Robert Harvey The Return of the Strong: The Drift to Global Disorder (London: Macmillan, 1995). 
23 Freedman and Boren p 48. But note that President Bush (and other spokesmen) consistently denied that'guilt' 
was a factor. News Conference 16 March, Despatch Vol 2 No 14, USIA 18 April 1991. 
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increase unrest in its own Kurdish population and 
perhaps assist the PKK terrorist campaign. Later, as a 
result of international opinion, the migrants were 
allowed to take shelter in mountain areas astride the 
border. 
2. The coalition states acted partly out of 
humanitarian concern for the mainly-Kurdish victims of 
the Iraqi repression. The US at first resisted calls 
for intervention due to concern over accusations of 
`incomplete victory in the Gulf War' and fears of 
`quagmire' and `fragmentation'. Later it bowed to 
public opinion and led the intervention. The European 
coalition states were also motivated in part by a 
sense of outrage over Iraqi repression. But they were 
also willing to intervene to show that they could take 
an initiative without depending on a lead from the US. 
3. Turkey cooperated with the coalition to ensure 
that the victims of repression would receive aid in 
Iraq, not in Turkey. Government policy was also 
influenced by a desire to cooperate with the US and 
western European states to establish itself as a 
regional partner for those states in the longer term. 
4. The coalition forces' operation emphasised the 
importance of human rights in international politics 
but does not amount to a legal precedent for future 
acts of intervention. 
5. The outcome of the Kurdish crisis was a `pragmatic 
solution' rather than a `turning point'. It did, 
nevertheless, show an appreciable development of 
international opinion towards an acceptance of `human 
rights' as a second pillar of international law, 
alongside the traditional concept of `sovereignty'. 
6. The Kurdish crisis (and the international reaction 
to it) did not substantially develop International Law 
- creating a `right of intervention'. But it did 
advance the idea that the 
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international community is capable, under certain 
circumstances, of recognising systematic abuse of 
human rights (and for the first time in Security 
Council resolutions, of political rights), as a 
potential (if not actual) threat to international 
peace and security. 688 did, nonetheless, specify 
only very limited action to be taken under its 
authority. 
The study's conclusions refine and develop the 
consensus view, as follows: 
1. The revolt in northern Iraq was a spontaneous, 
unplanned event not the act of a long-standing and 
broad-based `nationalist movement' bent on securing 
independence from Iraq. Nor was it a conscious 
attempt to `liberate' other parts of Iraq. 
2. Turkey's decision-making during the Kurdish 
crisis was dominated by domestic political and 
economic upheaval. The struggle between the factions 
within the ruling party was at its height. 
Accusations of `unconstitutional' actions by the 
president added to the sense of crisis. Lack of 
consensus (and hurried decision-making) in the 
Turkish political elite led to sudden shifts in 
policy. The Kurdish crisis occurred just at a time 
when Turkey's internal and foreign policy was in 
disarray. On the one hand Turkey wanted to cooperate 
with the UN and the Western states. But Turkey also 
wanted to assert its independence against perceived 
attempts at manipulation by the US and the UK. Above 
all, the issue of Kurdish rights - central to the 
international crisis - touched the most sensitive 
area of Turkish politics. These contrary motives 
resulted in a dichotomy in Turkey's conduct: 
cooperative action at presidential level and 
suspicious, obstructive attitudes at lower levels. 
3. The coalition states' stated reason for action 
was humanitarian concern. But in several coalition 
states this public feeling only determined the 
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outcome after ministers' strategic reservations had been 
overcome. 
4. Earlier authors were correct in attributing the US 
Administration's initial refusal to intervene to a concern that 
another intervention in Iraq would diminish the Gulf War 
`victory', draw the US into a `quagmire' or fragment Iraq, to the 
detriment of regional security. They were correct to attribute 
the decision to commit ground forces to humanitarian concern for 
the victims of repression and to give some weight to a sense of 
responsibility for inciting the revolt. But the Administration 
may have had another reason: the fear that another intervention 
onto the territory of an Arab state - and on behalf of the 
unpopular Kurds - would offend potential supporters of US policy 
(including the emerging Middle East peace initiative) in the 
region. (Similar concerns had determined US policy towards the 
Iraqi Kurds 1973-6. ) It is not possible, at this stage, to make a 
considered assessment of the relative weight of these various 
factors in the US decision-making process. 
5. Whereas the coalition conducted a forcible intervention 
operation, claiming that its actions were `consistent with 
688', the UN Secretariat sought the consent of Iraq for its 
activities in that country. This difference in approach 
exemplifies the uncertainty over the legality and practicality of 
humanitarian intervention, even after the adoption of an 
apparently supportive Security Council Resolution. 
6. The Kurdish crisis (and the international reaction to it) 
did not significantly develop International Law creating a 
`right of intervention'. Nevertheless the literal and absolute 
interpretation of state sovereignty is giving way to a more 
`elastic' definition. The actions of the Security Council and the 
coalition states, taken together, may have created a political, 
if not a legal, precedent for future acts of intervention. 24 
7. PROVIDE COMFORT showed how a multi-national `coalition of 
the willing' could successfully carry 
24 Seep 34. 
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out a humanitarian intervention operation. The 
mission was accomplished, however, in the face of 
significant operational risks at the tactical level. 
These operational difficulties were minimised by 
consistent political direction, effective command 
through a `lead-nation', intense logistical effort 
and a shared operational doctrine. 
8. It may be that the real lesson to be drawn from 
the success of the operation was not the `safe 
havens' formula for interventions but the high level 
of commitment by leading states and the unusual 
(perhaps unique) circumstances. Without the 
commitment of the leading states, directly linked to 
the pursuit of their own interests, this success is 
unlikely to be repeated. 
Further conclusions are: 
1. The coalition states intervened because their 
governments and their publics wanted to relieve the 
suffering reported by the media. They had important 
secondary incentives, however. The West European 
states wanted to assert themselves after they had 
played a supporting role in the Gulf War. The US at 
first resisted calls for intervention: it wanted to 
preserve the political opportunities, in foreign and 
domestic policy, created by its leading part in the 
victory in that war. Later it bowed to the pressure 
of its own public opinion. 
2. International law is still founded on the 
concept of sovereignty. The international community 
is only prepared to tolerate (forcible) intervention 
in `exceptional circumstances', a proviso which may 
be further widened in subsequent crises. The 
intervention into northern Iraq will stand as a 
political, if not a legal, precedent for future 
interventions to protect minorities suffering mass 
abuse of human rights in intra-state conflict. 
Turkey's reaction was dominated not just by its fear 
for the implications for its own PKK terrorist 
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campaign but also because of a wider political crisis 
engulfing the president and the ruling party. 
3. The analysis suggests that intervention is more 
likely to be successful when the political direction 
is consistent, command is professional and the mission 
is limited. It may become a tool of crisis management 
in cases where leading states approve this response 
and when it is endorsed (explicitly or tacitly) by the 
Security Council. For some time afterwards PROVIDE 
COMFORT's achievement of its limited mission suggested 
that `the creation of safe havens by external military 
forces' might be a formula which could be followed in 
subsequent crises. Despite this optimism PROVIDE 
COMFORT did not prove to be a workable model in the 
crises which followed. 
LITERATURE REVIEW & SOURCES 
PRIMARY SOURCES 
In this study I have used documents and official 
statements issued by the UN and the governments of 
states which participated in the military operation. 
The resolutions and published records of the Security 
Council (and supporting correspondence) provide the 
essential core of the primary sources. 
I have also studied parliamentary records and reports 
to parliaments even though they produced little new 
information. During the military operation I was 
present at planning meetings, received briefings and 
participated in decision-making. I was able to discuss 
these events with senior diplomats and military 
officers. In consideration of security regulations - 
and the wishes of most of these officials to speak on 
a non-attribution basis -I have not quoted these 
sources directly. I have used 
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the information provided to check facts and test 
judgements derived from open sources. During the 
military operation itself I also interviewed other 
military commanders, Turkish officials, Iraqi Arabs 
(military and civilian), Kurdish refugees and aid 
workers. 
I have made use of all these sources in my analysis 
of the military operation. As a former senior staff 
officer (Chief of Operations, HQ PROVIDE COMFORT and 
later, as British contingent commander) in-theatre I 
am able to make these observations in more detail 
and with more authority than the authors of existing 
published accounts of these events. The most 
important areas analysed include: 
" the operational policy of commanders and staff 
assigned to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT 
" the operational tasking of forces assigned to 
PROVIDE COMFORT 
" the conduct of the operation, including the 
planning preceding each operational phase (as well 
as exit coordination) 
" the work of the MCC (Military Coordination Centre) 
" the force balance and force-mix of the coalition 
forces 
" command and control 
" potential and use of air power. 
These sources of information allowed me to confirm 
or correct statements made by others and to develop 
a new military analysis. 
SECONDARY SOURCES 
The thesis draws on several distinct bodies of work: 
the literature of the Kurds, Arabs and Turks and 
their common history; the literature of the 
political-military and legal aspects of 
intervention; the literature of sovereignty, 
nationalism and human rights; as well as existing 
accounts of (and commentaries on) the Kurdish crisis 
and the intervention operation. 
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The literature on the national and ethnic identity 
of the Kurds is dominated by the early work of 
Gerard Chaliland23 and the recent work of Philip 
Kreyenbroek. 24 The latter's assessment of the ethnic, 
religious and linguistic character of the Kurdish 
people informs the analysis of the Kurdish crisis. 
Michael Gunter's standard texts provided background 
25 into the history of the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq. 
Entessar's valuable contribution-6 is the concept of 
`ethno-nationalism' as applied to the Kurds. His 
assessment of the status of Kurdish `nationalism' 
bridges the conceptual gap between `ethnic' and 
`political' consciousness. 
Several authors have addressed the problem of 
intervention into intra-state conflict as a key area 
of international politics in the post Cold War era. 
Henry Kissinger", Stanley Hoffmann28 and John 
Ruggie's work29 (as well as those other authors) 
identify the opportunities and the obstacles to the 
establishment of intervention as a means of conflict 
resolution in the future. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 
present a reconceptualisation of `humanitarian 
intervention' which develops inter alia questions on 
the legal and practical consequences of the 
intervention into Iraq. Despite several serious 
errors of fact in their brief account of events the 
breakdown of `humanitarianism' into action, cause, 
end, approach, means and outcome allows a deeper 
analysis than is achieved by most commentators. 
23 Gerard Chaliland (ed) People without a Country: the Kurds and Kurdistan (London: Zed Press, 
1980). 
24 Philip Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl (eds. ) The Kurds A Contemporary Overview (New York: 
Routledge, 1992) and Philip Kreyenbroek and Christine Allison (eds. ) Kurdish Culture and Identity 
(London: Zed Books, 1996). 
25 Michael M Gunter The Kurds of Turkey: A Political Dilemma (Boulder, Colorado, Westview 1990) 
and The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hogg (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992). 
26 Nadar Entessar Kurdish Ethno-nationalism (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner, 1992). 
`7 Henry Kissinger 'Diplomacy. 
28 Stanley Hoffmann 'The Politics of Military Intervention'. 
`9 John Gerard Ruggie Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the new Era (New York: 
Colombia University Press, 1996). 
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Their analysis of the `precedent' question is also a 
useful contribution to the literature. 30 
Several academic journal articles have, accordingly, 
examined the legal issues involved in the 
intervention in the Kurdish crisis. Christopher 
Greenwood's early work (1992) established the 
consensus view that the crisis did not provide any 
new `right of intervention'. 31 Howard Adelman32 
contributed a useful, if brief, analysis of the 
debate on 688. Richard Lillich33 and also Sydney 
Bailey34 have offered useful assessments on the 
prospects for the future development of 
`humanitarian intervention'. Rosalyn Higgins and 
Alan Buchanan have also recently published 
significant work on the international law of 
35 `succession' of minorities. 
UN documents relating to the Kurdish Crisis36 are 
another source of information. These include the 
Secretary-General's statement of intent, Agenda for 
Peace, published in June 1992, and records of 
meetings and correspondence. Several recent books 
have assessed the state of the UN at its 50th year 
(1995), including the prospects for the enhancement 
of the organisation's powers of crisis management. " 
'° Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict; A 
Reconceptualisation (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996). 
31 Christopher Greenwood 'New World Order or Old; The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law' 
Modern Law Review March 1992 and 'Is there a Right of Humanitarian Intervention' The World Today 
February 1993. 
32 Howard Adelman 'Humanitarian Intervention; the Case of the Kurds' International Journal of 
Refugee Law Vol 4 No 1 January 1992. 
33 Richard Lillich Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Charlottesville: University Press 
of Virginia, 1973). 
34 Sydney D Bailey The UN Security Council and Human i hts (New York: St Martin's Press, 1994). 
35 Allen Buchanan Secession: the Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and 
Quebec (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1991). 
36 The text of R 688 itself (see Chapter 7, below) and the record of the debate at the time 688 was 
adopted. Also the MOU signed by Sadruddin Agha Khan and the Iraqi government on 18 April (amended 
25 May). 
37 Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury United Nations: Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon 
Paperbacks, 1993). 
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In addition to statements made during the Security 
Council debate on 5 April, the participating states 
and other interested states made additional 
statements during the crisis. 38 Keohane, Nye and 
Hoffmann39 provided additional material on the 
preoccupations of the US Administration after the 
Gulf War. Other sources gave insights into US", 
French41, Soviet, Chinese42 and Israeli°3 policy at the 
time of the Kurdish crisis. The US material presents 
interesting connections between US policy towards 
the Kurdish crisis and broader US foreign policy 
objectives in the region. 
Additional source material came from accounts of the 
crisis published soon after the events. The most 
reliable account published to date has been by 
Freedman and Boren. 44 This is a short work, however, 
and one which does not analyse the various actors' 
motives in any depth. It provides some military 
details but does not attempt a military analysis. 
Its authors were understandably unaware of a number 
of significant facts which have come to light 
recently. They do, however, present a concise, 
accurate account of the events of the crisis and the 
intervention, as well as a list of sources for 
further study. The next most authoritative account 
is found in a chapter in Nicole and Hugh Pope's 
,9E. g. the news conferences given by the US president and the British prime minister in April. 
3.9 The end of Cold War was marked by the collapse of communist regimes in the USSR and In eastern 
Europe. It was also marked by the reunification of Germany, realised on 3 Oct 1990. 'Introduction: The End of 
the Cold War In Europe' by Robert O Keohane and Joseph S Nye in Robert O Keohane, Joseph S Nye and 
Stanley Hoffmann (eds. ) After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe 11989- 
1991, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993) p 2. 
40 John King Handshake in Washington: the Beginning of the Middle East Peace Process ? (Reading: 
Garnet, 1994). 
41 M Bettat! 'Le Droit d'ingarence; sons of poitee' Le Debat 1991. 
42 'Beijing Review'. Also Thomas J Christensen, 'Chinese Realpolitik' Foreign Affairs 
September/October 1966 and Samuel Kim (ed) China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the 
Post Cold War World 3r° Edition, (Boulder, Co: Westview, 1994). 
V Joseph Alpher War in the Gulf: implications for Israel (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1992). 
44 Lawrence Freedman and David Boren 'Safe Havens' for the Kurds in post war Iraq' in Nigel Rodley 
(ed) To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights 
(London: Brassey's, 1992). Other chapters in this book provide additional information and assessments 
of the Kurdish Crisis. 
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recent history of Turkey in the 20th century. 45 This 
account does contain, however, a number of 
controversial assessments which are not well 
supported by evidence. 
One of the longer accounts of the crisis is Bulloch 
and Morris' `No Friends but the Mountains' . 
46 Theirs 
is a journalistic and somewhat emotive account of 
events. There is no military analysis nor are there 
any notes for reference. A similar approach is taken 
by Jonathan Randal whose recently-published study 
usefully pursues the questions of motivation in 
governmental decision-making in the intervening 
states. " Several military specialists48 have written 
about the crisis, notably Bolger49, Bellamy50, Brown 
and Shukman, and Connaughton. 51 Bolger's account 
gives a good overview of the operation but contains 
many errors of fact and debatable assertions 
presented as conclusions. Bellamy writes from the 
perspective of a war correspondent and focuses on 
his own first-hand experiences. He develops the 
perspective of the Kurdish crisis as a consequence 
of the wider Gulf conflict. His contribution is 
therefore mainly in placing events in their wider 
context. Bolger and Bellamy's accounts contain 
significant errors of detail, however, and their 
descriptions of events are in any case quite brief. 
Connaughton produces a valuable analysis of military 
doctrine associated with `intervention' operations 
and some thoughts on the doctrinal questions 
45 Nicole and Hugh Pope Turkey Unveiled: Ataturk and After (London: John Murray, 1997). 
46 Bulloch and Morris 'No Friends'. 
47 Jonathan C. Randal After Such Knowledge what Forgiveness ? My Encounters with Kurdistan (New York: 
Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1997). 
QE Ben Brown and David Shukman All Necessary Means: Inside the Gulf War (London: BBC Books, 
1991). 
49 Daniel P Bolger Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s (Novato, Ca: Presidio Press, 1995). 
50 Christopher Bellamy has written two accounts: Expert Witness: A Defence Correspondent's Gulf 
War 1990-1 Brassey's 1993 and Knights in White Armour (London: Hutchinson, 1996). The second 
deals with the Kurdish crisis in 3 pages, concentrating on narrative rather than analysis. 
51 Richard Connaughton 'The Principles of Humanitarian Intervention' British Army Review 97 
Summer 1987 and 'The Principles of Multinational Intervention in the Gulf Crisis' British Army Review 
102 Autumn 1993. 
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associated with `humanitarian intervention' 
specifically. 
Press reports of speeches of political leaders, 
especially in the US and the UK, formed the basis 
for commentators' first attempts to understand the 
actions taken by - and the underlying motives of - 
the governments of the coalition states. These 
reports have since been supplemented by 
retrospective press interviews and biographical 
publications. According to these accounts the 
governments' motives were largely, if not purely, 
humanitarian. National (not to mention party- 
political) interests are played down. These press 
and biographical publications form the main body of 
evidence on which the `consensus' view is based. 
Freedman and Boren cover this evidence well. 
Few of the key decision-makers in the crisis have 
published memoirs to date. James Baker's account of 
his years as Secretary of State contains a brief but 
revealing account of the Kurdish crisis. It adds 
little to the consensus other than the claim that it 
was he who persuaded the president and colleagues in 
Washington to reverse the original (non- 
intervention) policy. " General Powell's 
autobiography also provided insights into US 
decision-making over the intervention and the timing 
of the withdrawal of forces. " 
I have also drawn on recently-published work on 
Turkish foreign policy. The first available sources 
on Turkish reactions to the crisis are the speeches, 
statements and interviews published in the press. 
Most of the literature takes no account of the 
political crisis taking place in Turkey at the time 
the Kurdish crisis took place. These political 
upheavals were of course reported. But they were not 
related to the government's - or more accurately, 
the president's - decision-making over the Kurdish 
52 See p 216, below. 
53 Colin Powell with Joseph E Persico A Soldier's Way (New York: Random House, 1995). 
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crisis. The most important, comprehensive and recent 
publication on Turkish politics in the 20`h century 
is Zurcher' s. 54 Aybet55, Aykan56 and Ayata57 have 
recently also produced important publications on 
Turkish foreign policy. 
Whereas the political turmoil inside Turkey - and in 
particular inside the governing party, ANAP - have 
been covered in detail by the Turkish press, no 
published work has added this information to the 
analysis of Turkish decision-making over the Kurdish 
crisis. The impact of the domestic political crisis 
inside Turkey is clearly relevant to the outcomes of 
that decision-making process. The main source has 
been Turkey Briefing. 
Additional study of the published and unpublished 
memoirs of military participants of the operation 
has further developed my understanding of details of 
the operation. 
INTERVIEWS 
I have drawn on many conversations I had with 
Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili, the commander 
of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, and other senior 
commanders and staff in Turkey and Iraq throughout 
the operation. I also had access to many other 
officers and officials who took part in PROVIDE 
COMFORT, and others whose assignments were in 
ministries or headquarters outside the operational 
area. 
The interview with the former senior official at the 
UK Mission to the UN brought new insights into the 
54 Erik J Zurcher Turkey A Modern History (London: IB Tauris, 1993). 
55 Gulnur Aybet Turkey's Foreign Policy and its Implications for the West: A Turkish Perspective RUSE 
Whitehall Paper 1994. 
56 Sencer Aykan 'Patronage, Party and the State; The Politicisation of Islam in Turkey' Middle East 
Journal Vol 50 No 1 Winter 1996. 
57 Mehmet Ali Aykan'Turkey's Policy in Northern Iraq 1990-91' Middle East Studies No 4 October 
1996. 
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conduct of the debate inside the security Council at 
the time of 688's adoption. 
The Packer interview gave insights into the legal 
basis for the Sadruddin and Suy missions and also 
the coordination of military and NGO relief efforts 
as seen from Geneva. The Ahtissari interview 
explained the background to the UN fact-finding 
mission sent to Iraq (and elsewhere in the region) 
immediately after the Gulf War. 
Judge Richard Goldstone contributed interesting 
reflections on the significance of intervention for 
the preservation of human rights and the enforcement 
of International Humanitarian Law. 
HE Martti Ahrtissari, (now the President of Finland) 
contributed useful information on the origins and 
conduct of his UN fact-finding mission to Iraq 
immediately after the end of the Gulf War. 
On the work of the humanitarian agencies the 
interview with Martin Griffiths (at that time a 
senior representative of the Save the Children) adds 
to the existing picture of NGO activities during 
(and attitudes towards) the humanitarian operation. " 
I have been able to develop and confirm my 
understanding of Kurdish nationalism and ethnicity 
by attendance at the SOAS seminars covering this 
subject in 1993 and 1994. I have also consulted Dr 
William Hale of SOAS, an international authority on 
Turkey and Turkish politics. 
I also consulted Professor Michael Yahuda of the 
LSE, an authority on China and its politics in the 
20th century. 
ORGANISATION OF THE MATERIAL PRESENTED 
The material is presented in order to develop two 
lines-of-enquiry: the origins and events of the 
58 Martin Griffiths is now a regional director of Action Aid. 
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crisis, on the one hand, and the political-legal 
significance of the crisis for the questions of 
sovereignty and intervention, on the other. The 
thesis is organised as follows: 
Introduction 
The Introduction presents the objectives, scope, 
themes and conclusions of the study followed by a 
review of existing literature. It contains a summary 
of sources and a statement on methodology. 
Part 1- The Issues 
Sovereignty and human rights: the legal and 
political debate 
This section examines the development of concepts of 
sovereignty and their relationship with the concepts 
of human rights. It also considers the legal and 
political basis for the `precedents' on intervention 
which existed at the time of the Kurdish crisis. 
The Kurds 
The geographical spread of the Kurdish peoples has 
led to a rich and diverse political history. This 
section examines the politics and culture of these 
people and their experiences up to 1976. 
Part 2 The Case Study 
Turkey and the Kurds 
Inside Turkey, the responses of the Turkish Kurds 
and the Turks to the crisis facing the Kurds of Iraq 
was conditioned by the history of conflict between 
the majority and minority populations. Specifically, 
attitudes were influenced by the on-going struggle 
between the Turkish Kurds' demand for cultural 
identity and the Turks' desire to build a unified 
state. Turkey's policy in 1991 was also influenced 
by the experience of providing a refuge for several 
hundred thousand Iraqi Kurds in the recent past. 
Iraq, Iran and Syria and the Kurds 
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This section traces the roots of the conflict 
between Kurds and their host states. The actions of 
the Iraqi and Iranian Kurds during and after the 
Iran-Iraq War influenced events in northern Iraq in 
early 1991. This section also gives a brief account 
of the uprising in March. 
The US, the USSR and the Iraqi Kurds 1988-91 
The study then considers the objectives and 
constraints felt by the US and Soviet governments in 
their approaches to the 1991 crisis up to 5 April. 
SCR 688 
This section analyses the resolution text and the 
Security Council debate at the time of its adoption. 
It measures international opinion on the 
sovereignty-human rights debate and questions of a 
`right of intervention'. 
The decision to impose the havens 
Between the adoption of R 688 and the arrival of the 
multinational force in northern Iraq there was 
intense diplomacy at UN HQ in New York and 
elsewhere. This chapter charts the decision-making 
process, at the UN and in the capitals of the 
coalition states, as well as the public reaction of 
the Iraqis to 688 and the intervention. 
The Intervention Operation 
There follows an account and an analysis of the 
humanitarian operation. The final chapter includes 
coverage of the coalition forces' and the aid 
agencies' responses to the crisis. 
Part 3 Analysis 
Assessments 
This chapter contains analysis and assessment of the 
significance of the intervention operation as a 
legal or political precedent for subsequent 
operations. It also contains a military analysis of 
the operation. 
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OUTLINE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
5 March First reports of fighting between 
dissident Iraqis (Kurds, Shia and 
others)and the Iraqi army in the 
north and south east 
21 Mar High point of revolt in the north 
25 Mar Iraqi army counter-attack in the north 
begins 
28 Mar Iraqi army regains control of main towns 
in the north. 
Flight of Displaced Persons (DPs) north 
and east begins 
5 Apr UN Security Council adopts R 688 
8 Apr EC summit in Luxembourg; John Major 
proposes `safe havens' 
First international military relief air- 
drops to DPs in mountains 
19 Apr US Marines arrive on Turkish border 
Coalition forces arrive in mountains and 
begin supervising distribution of relief 
to DPs 
2-8 May Coalition forces extend security zone 
eastwards 
19 May First deployment of UN Guards to Iraq 
21 May Coalition forces extend security zone 
southwards, 
include the (demilitarised) town of Dohuk 
15 Jul Coalition forces withdraw from northern 
Iraq 
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Part 1- The Issues 
CHAPTER 2 
THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONSENSUS ON HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION AT THE TIME OF THE KURDISH CRISIS 
The principal `material sources' of modern international law are 
`treaty' and `custom'. Other sources are to be found in `general 
principles of law of civilised nations', judicial decisions and 
writings by legal experts and the declarations of international 
organisations. Treaty provisions are the bi-lateral and multi- 
lateral commitments accepted by states in formal agreements. 
Custom is the `practice of states' developed, from historic 
`customary rules', where patterns of accepted `usage' by states 
develops into `custom', in Brownlie's definition `practice 
accepted as law' .1 As the same authority has also noted custom 
depends on the repeated, consistent and uniform practice of 
states, accepted as law. Customary law, once established, is 
_binding 
on all states, irrespective of their consent, and stands 
above their bi-lateral agreements. A point of law is not, 
therefore, recognised as a matter of `custom' until a succession 
of precedents indicates an international consensus. Political 
precedents flow from the actions of states, the statements of 
government representatives and the declarations of international 
bodies. Legal precedents are found in the decisions of 
international courts or tribunals as well as the commentaries of 
legal experts. It follows that the `legal' and the `political' 
precedents come together to form customary law: they represent 
two complimentary sources, not conflicting elements. Where the 
legal and political precedents indicate a wide and strong 
consensus the action might quickly be recognised as `custom'. 
Where the legal and political precedents are mixed and the 
consensus is limited the action may not be fully recognised as 
`custom' but only as an `emerging' principle, or something less 
than that. This chapter considers the legal and political issues 
surrounding the subject of `intervention' in intra-state conflict 
at the time of the Kurdish crisis. 
There is, nonetheless, evidence of a gradual shift in the 
international consensus towards a greater tolerance of 
intervention, in `exceptional cases', over the years since the 
first days of the UN in 1945. But states consistently affirmed 
their sovereignty and independence. Questions based on the 
tension between sovereignty and human rights were raised - and 
were regularly re-considered - in the years before 1991. Did the 
international community have the right to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of a state to end mass suffering or the abuse of 
1 ICJ Statute A 38. Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 41' Ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) p 5. The ICJ has frequently 
refined its definition of 'custom' eg in the Rights of Passage Case (Portugal v India 1960) to identify special regional applications of 
custom'. States and authorities often disagree over the emergence and application of 'custom' in particular cases. 
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human rights? Should the protection of human rights seek a 
`universal' standard or should regional variations be allowed? 
Should that protection apply just to individual human rights, or 
should there be some guarantees for collective human rights as 
well? 2 Could the international community use force to impose its 
standards on states which failed to honour these norms ? 
Having exposed the main strands of these debates the chapter 
concludes that, by April 1991, international opinion was already 
becoming more receptive to intervention, in exceptional 
circumstances. By the end of the PROVIDE COMFORT intervention 
there was, arguably, a greater confidence in intervention as one 
of several forms of international action which could resolve 
crises of this kind. These conclusions come from an assessment 
that previous, limited, examples of intervention to deal with 
transborder threats to security could become precedents 
justifying intervention to end mass suffering (and to protect 
human rights). 
The themes discussed in the chapter will be as follows: 
" The development of the concept of state sovereignty in Europe 
since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and, since the 19th century, 
the global community of states' successive agreements to limit 
the use of force in international disputes. 
" Intervention in the years 1945-89 and since 1989; the 
significance of UN mandates against apartheid regimes and the 
international community's tacit approval of the ECOMOG 
intervention in Liberia. 
" Order versus Justice, individual and collective human rights 
and the place of Intervention in modern International Law. 
" The Political Context of these developments in the conduct of 
states and the legal consensus on intervention on the eve of the 
Kurdish crisis. 
THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN RESPECT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY, ORDER, JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
THE ORIGINS OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A CONTRIBUTOR TO 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE 
State sovereignty is a fundamental concept and one which 
underpins the international system. In medieval times European 
states recognised the supra-national authority of the Pope. 3 In 
addition the states of Germany accorded some authority to the 
2 The human rights of groups of people, defined by ethnicity, race, language or religion, within states is an even more sensitive 
subject than individual human rights. If groups have rights those rights can be violated. If so there would be a case for external 
intervention to restore those rights, against the spirit of 'domestic jurisdiction'. See Page 41, below. 
3 The term 'Christendom' described a European order based on a Christian value-system which underpinned the authority of 
medieval monarchs. 
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Holy Roman Emperor. The Thirty Years War (1619-1648) removed the 
remnant of this supra-national system. The modern concept of 
state sovereignty can be said to have developed by 1648, the date 
of the Peace of Westphalia. ' Thereafter European states - and in 
due course states in all parts of the world - claimed complete 
sovereignty. 
In the 350 years since Westphalia states have agreed to give up 
some of their absolute freedoms, first to make warfare more 
humane5 and later in order to secure a more peaceful world. 6 
Finally, in the UN Charter, the member-states renounced the right 
to use force in all circumstances, save that of self defence 
against an armed attack on their territorial integrity or 
political independence. 
In the 19th century the Great Powers developed the `concert 
system' to promote the `tranquillity of Europe': the first 
objective of the earlier interventions was to defeat 
`revolution'. Later, leading states took action to defend 
threatened minorities, typically in the Ottoman territories . 
78 As 
the international community grew with the establishment of new 
states in the mid-20th century it began to develop legal norms 
concerning `humanitarian intervention': the despatch of forces 
onto the land, air space and territorial waters of another state, 
without the consent of that state, for an altruistic purpose. 
During the first half of the 20th century wars, invasions and 
genocide redrew the political map of continents, destroying great 
' Paul Schroeder 'Historical Reality vs Neo-Realist Theory International Security Vol 19 (Summer 1994) pp 110. Stanley 
Hoffmann 'The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention' Survival Vol 37 No 4 Winter 1995-6 p 35. Charles Tilly 'Reflections on 
the History of European state-making' in Charles Tilly (ed) The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), Introduction. Also, Gene M Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds. ) Beyond Westphalia: 
National Sovereignty and Intervention (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press) 1995. Jarat Chopra and Thomas G Weiss 
'Sovereignty is no Longer Sacrosanct; Codifying Humanitarian Intervention' Ethics and International Affairs Vol 6 1992 p 103. 
5 The Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907, followed by the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In 
these treaties the contracting parties accepted the need to reduce 'unnecessary suffering' and to protect the rights of non- 
combatants. Although these ideas had emerged in Europe in the 17`h century (above all in the writings of Hugo Grotius on jus in 
bello) this was the first time that states had agreed to be bound by principles these principles. These treaties resulted in the 
foundation of the International Red Cross and modern 'international humanitarian law' (IHL). 
6 The first of these was The Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), also known as 'The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War'. The 
sixty-three states which were party to the treaty abjured the use of force in settlement of disputes, irrespective of the justice of 
their own claims. 'The contracting parties resolved that, no matter what the nature or origin of a dispute, they would resolve it by 
peaceful means' Rosalyn Higgins 'Grotius and the Development of International Law in the UN period' in Hedley Bull, Benedict 
Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (eds. ) Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) pp 269-270. 
In the 19th century however there remained significant exceptions to this principle. The first was the right of states to 
intervene to prevent the mistreatment of their nationals abroad. This was the justification for Britain's naval bombardment of 
Athens in the Don Pacifico affair (1850). It was also used to justify the protection of co-religionists, such as the 'right' of the 
Russian czar to intervene to protect Orthodox Christians under Ottoman rule from persecution. The second general exception was 
to permit an intervention 'where another state mistreated its citizens in a way so far falling below the general standards recognized 
by civilized peoples as to shock the conscience of mankind'. (Jean-Pierre Fonteyne 'Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect 
Human Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations' in R Lillich (ed) Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973) p 178. 
In these cases the 'offenders' were often the Ottoman Turks: interventions onto Ottoman territories took place in Greece 
(1827-30), Crete (1866) Bosnia and Bulgaria (1876). After the massacres of Christians in Syria in 1860 the Great Powers 
authorised France to intervene. 
8 Although the ideals of the Charter have not yet become established as the basis of a new political order they have become the 
basis of an emerging legal order. Sally Morphet 'Resolutions and vetoes in the UN Security Council: their relevance and 
significance' Review of International Studies 16 (1990), p 341. 
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empires and creating many new states. In 1945 the drafters of the 
UN Charter re-designed the `collective security' model which had 
failed in the League of Nations. 9 Whereas the `United Nations 
system' is often described as `collective security' it has many 
additional features. Several layers can be defined. Far from 
relying entirely on the whole international community's 
commitment to guarantee international peace and security for 
every state the Charter emphasises a continuing right to self- 
defence (in the case of actual or threatened armed attack) and 
recognises the contribution of `regional arrangements'. 
Furthermore the Charter comes to terms with the special status of 
certain powerful states (the P5), recognising that collective 
security cannot easily be brought to bear against these states, 
even if they resort to forceful action. To that extent, 
therefore, the UN system is a modified version of `collective 
security'. In this second attempt at an international `collective 
security' regime the UN Security Council became responsible for 
maintaining international peace. The Charter armed the Council 
with non-forcible and forcible sanctions against those who would 
disturb international peace. The member-states thereby confirmed 
their belief in a collective approach to matters of peace and 
security. But they did not accept a collective approach to every 
other problem of inter-state competition'°nor did they accept a 
collective approach to the conduct of states' internal affairs. 
Addressing the individual states the Charter declared: 
All members shall refrain in their international relations 
from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations' (A 2(4)) 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right 
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. (A 51) 
Addressing the United Nations itself the Charter stated: 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression, and shall make 
9 In the 19th century however there remained significant exceptions to this principle. The first was the right of states to 
intervene to prevent the mistreatment of their nationals abroad. This was the justification for Britain's naval bombardment of 
Athens in the Don Pacifico affair (1850). It was also used to justify the protection of co-religionists, such as the 'right' of the 
Russian czar to intervene to protect Orthodox Christians under Ottoman rule from persecution. 
The second general exception was to permit an intervention 'where another state mistreated its citizens in a way so far failing 
below the general standards recognized by civilized peoples as to shock the conscience of mankind'. (Jean-Pierre Fonteyne 
'Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations' in R Lillich (ed) Humanitarian 
Intervention and the United Nations (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973) p 178. In these cases the 'offenders' were 
often the Ottoman Turks: interventions onto Ottoman territories took place in Greece (1827-30), Crete (1866) Bosnia and Bulgaria 
(1876). After the massacres of Christians in Syria In 1860 the Great Powers authorised France to Intervene. 
10 Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury write of a 'UN system' bringing together the bodies created by the Charter (the 
General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Trusteeship Council and 
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)), together with the 'principal organs' subsequently created by the General Assembly 
(such as UNICEF, UNHCR, UNDP) and the'specialised agencies' with their own memberships and constitutions. United Nations: 
Divided World (Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks, 1993) pp 4-8. 
These agencies strive to protect the rights of individuals and advance economic and social welfare. Nevertheless the UN's 
principal task is the preservation of international peace and security. 
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recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain 
international peace and security... (A 
39) 
Nothing contained in the Charter shall authorize the 
United Nations to intervene in matters which are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state 
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter but this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII. (A 2(7)) 
The language of the Charter, seen above, clearly states that 
the international community represented by the UN does not 
claim for itself a general right to intervene in a state's 
domestic affairs. On the contrary it asserts the principle of 
non-intervention. 10 
1945-89 saw two overarching developments in international 
politics: the Cold War and the achievement of independence by 
many `non-self-governing territories'. One consequence of Cold 
War rivalry between leading states was the deployment of their 
own (or surrogate) forces, onto the territory of a weak state. 
Lack of consensus in the UN Security Council prevented that 
body from taking action to prevent or reverse these acts of 
forcible intervention. Leading states developed `doctrines' to 
justify these actions to escape the provisions of A 2(7) of the 
Charter. As the first of the many former colonial territories 
gained independence they joined with other states - often under 
the aegis of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM)- to demand an end 
to colonial rule in the remaining colonies. They also developed 
`doctrine' to justify intervention by external powers to assist 
`wars of national liberation' against the colonialists. 11 
Whereas the NAM had first asserted the right of states to 
intervene, forcibly or by providing external support, to 
peoples struggling to throw off 
10 But some agencies of the UN, and commissions brought into existence by them, have no such 'domestic affairs' 
limitation on their activities. As the member-states established these organisations by a separate vote it can be argued that 
they are authorised by separate treaties. Thus the organisations can, in accordance with their mandate, act to protect human 
rights on the territory of the member-states, if necessary without the consent of the sovereign power. 
li The doctrine of 'self-determination' is discussed on pp 43-45, below. 
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`colonial' or `alien' rule it later emphasised non- 
intervention in the internal affairs of states, 
especially the newly-independent states. 12 
Despite the Cold War the Security Council was able to 
take some positive action in the field of international 
security. One promising development was the Security 
Council's approval of UN `peacekeeping' operations. 
These military activities were innovative: they were 
not foreseen at the UN's foundation. (The establishment 
of UNEF 1 in the Suez Canal zone in 1956 - the first 
`UN peacekeeping operation' - was the result of a 
proposal made by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold. ) 
Since the 1960s, however, `peacekeeping' operations 
have played an important part in the peaceful 
resolution of international disputes. The essential 
features, of `peacekeeping' are consent, impartiality 
and the use of force only in self defence. Activities 
of UN peacekeeping forces have included monitoring 
cease-fires, supervising elections and assisting 
international relief work. 13 'UN peacekeeping' amounts 
to a `non-judgmental' approach to conflict resolution. 
At the end of the Cold War in 1989 the Security Council 
was able to find a new consensus and appeared to be 
ready to taken on the role assigned to it in the 
Charter. 
12 An example of this principle of non-intervention concerns the sensitive point of state borders. The now- 
universal rule is uti possidetis, the concept that state borders should only be changed by agreement, not by 
force. 
13 It is important to recognise the limitations on the purview and powers of the Security Council. The Charter 
requires it to concern itself with threats to international peace and security. Even within that mandate it is not 
permitted to take any action which is inconsistent with 'the principles and purposes the United Nations' as 
defined in the Charter and (more generally) by the expressed wishes of the international community as found 
In the resolutions of the General Assembly. Nor is it empowered to extend its purview - to create a new 
Jurisdiction - beyond its duty to deal with threats to international peace, nor to impose itself upon states where 
an international threat does not exist. The Security Council is, therefore, a body authorised to preserve peace; 
it is not authorised to recreate the international system in accordance with any concept ofjustice. Hence the 
debate during consideration of draft R 688 over the jurisdiction of the Council to discuss and act upon events 
inside a state. 
Some UN activities, first seen in peacekeeping operations, have been the focus of a wider debate within 
the UN over the jurisdiction of the Security Council. Briefly the US and the UK have sought to widen the 
purview of the Council - and with it their privileged position as permanent members - from action arising directly from threats to international peace to general support for and a large group of non-permanent 
members have resisted these proposals. The Non Aligned states occasionally criticise the Security Council, 
and the permanent members in particular, for seeking to extend the definition of 'international peace and 
security' (and thereby the Council's area of exclusive action). These accusations oppose the claim that the 
Security Council has the right to consider wider threats to 'security' such as the narcotics trade. There was 
also opposition to the Council's past attempts to authorise election monitoring and scrutiny of the observance 
of human rights (where there is no UN peacekeeping mission). Opponents of the widening of the Council's 
purview went on to argue that it may only institute human rights monitoring when it has determined (under A 
39) that the situation is a threat to international peace. In other circumstances human rights activities are in 
the domain of the General Assembly. 
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ORDER AND JUSTICE 
The states' willingness to accept legal constraints on 
their right to use force in pursuit of their interests 
arose out of a desire for peace. But the signatories of 
the UN Charter consented to this restriction on the 
assurance that matters of `domestic jurisdiction' would 
not be subject to international purview. The residual 
rights of sovereignty - self defence and inviolable 
domestic jurisdiction - therefore became the bedrock of 
sovereignty. 
The international community, however, soon turned to 
consider the issues of `justice'. Before long the UN 
member-states came under pressure to modify the domaine 
reserve of `domestic jurisdiction' to allow 
intervention in pursuit of `self-determination'. 
For the first time since 1648 a new set of `universal' 
values - concerned with human rights - would challenge 
the supremacy of state sovereignty. The role of the 
United Nations in developing respect for human rights 
is at the centre of yet another debate, however. The 
Charter refers separately to the affirmation, the 
promotion, and the observance, of human rights. The 
Charter does not give a coherent guide to UN action in 
this field. It is vague about the way ahead: should the 
organisation actively enlarge and expand the code of 
human rights or should it merely defend a basic list of 
human rights ? In the Preamble the members `reaffirm 
faith in human rights'. In A 1(3) they are `promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and 
[developing a further concept] for fundamental freedoms 
for all'. The Charter presents, but does not define, a 
distinction between `rights' and `freedoms'. In A 
13(lb) the General Assembly has the duty of `assisting 
in the realisation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms'. In A 55 this has become `respect for the 
principles of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples' and (A 55b) `respect for and observance of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms'. In A 62(2) 
ECOSOC is required to make recommendations `promoting 
respect for, and the observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms'. A 68 refers to the `promotion of 
human rights'. The Trusteeship system has as one of its 
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basic objectives `to encourage respect for human rights 
and for fundamental freedoms for all' (A 76c). The 
variety of terms used in the treatment of human rights 
in the Charter suggests uncertainty, or deliberate 
obscurity. The Charter did make clear however, the duty 
of the General Assembly to debate and declare its 
opinion on matters of human rights. 
In seeking to promote individual human rights as well 
as international peace the UN Charter created a 
powerful contradiction: the idea that a single legal 
regime might guarantee the sovereign rights of states 
and simultaneously protect the citizen from the abuse 
of state power. Various UN bodies have, nonetheless, 
sought to make progress in the protection of human 
rights, notwithstanding the contradictions. See, for 
example, ECOSOC Resolution 1503 which allows 
individuals (or, more likely) NGOs to publicise and 
seek redress for human rights abuses. 
The Charter fails to specify the UN's responsibilities 
in the field of individual rights. It says nothing, 
however, about the collective rights of peoples or 
groups. Collective rights are even more divisive and 
controversial than individual rights. Many states will 
tolerate statements of individual rights but will 
resist any attempt to define collective rights. 
The conflict between the relative priorities of 
sovereignty and human rights is noted by all 
commentators on the work and status of the UN today. 
The clear intention of the founding conference of the 
UN, as shown in the record - the San Francisco traveaux 
preparatoires - make it clear that questions of 
sovereignty and human rights (in so far as the latter 
were regarded as important operational objectives in 
those days) were at all times subordinate to the 
interests of international peace and security. 
Furthermore, as the Security Council debate on draft R 
688 shows, states are loath to abandon the legal 
protections of domestic jurisdiction. This applies 
especially when threats to international peace are 
defined in an `elastic' way, as they were in the 
Kurdish crisis of 1991. 
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE FIELD OF 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 
The UN Charter, signed by the 52 founder member states in 1945, 
gave the General Assembly the right to debate and develop the 
principles of state conduct. 14 Although the Charter gave the 
Security Council the exclusive right to debate and determine 
questions on threats to international peace and security15 the 
General Assembly has acted on its own mandate to make 
declarations on inter-state conduct. General Assembly 
declarations are, for example, regularly quoted in ICJ 
judgments. 16 
The General Assembly's work in this field is also carried forward by 
conferences. The conflict between sovereignty and human rights came 
to a head in the Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. As a 
result of this activity over time there is a still-growing body of 
international law, based on custom and treaty, which can be 
summarised as follows: 
" The first principle is that of sovereignty17 and equality. 18 Respect for 
sovereignty and equality requires that there should be no 
intervention into the affairs of sovereign states. 19 The General 
Assenbly has 
14 The UN was and is however, principally an institution of inter-state relations. Although it has admitted some non-state 
organisations as observers or in associate membership its approach to peace and security Is one wnich recognises above all 
the rights and duties of states, rather than those of peoples, races or organisations. 
15 The'Uniting For Peace' General Assembly declaration [GA R 37711950 established an exception to this rule. The 
Security Council accepted the right of the General Assembly to debate peace and security crises where the Security Council 
was unable itself to take action. See M Shaw International Law (3rd Ed) Grotius, Cambridge, 1991 p 712-3. 
16 ICJ judgments are only binding on the parties in the case. They are authoritative, however, as interpretations of the law 
and are influential in the framing of subsequent Security Council resolutions. They often draw on General Assembly 
resolutions as statements of customary law. 
17 A 2(7). 
18 Antonio Cassese 'International Law in a Divided World' Clarendon, Oxford 1986 p 129 : 
Of the various fundamental principles regulating international relations, this is unquestionably the only one on which there is unqualified agreement, and the support of all groups of States, irrespective of ideologies, political leanings, 
and circumstances. All states agree upon both the crucial importance of the principle and its basic contents. The 
conclusion is therefore warranted that sovereign equality constitutes the lynchpin of the whole body of legal 
standards, the fundamental premise on which all international relations rests. ' 
Jost Delbruck 'A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the United Nations' 67 Indiana LJ (1992) p 889: 
'The principle of nonintervention is deeply enshrined in general international law. It has its legal basis and legal 
policy foundations in the principles of sovereignty and equality of states, the constitutive e! ements of the international legal order. ' 
19 In the last 30 years the UN's member-states have argued for the recognition of a legal right for a 'people' to determine Its 
own political future. This pressure came in the form of pressure for 
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asserted this principle in a succession of 
declarations. 20 Other international organisations have 
adopted similar statements. 21 
"A second principle is that of self-defence. If state 
sovereignty is a key principle of modern international 
relations then it follows that first amongst the 
sovereign rights is self-defence. 22 
"A third principle is that of self-determination. In 
the case of people living under colonial or alien rule 
there is a significant body of customary law 
peoples 'under colonial rule' and has been interpreted restrictively: states have declared themselves in favour 
of a general right of self-determination, not a right of succession. Indeed the states which have most 
vigorously advanced 'self-determination' on behalf of peoples under colonial (or 'alien') rule have been the first 
to deny that right to peoples seeking to throw off the control of a non-colonial government. These separatist 
elements are often made up of linguistic-cultural populations which form a minority in a state with 'colonial' 
borders. Today, in the post-colonial world, the principle of self determination has become a threat to the unity 
of many newly-independent states. These states struggle to achieve national unity in the face of a threat of 
fragmentation due to the ethnic diversity of their populations. So practice has tended towards the limitation 
rather than extension of the application of self-determination. The emphasis on self-determination has been in 
part replaced by the importance given to non-intervention and the permanence of existing state borders. This 
principle of non-intervention has been adopted by most regional organisations. 
20 -'The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference In the Domestic Affairs of 
States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty' GA R 2131 (XX) December 1965. 
-'The Declaration on the Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in 
Accordance with Principles of the Charter of the United Nations' GA R 2625 (XXV) 24 October 
1970. 
The eighth perambular paragraph reads: 
'the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of 
the Charter but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten 
international peace and security. ' 
-'The Declarations and Principles of International Law on the Relations and Cooperation among 
States In Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations' (1970) 
-'Consensus Definition of Aggression' (UN GAR 3314 (XXIX) (1974) 
A 3(a): 
'The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State on the territory of another 
State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such an 
invasion or attack ..: These resolutions state that international order is based on two principles: the territorial integrity of states (and 
the rights that flow from it) and the right of self-determination of peoples (under alien or colonial rule). The 
non-intervention' rule would only be applied to states 'conducting themselves In compliance with the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination. ' 
Specifically the Declaration on Granting Independence (GA R 1514) stated that support for peoples in their 
struggle for self-determination did not offend the 'non-intervention' principle of the UN Charter. GA R 1514 
Identified, inter alia, the colony Southern Rhodesia [pre-UDI] was declared to be 'non-self-governing' within the 
meaning of the Declaration. 
21 The charter of the OAS states: 
'No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any state. ' (A 15. ) 
Identical language is to be found in the 'Declarations and Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
relations between States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations'. 
The Charter of the OAU (a 3), for example, lays emphasis on the importance of non-intervention and 
forbids the alteration of frontiers of any member-state except by agreement of all parties concerned. 
The OSCE also affirms this principle. 
22 In modern international law this was affirmed by the 'Corfu Channel case' (ICJ Reports 1949, p 4: 16 ILR 
p 155). More controversial however is the alleged right of a state under attack to call for assistance from its 
neighbour. It is accepted that a state under armed attack may call for armed assistance from a third party, but 
does this 'right' extend to the call of a government for assistance in putting down a revolt? If the revolt is in 
the nature of a separatist uprising would not such assistance amount to denial of the self-determination of the 
dissident population ? In the 'Nicaragua' case the ICJ gave important rulings on the application of the principle 
of self defence. It ruled on the right of a dissident group engaged in a civil war against its government to 
obtain military assistance from a foreign power. It did not, however, define the limits of this right. 'Case 
Concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions' (Nicaragua v Honduras (ex parte USA)) (Merits) ICJ 
Reports 14 1986. 
43 
justifying the people's efforts of to resist the government - 
and receive assistance from states - using force if necessary. 
`Self-determination' is a principle which gained acceptance 
only in the 20th century. President Woodrow Wilson favoured the 
greater political rights for minorities in the old European 
empires. He did, nevertheless accept that the concept which 
came to be known as `self-determination' was subordinate to 
that of sovereignty. Self-determination was not written into 
the Covenant of the League however, nor was it recognised by 
the first Committee of Jurists assembled to adjudicate for the 
League. 
Positive international law does not recognise the right of 
national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the 
State from which they form a part by the simple expression 
of that wish. 22 
Self-determination was not included in the UN Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (1948). It is mentioned twice in 
the Charter (A 55) but only in the contexts of developing 
`friendly relations between states' and promoting `equal rights 
of peoples'. Its origin, in the US system, lies in a series of 
General Assembly resolutions, beginning with the `Declaration 
on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' 
(1960). The two UN Covenants on Human Rights, approved by the 
General Assembly in 1966, inter alia reaffirmed this 
principle. 23 
The UN General Assembly has often been criticised for adopting 
double standards over `self-determination'. On the one hand it 
called for pressure on the racist regimes of southern Africa, 
and on Israel for its occupation of the territories captured in 
the 1967 war. On the other hand it published a succession of 
22 'Report by the Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion on the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Island Question' quoted by Hurst Hannum in Autonomy. Sovereignty and Self- 
Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1960) p 61. 
23 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights share two Identical articles: the affirmation of self-determination (A I in each case) and an assurance that the Covenant provisions 'in no way impair the provisions of the Charter' (A 24 and 46 respectively. ) 
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declarations in the 1960s and 1970s affirming the 
principle of non-intervention. The apparent 
contradiction is relieved, if not explained, by the 
definition of self-determination as `freedom from 
colonial or alien rule'. The right does not encourage 
minorities in states to achieve separatism but only to 
remove the subjugation of peoples by foreigners. Hence 
colonies ruled by Western states and territories 
detached by force from their parent state, offended 
the principle of self-determination. Likewise racist 
regimes holding indigenous people in a form of slavery 
also offended against `self-determination'. The 
principle offers no standard of `good government'; it 
merely states that authority should lie with local 
people, not with aliens. 
Self-determination is concerned with a change in 
sovereign status, and not with how sovereignty is 
exercised thereafter. 24 
Michael Walzer makes the same point, quoting John 
Stuart Mill: 
For self-determination and political freedom are 
not equivalent terms .... A State is self- 
determining even if its citizens struggle and fail 
to establish free institutions, but it is deprived 
of self-determination if such institutions are 
established by an intrusive neighbour. 25 
Supporters of `self-determination' see no conflict 
with the principle of `non-intervention in the 
domestic jurisdiction of States' as most of the 
territories concerned are not sovereign states but 
colonies or other non-self-governing (or `occupied') 
territories. 
The `self-determination' debate does not rest there, 
however. In recent crises the international community 
has been divided over the conflicting rights of 
minorities and majorities in intra-state conflicts. 
Should the international community allow the self- 
determination of minorities and irredentist pressures 
from neighbours? Or should it respect the rights of 
24 Harold S Johnson Self-Determination Within the Community of Nations (Leyden: AW Sijthoff, 1967). 
25 Walzer Just and Unjust Wars p 87. 
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states to suppress minority dissent? Western states have, for 
the most part, favoured multi-ethnicity as a conservative 
formula as this tends to uphold the status quo. Others have 
seen advantage in partitions and population exchanges to bring 
an end to long-standing quarrels between ethnic groups within 
states. 
And when the cause of a civil conflict, or the failure of 
a state, is ethnic or religious strife, despite the ritual 
and quasi-universal commitment to `the people's right to 
self-determination' deep divisions exist between those who 
believe this norm must lead to borders based on ethnic or 
religious demarcation lines, and those who think that 
formulas of `con-socio-nationalism' or federalism'... 
might save multi-ethnic societies. Discussions in the 
Contact Group about the future of Bosnia have been marked 
by acrobatic attempts at reconciling these conflicting 
points of view. 26 
Rosalyn Higgins27 has recently drawn attention to the common 
misunderstandings on international law and 'self- 
determination'. Tracing the development of law in this field 
from the conservative provisions of the UN Charter through the 
resolutions of the General Assembly and ICJ judgements she goes 
on to discuss the contrasting rights under A1 and A 27 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The 
weight of international law supports the self-determination of 
`peoples' (from alien rule). But the Political and Human Rights 
Commission, acting as the body charged with enforcing the 
Covenant, has in recent judgements, drawn an important 
distinction between minorities and peoples. Briefly, it has 
refused to support the claims of minorities to secede. 
Minorities per se have certain rights but these do not include 
an automatic right of secession on the grounds of self- 
determination alone. There are two important exceptions to this 
rule. Where a minority is the target of systematic persecution 
by the majority it may claim that secession is the only means 
of relief from that persecution. Second, indigenous peoples are 
in the process of claiming that theirs is a special situation: 
26 Stanley Hoffmann 'Clash ?'p 47. 
27 Rosalyn Higgins Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). Chapter 
7. 
46 
they claim a right to autonomous institutions if that 
is necessary to preserve their cultural identity. This 
claim is a matter of debate in the drafting of the UN 
Declaration on Indigenous Rights. 
"A fourth principle is the prohibition on the use of 
force by states, except in highly restrictive 
circumstances. 
"A further set of principles addresses the rights of 
the citizen against mistreatment by his own government: 
the right to live in peace, under just laws, in a clean 
environment, free from the threat of persecution. But 
these `rights' are listed as aspirations: they are not 
yet widely accepted as rights. Indeed the idea that any 
individual right might be `universal' is profoundly 
controversial. (The pressure for groups within states to 
have their collective rights respected is even more 
controversial. ) 
There is, furthermore, no consensus on the rights of 
minorities (even oppressed minorities) to struggle for 
independence. These `collective rights of minorities' 
are even more sensitive to international opinion than 
proposals for a right of `intervention'. These issues 
are in the arena of `human rights' and have not been 
fully absorbed into international law. 28 Although most 
people would agree that regimes of law should protect 
individuals from abuses states do not seem ready to 
adopt laws which will guarantee these rights. Despite 
the UN General Assembly's adoption of `The Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights' (1948) and other 
international conventions (e. g. those prohibiting 
genocide and slavery) which are considered to express 
`customary law', human rights remains, for the present, 
more a political than a legal issue. States show more 
interest in promoting stability and order rather than 
individual rights. The history of the nation state, 
after all, shows that the achievement (or imposition) 
of order has usually taken priority over concerns for 
civil liberties. Indeed there are many who would argue 
27 Rosalyn Higgins Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994). Chapter 7. 
28 Allen Buchanan Secession: the Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec 
(Boulder: Westview, 1991). 
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that order in society is itself its greatest blessing and that 
civil liberties are a desirable consequence of order, but 
cannot precede it. Furthermore there is no consensus on the 
outer limits of `civil liberties', for example the question of 
a `right' of good governance, or more controversial still, a 
right to be ruled under a genuinely `representative' or 
democratic, government. Finally there is no consensus on the 
rights of `peoples' or ethnic groups to enjoy collective rights 
beyond those which they deserve to enjoy as individuals. 
Allen Buchanan is one of the only scholars recently to have 
published a study of secession, focused on the moral and 
political problems associated with dissident minorities inside 
states. He has formulated a "moral framework" from a liberal 
standpoint. Buchanan proposes that a right of secession should 
exist if the physical safety, or cultural identity, of the 
group is the target of sustained, governmental repression or 
the violent actions of "loyalist" groups. He warns, however, 
that plebiscites and referenda may give a false picture in the 
many cases where the demographic mix has been deliberately 
altered, by colonisation or forced resettlement, to establish 
"loyal" groups who will oppose secession. (The ethnic Russian 
population which now exists in Latvia is an example. ) Even if 
this putative right to secede is accepted the right or duty for 
other states or organisations to assist would-be secessionists 
is yet another step. Whereas this moral debate is of interest - 
and may in time become the basis of international practice - it 
remains the case that secession is at best a moral right, not a 
political right recognised by international law. 
INTERVENTION, IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 1945-1989 
AND SINCE 1989 
International politics in the period 1945-1989 (the period of 
the Cold War) was dominated by superpower rivalry. Despite a 
number of famous crises, however, the superpower blocs did not 
engage each other in warfare, indeed their relationship showed 
many elements of cooperation on fundamentals, especially after 
the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The period saw smaller wars 
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nonetheless: wars between states as well as civil wars. 
Some of these wars involved `unilateral' intervention 
by one or more outside powers, sometimes by the leading 
states. 29 Some of these interventions were clearly 
motivated by national interest; others by an element of 
'humanitarianism'. 30 The United Nations has often 
condemned aggression and, on occasion, authorised 
action or taken action itself, against aggressors (in 
Korea 1950 and in the Gulf War 1991). The international 
community has, on the other hand, frequently given 
silent consent to interventions, even when it has been 
clear that the intervening states were acting from 
motives of old fashioned power politics. The 
international community has only been prepared to give 
explicit approval to interventions clearly motivated by 
humanitarianism. Some examples of interventions which 
occurred before the Kurdish crisis in 1991, are: 
India into East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) 1971, 
Vietnam into Cambodia 1978, 
Tanzania into Uganda 1979, 
US into Panama 1989, 
The ECOWAS states into Liberia 1990. 
In these cases the intervention was `unilateral', that 
is, not given prior authorisation by the UN Security 
Council. As Christopher Greenwood31 has pointed out the 
intervening states customarily cited `self-defence'32 as 
their justification for intervention, even when the 
sufferings of whole populations were clearly visible. 
International public opinion began to demand 
improvements in civil rights inside many states and was 
29 Stanley Hoffmann reminds us that 'the issue of intervention in domestic affairs was central during the 
Cold War. ' Hoffmann 'Clash ?'p 30. 
30 Humanitarianism is a word which is found in many UN resolutions and statements by government 
spokesmen. It has two distinct meanings, however. Sometimes it is unclear which applies. Humanitarian acts 
can mean 'acts designed to promote the physical well-being of people' or it can mean 'to promote individuals' 
human rights and freedoms'. 
31 'In each case [India, Tanzania and Vietnam) the Intervening state and its supporters rested their case 
primarily on the right of self-defence'. Christopher Greenwood 'Is there a right of humanitarian intervention ?' 
The World Today February 1993 p 35. 
An interesting discrepancy exists, however, in the justification presented by India, As Michael Akehurst 
has pointed out the verbatim record of the Security Council debate on the Indian intervention shows that 
India's case contained a 'human rights' argument, as well as a 'self-defence' argument. When the formal 
record was published, however, the 'human rights' argument had been excised from the text. Akehurst 
comments that the text was changed because India realised that human rights would not be an acceptable 
justification for the action taken. M Akehurst'The Use of Force to protect Nationals Abroad' International 
Relations Vol 5 (1977) p 11. 
32 ECOWAS justified its intervention on humanitarian and on self-defence grounds. E Emmanuel 
'Peacekeeping' Africa Forum Vol 1 No 1 1991 p 27 quoted in Comfort Ero Subregional Peacekeeping and 
Conflict Management: The Liberian Civil War UN and Conflict Programme, UNA, 5 Whitehall Court, London, 
April 1995 p 11. See discussion of the Liberia intervention below. 
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showing increasing sympathy for people suffering 
repression, such as the Jews in the USSR. There was 
increasing interest, especially in the West, in the 
wider cause of human rights as an issue in 
international politics. The preservation of sovereignty 
and the advancement of human rights were in many cases 
in conflict. 
There were also `humanitarian' interventions by the UN 
itself, during the period 1945-89. In the 1960s the UN 
took Chapter VII enforcement action against South 
Africa and Southern Rhodesia in order to pressure the 
two territories - one a state, and the other a UK crown 
colony - to abandon the policies of segregation and 
minority rule. 
Space precludesa detailed examination of each of these 
cases. Instead two representative cases will be taken 
in order to show the development of `humanitarian 
intervention' prior to the Kurdish crisis of 1991. 
Humanitarian Intervention by the UN - South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia33 
In the 1950s and 60s former colonies achieved 
independence and became member-states of the UN. They 
developed a strong `anti-colonial' group within the 
General Assembly. The apartheid regime in South Africa 
was the main target for `anti-colonial' action in the 
UN, in the Commonwealth as elsewhere, in the post World 
War 2 period. In due course many of these states came 
together in the Non Aligned Movement (NAM), a large 
group with a broad agenda which included 'anti- 
colonial' issues. 
But there were other targets than South Africa itself. 
Furthermore the `colonial' formula was expanded to 
cover `non-self governing' territories in order to 
include not only colonies but also anomalous `alien 
rule' regimes such as Southern Rhodesia after UDI. 
Later still the formula would cover `occupied 
territories', in particular the areas of Palestine 
which were occupied by the Israelis after the 1967 war. 
33 R 417 and 418 (October and November 1977). 
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Whereas the protest against South Africa was the first 
multi-national campaign conducted in the UN, the action 
against Southern Rhodesia involved stronger measures. 
In the 1960s South Africa was a strong state with a 
mixed economy. Its strength commanded a significant 
measure of international support, even if that support 
was often covert. Southern Rhodesia, on the other hand, 
was a land-locked territory with a largely-agricultural 
economy. It was seen as a more promising target for 
economic sanctions than South Africa. 
The pressure exerted by the newly-independent (and 
other Non Aligned) states for `anti-colonial' action at 
the UN has been described above. Whereas South Africa 
was the main target it was a strong state with a well- 
developed economy and with ready access to world trade 
outlets. The UDI Southern Rhodesia regime was seen as a 
more vulnerable and thus became the first target for 
international pressure. 
UN sanctions against Southern Rhodesia(SR) were the 
most severe and comprehensive to date. 34 Over the 11 
years following the declaration of UDI in 1965 a 
succession of Security Council resolutions prohibited 
the import of all materials originating from SR, the 
sale or supply of all materials to customers in SR and 
the use of ships and aircraft for trade with SR. 
Furthermore the resolutions demanded that all member 
states withhold financial deposits and deny investment 
funds for the development of business in SR. Finally 
the resolutions required member states' airlines not to 
call at SR airports nor to provide facilities in 
connecting flights for SR passengers, and insurance for 
such flights. 
Before the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1 UN economic sanctions, 
imposed under A 41, normally required member states to 
take action in respect of their own trade with the 
territory under sanction. They did not authorise action 
`involving the use of armed force35' or any actions 
outside their own territories. The action the UN 
34 These sanctions were only exceeded In severity by the measures Imposed on Iraq 1990-1 in a succession 
of Security Council resolutions culminating in R 687. 
35 A 41. 
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authorised against SR went further. In SC R 221 (1966), 
the Council recalled an earlier `finding' under A 3936 
and then called on all states to `ensure the diversion 
of any of their vessels ... carrying oil 
destined for 
Southern Rhodesia' but also authorised the UK 
specifically, to `prevent, by the use of force if 
necessary, the arrival in Beira of vessels [whatever 
their nationality] believed to be carrying oil destined 
for Southern Rhodesia. ' On one occasion a Royal Navy 
warship fired warning shots at an oil tanker which had 
refused to obey signals to stop and submit to a search. 
(In the case of Iraq in 1990 R 665 followed this 
precedent when it authorised member states' maritime 
forces `to halt inward and outward maritime shipping in 
order to inspect and verify their cargoes'. 37) So R 221 
created a precedent for the forcible imposition of 
economic sanctions, a precedent which was followed in R 
661. Member states were in these cases authorised not 
just to restrict their own trade with defaulter states 
but also to prevent illegal trade carried out by other 
nations' shipping. The mandate to the UK specified that 
armed force might be used against sanctions-breakers. 
The development of more intrusive and forceful 
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in the years 
following UDI prepared the way for even more severe 
treatment of South Africa in the late 1970s. From 1960 
(the Sharpeville massacre) to 1977 various UN organs 
had repeatedly condemned minority rule, apartheid and 
all the repressive actions of the South African state. 
By the late 1970s South Africa had been the target of 
UN economic sanctions. The sanctions regime had started 
with an embargo on the supply of arms and related 
materiel. 38 In 1977, however, R 418 of 4 November, 
observed that the abuse of human rights in South Africa 
represented a threat to international peace and 
36 The earlier SCR had identified the South African regime as 'alien rule' and as such to be a threat to 
International peace. It was only in 1970 that a subsequent SCR extended the'threat to international peace' 
formula to colonial rule, in R 289. 
37 R 221 was In fact the basis of the R 661 draft considered by the Security Council during the Gulf Crisis. 
Freedman and Karsh p 83. But it was not until R 794, adopted in 1992, that the Security Council first 
authorised Chapter VII enforcement action, inside the state concerned, including the use of force on the basis 
of'internal conditions' alone. See H McCoubrey and ND White International Law and Armed Conflict (London: 
Dartmouth, 1992) p 24. 
38 Similar embargoes were imposed in Libya, Somalia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (ie Serbia) at 
other times. In the case of Libya the further embargoes involved the supply of aircraft and aircraft spares and 
the prohibition on civil air traffic to and from Libya. States were also required to reduce their diplomatic 
representation to and from Libya. 
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security and justified forcible action by the 
international community to terminate those abuses. The 
target was South Africa. This resolution recalled 
another resolution (adopted earlier in the year) which 
had for the first time identified a threat to 
international peace arising from the actions of the 
government. It was the import of arms from abroad 
which, in the determination of the Council, 
internationalised the situation. In R 417 (31 October) 
the Council expanded its `threat to international 
peace' decision when it noted the `torture of political 
prisoners and the deaths of political detainees as well 
as the mounting wave of repression against individuals, 
organisations and news media' in South Africa. It also 
identified a threat to international peace and security 
in that `the violence and repression by the South 
African racist regime have greatly aggravated the 
[regional] situation and will certainly lead to violent 
conflict and racial conflagration with serious 
international repercussions'. Although the Council 
might have cited the recent cross-border military 
operations of the South African armed forces (into 
Mozambique), and the continual in- and ex-filtration of 
armed groups from neighboring states, the preambles of 
R 417 and 418 make no mention of this. The implication 
is that the Council, for the first time, saw a threat 
to international peace and security in the region as 
arising solely from the repression of human rights 
inside South Africa, and not from the cross-border 
military incidents. Rodley comments as follows: 
As an abstract proposition, if a human rights 
situation can amount to a threat to international 
peace and security, thus permitting the Council to 
take enforcement action to remedy the situation, 
there is nothing in A 2(7) restricting the 
enforcement action to measures short of the use of 
force. 39 
The exceptional actions of the Security Council with 
respect to South Africa, and less obviously to Southern 
Rhodesia, backed by the `self-determination 
declarations' of the General Assembly, opened the way 
39 Rodley p 28. 
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for a development of a new `interventionist' path for 
international law. 40 
Rs 221,417 and 418 therefore established a precedent 
for the Security Council to take enforcement action in 
cases of mass abuse of human rights inside a state, 
even when there is no separate threat to international 
peace and security. The discussion [below] of the legal 
issues underpinning the debate and formulation of R 688 
in 1991 will refer to the precedent set by Rs 221,417 
and 418. 
Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention by a state or 
states - Liberiaar 
In August 1990 the situation in Liberia was a matter of 
international concern. The civil war - which had begun 
the previous year - was degenerating into widespread 
tribal conflict. As a result many people fled as 
refugees over the borders. 42 The head of state, 
President Doe, appealed for military intervention to 
deal with the situation. At the time of the appeal Doe 
had lost control. He was a virtual prisoner, trapped in 
the presidential palace, while the various warring 
factions controlled the rest of the country. 
On 6-7 August 1990 Standing Mediation Committee of the 
Economic Cooperation Organisation of the West African 
States(ECOWAS) decided to send an intervention force to 
Liberia. Days later the decision was confirmed when it 
was announced that Doe's opponents had murdered 1000 
4o Security Council action to bear down on apartheid did not involve the use of force in every case. Namibia, 
or South West Africa, has also been the focus of Security Council action In accordance with the principle of 
'self-determination'. Whereas the Council did take action to terminate the 'illegal' South African rule In Namibia 
it did not take forcible action in that regard. It is not therefore an example of 'intervention' in this context. 
41 Main sources on the ECOWAS intervention are: W Ofuatey-Kodjoe 'Regional Organisations and the 
Resolution of Internal Conflict; The Ecowas Intervention in Liberia' International Peacekeeping 1994 pp 261- 
302, C Scott, L Minear and TG Weiss Humanitarian Action and Security in Liberia: 1989-1994 (Thomas J 
Watson Institute for International Studies, Occasional Paper No 20 1995, K0 Kufuor'The Legality of the 
Intervention In the Liberian Civil War by the Economic Community of West African States' in African Journal 
of International and Comparative Law Vol 5 No 3, p 526, VP Nanda 'Tragedies in Northern Iraq, Liberia, 
Yugoslavia and Haiti - Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law' Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy Vol 20 (1992), p 305. On the failure of economic sanctions in this case 
see N Schriver'The Use of Economic Sanctions by the United National Security Council: an international Law 
Perspective' in HG Post (ed) International Economic Law and Armed Conflict (Netherlands: Martinas Nijhoff 
Publications, 1993) p 123. 
42 By October 1990 there were 600,000 Liberian refugees in neighbouring states. UNHCR, Cote d'Ivoire, 
reported in Africa Research Bulletin 1-31 October 1990. 
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Nigerians who had taken refuge in their country's 
embassy in the capital, Monrovia, on 8 August. 
Early in September, soon after giving his consent to 
the intervention, Doe was murdered by supporters of 
`Prince' Johnson, the leader of one of the factions. 
The force, ECOMOG, arrived in Liberia in November 1990. 
The troops were immediately attacked by forces of 
Charles Taylor's NPFL faction. ECOWAS changed the 
mandate from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. ECOMOG 
then imposed its authority over the area around 
Monrovia. Later it reverted to peacekeeping activities. 
ECOMOG eventually achieved a cease-fire in November 
1992 and restored a measure of public safety in and 
around the capital. It began the task of mediation in 
the conflict and supervised the installation of a new 
government. The Lome agreement did not end the 
humanitarian crisis nor the civil war. Fighting resumed 
and further mediation attempts took place. The UN 
Security Council made no comment on ECOMOG until 19 
November 1992, two years after the first deployment 
into Liberia. The retrospective endorsement came in the 
text of SCR 788 which launched the UNOMIL peacekeeping 
mission. The resolution set out the Council's approach 
to monitoring of the cease fire and the continuation of 
the mediation process. 
ECOMOG called its intervention an act of `collective 
self-defence' justified by the `transborder effects' on 
neighbouring states: 
General Erskine of ECOMOG stated that "with the 
crisis in Liberia creating unbearable refugee 
problems for Sierra Leone, Ghana, the Gambia, 
Guinea, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast it is obvious 
that the situation in Liberia has gone beyond the 
boundaries of that country and ceases to be an 
exclusive Liberian question. " 
It also cited a humanitarian motive: 
Second the decision of the West African leaders to 
get involved was said to be humanitarian. In its 
Final Communique the Standing Committee gave a 
strong rationale for its decisions, adding that 
"presently there is in Liberia a government which 
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cannot govern and contending factions which are 
holding the entire population hostage, depriving 
them of food, health facilities and other basic 
necessities of life. "43 
Despite these public statements it is clear that 
political rivalries between the leaders of neighbouring 
states played some part in the decision to intervene, 
and in the protests from the neighbouring states which 
opposed the intervention. Togo and Burkino Faso, also 
members of ECOWAS, opposed the intervention publicly. 
Cote d'Ivoire is also believed to have protested 
privately. The opponents of intervention saw the action 
as self-interested, a ploy by Nigeria (and its 
supporting Anglophone states) to maintain its influence 
over Liberia. (On deployment Nigeria supplied 90% of 
the ECOMOG forces. The commander was Ghanaian. ) Doe 
certainly appears to have been Babangida's protege and 
an ally in Nigeria's claim to leadership of the sub- 
region. Ero is satisfied that the real reason for the 
intervention was neither self-defence nor 
humanitarianism: it was the Nigerian military regime's 
determination to prevent Charles Taylor and his NPFL 
from seizing power. 
The legality of the intervention has been the subject 
of much debate. The quality of the consent given, the 
preference given to one faction over another, the 
enforcement measures taken without reference to the 
Security Council, all of these legal defects have been 
noted. But these objections have been restricted to the 
academic community. The international community's 
reaction concentrated on the practical results, not the 
legal implications. 
Briefly, the legal objections to ECOMOG's mission rest 
on two issues. 44 First, ECOMOG's operation disregarded 
43 Marc Weller (ed) Cambridge International Documents (Cambridge: Grotius, Cambridge University Press, 
1994) 'Regional Peace-keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis', 'Document 54' p 72, 
quoted in Comfort Ero Subregional Peacekeeping and Conflict Management: The Liberian Civil War (London: 
UN and Conflict programme, UNA) 1995 p 11. 
44 There is a further area of dispute over the legality of ECOMOG's action in Liberia. It is, however, a 
technicality which has so far prove to be of interest only to academic lawyers. For completeness sake a short 
reference is added below. 
ECOWAS is an economic grouping of states, with a minimal mandate for mediation of bi-lateral disputes 
between members-states but no comprehensive mandate for crisis-management, even when the additional 
protocols to its Charter are taken Into account.. According to this line of argument the operation was defective 
because the organisation was acting ulta vires. Despite the various protocols adopted after the Charter came 
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the two principle canons of traditional peacekeeping: 
`consent' from the sovereign power and `impartiality' 
between warring factions. ECOMOG had not secured the 
prior consent of a competent government (nor the 
consent of all the significant factions45). President 
Doe had ceased to be the effective ruler of Liberia by 
the time he issued the invitation to external forces to 
intervene. In any case his regime had totally collapsed 
- and he himself had been murdered - before the ECOMOG 
troops arrived in Liberia. ECOMOG's operation also 
appears to have failed the test of impartiality: it 
consistently opposed the NPFL. Finally Security 
Council approval for the enforcement elements of 
ECOMOG's action was neither sought nor granted. 46 
It appears that the international community was 
prepared to see a multinational coalition intervene, on 
its own authority and in accordance with its members' 
collective right of self defence, to address an urgent, 
mass humanitarian need. Furthermore it is important to 
note that the ECOMOG operation was the first time the 
international community had looked favourably on an 
intervention into the territory of a developing state 
where there was no element of `alien rule' or 
colonialism. Previously in the UN era Non Aligned 
states had approved intervention only in order to 
further the cause of `self-determination'. 
The international community's acceptance of ECOWAS' 
action - and its eventual endorsement of the operation" 
into force ECOWAS' mandate from its member-states was predominantly economic. The 'Protocol of Non- 
Aggression' was adopted at ECOWAS third heads-of-state conference, at Dakar, Senegal, in 1978, the 
'Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence' at Freetown, Sierra Leone in 1981. ECOWAS also developed a 
crisis-management institution designed to manage disputes between the member-states. A five-member 
'Standing Mediation Committee' was established in 1990. Nevertheless it is a fact that ECOWAS was not a 
'regional arrangement' as visualised by the UN Charter. 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (A52) approves of suitably mandated 'regional arrangements' undertaking 
conflict resolution providing that the action is 'in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter'. 
A 'regional arrangement' would normally be an association of states committed by treaty to act together in 
matters of regional security. In West Africa the only organisation empowered to act in security questions was, 
and is, the OAU. The OAU Charter contains a crisis-management mandate. 
In accordance with A 53 'regional arrangements' may only adopt 'enforcement' measures if such 
measures are first approved by the Security Council. 
45 ECOMOG initially described its action a 'peacekeeping' mission. But, as the Togo delegate at the meeting 
of the ECOWAS' Standing Mediation Committee pointed out, peacekeeping contingents operate under 
consent. Togo would not participate without having first received the consent of the three major factions in the 
Liberian civil war. 
45 ECOMOG's military operation was not even-handed; it was directed principally against one of the parties in 
the civil war (the Charles Taylor faction). 
47 The Council gave retrospective endorsement to the intervention, in 1992, with the unanimous adoption of 
SC R 788. The only dissenters in the debate on 788 were non-voting participants: those ECOWAS members 
states which had voted (in ECOWAS meetings) against the original military operation. Greenwood he World 
oda February 1993 p 37. See also 'Funmi Olonisakin 'UN Cooperation with regional Organisations In 
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- is more significant than the objections raised by 
academic lawyers. It is the practice of states which 
determines the growth of international law, not the 
constraints of legal tradition. In the case of the 
ECOMOG operation the international community was 
prepared to accept the actions taken, irrespective of 
the apparent legal defects. The ECOMOG operation was 
incorporated into the UN's programme of conflict 
resolution in Liberia. 
As the international community was prepared to tolerate 
ECOMOG's operation as an `exception' to the general 
rule of non-intervention what can be said of the state 
of the international consensus on intervention in 
November 1990, when ECOMOG first deployed to Liberia? 
Oscar Schachter48 has noted that the General Assembly 
condemned the US intervention in Grenada in 198319 but 
there was no equivalent UN condemnation of the ECOMOG 
intervention in Liberia. Perhaps the explanation for 
the silent acceptance of intervention in Liberia was 
due to: 
" an awareness that a humanitarian crisis was imminent 
and no other form of conflict resolution (apart from 
ECOWAS intervention) was likely to have any positive 
effect on the situation. 
"a preparedness to accept that this coalition, 
although open to the charge of `national-interest 
motivation', could not be criticised as a colonialist 
adventure designed to further the interests of 
leading states. 
The international community appeared to be re-defining 
its attitude to intervention since the US-dominated 
Grenada intervention. Whereas it had previously only 
accepted intervention for the purposes of 'self- 
determination' it would tolerate intervention so long 
as it was multi-national and justified by a genuine 
humanitarian crisis. If this analysis is correct 
November 1990 marked another threshold in the 
transition of international opinion - expressed in 
Peacekeeping: ECOMOG and UNOMIL In Libena' International Peacekeeoina Vol 3 No 31996 pp 33-51. 
Following 788 the UN dispatched a peacekeeping force, UNOMIL, to Liberia. This force worked in cooperation 
with ECOMOG; it did not replace it. 
48 O Schachter 'Authorised Uses of Force by the UN and Regional Organisations' in LF Damrosch and DJ 
Scheffer (eds. ) Law and Force in the New Intemational Order (Boulder, Colorado: Westview. 1991) p 88. 
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pragmatic action rather than legal decisions - on 
intervention in humanitarian crises. 
Where the international community gives silent consent 
to a previously unacceptable practice it is not 
necessarily creating a valid legal (or even political) 
`precedent'. States do not recognise a political or 
legal obligation to follow all the pragmatic decisions 
of the past. The development of international law, 
though based on state practice, is not so clear-cut. It 
advances by small steps as well as large ones. The 
small ones are practical decisions which attract 
approving reactions, or silent support, from the 
international community. The large ones are formal 
shifts in declared norms of international conduct, 
delivered in international treaties or in formal 
declarations by the General Assembly of the UN. 
Study of the early days of the ECOMOG intervention is 
relevant to the study of the Kurdish crisis. In the 
first place ECOMOG deployed just months before the 
Kurdish crisis broke. The international community was 
watching the progress of the ECOMOG operation just as 
the Kurdish crisis arose. Second, the crises in Liberia 
and in northern Iraq stemmed from similar causes: civil 
wars bringing threats to neighbours' stability and mass 
civilian suffering. Third, the actions taken by the UN 
were similar: the Security Council chose neither to 
authorise a UN intervention nor to take a position on 
the legality of the intervention. In both cases the 
Council remained silent despite the accusations from 
some states that the interventions were contrary to 
international law. 
It is likely that the members of Security Council and 
the General Assembly avoided conclusive decisions on 
the legality of these interventions because they 
preferred a pragmatic rather than a legalistic 
approach. In both cases the international community 
treated the interventions as exceptions to the 
principle of non-intervention. 
This analysis of interventions in southern Africa and 
Liberia suggests the following conclusions: 
49 GAR 387,38 UN Supp (No 47). UN Doc A/381L 8 (1983). 
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" The `self-determination' declarations of the General 
Assembly created the first political exception to the 
general principle prohibiting intervention in intra- 
state conflict. This was in cases where colonial or 
apartheid conditions were found to exist. Intervention 
- including limited forcible action - taken by 
neighbouring states (and others) could be justified on 
a case-by-case basis. It might be justified if intra- 
state conflict caused a `threat to international peace 
and security'. Action by neighbours (and others) might 
also be justified on the sole grounds of the `violation 
of basic human rights' by an `alien' regime. This 
rationale implied that multinational intervention could 
be justified by conditions inside a state, even if the 
crisis had no `international' effects. Actions taken 
and authorised by the UN in respect of apartheid 
territories rarely involved the use of force, and never 
involved the use of force on the territories 
themselves. The measures taken against South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia amounted to a precedent but cannot be 
said to have defined a `right' with the full force of 
customary law. 
" In one of the first cases of forcible intervention to 
occur after the end of the Cold War the action (and 
inaction) of the Security Council in respect of the 
ECOMOG intervention in Liberia appeared to approve this 
intervention as another exceptional case. In Liberia, 
however, (forcible) `humanitarian' intervention in an 
intra-state conflict occurred for the first time in a 
state or territory where no colonial or `alien rule' 
conditions existed. The Security Council tacitly 
approved that intervention at the time, and, in 1992, 
did so explicitly. 
The international community appeared to tolerate 
interventions inside states in order to relieve mass 
suffering. But this tolerance was limited. Council 
members preferred to call permissible interventions 
into intra-state conflict `exceptional cases'. It 
appears that the requirements for international 
approval in such `exceptional cases' are: a mass 
tragedy (from human rights abuse or natural causes), a 
requirement for urgent action, where the action is to 
save life (not alter borders nor unseat a responsible 
and recognised government), and where there is at least 
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a threat of transborder effects threatening the 
security of neighbouring states. 
If humanitarian intervention is ever to be 
justified, it will only be in exceptional and very 
particular circumstances [emphasis added]- a 
compelling and urgent situation of extreme and 
widespread humanitarian distress-the territorial 
state is incapable of meeting the needs-or 
unwilling to do so-(or is perhaps the cause of 
it)... active resistance on the part of the 
territorial state-action taken is limited in time 
and space... overwhelming and immediate considerations 
of humanity and has the general support of the 
international community. 5° 
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS 
IN INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT 
The period 1945-89 was dominated by confrontation 
between leading states and also regional wars as well 
as lesser forms of conflict. Super-power rivalry, the 
operation of spheres of influence51 and the existence of 
the threat of nuclear war tended to marginalise the UN 
and international law as a determinant of the conduct 
of states. In the UN General Assembly, however, many 
member-states pursued an agenda of anti-colonialism, 
anti-apartheid, and to some extent, anti-Zionism. More 
broadly there was pressure for the redress of historic 
grievances (especially the legacy of colonialism), the 
reduction of leading states' domination of less 
powerful states and a more equitable sharing of the 
world's resources. 
In the same turbulent period there were civil wars in 
which substantial numbers of people were killed, made 
homeless and forced across borders into exile. Examples 
are the Nigerian civil war (1966-7), Burundi (1972-3), 
Kampuchea (1975-6), East Timor (1975-6), the Central 
African Empire (1978-9) and Equatorial Guinea (1977- 
9). 52 These civil wars, despite their immense cost in 
50 R Jennings and A Watts (eds. ) Oppenheim's international Law (9`" Edition) London 1992, p 443, Note 18. 
51 Superpower attempts to prop up faded or failing states caused friction. Sometimes these situations led to 
unilateral intervention. 
52 Leo Kuper Genocide: Its Political Use in the 2Q Century (London: Penguin, 1981). 
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human lives, did not attract intervention. Was the lack of 
international response determined by super-power confrontation, 
in the UN or elsewhere, or by respect for the `domestic 
jurisdiction' of the states concerned? Or were the consequences 
of these wars too insignificant - in strategic terms - to 
warrant intervention from abroad? It is likely that these wars 
were allowed to continue without intervention because 
neighbouring states, and leading states, saw the wars as 
unthreatening to their own vital interests and not worth the 
risks and costs of intervention. 
Thus, however bitter for those consumed by its violence, 
the troubles of many weak states may be of no 
international consequence if they have little effect on 
the state system as a whole. Disputes well away from the 
main political centres are unlikely to excite the 
participation of leading states. 53 
In other cases, mentioned above, neighboring states intervened 
unilaterally in intra-state conflict. But some of the most 
controversial interventions of the Cold War period were 
undertaken by the superpowers in pursuit of their own 
interests. The USSR sought to justify the occupation of Hungary 
1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 as efforts to `protect 
socialism' . 54 The US intervention in the Dominican Republic 
(1965) was in part justified - to the domestic US audience, at 
least - as an action to `promote democracy'. In the Panama 
intervention (1989) the domestic justification was the 
suppression of drug imports into the US. 55 Thus both the US and 
the USSR claimed a right of intervention within their sphere of 
influence. These examples do not conform with a modern concept 
of `humanitarian intervention'. 
During this period international opinion overwhelmingly 
supported respect for national sovereignty and therefore non- 
intervention. The letter (and, surely, 
5-4 Lawrence Freedman Weak States and the West' Economist 11-17 September 1994 p 50. 
54 The Brezhnev Doctrine. 
55 Sometimes called the Reagan Doctrine. 
Both the Brezhnev doctrine and the Reagan doctrine proclaimed a highly non-humanitarian droh drngbrence (right of 
Intervention) respectively, In order to crush emancipatory revolts among satellites (such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan) and in order to support anti-communist insurgents (such as in Nicaragua, Angola and Afghanistan) . Hoffmann p 30. 
The policy was not what it seemed. See Robert Kagan The Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua 1977-1990 
(New York: The Free Press, 1996) p 352. For a legal judgement on the policy vis-a-vis Nicaragua, see ICJ judgement. Note 22 p 43, above. 
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the spirit) of the UN Charter points unfailingly in that 
direction. This period also saw an exception to that rule in 
cases of `self-determination'. But by the end of the period, 
even before the end of the Cold War, it is possible to 
discern a further shift in opinion and in the practice of 
states. The acceptance that `self-determination' should 
`exceptionally' justify intervention gave way to a broader 
notion that a second principle - the systematic abuse of 
human rights - could also justify intervention. 
The first such crisis after the end of the Cold War - the 
civil war in Liberia and the ECOWAS intervention - showed 
that the relief of mass suffering could justify forcible 
intervention. This suggested a new type of `exceptional 
case', even where no `alien rule' or `occupied territory' 
conditions existed. These developments strengthened the 
effect of General Assembly resolutions adopted in 1988,1990 
and 199157 which required states to give aid agencies access 
to victims of disasters. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Conclusions of this chapter are as follows: 
" The 19`h century practice of `great power' interventions 
established a precedent for states to intervene in other 
territories, forcibly to protect their citizens, their co- 
religionists and their property. But these `rights' were 
progressively dismantled by the treaties which created the 
`collective security' regimes associated first with the 
League and then with the United Nations. " 
" Since World War 2 the practice of the international 
community has acknowledged the legitimacy of state 
authorities' `domestic jurisdiction': customary law 
prohibited (forcible) intervention into states and non-self- 
governing territories. 
" During the period 1945-89 `Cold War' interventions did not 
prompt remedial action (or, in some cases, even 
5' These were GAR 43/131 'Humanitarian Assistance to Victims of Natural Disasters' December 1988. GAR 45/100 
of December 1990 and GAR 46/182 'Strengthening the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance' of December 1991 (ie 
after PROVIDE COMFORT). All emphasised the humanitarian need for aid agencies to provide relief to victims even 
when the government of the state refused to, or failed to. consent to their actions. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 
Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualtsation (Cambridge: Polity, 1996) p 86. 
58 Seep37. 
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censure) from the UN because there was no working 
consensus on the Security Council to take concerted 
action. 
" In the `self-determination' declarations adopted by 
the General Assembly the UN created an exception to the 
principle of non-intervention in territories under 
colonial or `alien rule'. In dealing with South Africa 
and Southern Rhodesia (after UDI) the Security Council 
accepted that intervention was justified. Sometimes the 
Council took action on the grounds that the intra-state 
conflict caused by racial divisions could be regarded 
as a `threat to international peace and security'. But 
intervention was also justified on the sole grounds of 
the `violation of basic human rights'. Here the 
Security Council implied that intervention could be 
justified by conditions inside a state, even if there 
was no threat to international peace. The Security 
Council favoured the use of economic sanctions - not 
intervention - and authorised only the most limited use 
of force. The measures taken against South Africa and 
Southern Rhodesia strengthened the case for 
intervention as an option open to the international 
community. But they did not create a universal 
precedent establishing a `right' of intervention with 
the full force of customary law. 
" In one of the first cases of (forcible) intervention 
after 1989 the Security Council ignored (and later 
endorsed) the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia. The 
approach taken by the Council broadened the category of 
crisis in which, as an exceptional case, `humanitarian' 
intervention (including the use of force) in an intra- 
state conflict would be permitted. This broader 
category would include, for the first time, states or 
territories where `self-determination' was not an 
issue. 
" The Security Council consideration of the intra-state 
conflict in Iraq in March and April 1991 drew upon this 
past practice of the UN when it decided upon action in 
the Kurdish crisis. Before examining the activity in 
the UN surrounding that crisis we must first consider 




THE KURDISH PEOPLE - RELIGION, LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND 
EARLY HISTORY 
The preceding chapter considered some of the problems 
of sovereignty in the international system in the late 
20th century. An interesting example of a people- 
without-a-state exists in the case of the 20 million 
Kurds, living as minority groups in states in the 
Levant and the Caucasus. Conflict between Kurds and the 
rulers of their `host' states has in the past 
threatened international peace and security. This 
chapter provides the background material on the Kurds 
and forms the backdrop to the description and analysis 
of events in the Kurdish crisis of 1991. 
International reactions to the Kurdish crisis were 
influenced in part by external states' concerns about 
political-legal questions on the proper status of 
minorities and by concerns over other parties' rights 
or duties of `intervention' in intra-state conflict. 
But the reactions were also conditioned by the 
competing interests of leading states and their 
governments' calculations about longer-term regional 
stability. The Kurds are therefore a people whose 
recent experience makes them a model for the study of 
`intervention'. 
The Kurds are citizens of states which have, to a 
varying extent, attempted to suppress their political 
identity and culture in the pursuit of assimilation. 
The Kurds have frequently rebelled against their `host' 
governments and fought against other groups within 
those `host' states. These rebellions have in turn been 
exploited by neighbouring states who have sought 
Kurdish allies in pursuit of their own interests. More 
recently the Kurds have become entangled in leading 
states' strategic involvement in the politics of the 
region. Another form of external contact has come from 
states and organisations which wish to protect (and, in 
some cases, to promote) the human and political rights 
of minority peoples. The Kurds are, therefore, 
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established targets of foreign influence and 
involvement. 
Some observers generally sympathetic to the Kurdish 
people have assumed that there is a long-standing, 
universal and coherent Kurdish aspiration for 
independent statehood, as well as a coherent movement 
dedicated to this cause. This is not an accurate 
picture, as will be explained below. 
The themes of this chapter will be as follows: 
" The historical origins of the modern states of the 
`northern tier' and the political history of the Kurds 
inside those states. 
" The linguistic, religious and political divisions in 
the Kurdish populations. 
" The distrust felt by Arabs, Turks, Persians and Kurds 
towards leading states, especially those states' 
involvement in the Middle East in the 20th century. 
" The `host states' attempts to assimilate their own 
Kurdish citizens to date. 
" The Kurdish populations failure (to date) to 
coordinate their separate efforts - and exploit all 
possible sources of external support - to create viable 
political structures. 
" The `host states' experience of receiving Iraqi Kurd 
refugees during the Anfal in 1988. 
KURDISH CULTURE, POLITICAL TRADITION AND 
IDENTITY IN HISTORY 
Until recent times the Kurds' sense of identity focused 
on the tribe or clan. There was little evidence of 
Kurds having a `national' consciousness. Indeed inter- 
communal rivalry and fighting between Kurdish groups 
was far more common than `national' resistance to any 
central authority. The explanation of this lies in the 
nature of Kurdish society. 
Throughout history most Kurds have lived as tribesmen 
in nomadic communities under the authority of feudal 
chiefs. ' By the opening of the 20th century, however, 
1 Van Bruinessen makes the point that 16th and 17th century sources use the word Kurd to mean a 'pastoral 
nomad' without regard for race. M van Bruinessen 'Kurdish society, ethnicity and refugee problems' in Philip G 
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many had become semi-nomadic and others lived in 
permanent settlements. By 1914 many were already living 
outside the feudal system as townspeople. Today 
40% of 
all Kurds live in cities. 2 
The traditional lands of the Kurdish people(s) are the 
mountains and foothills in the `northern tier' of the 
Levant, Anatolia and the Caucasus. With a total 
population of over 20 million they are to be found 
in 
eastern Turkey3, northern Syria, north western Iran4 and 
in northern Iraq. There are also small populations 
in the 
Lebanon5 and the southern Caucasus states of Azerbaijan, 
Armenia and Georgia. 6 Recently sizeable Kurdish 
populations have become established in Western European 
states: there are large communities in Germany and Sweden 
and a smaller community in France. 
In 1989 the Kurdish population in Turkey was assessed to 
be between 10% and 20% of the Turkish population: 8-9 
million out of a total population of 60 million. The 
Kurds are in a majority in Turkey's south-west provinces. 
Other centres of Kurdish population exist in Istanbul, 
Izmir, Ankara and Adana. The Kurds in Western Anatolia 
are descended from people who were compulsorily relocated 
from the East after uprisings in the past.? The Turks 
themselves are not an ethnically pure race. One authority 
has noted that many Turks are of foreign (that is, non- 
Turkic) descent: 
The proportion of urban and middle class Turks 
whose grandparents came as refugees from the 
Balkans, Crete, Egypt, the Caucasus and other parts 
of the Soviet Union is probably over 50%. 8 
2 'Fehrad Ibrahim 'The Kurdish National Movement and the Struggle for National Autonomy' in Berch Berberoglu 
(ed) The National Question: Nationalism. Ethnic Conflict & Self Determination in the 20th Century' (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1995) p 37. 
3M Gunter'The Kurds in Turkey: a Political Dilemma (Oxford: Westview, 1991) p6 and Henri Barclay 'Turkey's 
Kurdish Dilemma' Survival Winter 1993-4 p 52). 
' Most Iranian Kurds live in the north-west of the country, in the province of western 'Azerbaijan'. Within this 
province there Is a district called 'Kurdistan'. Other significant Kurdish settlements exist in Bakhtara and Ilima, 
and others in Luristan and Hamadan. 
5 Vanly In Kreyenbroek p 165. 
6 Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou states that the total area occupied by Kurds [in 19651 was 409,650 square miles. 
Kurdistan and the Kurds (London: Collets Holdings, 1965) p 23. 
7 Barclay p 52. 
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There are also Azeri-speaking Turcoman populations, 
mostly in the cities of Diyarbakir and Kirkuk. These 
people have inter-married with Kurds and are often 





Syria 750,000 - im (sources disagree) 
Lebanon 60,000 - 90,000 (sources disagree) 
Caucasus 300,000 
Syria does not acknowledge the existence of its 
minorities. Nevertheless it is calculated that there 
are im Kurds living in that state, amounting to 10% of 
the population. The main centre is Jazira, on the 
Turkish and Iraqi borders, in the same district where 
the oilfields of Quarachok and Remilian are located. 
There is another Kurdish enclave, Arab-Pinar, further 
to the west, where 60,000 Kurds9 live. 
In Iraq the 4m Kurds represent 20% of the population. 
This is the largest of the different Kurdish 
communities, relative to the population of the `host' 
state. The traditional Kurdish areas are in the 
mountainous north of the country. Forced resettlements 
have created Kurdish areas in the west and south of 
Iraq. The Kurds of Iraq have periodically fought for 
autonomy from the central government. Whereas some 
leaders have recently begun to campaign for separate 
statehood most Iraqi Kurds still define their 
aspirations as `cultural autonomy'. In northern Iraq 
there are two other minority groups whose political 
fortunes are associated with those of the Kurds: the 
220,000 Turkomans (mostly Sunni Moslems) and the 
133,000 Assyrians (Orthodox Christians). '0 
The Kurdish. people of Lebanon are in nearly every case 
first, second, or third generation migrants from Turkey 
or Syria. Many are descended from people who left 
8 David Barchard Turkey and the West (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul for the IISS, 1985) p 13. 
9 Vanly in Kreyenbroek p 148. 
10 Helen Chapin Metz (ed) Iraq: A Country Study (Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1990) p 
86. 
68 
Turkey after the failed Kurdish uprisings in the 1920s. 
In 1983 the number of Kurds in Lebanon was estimated at 
90,000. Nearly all live in west Beirut. The recent 
civil war (and occupations by foreign forces) have led 
the Lebanese Kurds to make themselves inconspicuous. 
There is no established `Kurdish rights' movement in 
Lebanon. 
The Kurds are also divided by religion. Although most 
Kurds are Moslem" they are divided into sects. 12 85% of 
Kurds are Sunnis but there are divisions between the 
adherents of various dervish sects (such as the 
numerous Nashquibandi and the fewer al-Allahis), 
especially in Turkey and Iraq. There are also Kurdish 
populations within the Shia religious community in the 
region - the Fali clan, in Iraq, and some of the Alevi 
people, in Turkey - who are regarded as kin to the 
Kurds. Whereas the Shia Kurds are accepted as members 
of the wider Kurdish population the Kurds of Iraq and 
Syria are hostile to their Shia Arab neighbours. 13 
The Fali represent about 10% of the Kurds in Iraq and 
live in the area of Baghdad. Earlier this century the 
Fali chose to adopt Iranian nationality but remain 
living in Iraq (largely to avoid conscription of their 
menfolk into the Iraqi or Iranian armed forces). In the 
1940s many Fali applied to become Iraqi citizens. 
Nationality laws required them to be naturalised rather 
than given full citizenship. This lesser status was 
exploited in 1969-88 when the regime deported 130,000 
Fali to Iran. 
Living amongst the Kurds are also Chaldean or Assyrian 
(Orthodox) Christians, Armenians (also Orthodox 
Christians) and Kurdish believers in Yazidism (a 
syncretic belief with elements of Islam, Nestorian 
Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism). Nearly all 
11 D McDowell A Modem Histo[yof the Kurds' (London: IB Tauris, 1996) p 10. Also Ibrahim p 36. Entessar p 5. 
12 Munir Morad 'The Situation in Iraq and Turkey; Current Trends and Prospects' in Philip G Kreyenbroek 
and Stefan Sperl (eds. ) The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview (New York and London: Routledge, 1992) p 
131. Also, M van Bruinessen 'Kurdish society, ethnicity and refugee problems' in Kreyenbroek and Sperl p 40. 
13 See the refusal of the Iraqi Shia parties opposed to the Baath to join the Kurdish parties in a joint united 
front, despite attempts made by the Kurdish leadership during the Iran-Iraq War and in 1990 during the early 
days of the Gulf Crisis. When asked if the Kurds would be safer in Iraq if the Shia - the majority Moslem 
denomination in Iraq - took power Kurds invariably replied that the Shia in power would be 'worse than 
Saddam'. Source: author's conversations with village headmen and elders in northern Iraq April-July 1991. 
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Yazidi Kurds are to be found in the Caucasus. There are 
also a few Jewish Kurds. Members of these religious 
groups who live amongst the Kurds, irrespective of 
their exact ethnic origin, consider themselves to be 
(and are accepted as) members of the same Kurdish 
communities. Van Bruinessen has noted that the non- 
Moslem minorities living in the Kurdish areas have 
significantly declined in the last hundred years `due 
to massacres, flight and perhaps to a lesser extent, 
due to religious conversion'. 
Writing about the global Kurdish population McDowell 
gives the proportion of Sunni Moslems as 75%, and Shia 
Moslems as 20%. According to Fehrad Ibrahim14 4% of this 
population are (Orthodox) Christian. Most of the 30,000 
Jewish Kurds (who lived in northern Iraq) emigrated to 
Israel in the period 1945-65. According to Entessar 
there are still 200 Jewish Kurd families living in the 
Iranian city of Sanandaj. 
The Kurds are also divided by language. The often 
remote location of Kurdish communities and the 
historically low literacy rate amongst the people have 
meant that the languages have developed slowly. During 
the centuries of Ottoman rule the Kurdish languages 
existed in an oral rather than a written tradition. 
They have also been influenced by the `majority' 
languages: Turkish in Turkey, Arabic in Iraq and Syria, 
Farsi in Iran. Kurds did not devise new words for 
contemporary objects or new ideas; they adopted the 
word or grammatical pattern found in the `majority' 
language. Vanly maintains, however, that 90% of Syrian 
Kurds use Kurdish amongst themselves in everyday life 
and the peasantry has no knowledge of Arabic. 15 Michael 
Ignatieff states that this is also true of Iraqi Kurds. 
In contrast many Turkish Kurds have no knowledge of the 
Kurdish languages. 16 
The Kurdish languages are Indo-Persian in origin and 
linguistically much closer to modern Farsi than to 
14 Note 2, above. 
15 Vanly in Kreyenbroek p 148. 
16 Blood and Belonging: Journeys into Nationalism (London: Vintage, 1994) p 137. 
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Turkish or Arabic. There are three main language groups 
(some of which are mutually incomprehensible): 
Kurmanji, Sorani, and a third group which exists only 
as an oral tradition. Kreyenbroek insists on `Kurdish 
languages' rather than `dialects of the Kurdish 
language' because they are so different. '7 He compares 
their differences to those between modern English and 
German. 
Kurmanji is spoken by Kurds in Turkey, Syria, the 
former-Soviet Caucasian territories, and in the 
northern parts of Iraq and Iran. Kurmanji is normally 
written in Roman script but there are exceptions: 
Cyrillic script is used in former Soviet territories; 
Iraqi Kurds living north of the Great Zab use the 
Arabic script. Kurmanji (like French and German) has 
gender and case-endings for articles, adjectives and 
nouns. From 1920-1945 the main centre for the 
development of Kurmanji as a modern language was Syria. 
After the end of the mandate it moved to western 
Europe. The Chair of Kurdish Studies at the Sorbonne 
was founded in 1950. 
Sorani is spoken by the Iraqi Kurds living south of the 
Great Zab and those living in the central Kurdish 
districts of Iran. It is written in the Arabic script. 
Like English it does not have case or gender-endings 
for articles, adjectives or nouns. Since the mid-18th 
century the sub-dialect of Suleymaniyeh has established 
itself as the dominant form of Sorani. 
The Iranian languages Zarza and Gurani'8 are also used 
in Kurdish communities. The Zarza-speakers, in most 
cases Alevi (Shia) Kurds, live in Tunceli province 
(formerly called Dersim) in Turkey, in the triangle 
between Diyarbakir, Ezerum and Sivas. Zarza uses 
Roman script although few publications exist to 
standardise the language. Many Zarza-speakers also 
understand Kurmanji but few Kurmanji-speakers 
understand Zarza. 19 Gurani is close to Zarza and is 
17 Kreyenbroek p 70. There are differences between language experts' assessments of the Kurdish 
languages. Entessar gives the main languages as Kurdi, Kurmanji, and Zarza. 
18 Kreyenbroek p 70. 
19 Ibid. 
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used by Kurds living in and around Bakhtaran (formerly 
Kermanshah) in Iran. 20 The native speakers of Zarza and 
Gurani are also accepted as Kurds. 21 
The written forms of these languages lack uniformity, 
however, even within the main language groups. Most 
Turkish Kurds now speak Turkish as their mother tongue; 
they also write whatever Kurdish words they know in the 
Roman script. Many, if not most, Iraqi Kurds, in contrast, 
speak Arabic as their mother tongue but write Kurdish 
words in Arabic script. The Kurds of Iran write Kurdish 
words in the Persian script. As noted above different 
Kurdish communities have incorporated words from the 
`majority' language into their Kurdish language. The 
Kurdish languages are therefore a patchwork where Kurds 
from areas distant to one another cannot understand the 
others' Kurdish, in speech or in writing. 22 
As with the languages so with considerations of ethnic 
unity. 23 Many Kurds acknowledge that their own lines of 
descent are from Arab forebears. 
On this evidence it is hard to conclude that the global 
Kurdish population constitutes a recognisable social 
community. It is even harder to recognise a coherent 
political community. Divisions are significant and the 
points of similarity seem superficial. Perhaps the key 
issue is the `sense of community' or `nationality' amongst 
these people. Do they regard themselves as a people, with 
collective identity and aspirations? Or is the Kurdish 
identity a myth propagated by their different leaders and 
by their friends abroad? Perhaps Western commentators have 
been too ready to accept the `Kurdish nationalist' 
assumption that any people sharing an ethnic identity, 
however fragmented, are somehow destined to belong to a 
unified political entity. 
THE POLITICAL TRADITION OF THE KURDS 
The Kurds originate from territories which have only 
recently entered the state system. Before the 20th 
20 Andrew Mango Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role (Washington: Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, 1994) p 35. 
21 Kreyenbroek points out that the native Zarza and Gurani speakers are probably not true descendants of ancient 
Kurds. They are however accepted as Kurds and regard themselves as such. Kreyenbroek p 70. 
22 The complexities of the Kurdish languages' oral and written forms are well described in Joyce Blau 'Kurdish 
Written Literature' in Philip Kreyenbroek and Christine Allison (eds. ) Kurdish Culture and Identity (London: Zed 
Books, 1996) pp 20-27. 
23 David McDowell 'The Kurdish Question; A Historical Review' in Kreyenbroek and Sperl p 11. 
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century the 'empire'24 of the Ottomans was a loose 
collection of provinces bound as much by a sense of 
Islamic religious and cultural identity as by a sense 
of political allegiance to a central authority. 25 The 
Islamic word for state (dawla) is itself a modern 
invention. Under the Ottomans the key concept was that 
of `ummal: the community of all Moslems ruled by a 
`sultan-caliph', a temporal ruler descended from the 
Prophet and bound to rule in accordance with Islamic 
Law. 26 
The remainder of the Kurds were under Russian (later 
Soviet) rule, or were subjects of the Shah of Persia. 
These Kurdish populations enjoyed a degree of autonomy 
due to the remote location of their homelands, far from 
the centres of power. 
Kurdish society was originally tribal and feudal. 
Chaliand notes that inter-tribal conflict defines the 
tribe itself. 
The one constant, the one important occasion when 
the tribe will always act as such, is in 
confrontation with another tribe or clan. In this 
sense one can say that only conflict and revenge, 
which are essential aspects of tribal values, 
give this type of segmentary social organization 
any relevance. 
Revenge is between groups. The goal is not to 
punish the guilty individual but the group to 
which he belongs.... The tribe is, in practice, 
the largest grouping within Kurdish society. 
There has never been, at least until the middle 
of the 20th century, any real national feeling 
capable of transcending tribal rivalries. Even in 
the 20th century, Kurdish nationalist movements 
have been systematically opposed, not only by 
governments but also by government-allied Kurdish 
militias who have sought thereby to weaken a 
24 Some authorities avoid the term 'Ottoman Empire' because the structure was loose and built on a 
consciousness of religious and cultural identity, rather than on state authority. 
25 Gunter p 11. 
26 Some Arab scholars argue that nationalism only arose In the Moslem world because of the activities of 
Western imperialists. It is argued that the Western powers used missionaries in order to create rifts in the 
hitherto peaceful Moslem umma in order to foster nationalism and thus allow colonial domination. Shabir 
Ahmed The Roots of Nationalism in the Muslim World (London: The Islamic Book Company, 1995) p 21. 
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rival. Until recently nationalism has never been 
a strong enough ideology to bridge such gulfs.... 
The play between tribes is one of perpetual 
opposition.... The ability of these leaders to 
develop good relations with the authorities will 
increasingly become the key factor in determining 
their political successes and failures. 27 
Kurdish rebellions occurred under the Ottomans, notably 
the uprising led by Sheik Obeidullah in 1880. Revolts 
against the central authorities reflected local 
leaders' annoyance at interference in their domains 
rather than any `nationalist' philosophy. Despite the 
Kurds' strong sense of independence there have always 
been tribes who have allied themselves with the central 
authorities against their fellow-Kurds. Where tribal 
lands have been accessible to government forces (and 
therefore vulnerable to punitive expeditions), or where 
ancient rivalries have divided Kurdish leaders, some 
tribes have repeatedly allied themselves with the 
central authorities and opposed any Kurdish rebellions 
which took place. 
Kurdish populations in the various territories have 
experienced central governments' attempts at 
assimilation28 of minorities. These policies have 
created counter-pressures for cultural recognition. 
As tribal federations crumbled the chiefs settled in 
urban areas and became absentee landlords. The sense 
of tribal identity was diminished. Nationalism slowly 
developed as one of the consequences of the breakdown 
of tribalism. A new class of urban Kurds, merchants, 
lawyers and intellectuals began to replace the aghas 
(chiefs) and sheiks (clergy) as leaders of the 
Kurds. 29 
27 Gerard Chaliand (ed) People without a Country: the Kurds and Kurdistan (London: Zed Press, 1980) pp 
20-22. 
28 The most determined effort to extinguish the Kurds' sense of identity has taken place in Turkey. See 
Chapter 4. 
29 Fereshteh Koohi-Kamali in Kreyenbroek p 172. 
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For Chaliand the Kurds' failure to achieve statehood 
has not just been a lack of effort, but a lack of 
aspiration. 30 He attributes the failures before 1978 to 
their leaders' blindness to the ambiguous nature of 
their alliances and their inability to forge an 
`organic link between the masses and the peoples' 
army'. Above all the leadership was parochial, 
lacking vision: 
The leadership never managed to set itself the 
goal of rising above its own society, carrying 
the masses with it, as other revolutionary 
leaderships managed elsewhere ...... - 
backwardness of the mountain Kurds, in particular 
their elites, did not seize opportunities 
presented by 1918 and 1946 with success, ..... 
carrying the masses with it like nationalists 
managed elsewhere ..... real radical practice. 
Chaliland also criticised Kurdish leaders: 
The fundamental values [of the elites] are those 
of yesteryear: tactical cunning instead of 
political analysis, clientist manoeuvrings 
instead of political mobilisation, and a few 
revolutionary slogans rather than an army nor a 
radical ideology, overtaking essentially tribal 
politics. 31 
THE VERSAILLES SETTLEMENT AND THE 
FORMER OTTOMAN TERRITORIES 
The Ottoman regime was shaken first by the Young Turk 
revolution of 1908 and then by Turkey's defeat in World 
War 1. After 1908 Turkey had been alarmed at the 
rapprochement of its old ally, Britain, with its most 
hostile neighbour, Russia. The British wanted to 
strengthen their position in Persia to safeguard their 
newly-acquired oil interests. Turkey therefore sought 
an alliance with the European state most hostile to 
Russia: Germany. Soon Germany and Turkey were 
cooperating in building the Baghdad railway which was 
part of the Kaiser's Drang nach Ostern (also called the 
Zimmerman Plan). The plan secretly prepared to 
encourage a Moslem revolt against British possessions 
30 Gerard Chaliand'Introduction' in Chaliand p 16. 
31 Ibid p 15. 
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in the Middle East and India. In 1914 Turkey allied 
itself with Germany and attacked Russian territories 
on the Black Sea coast. Britain attempted an invasion 
of Turkey in the failed Dardanelles operation but 
later inspired the Arab Revolt and overran Turkish 
territories in the Levant. 
Britain and France planned a post-war settlement in 
which they would take control of the Turkish 
possessions in the Levant and Arabia. These plans 
were finalised in the secret Anglo-French Sykes-Picot 
Agreement, signed in 1916.32 But the US decision to 
enter the war in 1917 introduced the Wilson 
Administration's `self-determination' 33 agenda into the 
post war settlement. The USA had entered the war `in 
association' with the Entente Powers, not in alliance 
with them. It had, furthermore, declared war on Germany 
and Austria (but not on Turkey). Accordingly the 
Versailles Settlement was influenced by the US 
Administration's enthusiasm for `self determination' 
for minorities. It also had to take account of 
President Wilson's concept of `collective security', an 
approach to international relations which sought to 
eliminate wars of conquest and other forms of 
aggression. The US Administration's concern for the 
rights of minorities in Anatolia, on the one hand, and 
the strategic ambitions of the British and the French, 
on the other, were eventually brought together in the 
system of `mandates'. Thus plebiscites would determine 
the political future of the minorities in Anatolia and 
the Britain and France would, for a few years, 
supervise the peoples of modern Syria, Lebanon, Iraq 
(and Transjordan) as they prepared for eventual 
independence. 
The Versailles conference only considered the post-war 
settlement of the former Ottoman territories after it 
had addressed the questions of Germany and Austria. But 
political and military tensions inside the region would 
not wait for decisions to be made at Versailles. 
32 Roger Adelson London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money Power and War 1902-1922 (New 
Haven NJ: Yale University Press, 1995) p 40. Czarist Russia was also a party to this Agreement. The 
Bolshevik regime, on coming to power, renounced Russia's participation (and published the documents). 
33 Jeffrey T Richelson A Century of Spies: Esoionaae in the Twentieth Century (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1995) p 44. 
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THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY 
At the end of the war the states with significant ex- 
patriate communities in Anatolia moved to protect their 
compatriots. On 29 March 1919 an Italian force landed 
at Smyrna. A Greek force followed on 14 May. Turkish 
nationalists were alarmed: they recognised that Turkey 
could not retain control of their former possessions in 
the Levant and Arabia. But they would not accept the 
fragmentation of the Anatolian heartland into 
territories dominated by non-Turkish peoples. On 4 
September Atatürk proclaimed the `National Pact', 
declaring Turkish sovereignty over all former-Ottoman 
territories in Anatolia and Thrace. In November 1919 
the French took possession of the Turkish province of 
Cilicia (part of Anatolia) on the grounds that it was 
populated largely by Christians. 34 
The European powers wanted to prevent a war in 
Anatolia but were unwilling to deploy the military 
resources required to impose a settlement. Indeed 
British policy in the region was driven in part by a 
desire to de-mobilise most of their units stationed 
in the Middle East. British forces did, however, 
occupy Constantinople. They also strengthened the 
garrison at Charnak, in Turkish Thrace. The Allies 
considered inviting the Greeks to occupy 
Constantinople. 
During the War of Independence (1919-23) Atatürk's 
forces confronted the garrisons of the enclaves and 
sought to subdue the minorities. In an attempt to 
bring order to the region the Versailles conference 
drew up a plan presented as the Treaty of Sevres, 
first publicised in 1921. It authorised the 
restoration of Greek and Italian enclaves and planned 
the eventual `self-determination' of the Armenian and 
Kurdish minorities, after plebiscites. 
By the summer of 1923 the new Turkish state had imposed 
itself upon these minorities and destroyed the Greek 
enclaves in Anatolia. The nationalists had, besides, 
34 This force was destroyed by the Turks in 1921.20,000 Christians were massacred. 
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defeated the Italian, French and Greek occupation 
forces, and had successfully emerged from a 
confrontation with the British (the Charnak Crisis). 
Their success was due to their energetic, if not 
ruthless, prosecution of the war and the refusal of the 
Great Powers to intervene decisively. 
The Treaty of Lausanne (August 1923) consolidated the 
nationalists' victories. Great Britain and France 
consented to Turkish rule over the Armenian and Kurdish 
minorities, abandoning the `self-determination' policy 
they had endorsed at Sevres. (The US, the original 
sponsor of `self-determination', had withdrawn from 
involvement in the region. ) The British and French 
contented themselves, nevertheless, with the control of 
the `mandates' granted by the League of Nations. 
Furthermore the British succeeded in detaching the oil- 
rich vilayet of Mosu135 from the new Republic of Turkey 
and incorporating it into the Mandate of Iraq. 36 
Kendal takes the view that the best chance for a 
Kurdish homeland occurred in the period October 1918 
and June 1919.37 The Kurds call the events of 1918-24 
the `first betrayal': the failure of the international 
community to fulfil the earlier undertaking to create 
`self-determination' for the Kurdish people in 
Anatolia, if not elsewhere in the region. 
THE MANDATES OF SYRIA AND IRAQ 
As the Treaties of Sevres and Lausanne had settled the 
future of Turkey and its ethnic minorities so the 
Conference of San Remo (1920) restructured the Ottoman 
territory of Syria. The four vilayets of Damascus, 
Aleppo, Saida and Tripoli were distributed between the 
two new mandate territories of Syria and Transjordan. 
35 The oil-rich vilayet of Mosul is a territory of 87,890 square kilometers and contained a population of 
800,000. Despite Turkish protests this dispute was settled, after several years of diplomacy, in 1926. French 
and US commercial interests were satisfied by the grant of oil extraction concessions in the Mosul oilfields. 
Turks recall Britain's part in the loss of Mosul as yet another example of its willingness to damage Turkey's 
legitimate interests. 
36 The British had to use force to maintain their control of Iraq under the Mandate. From December 1919 to 
January 1921 an Arab revolt in Iraq occupied a British military force of 60,000 men. Iraq was subsequently 
'policed' by the RAF. William Jackson Britain's Triumph and Decline in the Middle East: Military Campaigns 
1919 to the Present Day (London: Brassey's, 1996) p 22-23. 
37 Kendal 'The Kurds in the Ottoman Empire' in Gerard Chaliand (ed) The Kurdish Tragedy translated by 
Philip Black (London and New York: Zed Books, 1994) p 38. 
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Later in 1920 the French further divided the mandate of 
Syria into two separate administered territories: Syria 
and Lebanon. 
The Mandate powers drew the territories' (and thus the 
future state) boundaries, intentionally dividing the 
Kurdish populations. 38 An agreement signed in March 1921 
(amended in October and again in 1926) transferred part 
of the Jazira area (and its Kurdish population) from 
Iraq to Syria. In 1939 the French transferred the 
sanjak39 of Haytay-Alexandretta (and its Kurdish 
population) to Turkey. 
During the inter-war years the British and the French 
encouraged minority cultures in their mandate 
territories, as a matter of individual rights. 40 They 
did not encourage the collective rights of minorities, 
however. They took military action to deal with 
uprisings and revolts against the central political 
authority. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of the chapter are: 
" The history of the Kurds is one of diversity and 
separation: in language, in religion and in political 
allegiance. Notwithstanding the claims made by their 
own leaders (and some others) the Kurds did not 
establish a national political consciousness, nor a 
national political movement, across the whole 
population, in history. 
" The leadership of the Kurds has always been 
fragmented. In the past the various Kurdish parties in 
Iraq, and across the Kurdish world, have been unwilling 
to cooperate in sustained political or military 
campaigns. 
" The first of the historic `three betrayals' of the 
Kurds by other peoples at Lausanne was the Kurds' first 
experience of betrayal by the West. Later in the 20th 
century they would recall these events as an early 
38 A Sherzad 'The Kurdish Movement in Iraq 1975-88' in Kreyenbroek and Sperl p 135. 
39 A sanjak is a district of a vilayet. 
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indication that powerful states would withdraw support 
if and when support for Kurdish aspirations became 
incompatible with truly high-priority diplomatic 
objectives. Arabs, Iranians as well as Kurds came to 
suspect the motives behind Western interventions in the 
Middle East, even when the declared intention was 
humanitarian. 
" The Kurds of the northern tier have been, separately, 
in opposition to the governments of their `host' states 
since the early years of the century. As a potentially 
powerful and warlike people forming a sizeable 
minority, they have shown themselves to be a source of 
conflict inside the various host-states. 
2 
40 Jackson pp 7-9. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE 
IN TURKEY 
The preceding chapter described how the Kurds came to 
be dispersed in several neighbouring states. It also 
described the Kurds' tribal origins and their 
differences in language and religion. This chapter 
examines the political history of the Kurds in Turkey 
in the 20th century from the foundation of the Republic 
to date. It also considers the effect of external 
powers' regional interventions on Turkey's Kurds. This 
material is presented briefly as historical background 
to events and reactions to the Kurdish crisis of 1991. 
This chapter explains why the Kurds are a dissident 
minority in Turkey and why the Turks are reluctant to 
recognise `Kurdish rights'. It will also explain why 
Turks (and Kurds) are wary of foreign interventions on 
behalf of the Kurds. As an introduction to the 
discussion (in subsequent chapters) of the rationale 
for Turkish decision-making during the crisis it will 
briefly describe the PKK campaign, the economic crisis 
and the strains within the governing Motherland Party 
(ANAP). 
The themes of this chapter will be as follows: 
" The conflict between nation-building and minority 
rights in the Republic of Turkey. 
" The policy of Atatürk, and his legacy in domestic and 
foreign policy. 
" The authoritarian tradition in Turkish politics and 
its impact on the minorities question. 
" The successive interventions by powerful external 
states and their effect on Turkish (and Kurdish) 
national consciousness. 
" Turkey's long-standing perception of Russia (and 
during its existence, the USSR) as the principal 
external threat and the consequences for Turkish 
security policy. The transition from policies of 
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neutrality through `containment' to a `multi-faceted' 
or balanced policy. 
" The PKK campaign and the strategies devised to 
defeat 
it. 
" The Turks' experience of receiving Iraqi Kurd 
refugees during the most recent Kurdish refugee crisis 
(the 1988 Anfal exodus) before the events of 1991. 
" The impact of the Gulf Crisis on the `multi-faceted' 
foreign policy. 
" The economic, security and political crisis facing 
the Turkish president and people in 1991, just as the 
Kurdish crisis took place, and the impact of those 
concerns on the government's actions in the Kurdish 
crisis. 
THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND THE KURDS 1923-1990 
After their victory in the War of Independence 
Atatürk and his followers - soon known as `Kemalists' 
- began the policy of `nation-building' which 
continues to the present day. They set out to build a 
modern state on a `western' model, in accordance with 
principles of secularism, capitalist enterprise and 
national unity. Cultural assimilation' was central to 
this plan: the integration of the many minorities was 
a key component of `nation-building'. They saw the 
suppression of the minority identities as essential 
for the building of a cohesive national community and 
a modern state. Similarly the Kemalists favoured 
democracy but maintained a one-party state until they 
judged that the population was ready to choose 
between a multiplicity of political parties. Atatürk 
himself stressed citizenship, not `pan-Turkism': he 
wanted Turkey to have a civic citizenship, not an 
ethnic one. ('Happy is he who calls himself a Turk'. )2 
He disapproved of pan-Turkism as inconsistent with 
1 More accurately, the suppression of minority cultures. 
2 In the eyes of the minority peoples, however, this distinction was of limited meaning. Until the 1990s 
Turkish officials refused to acknowledge that Kurdish people were in any way distinct from Turks. They would 
refer to 'mountain Turks' but never 'Kurds'. During periods of particular repression the laws forbidding the 
wearing of Kurdish dress in public were enforced. Kurdish towns and villages were given Turkish names. 
Kurdish people were forced to register new-born children with Turkish, not Kurdish, names. 
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Westernisation: he opposed the Young Turks' call for 
Turkey to align itself with the Caucasian peoples of 
Turkic origin and always opposed those who wanted an 
ethnic basis for citizenship. 3 
These assimilation programmes were partly successful: 
many Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians and Laz chose to 
abandon their ethnic roots and integrate with the other 
members of the Turkish population. 
This policy offended many members of minority 
communities, especially those living in rural areas. 
Kurdish people - as well as members of other minorities 
- wanted to retain their traditional lifestyle and to 
be free of the interference of the central authorities 
in taxation, the enforcement of non-traditional laws 
and conscription. One of the most contentious issues 
was the refusal of the authorities to provide education 
to members of minorities in their own language. Another 
was the drive to remove Islamic influences in the 
political life of the state. Government assimilation 
programmes have been assisted, over the years, by the 
drift of people from the poor country areas to the 
towns. 
The Westernisation policy also failed to satisfy the 
aspirations of Kurdish intellectuals. Educated, city- 
dwelling Kurds - often with leftist political views - 
opposed the Western, and capitalist direction of state 
policy, as well as the authoritarian nature of the 
single-party system which existed in Turkey until 1945. 
The intelligentsia also opposed the remnants of 
feudalism whereby Kurdish peasants were still under the 
control of aghas and sheiks in country areas. 
From the earliest days of the civil war the Kemalists 
saw Islam as having positive as well as negative 
aspects. On the positive side Islam was the religion of 
the Turkish people and a cultural basis for the 
In 1990 President Ozal signalled his willingness to try reconciliation with the Kurds by referring in public 
to 'people of Kurdish origin'. This was a dramatic - and controversial - signal that the policy of forced 
assimilation was about to be replaced by a policy of (limited) tolerance and recognition. 
3 Atatürk and his legacy still command great respect in modern Turkey. Nevertheless pan-Turkism has 
resurfaced in Turkish foreign policy as one of the strands of the 'multi-faceted' policy followed by all Turkish 
governments since the late 1970s. 
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nation's identity. It was a source of social welfare 
and cohesion. (In the 1940s and 1950s the authorities 
would value Islam as a counter to the threat of 
communism in Turkish society. ) But it also was an 
element of backwardness and traditionalism in Turkish 
society. It pointed to Turkey's Middle Eastern past, 
not its `European' future. To resolve this conflict the 
Kemalists decided on a separation of religion and 
state. Islam would neither be encouraged nor 
suppressed; it would be relegated to the privat areas 
of life, not the public affairs of the state. 
Accordingly, Atatürk abolished the Caliphate, the 
Islamic courts and schools in 1924, less than one year 
after the proclamation of the Republic. In 1925 sects 
were banned and monasteries were closed. A new 
Directorate of Religious Affairs was established in 
1925. In 1928 the Constitution was amended to remove 
the designation of Islam as the state religion. Islamic 
teachers were encouraged to preach the separation of 
state and religion. 4 
In foreign policy the Kemalists adopted a policy of 
neutrality: in the inter-war years Turkey concentrated 
on its internal development and avoided foreign 
commitments, especially those which would inhibit free 
trade. Turkey had followed Atatürk's insistence on 
neutrality: `peace abroad, peace at home'. Turkey 
should seek to be friends with all states, especially 
its neighbours. 
Neutral Turkey could not overlook the potential threat 
from Russia, however. Turks like to recall the `sixty 
battles and thirteen wars' fought by the two neighbours 
over the last 1000 years. For generations Ottoman 
Turkey and Czarist Russia had struggled for control of 
the eastern Balkans, the Caucasus and the Turkish 
Straits. During the 19th century Russia had claimed the 
right to intervene to defend the Sultan's Orthodox 
Christian subjects from persecution. It was only in the 
period 1917-1923 that the two neighbours had found the 
need to give each other support. The newly created USSR 
and the new Turkish Republic were in agreement in 
4 Sencer Ayata 'Patronage, Party and the State: The Politicisation of Islam in Turkey Middle East Journal 
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resisting British and French influence in the Middle 
East. (Hence the new Soviet government's publication of 
the Sykes-Picot Agreement. ) A Treaty of Friendship was 
signed in 1921. When both the USSR and the new Republic 
of Turkey had become established members of the 
international community, however, they rediscovered 
historic differences which could not easily be put 
aside. In 1936 the Soviets were annoyed by the Turkish 
insistence on control of the Straits in the Montreux 
Convention. The Turks were angered when they discovered 
some anti-Turkish provisions in the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact of 1939. 
Turkey remained neutral for most of the World War 2, 
declaring war on the Axis powers in 1945, when the 
Allied victory was already in sight. As the USSR 
emerged as a superpower in 1945 Turkey recognised that 
it would need allies in resisting the pressures exerted 
by such a powerful, ideologically-hostile, neighbour. 
In that year, for example, the Soviets revived an old 
claim to the Turkish province of Kars and once again 
demanded a naval base in the area of the Straits. The 
Turks were concerned to see the USSR supporting 
uprisings elsewhere in the Kurdish world, especially in 
Iraq. The Soviets also provided a refuge for Kurdish 
fighters when the Iraqi revolt collapsed in 1945. The 
Soviet occupation forces in Iran also inspired the 
foundation of the `Republic of Kurdistan' at Mahabad. 
Soviet policy towards Kurds elsewhere reinforced the 
Turkish decision to develop a stronger security 
relationship with Western states. 
POST WAR TURKEY - DEMOCRACY, MILITARY RULE AND 
EVOLUTION IN FOREIGN POLICY 
From the first days of the Republic Turkey had been a 
one-party state. In 1945 however, as part of the 
Westernisation programme, the government encouraged new 
parties to form. These parties contested the 1950 
parliamentary election. The new parties, seeking votes, 
courted the minorities, especially those (like the 
Kurds) whose geographical concentration made them a 
Vol 50 No 1, Winter 1996 pp 41-2. 
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significant bloc in many constituencies. The Kurds 
supported parties which were defeated by Adnan 
Menderes's Democrat Party which won power in that 
election. This was, nevertheless, the Kurds' first 
experience of developing political influence. 
The end of World War 2 also brought the renewed 
involvement of powerful states into the affairs of the 
region. The superpower confrontation forced Turkey to 
review its neutrality. In the late 1940s and 1950s the 
UK and, in due course, the US, sought to strengthen the 
stability of the states of the eastern Mediterranean 
and the `northern tier' to counter the perceived Soviet 
threat. The Truman Doctrine5 eventually developed into 
the broader policy of world-wide `containment'. Turkey 
made its decision: it adopted a pro-Western security 
policy to protect itself from Soviet subversion or 
attack. 
Turkey's pro-Western stance was wholehearted: it was 
the only `Moslem' state to recognise Israel in 1948. 
Later it refused to adopt the anti-Western policies of 
Nasser. It supported the US in its periodic attempts to 
resolve the conflict between Israel and its neighbours. 
These policies had since the late 1940s prevented 
Turkey from developing close relations with its 
southern neighbours. 
In 1953 NATO welcomed Turkey as a new member-state as a 
reward for its participation alongside US, British (and 
Commonwealth) forces in the Korean War. In accordance 
with the perceived Soviet threat Turkey agreed, as part 
of the 1959 bilateral `Agreement of Cooperation', to 
the deployment of US JUPITER strategic missiles (IRBMs) 
at the Cigli Air Force Base, near Izmir. This decision 
was uncontroversial in Turkey, especially as the 
country's economic weakness6 made US economic aid 
5 In the eastern Mediterranean this policy became known as the Truman Doctrine, after President Truman's 
support for Greece against the communist insurgents in 1947. 
6 Turkey had a balance of trade deficeit of $ 350m in 1958. Total foreign aid that year was $ 349m, of which 
$ 234 came from the US. Nur Bilge Criss' Strategic Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair 1959-63' The 
Journal of Strategic Studies Vol 20 No 3p 111. 
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increasingly important. ' Membership of the alliance may 
have brought Turkey security from the Soviet threat but 
it did not prevent a revival of the historic 
confrontation with Greece, also a NATO member-state. By 
the 1950s this dispute had become focused on Cyprus - 
where the Greek Cypriots' EOKA insurgency demanded 
union with Greece - and disputes over territorial 
rights in the islands. 
After ten years of multi-party democracy in Turkey 
there was a national crisis: rivalry between political 
leaders had produced a paralysed political process and 
growing public disorder. The instability reflected in 
part the difficulties every Turkish government 
experiences in bringing together the many competing 
aspirations of its diverse population. On the 27 May 
1960 the military - in the guise of the National Unity 
Committee - assumed responsibility for the government 
and charged several leading politicans with criminal 
offences. In 1961 Menderes, together with two of his 
senior ministers, was convicted and executed. Shortly 
afterwards new elections were held and civilian 
government resumed. 
The armed forces had been a powerful but non-political 
force in Turkey since the 1920s. They has normally 
avoided involvement in party politics. But senior 
officers see the forces as the guardian of the 
Constitution, guaranteeing its emphasis on 
Westernisation, secular politics, civil order and 
national unity. 
1960 also brought the question of Cyprus to the fore. 
In that year Britain gave independence to Cyprus with 
constitutional guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots. But 
in 1964 a Greek nationalist coup d'etat in Cyprus 
threatened to remove the Turkish Cypriots' minority 
rights. Turkey's protests were disregarded by the NATO 
allies. The US Administration warned that any 
unilateral Turkish intervention in Cyprus would result, 
at least, in the suspension of Turkey's right to 
7 The actual deployment of JUPITER missiles took place in late 1961, by which time they were obsolescent. 
Criss p 110. The missiles were de-commissioned in 1962 (and later removed) as a consequence of a secret 
agreement between the US and USSR at the time of the Cuban Missile crisis of October 1962. 
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collective defence under NATO's Washington Treaty. 8 This 
response from the other NATO member-states caused deep 
resentment in Turkey. Another cause for resentment was 
the government's publication of the secret US-USSR 
agreement which had caused the JUPITER missiles based 
in Turkey to be decommissioned in 1962, in return for 
the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Following 
a long foreign policy reassessment Turkey insisted on 
adding to a new, renewable, bi-lateral defence 
agreement with the US to the existing NATO-standard 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The new agreement, 
the 1969 Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
(DECA), asserted Turkish rights in respect of US (and 
all other foreign) forces based on Turkish territory. 
In the late 1960s Turkey was once again threatened by 
civil disorder, as a result of an internal political 
crisis. By 1970 a succession of weak governments were 
unable to solve Turkey's serious internal problems: 
rapid growth in population combined with economic 
failures persuaded many country people to move to the 
cities. Slum shanty towns (gekondus: `built-by-night') 
grew outside the cities. Crime and public disorder 
increased. In 1970 the armed forces intervened again, 
this time in a `coup by memorandum'. The military did 
not formally take power, however, as it had in 1960. 
This time the generals selected civilian politicans to 
serve as ministers. They justified their action by 
declaring that the legacy of Atatürk was in danger: the 
political stalemate harmed the national interests and 
the recent advance of Islamism into the political life 
of the nation was unacceptable. This second military 
intervention caused severe repression of all dissident 
groups; its effect upon the Kurds was to polarise 
opinion. It was in the aftermath of this period of 
military rule that many Kurdish political groups - the 
`associations of the East' - came into existence for 
the first time. 
In 1974 the international oil crisis further undermined 
political cohesion. Politicans seemed unable to deal 
with the worsening cycle of crime, inflation and 
$ This threat was delivered in the famous 'Johnson Letter', named after US President Lyndon B Johnson. 
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unemployment. In the climate of increasing anarchy 
political extremist groups arose. Some of these worked 
to create a socialist revolution9, others sought the 
liberation of long-oppressed minorities. 
1974 also saw Turkey engulfed in a second major 
international crisis over Cyprus. After an outbreak of 
communal fighting Turkish forces invaded and occupied 
the north east of the island. NATO's member-states 
condemned the invasion. Their refusal to support 
Turkey's national interests caused a profound shift in 
public opinion in Turkey. The government then devised a 
`multi-faceted' foreign and security policy. Turkey 
would remain a NATO member but it would thereafter show 
a greater openness towards neighbours and potential 
trade partners in the middle East and the Caucasus. It 
would seek better relations with states like Syria and 
Iraq which were on bad terms with the US. Turkey began 
to play a more prominent role in the Islamic 
Conference. 
Turkey's new policy was designed to preserve the full 
value of the NATO's strategic security guarantee but 
also to improve trade relations and regional 
cooperation with the USSR and other Black Sea and 
Middle East states. By this policy change Turkey 
signalled that the US should no longer rely on Turkey's 
unquestioning support for its policy objectives in the 
Middle East. Turkey would assess each issue in terms of 
its own interests. 
Whereas Turkey would distance itself from the US in 
regional issues it could not easily achieve a 
substantially better relationship with the USSR. 
Turkish national interests were directly opposed by 
Soviet objectives in the eastern Mediterranean, in the 
Balkans, in the Black Sea, in the Caucasus. The Soviets 
condemned the Turkish 1974 invasion of Cyprus and the 
Turks condemned the Soviet 1979 intervention in 
Afghanistan. 
9 The later notoriety of the PKK has caused many people outside Turkey to consider it the only terrorist 
group operating in Turkey. There are several others, such as Dev Genc and Dev Sol, two extreme leftist 
groups (with no Kurdish associations) which are just as active and violent as the PKK. They operate in the 
south and west of Turkey. 
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THE '12 SEPTEMBER' COUP AND THE ORIGINS OF THE PKK 
In the late 1970s worsening economic, social and 
political conditions threatened public order throughout 
Turkey. On 12 September 198010 the armed forces 
suspended all democratic institutions", took power and 
unleashed a wave of repression designed to eradicate 
crime and suppress political agitation. 12 This 
repression led many moderate members of minorities into 
supporting militant organisations. 
The PKK, Partia Karkaren Kurdistan, was founded in 
1978. It was established in Turkey before the coup but 
was able to move its headquarters to Syria before `12 
September'. 13 Originating in the Marxist Dev Genc 
(Revolutionary Youth) movement in 1974 the PKK under 
its first (and, so far, only) general secretary 
Abdullah Ocalan worked to bring revolutionary change in 
the Turkish state, first through a phase of recruitment 
and fund-raising (followed later by a campaign of 
`armed propaganda'). 
The PKK set out to exploit conditions in eastern 
Anatolia, especially the plight of the poor, 
discrimination against women and the greed of feudal 
landlords. The first manifesto, Kurdistan Devriminim 
Yolu (Path of Kurdish Revolution) was published in a 
clandestine edition in 1977.14 The document laid down 
the objectives of the struggle: 
10 The '12 September' coup imposed three years of authoritarian military rule on Turkey. When civilian rule 
resumed, in late 1983, changes In the Constitution made by the military government ensured that many of 
these restrictions continued for the next five years. 
il All existing political parties were eventually banned and all practising politicians barred from holding office. 
These restrictions were written into the 1982 constitution but were progressively relaxed after 1986. The 
principal effect of the restrictions was to prevent existing parties and established leaders to content the 1983 
elections. This allowed new political parties and leaders to take centre stage in the campaign. 
12 Whereas dissident Kurdish groups were politically active before the coup, and their members were 
sought by the authorities, they were not the principal target of repression. It was the leftist groups, and 
anarchists, who the authorities pursued. Even so the regime targeted prominent dissidents from all sections of 
the population, including many Kurdish activists in the south east. 
13 Syria nurses several grievances against Turkey: France's transfer of Haytay-Alexandretta from Syria to 
Turkey (under the mandate) in 1945, Turkey's pro-US and pro-Israel policy from the late 1940s onwards and 
Turkey's controversial 'South Anatolia' (GAP) project. Under the $ 32 bn GAP project Turkey has completed a 
network of dams and waterways which divert 50% of the headwaters of the Euphrates to irrigation schemes 
inside Turkey, to the detriment of Syria (and Iraq). 
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9 The confiscation of landlords' estates 
" The cancellation of peasants' debts 
" The reform of the national economy towards a 
programme of industrialisation 
" The development of a national Kurdish language 
" The removal of all foreign military forces from 
Turkey 
" Solidarity with revolutionary forces in Iraq, Iran 
and Syria 
" Friendship with other socialist countries and 
national liberation movements abroad. 
The PKK set out to recruit young Kurdish peasants and 
workers, rather than mature intellectuals who, in PKK 
propaganda, are typically accused of abandoning their 
Kurdish roots in the hope of advancement in the Turkish 
state and society. The PKK also worked to achieve 
dominance over the many other Kurdish revolutionary 
groups. This required the ruthless exploitation of the 
rivalries and personal differences of other Kurdish 
militants, often through the use of agents 
provocateurs. The PKK's most significant rival was the 
National Liberation [Army] of Kurdistan (KUK) which 
also presented a radical programme to the Kurds in 
Turkey. 15 The PKK soon infiltrated and undermined the 
KUK; it was determined to establish itself as the only 
effective representative of Turkey's Kurds. It needed 
to persuade moderate Kurds that nationalism was 
compatible with Marxism: in the early days the PKK flag 
combined the traditional colours of Kurdistan with the 
Hammer and Sickle. (The Hammer and Sickle was removed 
by a decision of the PKK's Fifth Congress. ) It was 
assisted in this objective by the repressive actions of 
the political Right in Turkey, represented by the 
police, the armed forces and political parties like the 
extremist NAP: Alparslan Türkes' `grey wolves'. 16 To 
finance its activities the PKK carried out armed 
robberies and was active in smuggling and drug-running. 
14 Serxweun (PKK'Programme')February 1983. 
15 Bozarslan p 102. 
16 Turkes, a former Army colonel, was a veteran ultra-conservative politician. He had been a leading member 
of the military faction which staged the coup in 1960. 
91 
(Various Kurdish groups had been carrying out armed 
attacks since 1974. ) At this stage the PKK did not 
conduct terrorist operations against the government, or 
against the civilian population in general. 
Before leaving office in 1983 the military regime took 
steps to ensure that the incoming civilian government 
would enforce `national unity' measures. The 1982 
revision of the Constitution placed additional 
restraints on expressions of minority cultures. It also 
confirmed the appointment of the officer who had led 
the military regime, General Evren, as president of the 
Republic. The parliamentary election in November 1983 
brought Turgut Özal's party to power. 
PRIME MINISTER OZAL, THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST PKK AND 
TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST 
Turgut Özal's ANAP owed its victory, in part, to its 
success in attracting the `Islamic' vote. As a 
practising Moslem (of the Nasquibendi sect) Özal was 
himself identified with the religious voter. He had 
selected ANAP's parliamentary candidates in 1983 and 
was thus responsible for the sizeable Islamist (and 
Nasquibendi) group of ANAP parliamentarians who were 
elected at that time. The Nasquibendi have strong links 
with the Sunni Moslems in the Gulf states. Turkey's 
relations with these states improved steadily through 
the 1980s. 17 
The incoming government faced a worsening security 
situation. During 1984 the PKK opened its `armed 
propaganda' terrorist campaign directed, for the first 
time, against government representatives and members of 
the security forces, as well as its established 
targets: the `collaborators and traitors'. 18 It 
continued to gain many recruits, especially amongst the 
urban poor. 
17 Ayata p 44. General Evren noted in his diary in 1986 that Ozal was noticeably tolerant of religious attitudes 
towards political subjects. As a result Evren, a rigorous secularist, considered withdrawing his support for 
ANAP at the parliamentary election in that year. (Interview: William Hale, who has studied the unpublished 
Evren diaries. ) 
18 Ismet G Imset The PKK: a report on separatist violence in Turkey (Ankara: Turkish Daily News Publications, 
1992). 
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Özal was forced to react to the upswing in the PKK 
campaign. His government at first tried to resolve the 
internal security crisis through military, rather than 
political, means. The centre of the PKK area, the south 
east, was designated the `Emergency State Region' and 
placed under virtual martial law. The centrepiece of 
the policy was the `koy korucusu' (village guard) 
programme, begun in the summer of 1985, whereby Kurds 
would be armed and organised to protect their villages 
from PKK intimidation. This initiative was soon 
defeated by local tribal loyalties, however. The armed 
forces arrested many terrorist suspects, nonetheless. 
In the period 1983-85 prosecutors demanded the death 
sentence for over 600 persons convicted of terrorism. 19 
In 1987, after the first four years the PKK's armed 
propaganda campaign, the government faced steeply 
rising costs. The government's repressive tactics also 
brought international complaints of human rights 
abuses. So ministers began to look for a new approach. 
Pressure for a new strategy intensified after the 
double attack in the Yuvali and Pecenek, in Mardin 
province, in July. Thirty civilians were killed by PKK 
action. A Turkish journal declared: 
For a moment last Thursday the Turkish state looked 
helpless and unable to root out terrorists.... The 
claims of successive Turkish governments over many 
years that the `Kurdish question' does not exist 
has been discredited by events. What looked like a 
local insurgency has, since the start of this year, 
escalated into something like a full-scale 
guerrilla war. 20 
The government's response was the `political-military 
strategy', which would re-balance the political and 
military elements of the campaign against the 
terrorists. Its most novel and visible feature was the 
appointment of a senior intelligence officer, Hayri 
Kozacioglu, as a `super-governor' for the Emergency 
19 McDowell p 44. 
20 'The PKK Challenge; What [is] the Next Step? ' Briefing 13 July 1987 pp 3,4. 
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State Region. 21 Another feature was a massive military 
engineering effort to create a line of obstacles 
designed to reduce cross-border movement of people on 
foot in remote areas of the border with Iraq. The 
emphasis was on law enforcement rather than political 
dialogue. 
In 1988 the end of the Iran-Iraq war led to a new wave 
of repression against the Kurds in northern Iraq. As a 
result of this, the Anfal campaign, 100,000 Iraqi Kurds 
took refuge in Turkey. Accommodated first in camps on 
the border (and later in central Anatolia) these Iraqi 
Kurds became an economic burden on the state. In 1991 - 
at the time of the next crisis - 30,000 of these people 
were still living as refugees in Turkey. 
The Turkish government wanted to eliminate the PKK 
sanctuaries in Syria and Iraq. The Syrians refused to 
cooperate. The Iraqis were prepared to assist the 
Turks; they also wanted to remove centres of Kurdish 
armed resistance inside their borders. The Iraqi regime 
wanted to eliminate all Kurdish armed groups operating 
on Iraqi territory. Accordingly, in 1988, it approved a 
`hot pursuit' arrangement whereby Turkish forces could 
cross the border to attack PPK units in Iraqi 
territory. 
The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq also agreed 
to cooperate with the Turks against the PKK, a rival 
for influence over the Kurdish people in the border 
area. It also wanted to remove PKK as a competitor in 
the lucrative (but illegal) cross-border trade with 
commercial interests in Turkey. 
TURKEY AND THE EC 
The turmoil inside Turkey from 1974, Turkish policy 
over Cyprus and the alleged abuse of human rights in 
the war against terrorism all presented a negative 
picture to Western states. When Turkey applied for the 
full membership of the EC in 1987.22 The EC's `Opinion 
21 'The Powers of the Super-Governor' Briefing 20 July 1987 p 12. 
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Record on Turkey's Request' of 17 December 1987 
deferred Turkey's full membership, until 1993 at the 
earliest. 23 Turkey's application has since been 
further deferred. 
Frustrated by these delays, Turkey has since then been 
making an effort to improve its relations with the 
USSR24 (later Russia), the Caucasus states (including 
Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan) as well as its immediate 
neighbours Iraq, Syria and post-revolution Iran. 
The Ozal government was determined to address 
international complaints over alleged human rights' 
abuse in Turkey. In 1990 Turkey became a signatory of 
the Charter of Paris. 25 It thereby accepted the human 
rights standards of Western Europe and undertook to 
abide by, and be inspected for, compliance with the 
Charter' s norms. 26 
SUMMARY 
Since the early days of the `new republic' of Atatürk 
in 1923 Turkey has sought national security and 
economic progress as a member of the Western group of 
states. Regional quarrels and internal upheavals inside 
Turkey have so far prevented the full achievement of 
these goals. At the heart of these problems lay two 
issues rooted in the past: the rivalry with Greece and 
the problem of minorities, especially the Kurds. 
Despite its support for Western security policy in the 
region, and despite its attempts to create a stable, 
22 Turkey applied for Associate Member status In 1959 and received it in 1964. It applied for full membership 
in April 1987. 
23 Atila Eralp'Turkey and the European Community in the post-war International System' in Canan Balkir and 
Alan M Williams (eds. ) Turkey in Europe (London and New York: Pinter, 1993) p 37. 
24 A pipeline agreement was signed in 1984. Turgut bzal visited Russia, as prime minister, in 1986 and as 
president, in 1991. During those high-level visits Turkey signed agreements securing future oil and natural 
gas supplies. The two states signed a Friendship Treaty in March 1991. 
25 Richard Weitz'Pursuing European Security' in Robert Keohane, Joseph S Nye and Stanley 
Hoffmann(eds. ) After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies 1989-1991 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993) p 348. 
26 Turkey did not accede, however, to the Council of Europe's Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (first presented in 1993 and in force in signatory states from I May 1998) which 
guarantees the rights of Individual members of minorities and at the same time assures states that their 
sovereignty will not be undermined by the exercise of those rights. France and Belgium were the other non- 
signatories. 
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democratic political system at home, these two issues 
have frustrated successive governments and exposed 
Turkey to criticism from abroad. Unable to fulfil its 
long-standing foreign policy objectives Turkey has 
increasingly sought to broaden its policy, replacing 
its former unconditional commitment to the Western 
states with a desire to achieve good relations with all 
its neighbours. In 1991, following the end of the Cold 
War, this reorientation was still in transition. 
Political leaders and commentators in Turkey and 
elsewhere continued to debate the courses of action 
open to Turkey and other actors in the region. 
GOVERNMENT DECISIONS DURING THE GULF CRISIS 
AND THE KURDISH CRISIS 
The Gulf Crisis came just as Turkey was taking stock of 
the new post-Cold War conditions. Decisions involved 
difficult choices. First, the confrontation forced 
Turkey to choose between its Western allies and Iraq, a 
neighbour with whom Turkey had recently developed 
important economic and security relations. Less than 
full cooperation with the US, on the one hand, would 
have destroyed Turkey's hopes of becoming the US' 
strategic partner in the region, weakened its place in 
NATO and further delayed its accession to the EU. 
Assistance to the US, on the other, would have ended 
Iraq's cooperation with Turkey against the PKK. Second, 
the expected outcome of the confrontation (the defeat 
of Iraq) might have triggered the fall of the Baath 
regime and even caused the disintegration of Iraq, 
destabilising the whole `northern tier'. 
In any event Turkey's active participation would 
certainly result in great expense and would delay the 
state's modernisation plans. The government decided to 
enforce the UN sanctions, despite the costs, and to 
give limited assistance to the US-led coalition. 27 
Compliance with UN sanctions was widely supported in 
Turkey. But cooperation with the US-led coalition in 
27 Özal was determined that Turkey should be an active player and be ready to claim the rewards of being 
on the winning side. Nicole and Hugh Pope Turkey Unveiled: Ataturk and After (London: John Murray, 1997) p 
218. 
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military action against Iraq was controversial, amongst 
parliamentarians and in public opinion. 
TURKEY AT THE TIME OF THE KURDISH CRISIS 
At the time of the Kurdish crisis in Iraq Turkey faced 
three serious domestic problems. It is argued here that 
Turkey's response to the crisis - and its detailed 
decision-making during the three months of the multi- 
national intervention in northern Iraq - was 
significantly influenced by these problems. 
The first problem concerned internal security. The 
government's failure to defeat the PKK had led 
ministers to adopt a new, controversial, policy to deal 
with the terrorist threat. It would increase the 
military pressure on the PKK but would also offer 
`cultural recognition' concessions for Turkey's Kurds. 
The second problem related to the economy. In early 
1991 faltering economic growth and rising unemployment 
were causing great concern. Turkey had borne heavy 
expenses during the Gulf Crisis. Despite the assurances 
given by international contributors Turkey had received 
only part of the financial compensation - and no 
confirmation of the additional military aid - by April 
1991. 
The third problem arose out of the long-standing 
divisions inside ANAP, the government party founded 
by Turgut Özal. By 1991 the party was split into two 
powerful factions: the `liberals' and the 
`conservatives'. ANAP's declining popularity foretold 
defeat in the forthcoming parliamentary election, due 
to take place in 1992.28 As the Kurdish crisis broke 
ANAP was preparing itself for the 1991 party congress 
where these deep divisions would have to be resolved. 
28 The record of ANAP's electoral in parliamentary and local government electoral performance since it first 
won power in 1983 shows a steady decline. Its share of the vote was as follows: 
1983 (Parliamentary) 45.2%, 1984 (local) 41.5%, 1987 (parliamentary) 36.3%, 1989 (local) 21.8%. 
[In the 1991 parliamentary election ANAP was to lose power. ] 
Source: Official results of elections provided by the Turkish Office of Statistics, published in Ergun Özudun 
'Democratisation in the Middle East' Journal of Democracy 1996. 
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SECURITY 
In the early months of 1990 the Turkish authorities had 
intensified the military campaign against the PKK in 
eastern Anatolia, forcibly resettling the inhabitants 
of many villages in Hakkari and Van provinces to more 
peaceful areas of the country. The military had 
increasing success in finding and destroying PKK 
units. 29 
Throughout the Gulf Crisis Turkey had experienced 
increasing turmoil, especially in its eastern 
provinces. At the same time the PKK campaign had 
intensified despite the increasing tempo of Turkish 
military operations against it. Turkish land and air 
forces had conducted armed incursions into Iraq, on 5 
August, 11 and 25 October 1990. The military claimed 
that these operations had been directed against PKK 
targets but critics complained that the only casualties 
had been innocent and defenceless villagers. Relations 
between the Turkish authorities and the KDP - which had 
previously cooperated with the Turkish authorities 
against the insurgents - had become strained. 
During March and early April 1991 international 
sympathy for the plight of the Iraqi Kurds encouraged 
Turkey's Kurds to increase the pressure on their own 
government to make concessions on `Kurdish rights'. The 
revolt in northern Iraq provoked demonstrations in 
support of Iraq's Kurds in the south east of Turkey. On 
21 March (Narwos - the Kurds' national day) there were 
demonstrations calling for `Kurdish rights' in many 
cities in eastern Anatolia but also in Adana, Izmir and 
Istanbul. 
To break the cycle of escalation Ozal and his advisors 
decided to introduce the long-planned `dual strategy' 
(or `balancing strategy') for resolving Turkey's 
Kurdish 'problem'. 30 The new approach would update the 
29 McDowell p 52. 
30 The new'dual strategy' strengthened the powers of the super-governor of the Emergency State Region. 
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1987 `political-military strategy'. It would revive the 
military campaign and, for the first time, offer 
concessions to the moderate Kurds. 31 The keystone of the 
political approach was a proposal to amend the 1982 
constitution. 32 These draft amendments - to Articles 
141,142 and 163 - proposed the repeal of repressive 
legislation underpinning the previous `assimilation' 
policy. Laws forbidding Kurds from expressing their 
cultural identity would be removed: the wearing of 
Kurdish dress would cease to be illegal. Prohibitions 
on people speaking Kurdish languages in public places 
would be removed. (The ban on the use of the Kurdish 
language in print was retained. ) An `amnesty' provision 
- for parole for those convicted of certain categories 
of `political' crimes and the commutation of some death 
sentences - accompanied these constitutional proposals. 
In a separate but related initiative the government 
proposed to lift the ban on the communist party (which 
had many Kurdish members). Ocalan announced that the 
PKK did not seek separation from Turkey, just 
autonomy for the Kurdish areas of the country. 33 
The constitutional amendments offered limited 
recognition to minorities. But at the same time the 
government introduced heavier penalties for convicted 
terrorists and all who sought `to change the character 
of the state'. These measures were known as the 'Anti- 
Terror Law': Karaname (decree) 413 and 424.34 Many 
Kurds, and their supporters abroad, saw this `dual' 
approach as a trick. 
Consequently Özal's efforts to open up the 
Kurdish question proved ineffectual in 
practice and Turkey commenced a new era of 
political repression and military aggression 
towards all sections of Kurdish society. At 
the same time Turkey began to play a new game 
with the Kurds. By pretending to help them it 
sought to demonstrate concern for Kurdish 
31 Briefing 15 April 1991. 'Historic changes provoke new arguments as gaols empty. ' 
32 See p 92, above. 
33 Hurryiet 1 April 1990. 
34 Helsinki Watch 'Turkey Restrictive New Anti-Terror Law' 10 June 1991. 
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people to the West and silence criticism of 
the dirty war raging in Turkey. 35 
The `dual strategy' was, in fact, a coherent policy 
designed to bring about a negotiated settlement with 
the PKK. The concessions were designed to detach the 
Kurdish moderates from the extremists. The new legal 
powers were to strengthen the on-going campaign against 
the terrorists. Conservative elements in Turkish 
society - especially the Turkish Armed Forces - were, 
nonetheless, alarmed at what they saw as a softening of 
the military campaign. On 11 April after a stormy, 13- 
hour, session in parliament the measures were approved. 
The issue split ANAP, however. Conservatives opposed 
making any concessions to Turkey's Kurds. 
The adoption of the `dual strategy' compelled Ozal to 
acknowledge, a few weeks later, that the previous 
course of action had been misguided. `A policy of 
repression was adopted with the aim of assimilating 
them. This was a mistake. ' On another occasion he said: 
`The government is engaged in a quest for a serious 
model for solving the Kurdish problem in a manner which 
goes beyond police measures'. 36 
One of the first results of the new strategy was a 
meeting in Ankara, on 9-10 March, where Jalal 
Talabani(PUK) and Mohsin Disai(KDP) conferred with 
Tungay Ugeri, a senior Foreign Ministry official. 37 For 
the Turks the public meeting was itself a significant 
concession: to meet a Kurdish delegation, even one from 
a foreign state, was a de facto acknowledgement of the 
political identity of the Kurdish people. But the Turks 
needed information and assurances: information about 
the Kurdish revolt, then at its height in Iraq, and 
assurances that the Iraqi Kurdish parties would, as 
35 Bulloch and Morris p 106. 
36 Muserref Secktin and Ilter Sagirsoy 'Measures to Solve the Kurdish Problem' octar 3 June 1990 pp 17- 
22. 
37 Jonathan Randal provides a detailed account of the diplomacy and decision-making which surrounded 
this meeting. He also relates how it took several weeks for political leaders and commentators - across the 
political spectrum - in Turkey to modify their initial shock at the news of this meeting. 'After Such Knowledge' 
pp 94-5. 
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before, prevent PKK fighters from crossing the border 
into Turkey. 
The government then announced the amnesty - more 
exactly the immediate grant of parole to many of those 
serving prison sentences (and the commutation of death 
sentences)- for those convicted of `separatist crimes'. 
As a result 43,000 of the 46,000 prisoners in eastern 
Anatolia were released and 270 death sentences were 
commuted. 38 
The Kurdish crisis occurred at a time when the Kurdish 
issue in Turkey was at its most sensitive. The 
controversial `dual strategy' had been launched but had 
not had time to produce results. A massive inflow of 
Iraqi Kurd refugees into south-east Turkey might have 
wrecked any chances of success for the `dual strategy'. 
But the multinational intervention to create `safe 
havens' inside Iraq - although first proposed by the 
Turkish president - might have encouraged Kurdish 
`national' aspirations. As PROVIDE COMFORT proceeded 
many Turkish officials became uneasy about US and UK 
policy towards the Iraqi Kurds. They suspected a 
`hidden agenda', encouraging the creation of an 
independent (or autonomous) Kurdistan in northern Iraq. 
Either development would have destabilised south-east 
Turkey. Turkey's ambivalent conduct towards PROVIDE 
COMFORT reflected these uncertainties. 
THE ECONOMY 
Turkey also faced an economic crisis. The government 
had imposed economic sanctions on Iraq on 7 August 
1990, in accordance with UN R 661.39 These included 
shutting off the flow of crude oil (on 8 August) 
through the Kirkuk-Yurmurtalik pipeline which connects 
the Iraqi oilfield with refineries on Turkey's Aegean 
coast. This step was to cost Turkey billions of dollars 
in lost revenue. 40 The cost of sanctions aggravated 
38 Bulloch and Morris p 166. 
39 UN SCRs required states to freeze Iraq's foreign financial assets (and Kuwaiti assets controlled by Iraq). 
Turkey complied with this requirement. 
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existing economic problems: in early 1991 the 
government was struggling to restrain the state 
industry workers' demands for better pay. By the end of 
the Gulf War Turkey was faced with an annual current 
account deficit of $2.6 bn. One estimate of the total 
costs of Turkey's contribution to the Gulf crisis (to 
May 1991, is $9 bn41). Turkey already owed the US $7 bn 
for earlier military purchases, out of a total foreign 
debt of $40 bn. 42 Inflation in 1990 had been 50-60% but 
in 1991 consumer prices rose by 6.6% in the month of 
April alone. 43 
Ozal and Akbulut's visited the US from 22 March to 2 
April. They asked the US Administration to persuade 
other states to honour the pledges of financial support 
they had made during the Gulf War. By that date Turkey 
had received $3.4 bn but was still waiting for $1.3 bn 
[from Kuwait ($900m) and Abu Dhabi ($400m)]. The Turks 
also asked the US for a temporary loan of $1 bn. During 
the visit Ozal received an additional $200m from the 
US, $25m from Canada, and a loan of BF 300m ($90m) from 
Belgium . 440n the strategic 
level Ozal took the 
opportunity of a Camp David weekend with the president 
to discuss Turkish-US security relationships in the 
future. He proposed that the US and Turkey should 
establish `a more formal security relationship' like 
the relationship between the US and Israel. 45 He 
repeated his request for PATRIOT missiles to help 
defend Turkey from future Iraqi SCUD attacks. (This 
request was refused. ) Özal was really asking for public 
40 This sanction alone cost Turkey's economy $ 750,000 per month. Mahmut Bali Aykan 'Turkey's Policy In 
Northern Iraq 1991-95' Middle Eastern Studies No 4 October 1996 p 353. 
41 Zurcher p 319. Freedman and Karsh estimate $7 bn. The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991 (London and Boston: 
Faber and Faber, 1993) p 352. William Hale' s assesssment, for the Economist Intelligence Unit, is $2 to $ 
2.5 bn annually. Hale 'Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis' International Affairs 68 4 1992 Note 11. 
Other authorities assess the total loss to Turkey, as at August 1993, at $ 20 bn. Mifliyet 15 August 1993 p 14. 
42 Stephen C Pelleti8re'Turkey and the United States in the Middle East: the Kurdish Connection' in 
Johnson, Pelletiere and Blank (eds. ) Turkey and the United States in the Middle East (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: 
US Army War College, 1993) p 101. 
43 Briefing 13 May 1991 'April inflation boosted by public sector hikes'. 
4a The US later provided an additional $ 82m in aid to Turkey. But in May the Congress rejected the 
Administration's proposal for an additional tranche of $ 625 m in aid and voted to maintain the 7: 10 formula for 
balancing aid to Turkey with aid to Greece. Turkey has long argued that it deserves more US support and that 
Greece deserves less. 'US Gives Turkey $ 82 Million More in Military Aid' International Herald Tribune 11 
February 1991, 'Turkey Says Assistance Falls Short of Needs' Defence News Washington 3 June 1991, 'US 
House Committee Keeps 7: 10 Ratio' Turkish Daily News 24 May 1991, 'Missing Dividend' Time 3 May 1991. 
95 Briefing 1 April 1991 'A Happy time for Ozal but no clear benefits for Turkey'. 
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signals of support for Turkey from the US. 46 A visible 
commitment would deter potential attackers and also 
help to silence the government's critics at home. 
From the beginning of the year a wave of labour unrest 
hit Turkey: at one time 1.5 million union members were 
on strike. In January ten thousand miners from 
Zonguldak marched to Ankara to protest at their low 
wages. A 5-week strike by Turkish Airlines' staff began 
in late March. Other unions prepared for a general 
strike in May and June. 47 The budget deficit in 1991 
rose to 12% of GDP. The economic situation was 
deteriorating just as Turkey's international problems 
were at their height. (Later, during a visit by Tariq 
Aziz, the Iraqi deputy prime minister, in early June, 
the opposition SDPP appealed to the government to 
protect the Turkish economy by suspending sanctions 
against Iraq. 48) 
Within weeks the Kurdish crisis brought a new financial 
burden: thousands of would-be refugees were about to 
cross the border into Turkey. In April and May 1991 
Turkey's costs amounted to $ 1.5m per day. 49 In May an 
IMF mission visited Turkey. 
Turkey had learnt from its recent experience not to 
count on aid from abroad when dealing with refugee 
crises. During the Iran-Iraq War as many as two million 
Iranians had travelled through Turkey as refugees to 
escape the war. Many had stayed. The arrival of 100,000 
Kurds in Turkey in 1988 after the Anfal, as well as the 
in-flow of a similar number of ethnic Turks from 
Bulgaria the following year, had imposed significant 
costs on the state budget. In early 1991 30,000 of 
these Iraqi Kurds were still in camps in Turkey, 
46 Özal sought similar military assistance as the US had offered to Israel - in return for a secret 
commitment that Israel would not retaliate against Iraq if attacked - in January 1991, before the start of the 
Gulf War. Freedman and Karsh p 295. 
47 Briefing 17 June 1991 'Mass strike threat overhangs public sector'. 
48 Briefing 17 June 1991 'Aziz visit brings dialogue but no break through'. 
49 Aykan p 345. 
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dependent on Turkish aid, 50 even though living 
conditions in the three camps (Diyarbakir, Mus and 
Kiziltepe) were primitive. There are also reports that 
foreign donors had, in fact, offered aid for the 
improvement of these peoples' conditions but Turkey had 
refused to accept this aid. It is said that Turkey 
wanted to avoid giving any encouragement to the 
migrants to remain in Turkey for a protracted period. 
Aside from aid, on both of these occasions - the Iraqi 
Kurd and Bulgarian episodes - the Western states had 
offered homes to only 500 of the refugees. There are 
also accounts of forcible repatriation of migrants, in 
contravention of international refugee protection 
norms. The prospect of a migration of hundreds of 
thousands of Iraqi Kurds into Turkey's Emergency State 
Region threatened worse trouble from Kurdish militants 
and significantly higher welfare costs for the state. 
The Kurdish crisis, when it occurred, presented the 
Turks with the prospect of another unquantifiable 
financial burden. It came, moreover, just as Turkey 
came to realise that its hopes for progress in its 
application for full membership of the EU would not be 
achieved, even after its efforts in support of Western 
states in the Gulf crisis. 51 Indeed those states which 
had (apparently) refused to assist Turkish humanitarian 
efforts in past crises were about to criticise it for 
its `inadequate' response to the plight of the latest 
wave of refugees. Turkey's insistence on the safe haven 
concept - the relief of the people inside Iraq, not in 
Turkey - should be understood in the light of its 
financial crisis and its past experience. 
POLITICAL DIVISIONS INSIDE ANAP 
In 1990 the Gulf Crisis had also brought turmoil to the 
political scene in Ankara. Özal favoured a policy of 
vigorous support for the coalition, despite consistent 
50 Entessar p 108. 
51 Edward Mortimer 'Problem Awaiting Solution' Financial Times 5 May 1991. In fact the EC did offer one 
'reward' in return for Turkey's cooperation over the Kurdish crisis. On 30 September Greece withdrew its 
objection to a meeting of the Association Council which brought together EC and Turkish representatives to 
discuss Turkey's accession. The result was agreement on a 'functional package' of agreements on trade. 
Christopher Brewin 'Turkey and the European Union' Cambridge Review of International Affairs Vol X No 1 
1966. 
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opinion poll evidence that at least two thirds of the 
Turkish electorate preferred neutrality to active 
involvement in the crisis. 52 After the adoption of R 
678 (in November 1990) Özal proposed that Turkey 
should send forces to assist in the defence of Saudi 
Arabia, as requested by the US Administration. The 
Turkish parliament, dominated by ANAP, approved. But 
a further proposal, that Turkish forces should take 
part in a future attack on Iraq, was vehemently 
opposed by the military and the Foreign Ministry. 
Ozal later claimed that the proposal was just a 
precaution. 
The parliamentary authority to send Turkish troops 
outside our borders is a precautionary measure. I 
emphasise that the Turkish armed forces will not 
engage in any operations against Iraq unless we 
are attacked. We do not covet Iraq's, or any other 
country's, soil nor is an inch of Turkish 
territory negotiable. 53 
Domestic opposition to Özal's policy in the Gulf Crisis 
grew. Many believed that the president's policy was 
wrong: for Turkey to identify itself with the US and 
the western Europeans in their confrontation with an 
Arab state would be against Turkey's longer-term 
interests. 
Turkey's foreign policy in the 1980s was the so-called 
`multi-faceted' policy which combined solidarity with 
NATO against the perceived Soviet threat with an open 
door to the wider Middle East, including Israel and 
Iran. 54 The critics, therefore, would have preferred 
Turkey to take a more neutral stance in the Gulf 
crisis: observance of UN sanctions against Iraq but 
refusal to extend military facilities to the 
coalition. 
52 Wall Street Journal 6 December 1990. This was interpreted as not so much a feeling of support for Iraq 
as a desire that Turkey should not thereby become directly involved in a war with Iraq. 
53 Turgut Özal'Turkey, an Unwanted War'became unavoidable' International Herald Tribune 23 January 
1991. 
54 See p 89 above. 
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The general approach of Turkey's `multi-faceted' 
foreign policy was as follows: 
Towards Europe and the US: 
" willingness to remain a full and vigorous partner 
in NATO 
" efforts to achieve international support in its 
disputes with Greece over Cyprus and other eastern 
Mediterranean issues 
" desire to become a full political and economic 
partner of the West European states through its 
application to become a full member of the EC, and 
the WEU 
Towards the Middle East and the Caucasus: 
" non-interference in the domestic affairs of Middle 
East states 
" non-interference in the disputes between states in 
the region, particularly disputes between Arab states 
" an even-handed approach to the Israel-Palestinian 
question 
" development of bi-lateral relations with all 
states of the region 
" maximisation of trade and economic relations 
" efforts to coordinate action with Syria and Iraq to 
defeat the PKK 
" efforts to establish itself as a leading state in 
the Islamic Conference 
" development of 13-member `Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation Zone' (BSECZ) . 
Özal's ready compliance with US requests, including the 
imposition of UN sanctions against Iraq, at great 
expense to Turkey55, was controversial. The proposal 
that Turkish ground forces should be sent to fight 
alongside other coalition forces in Saudi Arabia and 
his endorsement of the coalition's request for military 
facilities in Turkey alarmed many parliamentarians, 
across the political spectrum. The most significant 
opposition came from a group of dissident MPs in the 
governing party, ANAP. These members were led by Mersut 
Yilmaz, a former foreign minister who had resigned in 
55 Seep 102, above. 
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February 1990 in protest at the president's 
interference in the conduct of foreign policy. In 
October, Yilmaz' successor as foreign minister, Ali 
Bozer also resigned. 56 Weeks later the Armed Forces 
Chief of Staff, General Necip Torumtay57 also resigned. 
Although observers reported that Torumtay's resignation 
was a protest against Ozal's policy, the general 
himself did not issue a public statement of 
disapproval, as many had expected. 58 Torumtay resigned 
in silence. 
After Bozer's resignation Ozal appointed Ahmet Kurtcebe 
Alptemocin to replace him. In December the popular 
defence minister, Safa Giray, like Yilmaz a veteran of 
ANAP's liberal wing, suddenly resigned after seven 
years as a cabinet minister, apparently dismayed by the 
`conservative' direction of government policy. He was 
replaced by Husnu Dogan, a relative of Özal's. (The 
president's brother, Yusuf, was already a prominent 
ANAP politician and the chairman of the parliamentary 
finance committee. ) Accusations of nepotism followed. 
(Dogan himself resigned a few weeks later, as a result 
of wrangling inside ANAP. ) 
William Hale attributes the Bozer and Torumtay 
resignations more to pique over the lack of 
consultation than a substantive disagreement over 
policy. 59 For example Torumtay was enraged when he 
discovered that Özal had drawn up his own plan for the 
defence of Turkey in the event of an Iraqi attack 
during the Gulf War. 
56 As minister for trade in August 1990 Boser had only learnt of the decision to shut off the oil pipeline from 
Iraq from journalists. After Yilmaz' resignation he became the foreign minister but resigned after a few weeks. 
During the official Turkish visit to Washington he had been annoyed at his exclusion from the Oval Office 
while Presidents Bush and Ozal, together with James Baker, discussed foreign affairs. The issues discussed 
included the recent resolution of the US Senate which had favoured Orthodox Christian Armenia in its dispute 
with Islamic (and ethnically Turkic) Azerbaijan. Boser resigned as soon as the delegation returned to Ankara. 
When the outcome of the president's visit was publicised there was an angry debate in the Turkish parliament. 
The government imposed restrictions on US military activity in Turkey and even held out the possibility of the 
termination of the Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) see p 79 above. ) 
57 Briefing 11 March 1991 p 9. 
58 Torumtay did not voice his criticisms of the government's conduct in the Gulf Crisis at the time. He did 
however write a critical account of events in his memoirs Necip Torumtay'Orgeneral Torumtay'in Anilari 
(General Torumtay's Memoirs) (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayinlari, 1994) p 98. 
59 'Turkey, the Middle East and the Gulf Crisis' International Affairs 68,4 (1992) pp 679-92. 
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Özal's critics also accused the president of 
dictatorial conduct. They said he had, since the early 
days of the Gulf Crisis, usurped the powers of the 
prime minister and had failed to consult other 
important persons and groups before taking far-reaching 
decisions on national security. For the president to 
take such an individual policy-making and diplomatic 
role is at odds with the traditions of Turkish 
government. 60 The media, furthermore, objected to his 
`aloof' manner. 
In a recent article Mahmut Bali Aykan challenges the 
charges laid against Ozal. He states that the president 
did, in fact, consult his colleagues. His policy was, 
furthermore, in accordance with national interests and 
followed the established foreign policy line: 
As for the part played by President Turgut Özal the 
record does not entirely support the one-man show 
thesis. 61 
Aykan argues that whereas Ozal's critics accused him of 
following a new and personal policy he was in fact 
consulting other political actors at this time and was 
merely adapting the established `multi-faceted policy' 
in the new circumstances. If the purpose of that policy 
is seen as `promoting regional stability' then, Özal's 
supporters can argue, `stability' required action to 
deal with the cause of the turbulence. Ozal's working 
methods may have been unusual, but that is not to say 
that his control of events was unconstitutional. Again, 
it could be argued that the president's policy 
reflected more than a meek obedience to the USA: it 
showed a proper respect for the UN and the mandatory 
resolutions of the Security Council. This analysis of 
the president's conduct is at odds with the consensus 
view. 
Another cause for complaint was Özal's association with 
religious people - his own Nasqibendi associations were 
mentioned - and his alleged support for `Islamic' 
60 Source: conversation with William Hale 30 March 1994. See also William Hale in Middle East 
Contemporary Survey for 1990 (Boulder: Westview, 1993) and also Mehmet Birand Milliyet 5 December 1990. 
61 Mahmut Bali Aykan'Turkey's Policy in Northern Iraq 1991-95' Middle Eastern Studies No 4 October 1996 
pp 343-366. 
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policies, despite the constitutional requirement for 
`secularism'. Özal was known to be a practising Moslem 
and had undertaken the pilgrimage to Mecca. His 
personal religious convictions were neither unusual nor 
controversial. The complaint of the secularists was 
that Ozal was in favour of an Islamic approach to 
political and legal questions in Turkey. It was also 
well known that he had first stood for parliament for a 
party which had Islamic leanings. General Evren in his 
6-volume diary records his concerns about Ozal's 
Islamic leanings. Before the parliamentary election in 
1986 Evren -a staunch secularist - considered 
withdrawing his endorsement of ANAP on these grounds. 62 
Özal defended his policy by declaring that Iraq under 
the Baath regime was a threat to Turkey. Turkey had no 
quarrel with the Iraqi people but the Iraqi regime was 
guilty of aggression and threatened the stability of 
the region. 63 Özal's stated aim was limited and 
defensive: 
[We aim to] to steer our country out of the present 
crisis without sustaining serious damage. 64 
Later he said: 
Doesn't anyone think that such an aggressive 
country will, in the future, constitute a problem 
for us as well? 65 
In his view the coalition would deal with Iraq's 
aggression and so remove a potential threat to Turkey. 
Furthermore as a partner of the coalition Turkey would 
have a voice in the post-crisis settlement. 66 In the 
medium term Turkey's assistance to the US in the crisis 
would probably ensure increased US support for Turkish 
security interests, despite the end of the Cold War. 
62 Hale interview 30.4.94. 
63 FBIS Western Europe 4 February 1991. 
64 FBIS Western Europe 7 January 1991. 
65 FBIS Western Europe 23 January 1991. 
66 Kushner p 211. Ozal had publicly stated that neutrality had served Turkey ill In the past. He maintained 
that if Atatürk's successors had abandoned neutrality and joined the Allies earlier during the Second World 
War Turkey would have gained 'twelve islands'. 'Akbulut seeks compromise after chaotic convention' Briefing 
11 March 1991. 
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Özal identified the imminent Gulf War as 
qualitatively different from past US interventions in 
the region. This time the US-led coalition would be 
`authorised' by the UN. The coalition forces would 
include contingents from several Arab states. Others 
would make financial contributions. International 
public opinion was clearly in favour of intervention. 
For Turkey to support the coalition was, in any case, 
in accordance with the underlying purpose of its 
established `multi-faceted policy': it would restore 
the regional status quo which Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait had overturned. After Iraq's destabilising 
invasion had been reversed Turkey would be able to 
return to a policy of `non-intervention' in Middle 
East politics. It might even play a prestigious role 
in healing the rift between Iraq (after the removal 
of the Baath regime) and the Western states. Turkey's 
support for the coalition would also gain respect and 
prestige for Turkey from its Western allies: it would 
be seen not as a redundant Cold War ally which should 
now be discarded but as a major contributor to peace 
and stability in the region. 
[Özal]realised that Turkey had lost most of 
its strategic significance as a bastion 
against the Soviet Union, which had been its 
most important bargaining chip in seeking 
membership of the EC and generally securing 
Western support. He saw Turkish participation 
in the coalition as a way to emphasise 
Turkey's status as a western stronghold in the 
Middle East and perhaps even to force Turkish 
entry into the European Community, very much 
in the way Menderes had secured Turkey's 
membership of NATO by sending troops to 
Korea. 67 
Following the US request for authority to use the 
facilities at Incirlik for the air campaign against 
Iraq Ozal tried to forestall criticism that his 
policy would expose Turkey to attack from Iraq. 
Accordingly he requested the deployment of the ACE 
Mobile Force (Air) to Turkey. This force deployed to 
67 Zurcher pp 317-18. 
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Turkey: forty-two combat aircraft, plus ground-based 
air defence systems, arrived and remained until the end 
of the war. 68 
Turkey's decision to support the Gulf War coalition, 
though opposed by some groups in parliament, received 
a measure of public approval. 69 But support for the 
coalition in the Kurdish crisis was more 
controversial. The result was ambivalence in Turkish 
policy throughout the approaching Kurdish crisis. As 
discussed below in Chapters 8 and 9 the high-level 
cooperation of the government was accompanied by a 
degree of obstruction by lower-level officials. 7° 
There was also public suspicion and criticism of the 
government's `subservience' to the West. 
On 15 January the Turkish cabinet approved a US request 
for the use of Incirlik for `humanitarian and limited 
logistical support' for its intended combat air 
operations flown from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states 
against Iraq. 71 The Cabinet deferred a decision on a 
further request that US air forces should also be 
allowed to fly combat missions from Incirlik over Iraq. 
On 17 January this further authority was granted when 
parliament approved the `Extended War Powers Act', by a 
vote of 250 to 148.72 (In previous Middle East crises 
Turkey had only approved the use of Incirlik for 
`humanitarian tasks' as in the 1970 evacuation of US 
civilians from Jordan during the civil war, and another 
evacuation, from Iran at the time of the revolution in 
1979. In 1982 during the crisis in Lebanon Turkey had 
permitted the US the use of Incirlik in the withdrawal 
of its contingent from Beirut after the bomb attack in 
which 240 US Marines had been killed. This permission 
68 The AMF(A) contingent comprised air defence aircraft (MIRAGE 2000, ALPHAJETS and F-104) plus a 
total of 500 personnel from Belgium, Germany and Italy. The force deployed to Erhac AirForce base, near 
Malataya. Briefing 7 January 1991. The AMF(A) aircraft took no part in offensive PROVEN FORCE operations 
against Iraq. Freedman and Karsh p 353. 
69 Zurcher p 319. 
70 See pp 210 below. 
71 The first request concerned stationing airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft and combat search and 
rescue (CSAR) services at Incirlik to support air operations conducted out of Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. 
72 Aybet p 17. 
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was in fact obtained only after Saudi Arabia had urged 
Turkey to agree. ) Flying operations began from Incirlik 
on 18 January73 and continued throughout the war. 
In April, as the new coalition addressed the Kurdish 
crisis, the US request for the use of facilities at the 
Incirlik revived the same concerns in Turkey that had 
been voiced during the Gulf War. Critics accused Özal 
of having failed to achieve the expected rewards for 
Turkey's cooperation in the Gulf crisis74 and of 
subordinating Turkey's interests to those of the US. A 
leading newspaper spoke out: 
It is a sense of quite genuine concern that 
Turkish foreign policy is being conducted by 
the president alone. Sometimes connected with 
this is the view that Ozal is acting on behalf 
of foreign interests, most specifically the 
(US] . 75 
During debates in the Turkish parliament over the US 
request for facilities Özal's critics added another 
charge to their list: the government was not only 
`subservient' to Western interests but it was also 
encouraging a new `interventionist' style of US crisis- 
management, a development which would threaten regional 
stability in the future. 
President Ozal's critics were not only concerned about 
the substance and style of the government's past and 
present policy on Iraq, however. This foreign policy 
question was a part of a more fundamental debate inside 
ANAP over the longer-term direction of the party. The 
contest between the liberal wing, the Ozal loyalists 
and also the conservative-Islamists was coming to a 
head just as the Kurdish crisis broke. 
The long-suppressed divisions inside ANAP had begun 
to surface in February and March. They all stemmed 
from Ozal's decision to accept nomination to replace 
73 Aybet p 18. A total of 50 A-15, A-16 and A-10 aircraft, plus additional combat support and transport 
aircraft. 
74 Aybet pp 18-19. 
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the outgoing president, General Kenan Evren, when his 
7-year term came to an end in 1989. 
Özal's decision had been controversial: the past 
presidents of the Republic had been notable men from a 
non-political background, often from the ranks of the 
military. For Özal, a working politician, to take the 
post raised the prospect of a `political' president. 
Some Turks found this disquieting. However the military 
declined to nominate a candidate so bzal received 
parliament's endorsement. 
Özal had insisted on the appointment of Yilderim 
Akbulut, one of his own closest supporters but a weak 
and unpopular figure, as his successor as prime 
minister. This appointment had deepened the existing 
divisions in ANAP. In the first months of 1991 - over a 
year later - the two opposing wings of the party were 
still manoeuvring to install one of their own number as 
prime minister. Furthermore the replacements for the 
ministers who had resigned in the earlier months of the 
crisis did not inspire confidence in the party or the 
public. 
The divisions inside ANAP even undermined party 
discipline in parliament: the liberals objected to a 
major piece of government legislation - the amnesty 
(part of the `dual strategy') - in order to embarrass 
Akbulut and the Özals. 76 
Observers expected that the tensions inside ANAP would 
be resolved in the annual party national congress, 
planned for June. Özal, as head of state, was 
constitutionally barred from attending the party 
congress so he arranged that his wife, Mrs (Semra) 
Ozal, would appear in his place. She would first stand 
for election for the influential post of the chairman 
of ANAP's Istanbul province. By campaigning on behalf 
of his wife Ozal departed from the absolute political 
neutrality in party politics traditionally shown by the 
75 Briefing 11 March 1991 'Akbulut seeks compromise after chaotic convention'. 
76 The SDPP and DYP opposition parties supported the proposed amendment. The only opponents were the 
ANAP liberals and, outside parliament, some officials at the Justice Department. 
113 
president. Here he not only showed an undue interest in 
the activity of one party but involved himself in 
controversies and divisions within that party. " 
At ANAP's Istanbul provincial congress, held on 3 
March, the presiding official - Mustafa Tazar, the 
minister of state, and an Özal supporter - 
sensationally annulled the poll before the final ballot 
totals were declared. It was widely supposed that he 
had done so because he could see that Mrs bzal was 
about to lose the election to her opponent, the 
combative Talat Yilmaz, the party chairman from the 
Fatih district of Istanbul. The vote was postponed till 
28 April, after the end of Ramadan. It was the 
(conservative) defence minister Hosnu Dogan's 
opposition to Mrs Özal's candidature - on the grounds 
that the election would give advantage to the party's 
liberal wing - which brought about his dismissal from 
the government. At the next attempt Mrs Özal was duly 
elected. The president was then criticised for 
attempting to dominate the congress through the 
presence of his wife. Mrs Özal was herself increasingly 
accused of behaving in an imperious manner. Dogan was 
replaced by Mehmet Yazar. 
In separate speeches on 19 May - the anniversary of 
Atatürk's 1919 landing at Sansum - opposition party 
leaders Inonu and Demirel criticise Ozal's conduct as 
president78, especially his alleged subservience to 
foreign interests. ANAP's poll ratings continued to 
77 He did, however, absent himself from Turkey during the party conference. He was in Moscow 11-16 
March undertaking the first visit by a Turkish president for 22 years. [He had visited the USSR in 1986, but as 
prime minister. ] On 12 March he signed a Soviet-Turkish Friendship Agreement. This visit was the 
culmination of diplomacy stretching back to 1984 when Turkey had agreed to improve relations with the USSR 
and had signed a Natural Gas Agreement. In this agreement Turkey would import 120m cu metres of Soviet 
gas over the next 25 years. Turkaya Ataov'Turkey and the CIS and Europe' in Balkir and Williams (eds. ) p 
197. 
78 SDPP leader Erdal Inonu repeated the criticism of Özal's assumption of the presidency in 1989. He also 
accused the president of unconstitutional conduct during the Gulf crisis. In fact Ozal had offended many 
groups in Turkish society during his presidency. He had angered the low-income workers by urging pay 
restraint; he had then annoyed poor people by his extravagant lifestyle. (For example the lavish 'high society' 
wedding reception held for the Özals' son, Efe, in March. ) At the same time there were reports of expensive 
improvements - such as the "TL 5m chandeliers scandal" - carried out in the presidential residence, with the 
contracts going to foreign firms. ) He also offended bureaucrats by ignoring or circumventing them. He 
angered the judiciary with his attempts to install supporters in the Constitutional Court. Intellectuals were 
alienated by Özal's apparent reluctance to deal with the abuse of human rights. The military were offended by 
at being left out of strategic planning: hence the Torumtay resignation. Islamic people were annoyed at Mrs 
Özal's prominence in political matters. 
Briefing 20 May 1991 'Özal confident as ever despite approaching danger. 
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fall. On 27 May the approval rate for the government 
reached a new low: 14%. 79 On 23 May the Jandarma 
commander in Adana, Temel Cingoz, and a retired general 
living in Ankara, Ismail Selen, were assassinated by 
unknown gunmen. 
In debates at ANAP's national congress in June the 
`conservatives' were led by Mehmet Kececilar (ex-mayor 
of Konya, an Islamist and at that time `minister of 
state' )80 and the `liberals' by Mesut Yilmaz, the former 
foreign minister, and a secularist. The key event of 
the congress was the election of the party chairman. 81 
The candidates were Akbulut, Yilmaz and the nationalist 
Hasan Celal Guzel. 82 Akbulut, in post at the start of 
the congress, had been ridiculed for months in the 
Turkish press (for his subservience to Öza183, and the 
circumstances of his appointment). Özal had become 
alarmed by the vehemence of the Islamists. Despite his 
own religious convictions and his earlier support for 
this wing of the party84 (as well as his personal 
dislike of Yilmaz) he abandoned his own candidate and 
endorsed 
the liberal candidate. 85 Yilmaz was elected congress 
chairman and shortly afterwards replaced Akbulut as 
prime minister. 86 
79 Briefing 27 May 1991. 
80 The issue of fundamentalism continued to form a theme in Turkish politics. In 1991 there was wide public 
concern about fundamentalism within the armed forces. According to media reports 150 air force officers had 
been dismissed for this reason in the recent past. Briefing 11 Jan 1991 p 9. 
81 In the Turkish system the person elected as congress chairman of the ruling party becomes the party 
leader and, if the party is in government, he or she becomes (or is confirmed as) prime minister. 
82 Akbulut had defeated Guzel, thanks to Ozal's influence, at the national convention In 1989 after Ozal had 
relinquished the party post on becoming president. 
83 An example of this was the ridicule heaped on Akbulut after he had ordered his ministers to parade at the 
airport to welcome the 6zals home from an official visit to the USA (on 1 April). In the press and In parliament 
opponents, led by the conservative Necdet Tarik Piskin (ANAP chairman in the Uskudar district of Istanbul), 
derided the ANAP ministers as 'Özal's poodles'. Briefing 8 April 1991 'Akbulut retreats on Amnesty as ANAP 
debates "poodles"; Ruling party largely incapacitated by power struggle. ' 
84 Ozal had first stood for parliament in the 1976 election on a NSP (Islamic party, forerunner of Refah) 
ticket. 
85 Özal eventually put aside his own personal feelings of dislike and distrust backing Yilmaz because he 
wanted the most popular man to lead ANAP into the forthcoming elections. He saw Yilmaz as a politician with 
a modern 'Western' profile and therefore more attractive to the key elements of the electorate than either 
Akbulut or Guzel. Ayata p 45. Özal also believed that he could better control a Yilmaz government than one 
dominated either by Islamists or nationalists. Briefing 6 May 1991 'Semra Ozal's election prompts early 
election expectations'. 
115 
The crisis within ANAP therefore came to a head in the 
same month as the Kurdish and Shia uprisings took place 
in Iraq. The internal battles continued throughout the 
Kurdish crisis. In June 1991 ANAP's national congress 
coincided with the debate over the coalition forces 
withdrawal from Iraq and the decisions over the 
`residual force'. 
These political e 
government during 
following the end 
inside the highly 
influenced by the 
political crisis. 
vents were unfolding inside Turkey's 
the Kurdish crisis in the months 
of the Gulf War. The decision-making 
centralised Turkish state was greatly 
turbulence caused by the many-sided 
SUMMARY 
For Turkey the Kurdish revolt in Iraq precipitated a 
crisis inside Turkey, as well as in Iraq. The events, 
following on so closely from the Gulf War, forced the 
government to take far-reaching decisions on sensitive 
issues, at speed. 
At first the revolt threatened the fragmentation of 
Iraq which might come from the downfall of the Baath 
regime. Also at stake was Iraq's cooperation with 
Turkey, south of the border, against the PKK. When the 
revolt failed another set of undesirable consequences 
loomed: a new exodus of Iraqi Kurds fleeing into 
Turkey, destabilising the already troubled south-east 
and costing Turkey millions of dollars in relief aid. 
There was furthermore the resentment of Turkey's 
southern and eastern neighbours: Turkey was assisting 
the West in support of the unpopular Kurds against an 
Arab state. 
The government was, moreover, trying to introduce a 
controversial new `dual strategy' designed to deal with 
86 On becoming prime minister Yilmaz conducted a purge of Islamists inside ANAP and in the upper 
echelons of the civil service. Ayata p 46. ANAP's Liberal wing flourished: Safa Giray was one of many former 
ministers restored to office. Giray became foreign minister. Shortly afterwards Yilmaz persuaded his 
parliamentary colleagues to support a vote in parliament to advance the date of the next parliamentary 
elections by 18 months, to 20 October 1991. In the event this proved to bean error. ANAP was defeated In 
that election. 
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the political and law-enforcement problems presented by 
Turkey's own Kurdish minority. There was, besides, a 
political crisis within ANAP. Ozal faced a revolt in 
the party he had founded and led for nine years. His 
main opponent, Mesut Yilmaz, had opposed his pro- 
Western policy in the Gulf Crisis and accused him, once 
again, of yielding to Western interests. Chapter 8 will 
explain how Turkey and the states which participated in 
the intervention came to do so, despite these 
reservations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of the chapter are: 
" Turkey's minorities and their place in society have 
been a source of tension since the foundation of the 
state. 
" The minorities issue has brought foreign 
interventions into Turkish affairs on many past 
occasions. Turks and Kurds have come to suspect 
interventions by Western states, even when the stated 
objective is humanitarianism. 
" The PKK campaign polarised opinion inside Turkey. The 
resilience of insurgents undermined the authority of 
the government at home and brought criticism from 
abroad. The experience of receiving Iraqi Kurd refugees 
during the 1988 Anfal exodus made Turkey reluctant to 
offer assistance in a new crisis. Kurdish issues, and 
the prospect of additional Kurdish immigration, had 
become highly sensitive in Turkey. 
" The Kurdish crisis occurred at a time when Turkey was 
in the middle of a reassessment of its long-term 
strategic interests. The pro-Western stance of the past 
- modified since the Cyprus crisis of 1974 - was under 
review. The Turkish people already felt frustrated over 
delayed EU membership, as well lack of Western support 
over Cyprus and other territorial disputes with Greece. 
It appeared that there would be no rewards for Turkey 
despite its contribution in the Gulf crisis. Turkey was 
also assessing its relations with its southern and 
eastern neighbours. 
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" The economic, security and political crisis facing 
the Turkish president and people in 1991, just as the 
Kurdish crisis took place, influenced decision-making. 
The timing of the crisis - and the need for quick 
decisions - led to equivocal, even contradictory, 
responses from Turkey. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE KURDS OF IRAQ, SYRIA AND IRAN 
This chapter presents the key events in the political 
history of the Kurds of Iraq, Syria and Iran in the 20th 
century to date. It also considers the interventions of 
external powers in those states where those 
interventions had an impact on the Kurdish people. This 
material is presented as background to the account and 
analysis of the Kurdish crisis of 1991. 
The themes of this chapter will be as follows: 
" the historical origins of modern Iraq, Syria and Iran 
and the political history of the Kurdish populations of 
those states. 
" the distrust felt by Arabs, Iranian-Persians (as well 
as the Kurds) towards leading states, especially those 
states' interventions in the Middle East this century. 
" Iraq, Iran and Syria's attempts to assimilate their 
own Kurdish citizens to date and the periodic 
confrontations between the governments and their 
respective Kurdish population. 
" the hostility between the Baath regimes of Iraq and 
Syria. 
" the part played by the Iraqi and Iranian Kurdish 
parties in the Iran-Iraq War and their disunity in the 
years 1988-91. 
" the conduct of the Western states during the Iraq- 
Iraq War and their failure to condemn the Iraqis' Anfal 
campaign (including the use of chemical weapons). 
" Turkey and Iran's experience of receiving Iraqi Kurd 
refugees during the Anfal in 1988. 
THE VERSAILLES SETTLEMENT AND THE NORTHERN TIER 
Persia (renamed Iran in 1934) was not part of the 
Ottoman territories and was not a combatant in World 
War 1. From 1924 Reza Shah, a former Czarist cavalry 
officer, began to re-establish a unified state out of 
the historic Persian territories after years of 
decentralised rule. 
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The Versailles Settlement arranged that Iraq and Syria 
would be governed by mandates under the formal 
supervision of the League of Nations from 1920. The 
mandates served the immediate interest of the mandate 
powers but, as transitional arrangements designed to 
bring the territories to independence, they were 
broadly acceptable to local nationalists. During the 
mandates the British and French respected and protected 
minority cultures'in the mandate territories. They did, 
however, take military action to suppress uprisings 
against the central government when they occurred. When 
the territories achieved independence the British (in 
Iraq) and French (in Syria and Lebanon) advisors 
remained to exert an influence which was mainly 
beneficial to Kurdish interests in those new states. 
In the 1930s the Kurds of the northern tier were united 
in admiration for the exploits of the charismatic 
`mullah' Mustapha Barzani, a traditional leader who 
resisted the authority of the British and the Iraqi 
monarchy in the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. He led 
a succession of revolts against the central government 
and encouraged Kurds elsewhere to achieve autonomy. The 
governments of Turkey, Syria and Iraq inserted an 
agreement to cooperate against the separate 
manifestations of Kurdish `nationalism' in their mutual 
defence agreement, the Saadebad Pact, in 1938. 
A territorial dispute between Iraq and Iran over the 
designation of sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab 
waterway developed in the 1930s. Britain influence 
ensured that the parties reached an agreement, on terms 
favourable to Iraq, in 1939. Iran renewed its claim 
later in the century. 
The inter-war years therefore saw several forces at 
work in this region. First was the re-designation of 
the former Ottoman territories resulting in a new and 
confident Republic of Turkey and the several mandate 
territories controlled by Britain and France. Second 
was the revival of centralised rule in Persia (Iran). 
Third was the beginnings of sustained, if uncoordinated 
and unsuccessful efforts by various Kurdish communities 
to establish autonomy in these new or revived states. 
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PERSIA(IRAN) BEFORE 1945 
During World War 1 Persia was a battlefield for the 
Turks and the Russians. The fighting lasted until 1917 
when the Russian forces ceased to be operationally 
effective. During the war many of the ethnic minorities 
in Persia took advantage of the breakdown of central 
government authority - which had never been very strong 
even in peacetime - to assert a degree of autonomy in 
their own areas. In 1919, a Kurdish leader called 
Simitko and his Shatak tribal federation took control 
of the area west of Lake Urmiah, in defiance of the 
central government. This revolt also coincided with the 
start of the Turkish War of Independence in Anatolia 
and Sheik Mahmud's revolt against the British in 
northern Iraq. In 1922 Simitko was defeated by the 
forces of Reza Shah and fled into Turkey. Reza Shah 
pardoned Simitko in 1924 and allowed him to re-enter 
Persia. But in 1926 Simitko began another revolt and 
was forced into exile for a second time. In 1930 Reza 
Shah contrived his murder. In 1931 a Kurdish leader 
called Jafar Sultan led another Kurdish revolt in 
Persia. Reza Shah quickly defeated this uprising and 
drove its leaders into exile. 
Whereas the Kurds of Persia were traditionally nomadic 
herdsmen organised in tribes controlled by traditional 
leaders, by 1920 this way of life was coming to an 
end. The tribesmen were inclined to settle rather than 
pursue the nomadic life, and central government was 
exerting more control that hitherto. As elsewhere in 
the Kurdish world the authority of the chiefs was by 
this stage in decline. This process was enhanced by 
Reza Shah's policy of land registration. 
REZA SHAH 
Reza Shah was a former Czarist Army officer who 
established himself as the ruler of Persia in 1926. He 
received support from the British who saw him as a 
useful counter to Russian influence in the region. He 
ruled an increasingly united Persia (Iran). An 
important instrument in this process was a land 
registration policy. Another was his policy of imposing 
the teaching of Persian as the official language in his 
domain. The chiefs became landlords and were absorbed 
into the ruling class of the emerging state. The former 
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tribesmen became tenant farmers, peasants or urban 
workers. Although there were frequent revolts against 
Reza Shah's rule he acted decisively using his forces 
to defeat the rebels, execute or exile the leaders and 
confiscate their lands. He rewarded those leaders who 
supported him. Reza Shah's regime developed a 
representative element some way short of a true 
democracy. 
In August 1941 British forces entered Iran from the 
south and the Russian from the north. They occupied 60% 
of the territory leaving a central zone under the 
control of the Shah's government. The British suspected 
Reza Shah of Axis sympathies and forced him to abdicate 
in favour of his son, Mohammed. 
The British expected to retain their influence (and 
their valuable oil concessions) in Iran under the new 
ruler. During the double occupation the central 
government's grip on the unoccupied part of the country 
was weak. Accordingly several ethnic groups took their 
chance at establishing an autonomous region free of 
Tehran's control. The opportunity came when the British 
and Soviet occupation forces prepared to withdraw from 
Iran, as agreed at the wartime Tehran Conference in 
1942. 
MAHABAD 
In 1942 the Kurds of Iran founded a movement called 
Rebirth (Komala-i-Zhian-i-Kurd, normally `Komala') to 
promote the cause of Kurdish autonomy during and after 
the double occupation of Iran. The Soviets supported 
this movement and encouraged the first members to 
recruit Qazi Mahommed, a traditional leader, as the 
leader of the Komala. 1 Komala developed into the 
Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) in 1945.2 The 
Komala's 8 point programme called for autonomy, 
education in the Kurdish languages, in the press and in 
commerce and solidarity with the struggle of other 
1 The Soviets preferred a traditional leader because they distrusted the democratic roots of the movement. 
They preferred an authoritarian leader who would insist on discipline and obedience. Archie Roosevelt fo( 
Lust of Knowing: Menoirs of an Intelligence Officer (Boston) 1988 p 139. The Soviet influence offended many 
of the traditional Kurdish leaders, however. They could not accept the increasing influence of the atheist 
communists. The Kurds have a historic hatred and fear of Russians: in the 19`" century and in the World War 
1 the Russians had fought over Kurdish lands and had treated the people with brutality. Even today Kurdish 
mothers quell their disobedient children with the threat 'The Russians will come and get you. ' Roosevelt p 
146. 
2 The Iraqi KDP was formed in 1946, following the example of the KDPI. 
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minorities in Iran. The KDPI had close links with an 
equivalent movement growing in the Azeri peoples in the 
neighbouring province of Iranian Azerbaijan. 
The `Republic of Kurdistan' was established in the area 
of Mahabad, a town in the Iranian district of Kurdistan 
in 1946.3 Qazi Mahommed became the president of the 
`republic'. The new government controlled a population of 
one million. The `republic' made approaches to foreign 
governments but refused contact with the British who were 
supporters of the Shah. 
The founders of the republic were soon joined by Mullah 
Barzani and 3000 followers. By the end of 1946, however, 
the Shah had recovered his authority and the Soviets had 
withdrawn their support for the Kurdish state. Soon 
afterwards the rebel republic was overrun by the Shah's 
forces and dissolved. Barzani and 500 of his men withdrew 
into the USSR where they remained in exile until the 
Qassim revolution in Iraq allowed them to return in 1958. 
Qazi Mahommed was later tried and executed by the Shah. 
For the Kurds this was the `second great betrayal' by the 
international community. Whereas the Kurds had proclaimed 
their republic at Soviet instigation, external support 
was not available to prevent the Shah from crushing it 
less than one year later. 
Ghassemlou, who later became the leader of the KDPI, 
attributes the failure of Mahabad to inadequate 
leadership. He also blames the pressures of time: it 
proved impossible to develop broad-based popular 
support, and foreign assistance, before the Shah 
recovered his strength. Roosevelt acknowledges the 
failure of leadership but also identifies the perennial 
conflict between the tribal leaders and the 
intellectuals. He believes that Mahabad might have 
survived if it had achieved the wholehearted support of 
either the Soviets or the tribal leaders. In fact it 
attempted to achieve both and achieved neither: they 
were irreconcilable. Fereshtesh Koohi-Kamali notes the 
backwardness of Kurdish society, the suddenness of the 
3 In Iran 'Kurdistan' is a district within the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. The Mahabad 'republic' was 
therefore in the western part of that province. The Azeri 'republic was in the eastern part. 
For the distribution of Kurds in Iran see p 67 above. 
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SYRIA 
During the inter-war years the British and the French 
encouraged minority cultures in their mandate 
territories. ' They did, however, take military action to 
deal with uprisings and revolts against the central 
political authority. When those territories achieved 
independence British (in Iraq) and French (in Lebanon 
and Syria) advisors remained to exert an influence 
which was largely beneficial to Kurdish language and 
culture. The Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party was 
founded in 1957 and has remained an underground 
organisation. 
The 1961 Syrian constitution emphasised Syria's Arab 
identity, recognising no minorities. In 1962 following 
a census in Jazira which identified 120,000 ethnic 
Kurds the government withdrew their citizenship and 
invited them to emigrate. 5 The Syrians may have feared 
that the Iraqi Kurds' recently renewed campaign against 
the Iraqi regime would cause unrest amongst the Kurds 
living on the Syrian side of the border. The Syrian 
government was also concerned about security in the 
newly-discovered oilfields of Jazira: Quarachok and 
Remilian. There is another Kurdish enclave, Arab-Pinar, 
further to the west, where 60,000 Kurds6 live. In 1963 
Syria sent forces to assist the Iraqi government in 
operations against the Iraqi Kurds. 
Since 1968, however, the Syrian and Iraqi Baath parties 
have been locked in rivalry: in 1975 Syria assisted the 
Iraqi Kurds in their revolt, and in 1980-88 it 
supported Iran in the Iran-Iraq War. 7 Syria has provided 
a refuge for Iraqi Kurd organisations (and training 
facilities for the Turkish Kurd PKK8). Iraq condemned 
4 William Jackson Britain's Triumph and Decline in the Middle East: Military Campaigns 1919 to the 
Present Day (London: Brassey's, 1996) pp 7-9. 
5 The government statement described the Kurds as 'foreigners who have infiltrated illegally'. Vanly in 
Kreyenbroek p, 151. 
6 Vanly in Kreyenbroek p 148. 
7 Syria and Iran are themselves rivals, however. Syria would like a Sunni Arab regime to replace the Baath in 
Iraq. Iran would like a Shia-controlled Iraq. Syria and Iran are also rivals for influence over Lebanon. A 
Sherzad p 140. 
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Syria's intervention in the 13-year Lebanese civil war 
and its occupation of the Lebanon. 
The Kurdish people of Lebanon are immigrants from 
Turkey or Syria, or descendants of recent immigrants. 
In 1983 the number of Kurds in Lebanon was estimated at 
90,000. Most live in west Beirut. 
In Syria and Lebanon the Kurds are an ethnic minority 
but are less active in claiming minority rights than 
their brethren in Iraq or Turkey. 
IRAQ 1945 - 1979 
Iraq under the monarchy, with support from the British, 
followed a nation-building programme into the 1950s. 
With Barzani and his followers in exile until the 
revolution in 1958 the government was content that the 
Kurds maintained their cultural identity but suppressed 
any signs of political agitation. The Iraqi government 
and the British recognised the danger of Kurdish 
unrest, however. Britain's regional allies came 
together in a succession of defence treaties, the 
Baghdad Pact 1955 and CENTO 1956. These treaties 
included undertakings to discourage Kurdish `national' 
aspirations. 
Arab nationalism gained a strong following in all Arab 
states, including those of the `northern tier', 
especially after the Suez crisis in 1956. As a result 
of their actions in the crisis the British forfeited 
much of their influence in the Middle East. This impact 
of Nasser and his ideology ensured that minorities in 
Arab states faced even greater pressures to integrate 
and conform. In 1958 a military junta overthrew the 
pro-British monarchy. The new Iraqi leader, Brigadier 
Qassim, was an admirer of Nasser and was determined to 
resist British and French influence in the region. 
Qassim invited Barzani, an enemy of the monarchist 
regime, to return. Despite the Arab nationalist 
atmosphere Iraq's Kurds expected their conditions to 
8 Syria's relations with Turkey, see Note 13, p 90 above. Syria's principal contact with the PKK Is President 
Asad's brother, Jamil al-Asad. Randal 'After Such Knowledge' p 237. 
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improve. Within two years, however, Barzani had fallen 
out with the regime and communal fighting recommenced. 
In 1961 the Qassim regime's threats against the 
independence of Kuwait9 brought Iraq into military 
confrontation with Britain, the supporter of the former 
regime in Iraq. Iraq's failure to make good its claim 
to Kuwait in 1961 - prevented by the deployment of 
British ground and air forces to Kuwait - was to be 
recalled when, in August 1991, Prime Minister Thatcher 
urged the US Administration to form a coalition to 
remove Iraq from Kuwait. Subsequent Iraqi regimes 
would remember the UK as a state which had resisted 
Iraq's expansion and also one which had been 
sympathetic to the fate of Iraq's Kurds. 
Iraq's border disputes with Iran - principally the 
Shatt al-Arab - caused occasional military clashes 
during the 1960s. Iran assisted Barzani's Kurdish 
Democratic Party (KDP) with funds and materiel in its 
sporadic military campaigns against successive Iraqi 
regimes. The KDP also received financial and material 
support from the US and from Israel. '° 
Since the 117 July' revolution against the regime of 
Abd al-Rahman Aref in 1968 the Baath party has held 
power in Iraq. The Baath party's pan-Arabism and 
hostility to Israel and Western influence in the Middle 
East have been evident in the policy of the state since 
that time. In 1968 the Baath came to power in Iraq. It 
faced an on-going Kurdish revolt and soon developed a 
rivalry with the Baath in Syria. The Baath regime in 
Iraq proclaimed a revolutionary Arab nationalist 
ideology and opposed Western interests in the Gulf 
region. (In 1970 it concluded a treaty with the USSR. ) 
These developments alarmed the pro-Western, monarchist 
regime in neighbouring Iran, then the pre-eminent (and 
expansionist) regional power in the northern Gulf. The 
9 Iraq's failure to make good its claim to Kuwait in 1961 - prevented by the deployment of British ground and 
air forces to Kuwait - was to be recalled when, in August 1991, Prime Minister Thatcher urged the US 
Administration to form a coalition to remove Iraq from Kuwait. 
10 Israel has identified successive regimes in Iraq as hostile. In response it has assisted Iraq's enemies 
(like Syria, Iran and the Iraqi Kurds) at times when their opposition was likely to distract the Iraqi regime from 
action against Israel. Gunter 'Kurds in Iraq' p 31. For details of CIA subsidies to the KDP in the 1960s see 
Jack Anderson 'Israel infiltrates Arab Regimes' Washington Post 17 September 1972 p B5. 
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two states had two continuing causes for disagreement: 
the Shatt-al-Arab and the financial support Iran was 
giving to the KDP's sporadic military campaign against 
the government in Baghdad. 
The KDP was divided, however. Since 1964 the 
`politburo' faction led by Jalal Talabani and his 
father-in-law Ahmad has occasionally fought with 
members of the mainstream KDP. At times this faction 
has received covert financial support from the Iraqi 
regime. 
In 1970, therefore, the new Iraqi regime offered to 
negotiate with the KDP. It needed a period of internal 
stability in which to consolidate its position and 
build its strength. In the 1970 `Manifesto Agreement' 
the regime appeared to concede a large measure of 
autonomy to Iraq's Kurds. " The KDP, for its part, also 
needed a period of peace. The regime promised the 
Kurds an attractive measure of autonomy, educational 
freedom and participation in government. It offered a 
plebiscite to decide the most difficult issue: 
control of Kirkuk. Iran immediately cut off its support 
for the KDP. 
In the next three years the Baath and the Kurds 
wrangled over the implementation of the agreement. 
During this period of peace the Baath Party 
establishing stronger links with the USSR. The Iraq- 
USSR Friendship Treaty (1972) followed and thereafter 
the Baath modernised its armed forces using Soviet-made 
arms. 
The Nixon Administration was alarmed at the Iraq-Soviet 
treaty. Acting on the proposal of Iran, its principal 
ally in the northern Gulf, the US encouraged the Kurds 
to rebel again. From the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
War the priority of US foreign policy in the region 
was to construct an accord which would assure the 
security of Israel and at the same time produce a 
measure of justice for the Palestinians and the Arab 
states. For the US pressure applied to Iraq would 
reduce that state's opposition to Arab rapprochement 
11 But by 1973 the regime had strengthened itself, not least by a new treaty and arms deal with the USSR. 
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with Israel. It would also counter growing Soviet 
influence in the northern tier. In the period 1973-76 
the complexity and importance of this task far 
outweighed any concern the Administration might have 
felt for a people like the Kurds. The Iraqi Kurds were 
angry at the regime's failure to honour the Agreement. 
But they only prepared to reopen hostilities - and 
abandon the once promising Manifesto Agreement - 
because of the assurances of support they had received 
from the US Administration and, to a lesser extent, 
Iran. Fighting resumed in 1973. 
In 1974 and 1975 the Kurds' campaign was successful. 
But their success led them to advance south into open 
country away from the mountains where their 
traditional organisation and irregular tactics were 
most effective. Increasingly dependent on military 
aid from the Iranians and financial aid from the US 
the Kurds were poised to inflict a lasting defeat on 
government forces. In the following year, however, 
the Kurds' campaign ended in disaster. The Iranians 
suddenly made a separate peace with the Iraqis - 
known as the Algiers Agreement - and immediately 
withdrew their support for the Kurds. The Iraqis 
counter-attacked and Kurdish resistance collapsed. 
The Iraqis then overran the Kurdish areas of northern 
Iraq, installing a repressive occupation regime. (The 
Kurds call this the third `great betrayal'. ) They 
blamed not only the Iranians but also the Americans. 
The US Administration had encouraged them to rebel, 
stood as guarantor of their alliance with Iran and 
had then abandoned them. 12 
In Iraq the devastating defeat of the Kurdish revolt 
led to the exile and death of Mustapha Barzani and the 
breaking away of the `politburo' faction of the KDP to 
form the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The 
resistance shown by the Iraqi Kurds towards a 
repressive Iraqi regime once again reminded their 
brethren in Turkey and in Iran of the need for struggle 
12 Details of the Administration's policy over Iraq, Iran and the Kurds was revealed when the US Congress' 
secret 'Pike Report' was published In the New York newspaper, The Village Voice, in 1976. It showed that 
Nixon (in office till August 1974) and Kissinger who served as Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and 
Ford (till January 1977) persuaded the Iraqi Kurds to rebel and gave them financial support. It also revealed 
the termination of that support immediately the Iranians came to their agreement with Iraq at Algiers. Jackson 
pp 155-157. 
128 
for cultural recognition, if not more. Barzani's 
reputation for bravery and determination strengthened 
even those who were conducting a political, rather than 
a military, campaign in their own countries. The effect 
was to heighten awareness of the Kurdish struggle 
throughout the northern tier. 
IRAN 1970-1979 
The 1970s was a decade of expansion and growing 
confidence for the Shah's regime in Iran. Increased oil 
revenues following the 1973-4 oil crisis, success in 
suppressing domestic opposition, a strong alliance with 
the US and the development of powerful armed forces 
allowed the Iranians to exert influence throughout the 
Gulf region. Iranian self-confidence was shown in its 
1972 annexation of the uninhabited but strategic Abu 
Musa and Tombs islands in the middle of the Gulf. 
Iran saw Baathist Iraq as a potential rival as the pre- 
eminent power in the northern Gulf. It gave covert 
financial support to the KDP in Iraq whenever it needed 
to exert pressure on its neighbour. Iran ceased its 
support when the KDP made peace with the Baghdad regime 
in 1970-4 and after the Algiers Agreement. 
The Shah's regime assisted the Kurds in Iraq but it did 
not encourage its own Kurds in their desire for 
autonomy. The formidable secret police organisation in 
Iran maintained its surveillance on potential Kurdish 
rebels, as it did on other opposition groups at home 
and abroad. The KDPI was for many years content to 
assist the KDP. It abstained from action against their 
own government in order to safeguard Iranian support 
for the KDP. 
After Algiers, however the KDPI changed its policy: it 
would no longer see the struggle for Kurdish rights in 
Iraq as the first priority. It would concentrate on the 
struggle inside Iran itself. By resisting the Shah's 
regime the KDPI offended the KDP's main supporter. The 
KDP thereafter regarded the KDPI as its enemy. The 
worst sign of disunity between the Iraqi and Iranian 
Kurds came in 1980 when Iranian Kurds desecrated 
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Mustapha Barzani's grave at Usnamiah. The next decade 
saw the Iraqi Kurds and the Iranian Kurds in open 
conflict. 
THE IRAN - IRAQ WAR AND THE KURDS 
After the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, and the 
taking of the US Tehran embassy hostages, Iran changed 
from being the US' most trusted ally in the region to 
being its most determined enemy. From the start of the 
Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 Western states took a public 
position of neutrality. But by the end of the conflict 
the US was openly assisting Iraq against Iran. 
Despite the US' listing of Iraq as a `state sponsor of 
terrorism' (1979) and the Carter presidential directive 
banning US arms sales to Iraq (1980), the Reagan 
Administration soon modified this policy. In the 
opinion of Caspar Weinberger, George Bush and James 
Baker Iraq's efforts against Iran - the hostage taker - 
were worthy of covert support. After the Israeli attack 
on the Osirak nuclear power station (7 June 1981) the 
US sponsored a UN Security Council resolution 
condemning Israel. Alexander Haig, the Secretary of 
State, objected to this policy as he identified Iraq as 
a potential adversary to the US in the region. Later 
that year Saddam Hussein's son-in-law made frequent 
visits to the US to buy arms. On 26 February 1982 Iraq 
was quietly removed from the list of `state sponsors of 
terrorism'. In July 1982 the US first supplied the 
Iraqis with satellite photographs showing the 
dispositions and status of Iranian forces. On 26 
November 1984 the US resumed full diplomatic relations 
with Iraq. Thereafter, for the duration of the war, the 
UK, France and Italy) supplied arms to Iraq. (From 
reports of the Iran-Contra affair it is now clear that 
the US supplied arms and materiel to Iran. ) The United 
States Navy's escorting of tankers carrying Iraqi oil 
led to several celebrated incidents. Following the 
Iranian attack on the USS Stark, the US Navy conducted 
air attacks on Iranian gunboats and the USS Vincennes' 
shot down an Iranian airliner. Despite its 
confrontation with its Kurdish population, the 
leadership saw that external assistance could still be 
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obtained. Iraq had started the war. Even so, as the war 
went on, the Iraqis found that they could obtain money 
from the Gulf states and buy arms from the USSR and the 
West. When Iran attacked neutral oil-tankers carrying 
Iraqi oil in the Gulf the USA was prepared to provide 
armed protection for those ships and was prepared to 
destroy Iranian warships and aircraft. 
During the Iran-Iraq War the Kurds on both sides of the 
border fought against their own governments. The 
Kurdish operations against the Iranian and Iraqi 
government forces during this war followed the long- 
established practice of asserting independence whenever 
the state authorities were distracted by wars or 
disabled by political divisions. 
Many Kurds in Iraq were conscripted into the Iraqi army 
and fought for the regime, at times against the forces 
of the KDP and the PUK. The conduct of these `National 
Defence Force' units - dismissed by the Kurdish 
peshmerga as jash (donkeys) - indicated at least some 
loyalty to the regime. These pro-government Kurdish 
forces did not serve entirely under compulsion. 13 The 
main Iranian Kurd organisation, the KDPI, collaborated 
with Iraq against the revolutionary regime in Tehran. 
Inside Iraq, however, the PUK, first fought in alliance 
with the KDP against the regime. In 1983, however, the 
PUK leadership judged that it was more likely to obtain 
concessions from the regime by making peace than by 
continuing its rebellion. Massoud Barzani opposed this 
policy and the KDP continued to make war. (This 
conflict between the major Kurdish parties recalled 
inter-factional fighting amongst the Iraqi Kurds in 
1968-70. ) In revenge the Baath removed 8000 male 
members of the Barzani clan from the Quashtapa 
internment camp and executed them. The PUK showed its 
willingness to support the regime by fighting against 
the KDP and other rebellious Kurdish groups. 14 The PUK 
negotiations lasted until January 1985 when they were 
broken off by the regime. Thereafter the PUK accepted 
13 See p 74, above. 
14 McDowell 'A Modern History' p 327. 
131 
the KDP offer of cooperation in a Kurdistan National 
Front which formed in 1987. (It subsequently 
incorporated non-Kurdish opposition groups. ) Bad blood 
remained however between the two Kurdish Parties. 15 A 
KDP spokesman said, in early 1986: 
We are not enemies anymore, but we cannot be 
considered loyal friends. So far as we know 
[Talabanil fights against the Iraqi government. 16 
Whereas the Kurds' military activities in the Iran-Iraq 
War were mainly conducted in northern Iraq (and the 
adjacent areas of northern Iran) these areas were, for 
most of the war, subsidiary theatres of operations for 
the main Iraqi and Iranian forces. The main battles on 
land were fought in the Basra area and on the nearby 
Fao peninsula. The exception was an Iranian land-air 
offensive against the Kirkuk oilfields in 1976. (The 
KDP assisted the Iranians in this operation. ) The Iraqi 
Kurds in their uneasy alliance did however control most 
of northern Iraq. The Front had 60,000 peshmerga in the 
field and controlled an estimated 3,800 square miles of 
territory. 17 Kurdish resistance in the north therefore 
denied government control of substantial areas of the 
north of the country and also encouraged members of the 
various minorities to desert from government forces. 
Barzani wanted to consolidate resistance to the regime 
by political as well as military action. Accordingly, 
between July 1987 and May 1988, he negotiated a wider 
alliance including the smaller Kurdistan People's 
Democracy Party KDPD (Sami Abderrahman) the Kurdistan 
Socialist Party (SKPI), socialist PASOK, the Assyrian 
Democratic Movement, the Kurdistan Toilers' Party and 
the Kurdish branch of the Iraqi Communist Party. The 
aims of the Kurdistan Front were the overthrow of 
Saddam, the institution of a democratic government for 
Iraq and the establishment of an autonomous zone in 
northern Iraq. 
The Kurdish parties with an Islamic platform refused to 
join the Front. These were the Kurdish Islamic Movement 
15 McDowell pp 348-352. 
16 Gunter'The Kurds in Iraq' p 39. 
17 Gunter p 41. 
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(PPK), the Hizbollahs of Kurdistan (led by Shaik 
Muhammed All Khalid Barzani, Massoud's cousin) and the 
Iraqi National Turcoman Party (INTP). Turkey had 
secretly inspired the foundation of this party which 
represented the 2.5m Azeri-speaking Iraqi Turcomans. 
Its leader was Mustapha Arslan. Likewise the Tehran- 
based Supreme Assembly for the Islamic republic of Iraq 
(Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim) - as well as the underground 
guerrilla group DAWA - refused to join the Front: they 
would not accept the Front's secular programme. 
For the Iraqi regime, therefore, the Kurds' efforts in 
the Iran-Iraq war were a nuisance and a provocation 
rather than a significant factor in the overall course 
of events. But that rebellion still provoked a harsh 
Iraqi response: in 1987 Saddam Hussein appointed his 
cousin Ali al-Majid as the governor of northern Iraq 
with orders to destroy Kurdish opposition to the Baath 
regime and to terminate the assistance the rebels were 
giving to the Iranian enemy. In April that year the 
first chemical weapons' attacks against Kurdish targets 
took place. '8 This campaign of repression became known 
as the `Anfal'. 19 It continued after the war until the 
northern part of Iraq was `pacified'. 
In March 1987 the Iraqis began to achieve success on 
the battlefield. 20 The support Iraq received from the 
US, and to a lesser extent from other Western states, 
encouraged its final campaign and demoralised Iran. 
Some observers assess that the upturn in Iraq's fortune 
in the war came at the time of the last `war of the 
cities' in which Iraqi missile attacks on Iranian 
cities created havoc amongst the Iranian population. 
After one attack against Tehran 500,000 people fled 
into the countryside in terror. In due course the 
`convoy' protection of neutral shipping from Iranian 
air and gunboat attacks and the well-publicised clashes 
between US warships and Iranian gunboats forced Iran to 
18 Bulloch and Morris state that there were 67certified CW attacks against Kurdish targets In the period April 
1987-November 1989. See also Valerie Adams Chemical Warfare. Chemical Disarmament (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1990) pp 85-90, Edward M Spiers Chemical Weaponry: A Continuing Challenge 
(New York: St Martin's Press, 1989) pp 121-125 and A Sherzad p 136. Iraq accused Iran of making attacks 
using CW. No conclusive evidence came to light to support these claims. W Andrew Terrill 'Chemical 
Weapons in the Gulf War' Strategic Review Spring 1986 and The Independent 2 August 1988. 
19 Sheri Laizer Martyrs. Traitors and Patriots: Kurdistan after the Gulf War (London: Zed Books, 1996) p 2. 
20 Herzog p 263. 
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recognise that it could not win the war. Finally the 
Vincennes incident triggered Ayatollah Khomenei's long- 
delayed agreement that the war should end. 
THE ANFAL IN IRAQ 
Anfal (`spoils of war') is the name of a chapter in the 
Koran. It lays down, inter alia, the treatment which 
should'be meted but to defeated enemies. The campaign 
terrorised the, Kurdish population in Iraq, caused mass 
depopulation of the border areas, forced re-settlement 
of Kurds in the south of Iraq and the harassment of 
Kurdish fighters who had previously opposed the regime. 
The Iraqis use of attack helicopters to deliver 
chemical warfare agents to kill civilians was a feature 
of early attacks. One writer has put the total of 
Kurdish deaths attributable to the Anfal at 182,000. 
The director of the Anfal was Hassan al-Majid, Saddam's 
uncle, known to Iraqis by the nickname Ali Kimiya - 
Chemical Ali. Majid acted under Baath Revolutionary 
Command Council's Decree 160 of 29 March 1987. (It was 
the memory of the Anfal campaign - with its Iraqi 
attacks using chemical weapons - which probably caused 
the desperate speed of the Iraqi Kurd flight after the 
failure of the uprising in March 1991. ) 
In March 1988 the Iraqis attacked the Kurdish defenders 
of the town of Halabja with chemical weapons. Halabja 
is a town with a normal population of 70,000, and lies 
15 miles from the border with Iran. It was in the 
battle zone of the Iran-Iraq war in the Spring of 1988. 
At Halabja at about 2pm local time on 16 March 1988 
Iraqi aircraft attacked the town. The targets of the 
attack were PUK peshmerga, fighting in alliance with 
Iranian forces, who had captured Halabja 48 hours 
before. The Iraqi aircraft used CW and then 
conventional air attack weapons, in many cases fired 
from armed helicopters. Mustard gas and sarin (a nerve 
gas) and possibly cyanide, were used. There were many 
non-combatant casualties, mainly Kurds. 5000 people 
were killed in the attack and many others wounded. 21 
21 Peter W Galbraith and Christopher van Hollen's report for the UN Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations 'Chemical Weapons' Use in Kurdistan: Iraq's Final Offensive' 100th Cong, 2nd Session September 
1988. Also Kanan Makiya (Samir al-Khalil) Cruelty and Silence (London: Penguin, 1992) Chapter 5 pp 151- 
200. 
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The Nordic states, Australia, Canada, Israel and Iran - 
as well as several Arab states - condemned Iraq's use 
of chemical weapons (CW) at Halabja. But the response 
from the Western states was muted. The UN SC R 620 was 
mild: it `regretted' the attack but did not single Iraq 
out for criticism, nor did it initiate any form of 
international sanctions. Whereas the US House of 
Representatives passed a condemnatory resolution the 
Administration refused to impose economic sanctions, 
restricting itself to a mild protest. One congressman, 
Bill Frenzel, opposed the resolution on the grounds 
that it would hurt future US trade with Iraq. The US 
Senate enacted what was to become the 1988 `Prevention 
of Genocide Act' . 22 
Turkey also refused to condemn Iraq's use of chemical 
weapons and denied international agencies access to 
survivors. Iraq owed Turkey $2 bn in war loans. It has 
been suggested that Turkey's anxiety about repayment 
led it to remain silent. 
After the end of the war in 1988 the Iraqis punished 
their own rebellious Kurds: the Anfal campaign laid 
waste the northern Kurdish areas, causing many direct 
casualties, destroyed 4000 villages, expelled families 
from historic lands in the border areas and forced 
their resettlement in distant parts of Iraq. This 
repression forced many thousands of Kurds to flee 
across the borders into the neighboring states of 
Turkey and Iran. 
Iraq emerged from the Iran-Iraq War in a badly damaged 
state. But its regime was able to present the war to 
its own people as a victory. Despite the substantial 
cost of the war, in lives and in damage to the economy, 
the Baath regime saw that it could extract support even 
from unwilling external states. The Arabs felt obliged 
to provide financial support, even to a deeply 
unpopular regime. Another consequence was the strength 
and renewed confidence of the Iraqi regime after the 
1988. Also Kanan Makiya (Samir a[-Khalil) Cruelty and Silence (London: Penguin, 1992) Chapter 5 pp 151- 
200. 
22 Amnesty International Iraqi Kurds: At Risk of Forcible Repatriation and Human Rights Violations in Iraq 
Amnesty International USA (New York June 1990) p 1. Bulloch and Morris pp 119 and 264. As US policy was 
then focused on persuading Iran to accept a cease-fire, as Iraq had long been willing to do, the Administration 
preferred (in public, at least) to condemn the use of CW by both sides in the war, without singling out Iraq for 
its conduct at Halabja. Amb Vernon Walters in US Dept of State 'Bulletin' July 1988 p 69. 
135 
war. Addressing its own people after the cease-fire the 
Baath was able to claim a large measure of victory; to 
the wider Gulf region Iraq was able to present itself 
as the champion of the Arab cause against the historic 
`Persian' enemy. 
Iraq had obtained support from Jordan, Egypt and the 
PLO. It had also obtained necessary financial support - 
as loans rather than gifts - from the Gulf Arab states. 
(It was to be Kuwait's refusal to cancel Iraq's war 
debt that precipitated the Iraqi invasion in August 
1990. )So long as the enemy was Iran the Iraqis could 
also expect support even from the USA. 
The arrival of the Iraqi Kurdish refugees in Turkey in 
1988 as result of the Anfal postponed the announcement 
of Özal's plan to win the cooperation of Turkey's 
moderate Kurds. The public was alarmed at the inflow of 
Kurdish people, especially as many of the Kurdish men 
were armed. Turkey received no international assistance 
for the cost of looking after these refugees. This 
sharpened public criticism of Ozal's decision to admit 
them. It was only in 1990 that he felt able to 
implement the next stage of his plan to offer the 
Turkish Kurds a form of cultural autonomy. By that time 
the whole region was embroiled in the wider Gulf 
crisis. The Western states' failed to condemn Iraq's 
original aggression towards Iran and sold arms supplies 
to Iraq during the war. These signals may have led the 
Iraqi regime to believe that the same states would 
tolerate future Iraqi moves to establish a dominant 
position in the northern Gulf. In 1988 the same states' 
silence over Iraq's repression of the Kurds appeared to 
give consent for the Anfal campaign and may have led 
the Iraqis to believe that they would tolerate another 
round of Iraqi repression against the Kurds in March- 
April 1991. 
In the months following the Anfal the KDP worked to 
assemble a Front to bring together all the Iraqi 
opposition parties, including parties representing the 
Shia Arabs in Iraq. Agreement was reached in Damascus 
in 1990. But in 1991 this 17-party organisation failed 
to agree on a programme of action to be taken following 
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the anticipated Iraqi defeat in the war. The Shia 
parties insisted on Iraq becoming an Islamic state. 
The Kurdish revolt during the Iran-Iraq war reminded 
the Iraqi regime that traditionally hostile sections of 
the Kurdish population would break ranks with their 
ethnic brethren if they saw a tribal or party advantage 
in doing so. The cooperation between the PUK and the 
regime in 1984-5 demonstrated the lack of cohesion 
between the various Kurdish groups. Furthermore the war 
exposed the rivalries between the Kurdish leaders and 
their willingness to sacrifice the longer-term 
`national' objectives for short-term tribal or party 
ones. Perhaps the underlying cause of this disunity was 
the continued strength of tribal and personal loyalties 
over national identity and aspirations: maybe the 
strongest feeling uniting Kurds in Iraq (and possibly 
elsewhere) is the desire for an area of autonomy. In 
such an area leaders would have decided important local 
issues and had access to external sources of funds so 
they would not have to risk their personal popularity 
by raising taxes from their followers. Revenues 
obtained for external sources - such as oil revenues - 
would be dispensed as feudal largesse to their 
supporters. In short autonomy would permit tribal life 
- including tribal warfare - to continue without 
interference from the central government. 
Arguably the Kurds of Iraq have never been able to 
agree, or organise, a national platform which went 
further than this basic aspiration. To go beyond this 
limited objective would require the Kurds and their 
leaders to subordinate their own activities to the 
pursuit of `national' interests, exchanging personal 
authority for constitutional processes. The war also 
demonstrated the indifference of the outside world to 
the activities (and the fate) of rebellious minorities 
in Iraq and Iran. 
THE GULF CRISIS 
Iraq had received support from many Western states 
during its war with Iran. In the Gulf Crisis, however, 
Western states opposed Iraq. In the early months of the 
crisis, before the air war campaign in January 1991, 
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the crisis had little impact on the Kurds. The Iraqi 
Kurds were still recovering from the Anfal. The 
separate KDP and the PUK approaches to the US 
Administration neither brought material support not 
encouragement for any Kurdish military action in 
conjunction with coalition operations. Nor did they 
achieve an agreement with the non-Kurd opposition 
groups in Iraq. There was therefore no united post-war 
strategy to deal with the Baath regime after its 
defeat. 
Although the Iraqi Kurdish groups represented a 
potential weapon to be used against Iraq the US and the 
other coalition states were unwilling to encourage 
their participation in the war. On 12 August 1990 Jalal 
Talabani visited Washington to offer the US the support 
of 30,000 Kurdish fighters against Iraqi government 
forces. State Department officials demurred. Senators 
Claiborne Pell and John Kelly - previously supporters 
of Kurdish rights - also withheld support for any such 
plan. 23 
For the Western and the Arab coalition states the 
objective of the Gulf War was the liberation of Kuwait. 
But for the coalition to have accepted or encouraged 
Kurdish assistance in the war effort would have implied 
encouragement for Kurdish aspirations in Iraq and 
elsewhere. Such aspiration are unacceptable to all 
coalition members, Americans, Europeans, Turks and 
Arabs. 24 For example Sheik Saud al-Sabah, Kuwaiti 
ambassador to the US, singled out the Kurdish members 
of the Iraqi occupation forces in Kuwait for 
condemnation. He said the Iraqi Kurds were the most 
brutal of the occupation forces and had been 
responsible for looting as well as rape and torture of 
Kuwaiti civilians. 
Eighty per cent of the Iraqi soldiers who were 
raping and pillaging Kuwait were Kurds ... I don't 
have (as] much sympathy as you have for the Kurds 
... They are more brutal, more violent, than the rest 
23 Nader Entessar'Kurdish Ethnonationalism' p 146. 
24 USA Today 3 July 1991. 
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of the Iraqis.... There are Kurds who stole 
everything and pillaged everything. 
It was argued that such a consequence would have 
destabilised the entire northern tier, from the 
Bosporous to the Caspian Sea. 
Whereas the KDP had succeeded in forming a 17-party 
opposition front against the Iraqi regime this front 
was unable to agree on a programme for the government 
of Iraq after the coalition victory. The Shia parties, 
in particular, refused to accept anything less than an 
`Islamic' programme. Thus there was minimal cooperation 
between the various opposition groups during the Gulf 
War. Likewise there was no evident coordination in the 
uprisings which followed. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of the chapter are: 
" The Kurds of Iraq have been a constant source of 
instability inside the state since its foundation. The 
presence of a 20% minority in a population might lead 
to this result in any state. But the Kurds are warlike 
and are reluctant to accept the authority central 
government. 
" In the 1970s Iraq's status, in the eyes of Western 
government's, was determined by its treaty with the 
USSR and its rivalry with monarchist Iran, a close 
regional ally of the USA. In the 1980s, in contrast, 
Iraq was in confrontation with the revolutionary regime 
in Iran. It therefore received Western support. 
" During the Gulf Crisis Iraq was guilty of aggression 
towards Kuwait. It therefore became the target of 
substantial `enforcement' action, authorised by the UN 
and carried out by a US-led coalition. 
" In all these shifts of political association the 
Kurds in Iraq were an instrument by which external 
forces could pressurise the Iraqi regime. But those 
external forces did not provide consistent support for 
Kurdish aspirations; they were intent on their own 
short-term interests. Hence the sense of betrayal felt 
by the Kurds towards those states which had given them 
support in the past. Far from giving effective, lasting 
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support to their Kurdish allies the other states 
exposed and abandoned the Kurds to repression: the 
Anfal was the consequence of Iraqi Kurds' resistance 
during the Iran-Iraq War. Its brutality strengthened 
the hatred and fear felt by many Iraqi Kurds towards 
their host state. 
" Despite the history of betrayal and repression the 
Kurds remain disunited. The conflict between the KDP 
and the PUK in Iraq, and between the Iraqi Kurdish 
parties and the KDPI, is evidence of the profound 
political fragmentation of the Kurdish world. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE US, THE USSR AND THE IRAQI KURDS 1988-1991 
A full study of the Kurdish crisis of April-July 1991, 
and its effects beyond the region, needs to consider 
the history of the Kurds in the 20th century. It also 
needs to consider the contribution made by broader 
world and regional events: the end of the Cold War 
together with the fall of communist governments in 
central Europe and the Gulf Crisis. The Kurdish crisis 
was shaped by these wider events. This chapter will 
present a tentative explanation of the historical and 
external influences on the events in northern Iraq and 
neighbouring territories in April-July 1991. This 
chapter will complete the description of the context 
of the Kurdish Crisis. 
The themes of this chapter will be as follows: 
" the lack of coordination between the opposition 
parties in Iraq after the Anfal. 
" the US Administration's post-Gulf War agenda in the 
Middle East. 
" the Soviet government's post-Gulf War agenda in the 
Middle East. 
The Kurdistan Front succeeded in uniting many of the 
anti-government Kurdish organisations in Iraq towards 
the end of the Iran-Iraq War. This was a promising 
development for those who supported the rights of 
minorities in Iraq. ' The unity was incomplete and 
fragile, however. The Islamic Kurdish and Shia Arab 
parties refused to cooperate with the Front. 
Furthermore the Front's joint military command and 
coordination organisation collapsed during the Anfal 
and could not be re-established. 
Two years later, as the Gulf Crisis developed after 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, there was another 
opportunity for all the anti-Baath parties and groups 
The 2.5m Turcomans, also the Assyrians, and others. 
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in Iraq - including the Islamic parties - to come 
together in a new `Front' organisation. In 
negotiations held in Damascus as many as 20 groups 
tried to find common ground. But, still demoralised by 
the Anfal, the various Kurdish, Turcoman and Arab 
groups found they could not agree on the nature of a 
successor regime to that of the Baath. Seventeen 
parties - excluding the `Islamic' and Shia groups - 
made a limited agreement to cooperate. Although the 
meeting resulted in a 12-point platform and the 
formation of a five-man `steering committee', it was 
not possible to arrive at a coordinated plan of 
action. Also involved in the discussions were 
representatives of some former Baathist Sunni Arabs 
who enjoyed Saudi support. 2 
The Kurdish groups sought autonomy, if necessary 
within the Iraqi state. They attempted to win support 
from the Communists, many of whom were Kurds. The Shia 
groups, also beset by internal rivalries, had always 
opposed Kurdish separatism and in any case sought a 
political resolution which would create an Arab 
Islamic republic like revolutionary Iran. They would 
have no dealings with the atheist communists. Whereas 
the Kurdish groups had some support in the West the 
Shia groups' association with the anti-Western regime 
in Iran discouraged Western governments from giving 
them any support. 
The radio stations funded by the various Iraqi 
opposition parties (the `Voice of Rebellious Iraq' and 
the `Voice of the People of Kurdistan') broadcast 
anti-regime propaganda from January 1991. Another of 
these stations, the `Voice of Free Iraq' was 
controlled by the CIA. 
The opposition parties seem to have assumed that 
Saddam and his regime would fall from power after the 
expected victory of the DESERT STORM coalition. At 
that point observers expected a struggle between Iraqi 
` Ofra Bengio'The Kurdish and Shia Communities; From Resentment to Revolt' In Amatzia Baram and 
Barry Rubin (eds. ) Iran's Road to War (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1994) p 51-60. 
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groups: the Kurds would rely on their military 
prowess, the Shia on their numerical strength. 3 
Turkey and Syria, separately, encouraged the Iraqi 
opposition to unite. Syria's assistance to Iraqi 
Kurdish groups was part of its long-standing campaign 
to destabilise the Iraqi regime. Until 1989 Turkey and 
Iraq enjoyed good relations. The two neighbours had 
cooperated, especially in the suppression of Kurdish 
separatism. But in 1989 Turkey had complained that the 
Iraqis were failing to prevent cross-border movement 
by terrorists and smugglers. (It also objected to the 
Iraqis' harassing the 100,000-strong Iraqi Turkoman 
population. ) Iraq replied by terminating the agreement 
which permitted Turkish forces' `hot pursuit' 
operations across the border into Iraq. Iraq (and 
Syria) then revived their long-standing objections to 
Turkey's GAP project to divert the headwaters of the 
Euphrates. In April 1990 relations worsened still 
further when Turkish customs in Istanbul intercepted 
parts of an Iraqi `supergun'. 
Above all Turkey was determined to destroy links 
between the PUK and the PKK. This alliance had been 
formalised in the `Protocol of Understanding' signed 
on 1 May 1989 in Damascus. One year later, however, 
relations between the Kurdish Front and the PKK had 
broken down. This development removed one of the 
obstacles to Özal's `dual strategy'. Turkey's 
objective was to persuade all Iraqi Kurdish groups to 
suppress PKK activities in northern Iraq. 
As the Gulf War came to an end the Iraqi Kurds saw yet 
another opportunity to exploit the weakness of the 
Baath regime. When the Shia began fighting against 
government forces in the south-west the Kurds in the 
north also rose in revolt. But the memory of the Anfal 
(and of Kurdish defeats in 1976) inspired fear as well 
as hatred: when the Iraqi counter-offensive began to 
succeed - and when it became clear that no external 
force would intervene on their side - the civilian 
3 Ibid. 
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population and the defeated peshmerga fled north and 
east to the borders. 
THE US ADMINISTRATION'S POST-GULF WAR POLICY 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
In framing the foreign policy of the Bush 
Administration (1989-1993) George Bush and James Baker 
were determined to make `historic' progress in long- 
standing US foreign policy objectives. Their approach 
built on good US-Israel relations achieved during the 
Reagan Administration. They desired the prestige that 
success would bring; they wanted to present an 
impressive foreign policy record to the American 
people at the next presidential election, in 1992.4 
The first foreign policy priority was, however, the 
management of the new post-Cold War relationship with 
the USSR. Throughout its term of office the Bush 
Administration hoped that cooperation would strengthen 
Gorbachev and the `reformers' in the USSR. One of the 
most important strands of that relationship was their 
cooperation in areas of regional conflict, especially 
in the Middle East. 
The Gulf Crisis allowed the Administration to 
demonstrate its US political and military power. The 
coalition's victory presented the US with the 
opportunity to launch a new initiative: American- 
brokered peace accords between the Arabs and Israel 
and between Israel and the Palestinians. 
In the autumn of 1990 and throughout the crisis 
Administration spokesmen prepared the ground for the 
initiative: officials spoke more and more confidently 
about `progress' towards peace between the Israelis 
and their neighbours, when the crisis was over. The 
peace process initiative would secure a part of the 
`new world order'. 
4 Baker had been Bush's campaign manager in 1988 and would be again in 1991. Boris Pankin, the last 
Foreign Minister of the USSR, recorded the following observation about Baker, In October 1991: 
'While he appeared obsessed with his country's role as undisputed world leader ... I saw that 
obsession as subservient to the basic aim of securing the re-election of George Bush and the 
Republican Party. ' 
Boris Pankin The Last Hundred Days of the Soviet Union (London: IB Tauris, 1996) p 98. 
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By the Spring of 1991 Bush and Baker had for some 
time been considering how to bring about a lasting 
peace in the Middle East. 5 On 6 February 1991 in 
testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
Baker listed five `challenges' which would need 
attention after the war: Gulf security structures, 
arms control, economic reconstruction, improved US 
energy conservation and reconciliation between 
Israel, the Arab states and the Palestinians. 6 The 
need for a comprehensive Middle East `peace process' 
was identified as a prime `structural' obstacle to a 
whole cluster of contingent policy objectives. 7 The 
Administration had signalled as early as September 
1990 - at the Washington Conference, attended by 
Syrian and Israeli delegations, and others - that a 
successful conclusion to the Gulf crisis could be 
the opportunity for a breakthrough in the Middle 
East. Two conditions were required, however. The 
first was the need to strengthen links with the Arab 
states which were willing to take action against 
Iraq. Second, Israel needed to refrain from actions 
against Iraq which would have embarrassed the US' 
Arab allies. The creation of these conditions guided 
the Administration throughout the Gulf and Kurdish 
crises. For example it was borne in mind in the 
drafting of R 6788 and in the deployment of PATRIOT 
to Israel after the Iraqi SCUD attacks. 9 
Another indication of the Administration's concerns 
and intentions came in Bush's 6 March speech to a 
joint session of Congress. He then laid out his 
5 For a discussion of the historic opportunity for the US presented by the Gulf War victory see Abraham 
Ben-Zvi The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1993) pp 202-3. For a discussion of the origins and tactical progress of the US diplomatic 
campaign which led to Madrid in October see King pp 59-60. 
6 Robert 0 Freedman 'Moscow and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait ' in Robert O. Freedman (ed. ) The Middle 
East after Iran's Invasion of Kuwait (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993) p 101. 
7 'The Bush Administration's focus on a Middle East peace settlement was evident from its inauguration' 
Hussein J Agha and Ahmad S Khalidi Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation (London: Pinter, for the RIIA, 
1995) p 60. See also Talbott on the dominance of Arab-Israeli questions at the State Department in the 
weeks following the Gulf War cease fire in Nye and Smith (eds. ) After the Storm p 27. 
8 The 'states in association with the government of Iraq' formula used in R 678, to exclude Israel. 
9A total of 39 Iraqi SCUDs had been launched at Israel during the Gulf War. 
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agenda for promoting lasting peace in the Middle 
East. 1°At the same time the GCC states plus Syria and 
Egypt published a draft of their own declaration on 
future Gulf security arrangements: the basis of what 
became the Damascus Declaration, signed in July", 
was first discussed in March. Baker visited Israel 
10-12 March and briefed government leaders on the 
`peace process'. At the end of his visit, on 12 
March, he briefed Faisal Husseini and ten other 
Palestinian representatives, ostensibly the 
`internals' (residents of the Territories, not 
Tunis-based PLO officials) . 
12 Egypt took the lead in 
approaching the `externals', including the PLO. 13 
This was the first of Baker's eighteen meetings 
with Palestinians between the end of the Gulf War 
and the opening of the Madrid Conference. 14 
US policy would exploit the opportunities presented by 
the resolution of the crisis. Just as important - but 
not emphasised in public - would be the US 
Administration's freedom to act without the 
restraining influence of the USSR, which was already 
close to collapse. A key pre-condition for the success 
of the initiative was the cooperation of the Arab 
states, especially the states with borders with Israel 
and the occupied territories. Some of these states, 
like Egypt, already had good relations with the US. 
Others, like Syria, had in the past obstructed US 
efforts to find solutions to these long-standing 
regional problems. The Gulf crisis had united most of 
the Arab world in opposition to Iraq. Despite the 
hostility of Jordan, Libya and the PLO - which had 
supported Iraq during the Gulf crisis - the US set out 
to broker a rapprochement between Israel and her 
lc Text in Washington Post 7 March 1991. Analysis in Marvin Feuerwerger 'Israel, the Gulf War and its 
Aftermath' in Robert 0. Freedman p 245. 
11 Rosemary Hollis'Whatever Happened to the Damascus Declaration 7 in Jane M Davis (ed) Politics and 
International Relations In the Middle East: Continuity and Change (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995) pp 37- 
60. 
12 Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawl This Side of Peace: A Personal Account (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995) 
Chapter 5. 
13 Louis Cantori 'Unipolarity and Egyptian Hegemony' in Robert 0 Freedman p 350. 
14 Ashrawi p 82. 
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neighbours, drawing on the trust it had earned among 
its Arab coalition partners in its conduct in the 
previous crisis. In the aftermath of the Gulf War 
victory, the argument ran, those who had always 
resisted rapprochement - in the PLO, in the Likud (and 
in the pro-Israel lobby in the US) - might be 
outmanoevred. 
Specifically the strands of the policy were: the 
weakness of the USSR and its inability to support its 
former Middle East client states (like Iraq and 
Syria); Syrian weakness and isolation after Iran's 
defeat in 1988; Saudi support for the US initiative, 
following US assistance to Saudi Arabia in the Gulf 
Crisis; the discrediting of the PLO and Jordan. 
(Later, in the summer of 1992, would come another 
helpful factor: the election of a Rabin-Peres Labour 
government on a `land for peace' ticket, replacing the 
hawkish Likud-led coalition. ) These intentions were 
noted approvingly by the US' traditional allies in the 
region, most of whom were anxious to build stability. 
But those traditional allies were also having to 
adjust to the new superpower and regional power 
relationships. Turkey, in particular, expected gains 
as a result of its cooperation with the US and the 
western European states in the Gulf War coalition. 
As soon as the war was concluded James Baker began his 
shuttle diplomacy designed to create the `peace 
process'. His first visit to Israel was from 11-12 
March, days after the end of the Gulf War. Between the 
war and the Madrid conference in October he made seven 
trips to the Middle East. 
Whereas the initiative was designed and driven from 
Washington the Administration took pains to encourage 
the Soviets to contribute to the process. After the 
August 1991 coup attempt US spokesmen sought to 
bolster Gorbachev's authority by giving increased 
publicity to US-Soviet cooperation in the Middle East 
peace process. 
Just as the initiative was gaining support the Kurdish 
crisis occurred. The humanitarian plight of the 
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mostly-Kurdish victims of the fighting brought calls 
for a further US military intervention in the region. 
The account of the crisis (below) will further explain 
why Bush and Baker were reluctant to comply. Domestic 
political concerns made it desirable for US forces to 
return to base without delay. It will also explain how 
the Administration's reluctance was eventually 
overtaken by the display of public concern, in the US 
and in Europe. The humanitarian crisis required, 
first, a relief operation which would supply aid from 
the air. Later it became clear that the humanitarian 
mission would not be achieved without a military 
intervention on the ground. The US Administration 
yielded to the first demand and then the second. But 
its reluctance was to show itself again in the desire 
for the urgent withdrawal of forces, just as soon as 
the job could be seen to be done. General Colin Powell 
devoted a one-page passage in his autobiography to the 
Kurdish crisis and the international operation to 
rescue the Iraqi people who fled north into Turkey. 
But the two-paragraph section is immediately followed 
by a statement about the return of US forces and the 
celebration parades. Even in retrospect Gen Powell 
moves quickly over the events of PROVIDE COMFORT and 
dwells on the triumphant return of the troops: 
In seven [sic] weeks Provide Comfort brought 
nearly half a million Kurds home. I watched 
Shalikashvili run this political and military 
maze with masterful skill and concluded, once 
again, that here was a soldier up to any mission. 
The troops came home to a wildly cheering 
America. I took part in victory parades in 
Chicago and Washington and in a ticker-tape 
parade in New York. Alma and I rode in a white 
Buick convertible. 15 
By April 1991 the diplomatic conditions had been 
achieved. In particular the `pro-Israel' lobbies had 
to recognise that the Administration had achieved a 
national triumph against one of Israel's most 
determined enemies. The president was in a position 
15 Colin Powell with Joseph E Persico A Soldier's Way (New York: Random House, 1995) pp 531-532. 
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to coerce Israel to accept terms which represented a 
real basis for agreement with the Arabs. This was an 
unique situation: in the past no president had been 
able to disregard domestic lobbies in policy-making 
vis-ä-vis Israel and her neighbours. 
The most urgent and prominent foreign policy issue 
facing the Administration in March 1991 was not the 
Kurdish revolt. It was Israel's demand for $13 bn in 
loan guarantees for housing which the Likud 
government planned to build in the occupied 
Territories. (Israel's housing problem was acute: 
300,000 immigrants from the USSR and Ethiopia had 
arrived in Israel since 1990. An additional 500,000 
were expected before the end of 1993.16) 
In March James Baker had recommended that Congress 
should authorise $ 650m as emergency supplementary 
military aid for Israel. But this had been an 
inducement for Israel to cooperate with the emerging 
US-led peace process. (The confrontation with Israel 
over the loan guarantees continued until September. 
In that month Israel attempted to mobilise the pro- 
Israel lobby in Congress - specifically the votes of 
legislators who had previously received campaign 
contributions from AIPAC (American Israeli Public 
Affairs Committee) - to defeat the president's 
withholding of the guarantees. Bush replied with a 
threat of a veto on any restraining legislation. By 
the Senate vote on 2 October it was clear that 
Israel's supporters in Congress had failed to muster 
an overriding two thirds majority vote. At that vote 
the relative weakness of the previously all-powerful 
lobby was revealed. This was the turning point; 
thereafter Israel's Likud government realised that 
it could not resist Washington's pressure for a 
conference in Madrid. The announcement that it would 
participate came on 20 October, after an anguished 
internal debate. It could only take comfort from the 
open agenda and the lack of preconditions. ) 
16 John King Handshake in Washington: The Beginning of Middle East Peace (Reading: Garnet, 1994) p 
65. 
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The Arabs, on the other hand, were to make 
concessions throughout the Spring and Summer. After 
the war, following pressures coordinated by Egypt, 
Syria abandoned its long-standing refusal to 
negotiate directly with Israels7. Syria, which had 
used the Hizbollah to pressure the Israelis in 
Lebanon, recognised at that point that there was 
more to be gained from diplomacy than the use of 
force, through surrogates. 18 The past cooperation of 
Egypt and Syria in the `Gulf war' coalition allowed 
their leaders to join in a new, even-handed, US-led 
peace process. By 27 September the PLO which had 
publicly supported Iraq in the Gulf Crisis had also 
agreed to participate, despite the threat of a 
damaging split in its ranks. 19 At a meeting with 
leading Palestinians on 20 September James Baker had 
given far-reaching assurances on the likely outcome 
of the Madrid conference. It was these assurances 
which allowed Arafat to prevail in the PLO debate. 
Above all the Administration wanted to avoid any long- 
term commitment to the protection (still less to the 
political independence) of the Kurds: this 
consideration drove the US to insist on an operation 
which would be limited in scope, cost and duration. 
Although it was public opinion which forced the 
Administration to intervene on behalf of the Kurds, 
officials acknowledged that an intervention would have 
some medium-term strategic merits. It would 
demonstrate US support and assistance for Turkey (and 
maintain pressure on Iraq). The Kurdish connection 
would touch sensitive US-Turkish concerns, however, 
and renew awkward `bridge or barrier' questions, on 
both sides. 20 
17 Cantori p 350. The Syrian decision still came as a surprise when, on 14 July, President Asad agreed to 
face -to-face talks without pre-conditions. The announcement convinced the still-undecided Prime Minister 
Shamir that he support full Israeli participation in Madrid. Feuerwerger in Robert 0 Freedman, p 247. At the 
Madrid Conference itself Syria suddenly refused to participate in bi-lateral meetings with the Iraelis and tried 
to persuade other Arab delegations to follow suit. Adam Garfinkle 'Jordanian Policy from the Intifada to 
Madrid' in Robert 0 Freedman p 323. 
18 Steven Pelletiere Asad and the Peace Process: the pivotal r6le of Lebanon (Carlisle Pa.: US Army War 
College SSI, 1995) p 22. 
19 David Hurst 'Arafat backs precious opportunity The Guardian 24 September 1991. 
20 'Missing Dividend' Time 3 May 1991. 
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THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S POST-GULF WAR POLICY 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
The Gulf crisis occurred in the USSR's last year as an 
integrated state. The pressures which were eventually 
to lead to its disintegration were already at work: 
throughout 1991 Gorbachev and his supporters fought to 
control the imminent collapse. Since 1985 the economic 
plight of the USSR had forced a Soviet retreat in 
foreign policy, from the military withdrawal from 
Afghanistan to the relaxation of control in eastern 
Europe. 
This weakness underpinned the spirit of Soviet 
cooperation with the West which had begun in 1987. 
During that year the USSR signalled its willingness to 
cooperate with Western states over certain 
international problems. The first came in July at the 
famous tea-party at the UN in New York at when the P5 
representatives made the agreement which resulted in 
the adoption of SCR 598, the peace plan for the Iran- 
Iraq War. The second was Gorbachev's Pravda article of 
17 September. The article offered Soviet cooperation 
with the West on the basis of `interdependence'. In 
the same year the disaster at Chernobyl had emphasised 
the need for international cooperation in 
environmental protection - as well as in economic and 
security matters. 
By late 1990 the USSR was determined to acquire 
Western aid. It also sought the support of Western 
governments for IMF and World Bank loans. 21Heavy 
Western assistance began in 1988, led by West Germany. 
During the German unification negotiations in 1990 
German financial aid and investment in the USSR 
increased noticeably with a DM 12 bn grant for housing 
and reconstruction and DM 3 bn in interest free 
credit. At the end of 1990 the US announced its first 
large bi-lateral aid package: $1 bn credit support for 
Soviet purchases of US agricultural goods. The flow of 
21 Angela Stent'Russia's Economic Revolution and the West' Survival Vol 37 No 1 Spring 1995 pp 125-6. 
151 
funds to the former USSR was further increased after 
the January 1992 conference on assistance to the Newly 
Independent States, held in Washington DC. The 
European Bank for Reconstruction (ERBD), created by 
the EU, came into existence later that year. 
Soviet economic weakness forced the government to 
comply with US policy in the Gulf. In 1991 the USSR 
was a partner in the US-led Middle East peace process. 
But from time to time the Soviets felt the need to 
demonstrate their independence from the policy of the 
Western states. 22 
Soviet policy in the Gulf crisis was therefore 
designed to maintain the wider cooperative 
arrangements with the US23 and improve relations with 
those Arab states which had opposed the invasion of 
Kuwait. The success of this policy with regard to the 
GCC can be seen in the achievement of several long- 
standing Soviet diplomatic goals. From 1964-1985 only 
Kuwait amongst the Gulf Arab states had agreed to 
establish full diplomatic relations with the USSR. In 
1985 Oman and the UAE had accepted the Soviet offer, 
as did Qatar in 1988. But Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
resisted. As a result of Soviet cooperation against 
Iraq on 17 September 1990 Saudi Arabia agreed to 
establish full relations with the USSR. Bahrain 
followed on 28 September. More practical assistance 
followed. In October 1990 Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and 
Kuwait announced a $4 bn loan to the USSR. 
The Soviets, seeking the prestige of a successful 
mediation effort, sent several diplomatic missions to 
the region during the crisis. Their first priority was 
the release of their own military and civilian 
advisors held hostage (along with Westerners) in Iraq. 
At the same time they tried to delay the build-up of 
coalition forces, and the adoption of UN mandate for 
intervention, especially after Bush's 8 November 
22 Such as the Primakov mission to Iraq in January 1991. 
23 The importance both the US and the USSR attached to their cooperation, and their intention to work together to 
resolve the Gulf crisis, can be seen from the concluding communique at the Helsinki summit, held in September 
1990. 
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announcement of a decision to double the US forces 
deployed in Saudi Arabia. The increased size of 
coalition forces would give the US and its allies an 
offensive land-air capability for the first time in 
the crisis. During the debate on UNSC R 678 the 
Soviets successfully urged a compliance deadline of 14 
January, not 1 January as the US had proposed. The 
Soviet policy was also designed to demonstrate a 
degree of independence from coalition policy, to 
provide a base for possible Soviet mediation and to 
provide the foundations for renewed cooperation with 
Iraq after the crisis, however it was resolved. For 
example despite the actions it took condemning Iraq in 
the UN Security Council the USSR continued to station 
its military and civilian advisors in Iraq up until 
the eve of the outbreak of war. Again, the USSR 
welcomed Saadoon Hamadi, the Iraqi deputy prime 
minister, on a visit to Moscow in August 1990. At the 
end of the visit Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 
commented favourably on the Hamadi's proposal that the 
release of foreign workers taken hostage by Iraq 
should be linked to a withdrawal of coalition forces 
from Saudi Arabia. This was contrary to US policy. 
Robert 0 Freedman has described this as a `minimax' 
Soviet strategy: 
[The strategy] involved doing the minimum 
necessary to 
preserve US-Soviet relations and foster the 
development of Soviet ties with the GCC states, 
Egypt and Syria, while at the same time 
maximising the amount of influence Moscow could 
maintain in Iraq. 24 
Whereas the USSR supported the twelve UN Security 
Council resolutions which condemned Iraq before the 
war began it also repeatedly called for a peaceful 
resolution of the crisis. If force had to be used, the 
Soviets argued, it would be better those forces were 
under UN control. It declined to commit forces, even 
non-combat forces, to the coalition military effort. 
24 Robert 0 Freedman p 82. 
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It appears that the Soviet policy in the crisis was 
not the result of a complete consensus within the 
Soviet government. Shevardnadze's resignation in 
December indicated divisions on this and other 
matters. Nevertheless by the start of the coalition 
air campaign the USSR had successfully balanced its 
policy between the respective parties in the crisis. 
During the 6-week war the policy continued unchanged. 
There was however a noticeable increase in anti-US 
rhetoric in the Soviet press as the hard-liners gained 
influence at the expense of the reformers. The pretext 
for anti-US statements was the realisation that the 
coalition intended to conduct a protracted air 
campaign targeting Iraqi infrastructure (inevitably 
causing Iraqi civilian casualties) not just the 
invasion forces in Kuwait. During his first visit to 
Washington in January the new Soviet foreign minister, 
Alexander Bessmertykh, observed that the Security 
Council mandate authorised action to liberate Kuwait, 
not to destroy Iraq: 
There are fears... that we are entering upon a 
second phase of the conflict, where, in addition 
to a resolution of the task stipulated by the 
Security Council resolutions - namely the 
liberation of Kuwait - the fear is beginning to 
mount that Iraq is being subjected to very 
serious destruction, and there is a mounting 
danger to Iraq's peaceful population. 25 
During this visit James Baker publicly accepted some 
linkage between the resolution of the Gulf Crisis and 
subsequent international action to settle the Israel- 
Arab and Israel-Palestinian conflicts. 
During the war the Soviets made repeated efforts to 
mediate. But Iraq was unwilling to make the 
concessions which would have made such mediation 
successful. The US (and the Western coalition 
partners) showed respect, in public at least, for the 
Soviet mediation efforts. 
During the 100-hour coalition ground offensive the 
Soviets assisted in the arrangement of the cease fire. 
25 Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh, FBIS: USSR, 28 January 1991, p 4. 
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But viewing the prospects for independent action in 
the post-war Middle East Gorbachev faced the prospect 
of a comprehensive `peace process' achieved by US 
influence alone. If there was to be a peace process 
then the Soviets wanted it to be a deliberate 
diplomatic process, jointly sponsored by themselves 
and the US. Another of their objectives was to prevent 
a permanent presence of US land-air forces in the 
region. After the war the Soviets sought to restrain 
the US-led coalition from taking the most severe 
measures against Iraq and its regime. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of this chapter are as follows: 
" All the sources agree that the US was at first 
reluctant to participate in an intervention 
operation in Iraq in April. The Administration 
feared domestic criticism of an `incomplete 
victory', `quagmire' and `fragmentation'. But this 
study concludes that there may have been another 
reason for that reluctance. The US was preparing to 
launch a peace initiative in the Middle East. It was 
designed to end years of confrontation between 
Israel and its neighbours. Another intervention into 
Iraq, this time interfering in its internal affairs, 
would risk offending all the other Arab states whose 
support would be required for the success of that 
initiative. It required an even more powerful motive 
for the Administration to overcome these reasons for 
non-intervention. This more powerful force was the 
strength of US public opinion which demanded US 
participation. When the intervention force had 
achieved its mission the same motives which had 
underpinned the Administration's first instincts - 
ie non-intervention - would lead the US to urge its 
coalition partners to agree to an early withdrawal 
of the forces deployed inside northern Iraq. 
" The USSR, by then dependent on Western economic 
support, continued to assist the US in its policy 
against Iraq. But it was keen to limit the long-term 
presence of the US forces in the Gulf region. It 
155 
wanted a prestigious role in post-Gulf War diplomacy 
and the continuation of good working relations with 
the US in wider post Cold war issues. In sum it 
wanted to present itself as a powerful state capable 
of independent action: that objective drove it to 
cooperate with the US and its allies in the 
resolution of the Gulf crisis. The same thinking 
would determine its conduct vis-ä-vis the Kurdish 
crisis which followed. It would cooperate with the 
Western states but would show its independence by its 
public warnings to the West to respect Iraqi 
sovereignty. 26 
26 For further comments on US and Soviet policy in the crisis seep 260-263 below. 
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Part 2- Case Study 
CHAPTER 7 
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 688 
This chapter contains an analysis of Resolution 688, 
the only formal action taken by the UN Security 
Council in response to the Kurdish crisis. Adopted 
after barely 24 hours' consideration, on 5 April the 
resolution tasked the Secretary-General to investigate 
humanitarian conditions in Iraq and to coordinate 
relief work. This tasking led to the deployment of 
rapporteurs and special representatives. 
The resolution was drafted, discussed and adopted at a 
time when the only form of intervention operation 
under consideration was a plan to air-drop supplies to 
the distressed people in the mountains on the Iraq- 
Turkish border. The formation of a coalition to send 
land-air forces into the airspace, and onto the 
territory, of Iraq had not even been proposed. So the 
resolution did not address, let alone authorise, the 
action which took the name PROVIDE COMFORT. The text 
of the resolution and the speeches of delegates did, 
however, address important questions on the 
international community's right to intervene in crises 
created by intra-state conflict. It is noteworthy that 
the Council did not return to the question of 
intervention after the coalition states had resolved 
to intervene. Council members were willing to let 
their consideration of the Kurdish crisis rest after 
making their statements on 688. They did not want to 
apply themselves to the more controversial questions 
raised by the military action taken after 688 was 
adopted. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to describe 
the terms of 688 and the debate which took place at 
the time of its adoption. The structure is as follows: 
" some observations on the text of R 688 
" the debate in the Security Council 
" commentary 
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" text of SCR 688 
The conclusions of this chapter do not challenge the 
consensus of academic opinion. They are, nonetheless, 
made in the light of opinions from a variety of 
sources, some of them recent in origin. The 
conclusions also include some judgments between 
conflicting assessments. 
THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION 
In April 1991, after the Kurdish and Shia revolts 
against the Baath regime in Iraq had failed, the 
Security Council adopted two resolutions in connection 
with the on-going crisis. The first, R 687, laid down 
cease-fire conditions and made post-war security 
arrangements to restore international peace and 
security to Iraq and its neighbours. In the opinion of 
one writer R 687 set an important precedent for the 
UN. It attempted to regulate the future behaviour of a 
state it had found guilty of aggression. 687 was 
therefore, a continuation of enforcement measures and 
the basis of a peace treaty. ' The dual purpose of the 
resolution made it hard to implement. This resolution 
was adopted on 3 April, at the end of five weeks of 
informal consultations between the members of the 
Council and the representatives of other concerned 
states. In late March, at the final stage of drafting 
R 687, France proposed the insertion of a Chapter VII 
clause condemning Iraq for its repression against the 
Kurds and Shia, into the resolution. The idea had 
originated in a comment by the Austrian delegate. The 
US and the UK declined to support France because they 
feared that the Chapter VII language would provoke a 
Chinese veto. Yemen and Cuba also opposed the draft 
amendment. So the clause was dropped, much to the 
relief of China which then abstained on, rather than 
vetoed, 687.2 The Council did refer to the continuing 
Iraqi repression of the minorities, however, by 
inserting a provision that economic sanctions would be 
reviewed periodically in the light of the `policies 
1 Ian Johnstone Aftermath of the Gulf War: An Assessment of UN Action (New York: Lynne Reiner for 
the International Peace Academy, 1994) p 1. 
2 Stephen Robinson 'The Toughness needed to avoid another Vietnam' Daily Telegraph 9 April 1991. 
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and practices of the government of Iraq'(Paragraph 
21). This can be interpreted as a reference to Iraq's 
internal, as well as external, policies. Several 
states noted the plight of the Kurds in the 
explanation of their votes on 6873. This device did not 
allay the more general concerns of some other states 
that, in the case of R 687, the Council was acting 
ultra vires by meddling in the `domestic jurisdiction' 
of Iraq. 
Diplomats from the Third World could be heard 
muttering in the corridors about the sacrosanct 
principles of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of member nations. 4 
The second, R 688, dealt with the humanitarian crisis 
in northern and southern Iraq - and the emergency 
caused by the flow of refugees into Turkey and Iran - 
which had arisen because of the Iraqi repression of 
the Kurds and Shiite populations during and after the 
revolts. This second resolution was debated and 
adopted on 5 April after consultations lasting no more 
than 24 hours. 
On 4 April the United States announced its plan for an 
air operation to drop aid to the Kurds in northern 
Iraq. On 5 April the Security Council debated and 
adopted R 688. The quick passage of R 688, and its 
adoption by a slender majority (but without 
amendment), conceals the intense diplomacy which 
preceded the formal debate. 5 Other examples of 
effective Western diplomacy earlier in crisis can be 
seen in the discussion surrounding Rs 678 and 687. In 
R 678 Western states anticipated a problem in 
retaining the support of the Arab coalition members if 
Israel were to be drawn into the fighting against 
Iraq. They could not prevent Israel from attacking 
Iraq - if it was acting in self defence under A 51 - 
but they could draft the Security Council mandate in a 
way which would exclude Israel from the states 
3 Johnstone p 18. 
4 Robinson (Note 2 above). 
5 See C Greenwood 'New World Order or Old - The Invasion of Kuwait and the Rule of Law' Modern Law 
Review London March 1992 pp 169,177. On the care taken by coalition states, especially the UK and the 
US, in framing policy with an eye to international law, see Adam Roberts 'International Law and the Use of 
Force Paper V in New Dimensions in International Security Part 2 Adelphi Paper 266 Winter 1991/2 pp 53- 
63. 
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empowered to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
Accordingly they inserted preamble language to confine 
the mandate to `states acting in cooperation with the 
government of Kuwait' in R 678. This strengthened the 
coalition, especially when there was a danger of 
Israel unilaterally counter-attacking Iraq in response 
to the SCUD attacks in December and January. In the 
second the concerns of China and Russia over the 
authorisation for humanitarian intervention were 
adopted in the `cease-fire' resolution R 687, and R 
688. In particular the drafting indicates how, as the 
international crisis continued over the months from 
August 1990 to April 1991, Western diplomats became 
adept at anticipating and accommodating the concerns 
of potentially obstructive Council members, 
particularly China and India (and to some extent the 
USSR). The resolution also needs to be compared with 
the other `Gulf Crisis' resolutions6, both for the 
voting record of the members', and the vehemence of the 
language. After the original `A 39 determination'(R 
660) in early August, R 688 was the only `Gulf crisis 
resolution' - apart from a purely procedural one 
concerning a committee inside the UN monitoring 
sanctions against Iraq - which did not invoke Chapter 
VII. 8 
In early April as the full extent of the Kurdish 
Crisis became clear Turkey9 and France1° requested a 
6 The significant resolutions were : 
R 660 (2 August) Identified a threat to international peace, under A 39, condemned the invasion, 
and demanded that Iraq withdraw. (Note : the USSR insisted on the deletion of 'act of aggression' 
in the text - Greenwood p 159. ) 
R 661 (6 August) Imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. Later refined by Rs 665,666 and 670. 
R 678 (29 November) 'all necessary means' authorisation. (Note : the USSR insisted on Inserting 
a 15 January deadline, rather than earlier as preferred by the US and the UK. China abstained on 
the vote. Greenwood p 166. ) 
R 687 (3 April) The 'cease fire resolution' which laid Chapter VII mandatory conditions on Iraq, 
against the possibility of a resumption of coalition hostilities. 
688 (5 April) condemned Iraq's repression of its own people and Identified the 'consequences of 
'the situation as a threat to international peace and security. But there was no explicit authorisation 
for states to use force to compel Iraq's compliance and did not invoke Chapter VII. 
7 The Security Council voting records of the states which refused to follow the line taken by the majority 
deserve attention. In the 'Gulf crisis' debates in 1990 the pattern of voting was unanimity on resolutions 
which merely condemned Iraq. Yemen and Cuba voted against resolutions which Imposed Chapter VII 
sanctions against Iraq (including 678. ) China voted in favour of the earlier resolutions (condemnation and 
non-forcible sanctions) but abstained on the final vote (678) which authorised 'all necessary means' (ie the 
use of force). See Note 6, above. 
8 The Council is obliged to identify a threat of international peace and security before it proceeds to 
authorise 'enforcement' measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
9 Letter S/22435 dated 2 April. 
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meeting of the Security Council. " The Council met on 5 
April and addressed a draft resolution - presented to 
the Council as document S/22778 and later adopted as R 
688 - sponsored by Belgium and France. 12 After a short 
debate the draft resolution was adopted, without 
amendment, on the same day. Of all the resolutions 
concerning the Gulf Crisis adopted by the Council R 
688 was approved by the narrowest margin. The draft 
was accepted on a vote of ten in favour, three against 
and two abstentions: Cuba, Zimbabwe and Yemen, quoting 
the principle of sovereign rights of states, voted 
against the draft resolution. The two abstentions were 
China and India. 13 
SOME GENERAL POINTS OF INTEREST IN THE TEXT OF 688 
" The resolution refers to 'Iraqi civilians', with 
only brief references to Kurds and Shia. This 
description of the suffering people avoided, where 
possible, references to ethnic groups inside Iraq. In 
doing so the sponsors hoped to avoid the accusation 
that they were attempting to endorse any of the 
warring factions in a civil war or internal political 
struggle. Some would interpret the minimal use of the 
word `Kurd' as an act of deference to Turkish and 
Iranian government practice and the minimal use of the 
word Shia as an attempt to avoid invoking memories 
amongst the US public who might recall the hostage 
taking of US embassy staff by militant `Shia' groups 
in Iran in 1980-82 (and the subsequent hostage-taking 
of Westerners by the pro-Iran Hizbollah faction in 
Lebanon). Freedman and Boren attribute the lack of 
international military action to assist the marsh 
Arabs in the south east of Iraq to the pressure from 
Saudi Arabia: 
10 Letter S/22442 dated 4 April. 
11 Under A 99 the Secretary-General could have brought the crisis to the attention of the Security Council 
as a 'threat to international peace and security'. He did not. This fact will be recalled when his contribution to 
the resolution of the crisis is assessed, below. 
12 The draft resolution was later co-sponsored by the USA and the UK 
13 A resolution is adopted on a minimum vote of 9 of the 15 members, provided that the five permanent 
members 'concur. It has become the practice of the Security Council to consider an abstention of a 
permanent member as 'concurrence'. 
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One reason why the Shia were not given the same 
protection as the Kurds was that Saudi Arabia did 
not want to see the strengthening of Iran which 
was thought to have helped organise the Shia 
rebellion and would be likely to benefit from any 
increase in Shia autonomy in Iraq. '4 
" In the preamble of the draft resolution specific 
reference was made to A 2(7). It affirms `the 
commitment of all member states to the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence of 
Iraq and all States in the area'. This statement was 
designed to assure members of the Council that the 
sponsors of R 688 fully accepted the importance of the 
principle contained in A 2(7). The measures proposed 
would not amount to an intervention in matters 
`essentially within the domestic jurisdiction' of Iraq 
(as defined in A 2(7)), neither would they amount to 
an armed attack on `the sovereignty or territorial 
integrity of Iraq'(as defined in A 2(4)). Most of the 
references to Iraqi sovereignty in the debate on R 688 
invoked A 2(7) and thus referred to the weight of 
customary law supporting the right of states to act as 
they wish within their own territories. Indeed the 
resolution appears to have been drafted to avoid a 
statement defining limits to a state's sovereignty. 
The explicit or implicit opinion of the states which 
voted against the Resolution, and those who abstained, 
was that the Security Council had no authority to 
involve itself with a matter of `domestic 
jurisdiction'. In taking this position these states 
warned of dire consequences for international peace 
and security if a `right of intervention' was to 
become established. 
" There was no specific reference to earlier 
resolutions, nor any specific 'finding' under A 39, 
nor any reference to Chapters VI or VII. The draft 
did not 'recall' such resolutions as 678 and 687.15 The 
absence of any reference to Rs 678 and 687 in R 688 
avoided confirmation or revocation of the delegation 
14 Freedman and Boren page 89, note 75. 
15 Johnstone p 37. See p 167 ('second operative paragraph'), below. 
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of enforcement authority to the coalition states in 
the Gulf War. 678 had empowered states `acting in 
association with the government of Kuwait'16 to restore 
international peace and security. This could have 
become an `open-ended' authorisation for the coalition 
to use force, and to continue doing so until the 
participating states decided that peace and security 
had been restored. An early draft of R 687 suggested 
that the authority for forcible action derived from 
earlier resolutions. This language was deleted, 
however, at the insistence of the Chinese. China 
wanted to be able to justify its non-veto of 687 on 
the grounds that the resolution had brought the war to 
an end and, by implication, terminated the `all 
necessary means' authority which had caused China to 
abstain on 678. Whereas 687 had partially reiterated 
this authority - without the `in association' language 
- operative paragraph 4 (0P4) of 687 implied that it 
would be for the Council (ie not any state or group of 
states) to decide on `such further steps' necessary to 
enforce Iraqi compliance with the terms of the cease- 
fire. Likewise the text of R 688, by omitting any 
reference A 39 or resolutions which had cited Chapter 
VI or Chapter VII in terms, chose not to specify the 
legal powers under which the resolution made demands 
on Iraq. 
Whereas 688 omitted any mention of A 39 (or of 
Chapter VII) several features of the resolution 
suggest `enforcement'. The several references to 
`international peace and security', the transborder 
effect of Iraqi shells having landed in Iran'' and 
Turkey18 (as well as the effect of refugee movements) 
strongly suggests that the Council had in mind 
`enforcement' action. Roberts notes that this omission 
was deliberate and designed to satisfy the concerns of 
Council members anxious to authorise a minimal degree 
of intervention (access for aid agencies etc) in an 
exceptional case. 19 
16 Seep 160, above. 
17 Letter from Iran UN doc S/22436 dated 3 April 1991. This letter alleged that 3 members of the Iranian 
security forces had been killed by these shells. 
18 Note 9, above. 
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Despite its peremptory language the resolution 
contained no specific reference to Chapter VII (or 
Chapter VI). This meant that the resolution avoided 
any mention of `enforcement' but likewise made no 
mention of `peaceful resolution of disputes'. Out of 
the ten Security Council resolutions adopted in 
respect of the Gulf Crisis between 1 August 90 and 5 
April 1991, only two resolutions -R 669 (adjusting 
the mandate of the UN committee supervising the 
sanctions against Iraq) and 688 - omitted mention of 
Chapter VII20. Accordingly the draft did not call for 
international action to stop the repression, just for 
the relief of suffering and international assistance 
for the aid agencies. No punishment for non-compliance 
or obstruction by Iraq was laid down, nor was any 
group of states or agency mandated to force the issue 
in the event of non-compliance. All these are normally 
part of mandatory resolutions, like R 678 and 687. 
Other enforcement measures, short of the use of force, 
were in any case still in operation against Iraq, 
under R 687, R 678 and earlier resolutions. Packer21 
identifies `standards of performance' for Iraq but no 
sanctions provision nor a nomination of a party 
authorised to enforce sanctions in the event of Iraqi 
non-compliance. In his view R 688 was in the same 
`condemnatory' category as R 660; it would have needed 
its own 1678' to authorise enforcement. 
Greenwood speaks of 688 as a non-binding 
`recommendatory' resolution, meaning that it did 
amount to a new mandate for forcible action (nor seek 
to impose an obligation on other member states to take 
further action against Iraq). It is Greenwood's 
contention, nonetheless, that even with these 
diplomatic omissions 688 retained the essentials of a 
continuing authority for the use of force: 
19 According to Greenwood it was the USSR which insisted, in informal consultations, that no A 39 finding 
should be included in the draft resolution. This was accepted, despite the fury of the French delegate whose 
insistence on identifying Iraq's 'crime against humanity' was heard in the debate. 
20 Fifoot p 159. 
21 Source: interview with John Packer, a Canadian lawyer working for UNHCR in Geneva at the time of the 
crisis. 
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The finding in [R] 688 that Iraq's repression of 
its civilian population created such a threat, 
taken together with a continuing mandate in 687 
might therefore furnish a legal justification for 
the operation in northern Iraq. 22 
Adam Roberts supports the Greenwood case: 
Thus it was possible for lawyers to say that the 
formal legal basis of the safe havens operation 
was by no means exclusively ... humanitarian: 
to 
the extent that the safe havens had a degree of 
UN authorisation, it was more on the familiar 
ground of threats to peace and security. 23 
The Greenwood case is persuasive but not conclusive. 
Whereas there was no citation of the earlier 
resolutions, nor A 39, every other feature of the 
resolution points towards a mandate for action, using 
force as necessary. 688 condemned the repression of 
the Iraqi civilian population `the consequences of 
which threaten international peace and security'. The 
resolution went on to demand that Iraq cease these 
attacks and allow aid organisations immediate access 
to the stricken population. There was no explicit 
authorisation for states to use force to relieve the 
condition of the `Iraqi civilian population'. 
The effect of the diplomatic language was to allow 
China, the USSR and other `non-interventionist' 
Council members to accept 688 as a stand-alone 
resolution. 
" It is also worthy of note that the plight of the 
Kurds and the threat to international peace and 
security caused by their flight was not brought to the 
Council by the Secretary-General (in accordance with A 
99) but by several members of the Council. This is not 
unusual. In the light of the subsequent conduct of the 
UN in the crisis, however, it might be taken as 
partial corroboration of the view that the Secretariat 
was from the first reluctant to involve the UN in what 
was, arguably, an internal Iraqi matter. 
22 Greenwood p 177. 
23 Adam Roberts 'Humanitarian War: military intervention and human rights' International Affairs 69 NO p 
437. 
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" Summary. It is clear that the Council, faced with a 
humanitarian crisis (with international consequences) 
rather than a case of international aggression, was 
not prepared to authorise forcible action against Iraq 
as an extension of the mandate which had authorised 
the coalition action in the Gulf War. It took action 
which condemned Iraq but did not set in motion 
punitive action. Despite the peremptory language of 
the resolution (and the almost unanimous condemnation 
of Iraq in the debate) calling on the Iraqis to 
terminate their repression of the `Iraqi civilians' in 
distress, the resolution did not go farther than a 
demand for access for, and a request for action by, 
the aid agencies and a diplomatic initiative by the 
Secretary-General. 
SCR 688 - SOME POINTS OF DETAIL 
The first operative paragraph (OP1) contained the 
following: 
[The Security Council] Condemns the repression of 
the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of 
Iraq, including most recently the Kurdish 
populated areas, the consequences of which 
threaten international peace and security in the 
region. 
Here the resolution identified a link between internal 
repression and a threat to regional stability: it 
connected the internal repression with the threat to 
international peace and security created by the 
`transborder effects'24. The resolution made the 
connection in order to satisfy the concern that a 
simple reference to internal conditions would be 
judged to be interference in Iraq's `domestic 
jurisdiction' and as such a contravention of the 
Charter. In the discussions of the early drafts of R 
687 several members of the Council expressed concern 
over the apparent willingness of the sponsors to 
`impose' an interpretation of the long-disputed Iraq- 
Kuwait frontier, disregarding Iraqi objections. There 
24 Johnstone pp 19-23. 
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had also been debate in the Council over the Security 
Council's right to impose a disarmament regime on 
Iraq. (These discussions should be seen as a 
continuation of long-standing debate over the 
`creeping' extension of Security Council competence. 
Briefly, members of the NAM accuse the US, the UK and 
France or seeking to expand the Security Council's 
area of competence to give themselves a wider, 
privileged, role in resolving international disputes. ) 
The sponsors eventually satisfied these concerns by 
confirming a past frontier agreement which had been 
reached in negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait, and 
by declaring that disarmament was an essential part of 
the restoration of `international peace and security'. 
In 688 it is noteworthy that the Council was prepared 
to link `internal repression' and `regional stability' 
without taking the next logical step: making an 
explicit reference to A 39.25 But OP1 makes no such 
reference. 
The second operative paragraph contains the following: 
[The Security Council] Demands that Iraq, as a 
contribution to removing the threat to 
international peace and security in the 
region, immediately end this repression and 
expresses the hope in the same context that an 
open dialogue will take place to ensure that 
the human and political rights of all Iraqi 
citizens are respected. 
Although there is no reference to Chapter VII, the 
peremptory tone of `demands' is the language of 
enforcement, rather than of the `pacific settlement of 
disputes'. The demand, furthermore, reinforces the 
linkage with the internal repression. It emphasises 
the prominence of internal conditions as a trigger for 
Council action, rather than regional instability. 
Finally there is a reference, not only to human 
rights, but, in a significant departure from previous 
25 A39: 
'The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression, and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken In 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and stability. ' 
A finding under A 39 is a necessary precondition to a Security Council enforcement action, under Chapter 
VII. 
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practice, to political rights as well. Ideological 
differences between states have, since 1945, inhibited 
the United Nations from defining `political rights'. 
All could agree on the importance of `the rights of 
states' but no agreement could be expected on the 
`political rights': ie rights of citizens inside 
states. (In the Charter the term `political rights' 
occurs only once, in the section concerned with 
Trusteeship. It merely affirms the duty of states 
administering Trusteeship territories to respect the 
(undefined) political rights of the people of that 
territory. ) In R 688 the Security Council went 
further: the reference to `political rights' for the 
first time recorded the implication that there 
exists a universal set of political rights, (and 
that Iraq had violated them). Differences between 
member-states over the interpretation of A 2(7) on 
the broader issue of `domestic jurisdiction' are 
overshadowed by the intense sensitivity surrounding 
statements on political rights, an issue normally 
considered far too divisive to inject into debates 
which seek to establish a consensus for action by 
the Council. 
In the third operative paragraph (0P3): 
[The Security Council] Insists that Iraq allow 
immediate access by international organisations 
to all those in need of assistance in all parts 
of Iraq and to make available all necessary 
facilities for their operations. 
Here the resolution, continuing to use peremptory 
language, requires Iraq to admit foreign aid workers 
to all parts of the state and give them assistance. 
Again both the strength of language and the order for 
Iraq to waive normal border controls overruled Iraq's 
sovereign rights. This language reinforces the 
impression of enforcement. One commentator has drawn 
attention to the similarity of language in this 
paragraph to the language in GA R 43/131(8 December 
1988) and 45/100 (14 December 1990). 26 
26 The two resolutions were adopted to state (and then to re-state) the importance of state authorities, 
other states and NGOs providing humanitarian services to victims (including displaced persons and those 
who have sought refuge in other states) of natural disasters. Whereas the underlying precept is that of 
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In the fifth operative paragraph (0P5) the Council 
called upon the Secretary-General: 
to address urgently the critical needs of the 
refugees and displaced Iraqi population. 
Calls upon the'Secretary-General to investigate and 
act normally come about when the Council agrees that 
action is required but cannot agree on a course of 
action or a precise mandate. It is also a device to 
throw the responsibility for deciding action, and for 
funding any action, on the Secretariat. 27 
In the sixth operative paragraph (OP6): 
[The Security Council] Appeals to all Member 
States and to all humanitarian organisations to 
contribute to these humanitarian efforts. 
Taken with the mandate to the Secretary-General, in 
0P5, the resolution committed the UN first to 
encourage, and then to take charge of, humanitarian 
relief inside Iraq and in the border areas of the 
neighboring states. This language indicates that the 
sponsors of the resolution, at the least, intended 
that any subsequent operation should be conducted by 
the UN. This mandate led to the Secretary-General's 
initiative in appointing Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan 
and Eric Suy. (Prince Sadruddin was to become the 
Executive Delegate of the UN Secretary General for 
the UN Humanitarian Programme for Iraq, Kuwait and 
the Iraq/Iran and Iraq/Turkey Border Areas. Eric Suy 
was appointed to conduct a fact finding mission on 
behalf of the Secretary-General. ) 
The mandate for UN action furthermore became the 
backdrop for the (later) debate over the use of UN- 
assigned forces (blue helmets), or UN Guards, in an 
operation inside Iraq. (Despite this mandate, for 
reasons explained below, the Secretary-General was 
later to rule out a blue helmet operation. The `safe 
'human rights and fundamental freedoms' both resolutions emphasize state sovereignty. It is noteworthy 
that the resolutions do not authorize non-consensual interventions. By Implication they rule out the use of 
force by external agencies, even in a humanitarian mission. M Bettati 'Le Droit dingerence: sens et portAe' 
Le Debat No 67(1991) p 14. 
27 Senior UKMis official. 
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havens' intervention was a multinational (coalition) 
operation conducted [arguably] in accordance with R 
688, rather than an operation conducted by the UN 
itself. ) 
THE DEBATE 
The debate28 in the Council saw nearly all members29 
address the question of the right of the Council to 
authorise enforcement action under Chapter VII in the 
case of internal repression. The representatives' 
statements contained, in nearly every case, references 
to the humanitarian crisis and the repression of human 
rights. Supporters made the case citing `transborder' 
effects and human rights violations. Opponents of 
intervention cited A 2(7). Some of these opponents 
insisted that the crisis did not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Security Council and urged the 
involvement of the UN's other agencies: those with 
responsibility for administering aid (with the consent 
of the state concerned) but not empowered to apply 
enforcement measures to any state. Some offered 
arguments for and against the right of intervention in 
the current situation. Others spoke in more general 
terms. Contributions to the debate were made by 
members of the Council and representatives of other 
states who, having been invited to speak30, stated 
their governments' views as non-voting participants31 
in the debate. 32 The delegates' statements are worthy 
of examination because individually and collectively 
they reveal the positions of a wider group of states, 
not just the 15 Council members who could record a 
vote. In some case Council members' statements provide 
28 The official record of the debate in UN document S/PV. 2982,5 April 1991. All quotations below are 
from this document unless otherwise stated. 
29 The following states were members of the Security Council in April 1991: Austria, China, Cote d'lvoire, 
Cuba, Ecuador, France, India, Romania, USSR, UK, USA, Yemen, Zaire, Zimbabwe, Belgium (president in 
April). 
30 Under Rule 37 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council (December 1982) the (non- 
voting) participation of other members of the UN, not represented on the Security Council, in Council 
debates is at the discretion of the president of the Council. In the event of a Security Council member 
objecting to the participation of a non-member the matter is resolved by a vote of the Council. 
31 In this debate the non-voting states represented were Denmark, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Norway, Portugal, Canada, Greece. The 
record of the debate shows that all the above, except Iraq, supported the draft resolution. ) 
32 Official record of the proceedings UN document S/PV. 2982 dated 5 April 1991. 
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interesting comparisons with policy stated by the same 
states in previous debates and votes at the UN. 
Turkey, one of the co-sponsors of the debate, set the 
parameters for discussion. In the opening speech of 
the debate the Turkish representative referred to his 
government's letter33 to the president of the Council, 
and described the situation on his country's border 
with Iraq. This letter, inter alia, referred to the 
impact of mortar shells, fired from Iraqi territory, 
having landed on the Turkish side of the border. 34 He 
estimated that there were 200-300,000 people on the 
border, 100,000 newly arrived `displaced Iraqis' 
inside Turkey and a further 600,000 still in Iraq but 
heading for the border. He said: 
There is no way in which what is going on in 
northern Iraq can be justified as an internal 
affair of that country. Given the scale of the 
human tragedy and its international implications 
... Iraq should stop its attacks on Iraqi 
civilians... 
Turkey requested the Security Council to take action 
for two reasons: 
[to] secure the international threat and secure 
respect for human rights... Before concluding I 
would like to make it very clear that in calling 
for a meeting of the Security Council it was not 
our intention to interfere in Iraq's internal 
affairs. We recognise A 2(7) of the Charter and 
believe it should be scrupulously observed. The 
steps we have taken have been taken ... threat 
posed to the stability, security and peace of the 
region by Iraq's method of repression. 
The delegate acknowledged the obstacle of A 2(7) but 
argued that the scale of the `tragedy' and flow of 
refugees took the situation out of the `domestic 
jurisdiction' category. It had become a regional 
crisis involving neighbouring states. He explained his 
appeal for action on the grounds that a threat to 
33 UN doc S/22435 dated 2 April 1991. 
34 A letter from the authorities in Iran to the Security Council referred to the recent [Iraqi] shelling of an 
Iranian border town and the resultant deaths of three border guards. UN doc S/22436 dated 3 April 1991. 
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regional stability existed due to the flow of refugees 
caused by internal repression. He proposed action 
which would restore peace and security. Although 
Turkey condemned the repression of `Iraqi civilians'35 
it did not propose any (punitive) action against Iraq 
but rather, action to alleviate the cross-border 
impact of Iraq's actions. Later Turkey was to appeal 
for funds to pay for relief activity inside Turkey but 
also to insist that the international relief effort 
should focus on encouraging the DPs to return home. 
Turkey wanted the longer-term assistance to the DPs to 
be given inside Iraq. 
The delegate representing Pakistan, who later voted in 
favour of the draft resolution, first stated that his 
government `as a matter of principle is opposed to any 
form of interference in the internal affairs of any 
country' but went on record its `dismay at the 
infringement of human rights now taking place in 
Iraq. ' Later in his statement he said he would support 
`any action in Iraq to prevent the further loss of 
life'. He reminded the Council that during the Gulf 
War he had expressed concern for the Iraqi victims of 
the [coalition] bombing. Pakistan was therefore 
motivated, in both cases, by the desire to prevent the 
loss of life and not by partisan support for either 
side in the wider dispute. 
The Iraqi delegate blamed the movement of refugees on 
`the starvation, lack of water and electricity 
inflicted by the allies action' as well as the action 
of `saboteurs who have been sponsored by outside 
governments'. He denounced the draft resolution as a 
violation of A 2(7) but encouraged the UN `to send a 
delegation to Iraq to ascertain the real situation'. 
The Romanian delegate, who later voted in support of 
the draft resolution, praised the inclusion of the 
reference to A 2(7) in the draft resolution and stated 
the view that 
situation of ... components of populations from 
the ethnic, linguistic or religious points of 
view are matters of internal jurisdiction of the 
35 Turkish officials were still reluctant to use the word 'Kurd'. 
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State ... In this respect, no one can 
disregard 
the imperative nature of A 2(7). 
Supporting the draft resolution he said: 
The action of the Security Council in regard to 
Iraq should be unbiased and purely humanitarian 
motivated. It should not create a precedent for 
political misuse in the future. Instead it should 
be regarded as a special case after the Gulf War. 
The Yemeni representative, who voted Against, 
denounced the draft resolution: 
We would have supported the present draft 
resolution if it had been confined to addressing 
humanitarian issues ... However the draft 
resolution now before the Council, although 
dealing with the humanitarian issues that face 
the Iraqi people, focuses on only one area and on 
one category of the Iraqi population. We object 
to the draft resolution as it attempts to 
politicise the humanitarian issue .... We wonder 
what State, big or small, has no internal 
problems; what State will not at some point in 
time encounter internal difficulties and 
experience transborder problems? In our opinion 
the text of the draft resolution is a first 
departure from the rule of maintaining a strict 
focus on the Council's responsibility under the 
Charter .... The Council 
is only competent to 
deal with threats to international peace and 
security and that this situation is internal ... 
We find this new world order ominous. We see a 
lack of balance .... We see no firm application 
of the law ... this may lead to a change in the 
rules which have contributed to stability over 
the past four decades. 
The delegate from Zimbabwe, before voting Against, 
stated: 
We recognise that a serious humanitarian 
situation has arisen as a result of these 
developments. However it is in our view 
essentially an internal matter, as defined in 
Paragraph [sic] 2(7) of the Charter. It is our 
view that addressing the situation in the manner 
suggested by the draft resolution would be 
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inconsistent with the clear parameters of the 
Council's competence as provided for in the 
Charter. 
He then proposed that: 
the Secretary-General should deal with the 
humanitarian crisis through the appropriate UN 
organs, not the Security Council. 
China, before Abstaining, agreed that: 
the Security Council should not consider or take 
action on questions concerning the internal 
affairs of any State. As for the international 
aspects involved in the question ... they should 
be settled through the appropriate channels. 
Rodley points out that the Chinese delegate's language 
could have led to a negative vote. 36 This, from a 
permanent member, would have vetoed the draft 
resolution. The Chinese delegate in the debate 
justified his abstention on the grounds of 
unwillingness to intervene in the `domestic 
jurisdiction' of Iraq. China had not offered this 
objection when it approved economic sanctions against 
Iraq in R 661. China had been prepared to endorse 
Chapter VII measures not amounting to the use of force 
and in clear cases of `threats to international peace 
and security'. But it would not endorse criticism of a 
state for its alleged systematic abuse of human 
rights. 
The fact that China abstained rather than voted 
against (a veto) suggests that China was prepared to 
tolerate, if not formally endorse, the limited action 
authorised in R 688, despite the possible violation of 
Iraq's domestic jurisdiction in a situation where the 
`international' threat was debatable. China's 
acquiescence in this resolution has been widely 
attributed to a desire to signal cooperation with the 
US and the international community following the 
protests over the forcible suppression of dissent at 
Tienamen Square in 1989. Whatever the reason, China's 
statement and vote on 688 was consistent with the 
policy adopted during the earlier `Gulf Crisis' 
36 Nigel S Rodley 'Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights and Civilian Populations: the legal 
framework' in Nigel S Rodley (ed) To Loose The Bands of Wickedness: International Intervention In Defence 
of Human Rights (London: Brassey's, 1992) p 30. 
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resolutions. In the debate on R 678, in November 1990, 
the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, had 
explained that China deplored the Iraqi invasion as an 
act of aggression. It had voted in favour of the 
resolutions which had condemned Iraq and those which 
had put in place Chapter VII sanctions not amounting 
to the use of force. It was not prepared, however, to 
vote in favour of `all necessary means' in 678 because 
it believed that economic sanctions and diplomacy were 
the best inducements for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. 
The Chinese government holds that the relations 
between States should be based on the Five 
Principles of mutual respect for ... sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, 
non interference in each others' internal 
affairs, equality ... and peaceful coexistence; 
and that disputes should be settled through 
dialogue and consultations.... 
This option [sanctions rather than the use of 
force] may take longer but the costs would be 
lower and the sequelae [sic] less serious. Once 
this war breaks out, all parties will suffer 
great losses... The reason why China voted in 
favour of the 10 earlier resolutions ... they are 
not in the domain of the use of force. 37 
This suggests `realpolitik' rather than ingratiation. 
In fact `realpolitik' in China's foreign policy has 
been noticeable for many years. In a recent article 
Thomas J Christensen argues that China's interest on 
international humanitarianism is tactical: 
although China has not actively opposed 
multilateral humanitarian efforts, the rationales 
for international missions ... are alien to the 
thinking of most Chinese analysts. 
Christensen goes on to argue that China is vigilant 
with regard to multinational organisations, always 
suspecting that their decisions are fronts for hostile 
power-plays, especially by the USA. 38 
37 UN document S/PV. 2963. 
38 'Chinese Realpolitik' Foreign Affairs September/October 1996 p 38. 
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China's abstention on R 678 was the first occasion 
(since 1981) when it had broken ranks with an 
otherwise united P5 in a Security Council resolution. 
China has long defended the principle that the 
`domestic jurisdiction' of states is central to their 
sovereignty and should not be breached, even in an 
otherwise good cause. Sally Morphet has argued that 
China's decision to withhold full support for Rs 678 
and 688 arose out of an increasing awareness - and 
disapproval - of an perceived tendency of the Security 
Council to try to widen its `international peace and 
security' mandate and thereby broaden the area in 
which the P5 could act on the basis of privileged 
status. 39 (Earlier alleged examples of such tendencies 
are the UK's unsuccessful bid to have action against 
the narcotics trade subsumed into `security', the 
controversy over the sponsorship of election 
monitoring missions in states where no UN peacekeeping 
activity was in progress, and certain questions of 
finance. ) China's vote on 678 also reflected a greater 
willingness on the part of China to adopt the posture 
of the NAM on structural issues concerning the United 
Nations. (China applied to join the NAM as a full 
member in late 1991. Its application was accepted the 
following year. ) 
China's consent to, if not endorsement of, action 
against Iraq in R 678 and 688 soon brought tangible 
rewards. In 1991 the US dropped its previous long- 
standing objections to China receiving additional 
World Bank loans for the development of its economy. 
The US had justified its objections by pointing to 
China's bad human rights record. In 1990-1 the World 
Bank loaned China $1.5 bn, in 1992 the amount was $2.5 
bn. (The figure for 1989, the year of Tienamen, was 
$0.5 bn) . 40 
Ecuador's representative, voting in favour of the 
draft resolution, emphasised the human rights issues 
involved, quoting the Preamble to the Charter: 
39 Sally Morphet'The Influence of states and groups of states on and in the Security Council and the 
General Assembly, 1980-94' Review of International Studies (1995) 21 pp 435-462. ) 
40 William R Feeney'China and the Multilateral Economic Institutions' in Samuel S Kim (ed) China and the 
World: Chinese Foreign Relations In the Post-Cold War Era Third Edition (Boulder: Westview, 1994) pp 
235-6. 
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`... draws attention to the member states' 
obligations "to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person". Respect for the essence of the 
human being is a universal requirement which must 
be accepted and must be demanded... The situation 
is not internal; it is affecting the broader 
areas of neighboring states ... If 
it was purely 
internal then perhaps the General Assembly or 
ECOSOC41 under Chapter IX would be the appropriate 
organ, but the situation affects international 
peace and security. ' 
Cuba, whose delegate later voted Against, denounced 
the draft resolution in uncompromising terms: 
`... the resolution violates the norm under A 2(7) 
... the US had already violated the principle 
when it encouraged the Iraqi people to overthrow 
Saddam Hussein and through Bush's orders to the 
CIA to aid the rebel factions in Iraq ... it is 
inconsistent not to condemn the USA for these 
actions while simultaneously contemplating ... 
violation of Iraq's sovereignty ... the Security 
Council has no right. The General Assembly could 
look at the problem under Chapter IX, A 60, ... 
[Cuba] complains that such action is beyond the 
Security Council's mandate ... [it] turns the 
Organisation into a system dominated by an 
oligarchical group which attributes to itself 
powers that no one has given it and imposes its 
will on the entire organisation ... Mr Ahtisaari 
was despatched by the Security Council to 
ascertain the situation in Iraq. He reported 
listing the repair/replacement of infrastructure, 
communications transportation, energy required to 
help the humanitarian situation. It was 
contradictory for the Security Council to base 
such a resolution on humanitarian concern when it 
was, in actuality, perpetuating the conditions 
which aggravated the situation. 
41 The UN's Economic and Social Council, on which 54 member-states are represented. 
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Following an earlier request from the Security 
Council92 the Secretary-General had sent Under 
Secretary-General Martti Ahtisaari to visit Iraq and 
Kuwait and report on humanitarian conditions in those 
countries. (Mr Ahtisaari had formerly been the 
Secretary-General's Special Representative in Namibia 
in 1978. ) His plan for the decolonisation of the 
territory was subsequently implemented by UMTAG. He 
subsequently became president of Finland. 43 The visit 
took place between 10-27 March 1991. The despatch of 
the Ahtisaari mission was a sudden decision of the 
Secretary-General. Inside the UN Secretariat Sadruddin 
Aga Khan, who was about to move to the Gulf on a 
similar task, argued that the Ahtisaari mission 
duplicated his own task. On arrival in Iraq the 
authorities told Ahtisaari that he was forbidden to 
visit the Kurdish areas in the north. 
France -a sponsor of the draft resolution - stated 
that the resolution: 
concentrates on the humanitarian role of the UN. 
Violations of human rights such as those now 
being observed become a matter of international 
interest when they take on such proportions that 
they assume the dimensions of a crime against 
humanity. That is indeed what is happening in 
Iraq. 
The delegate continued: 
The demands made in the resolution regarding 
Iraq's treatment of its population are the 
minimum which the international community must 
make in order to live up to the commitments they 
entered into when they adhered to the Charter of 
the UN. They are the minimum reflection of the 
faith they have expressed in the equality of 
rights of men and women in all nations. 
President Mitterand was later to claim that France had 
been the first state to declare that a `right of 
humanitarian intervention' existed, and should be 
exercised to protect the minorities in northern Iraq. 
42 The request came in Document S/22322. The report was Document S122336. 
43 Interview with Mr Ahtisaari, Prague, 11 September 1996. 
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C'est la France qui a pris 1'initiative de ce 
nouveau droit assez extraordinaire dans 
1'histoire du monde, qui est un sorte de droit d' 
ingerence en l'interieur d'un pays, lorsqu' une 
partie de sa population est victime d'une 
persecution. Francois Mitterand affirme ainsi, 
dans son allocution du 14-7-91. " 
India's contribution to the debate - after it had 
abstained on the vote - emphasised the threat to 
regional peace and security, rather than the 
continuing civil strife in Iraq: 
Our endeavour was to focus the attention of the 
Council on the aspect of the threat or likely 
threat to peace and stability in the region 
rather than on the factors which have created the 
present situation. We believe that the Council 
should have concentrated on the aspect of peace 
and security, which is its proper mandate under 
the Charter, and left other aspects to other, 
more appropriate agencies of the United Nations. 
The important course of action was to: 
demand that conditions be created to enable (the 
refugees] to return to their homes in safety and 
dignity. 
The Council should not attempt: 
to prescribe what should be done as that would 
impinge on the internal affairs of States. 
India was arguing for the Council to restrict its 
purview - and its (implied) use of Chapter VII powers 
- to the international aspects of the crisis, not the 
questions of internal conditions inside a member- 
state. The remedy for humanitarian problems, it 
argued, was the consensual involvement of UN and other 
aid agencies, not forcible intervention. India's 
policy was consistent with a desire to spare Iraq 
further destruction and humiliation but was also 
consistent with its traditional aversion to 
legitimising intervention. 
44M Bettati 'Un Droit d'Ingerence 7 95 RGDIP p 640. Translation: It was France which, for the first time in 
the history of the world, took the initiative on this extraordinary new right. This is a sort of right of 
intervention in the interior of a country when one part of the population is suffering persecution. Francois 
Mitterand made this point in his speech on 14 July 1991. 
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Later that year in the debate leading to the adoption 
of R 713 - one of the first Security Council debates 
over the secessionist struggles in the former 
Yugoslavia - the Indian delegate would insist that the 
debate should begin only after a request from the 
Belgrade authorities - the original sovereign 
government - and that it should focus on the 
international consequences of the crisis in the 
region, not the humanitarian or security crisis - ie 
the internal situation - in the `state'. 
A formal request from the state concerned is an 
essential requirement in such cases before the 
Council can take up the matter ..... we must not 
forget A 2(7).... Let us therefore note today in 
unmistakable terms that the Council's 
consideration of the matter relates not to 
Yugoslavia's internal situation ... but ... 
its 
implications for peace and security in the 
region. 45 
Throughout the earlier Gulf Crisis India had 
consistently argued for the international community to 
act with moderation towards Iraq. This policy might 
have derived from India and Iraq's close cooperation 
in NAM matters, India's general support for the 
Palestinian cause and India's belief that Iraq's 
military strength - recently tested in the war with 
Iran - would prove superior to that of the coalition. 
Whereas this line led the Baharatiya Janata-led 
coalition of VP Singh to support Iraq in the later 
months of 1990 the incoming Chandra Shekar government 
was forced to take a more equivocal line. In early 
1991 the financial crisis looming in India required 
IMF action. The government was anxious not to alienate 
the US in this regard. Accordingly, in the debate on 
688, India's representative at the UN, Mr Gharekhan, 
continued to argue for moderate treatment for Iraq but 
offered no real resistance to the near-consensus view 
45 S/PV. 3009. 
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that Iraq's repression of minorities was 
unacceptable. 46 
Some of the other delegates who spoke in support of 
the draft resolution emphasised the humanitarian 
nature of the crisis and the abuse of human rights. 
Supporting the resolutions the US delegate stated: 
It is not the role or the intention of the 
Security Council to interfere in the internal 
affairs of any country. However it is the 
Council's legitimate responsibility to respond to 
the concerns of Turkey and the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, concerns increasingly shared by the 
other neighbours of Iraq about the massive 
numbers of people fleeing ... 
This is of course a special case which has arisen 
in the aftermath of the Gulf Crisis. 
He then referred to the $35m which the USA had already 
spent in relief aid and the further grant of $10m 
which President Bush had just approved. 
The Soviet delegate confirmed his country's respect 
for A 2(7) and stated that it applied to Iraq as 
well as to all other states. The Security Council 
should, nevertheless, address the security threat 
posed by the refugees. He supported the mandate in 
the draft resolution which referred to the 
Secretary-General's humanitarian efforts. 
In voting in favour of R 688 the USSR continued its 
policy of cooperating with the US to restrain Iraq. 
Thus the USSR had voted with the US in all previous 
`Gulf crisis' resolutions. At the time of 688, 
however, there was no indication that the next move 
would be an intervention into northern Iraq. When that 
intent became clear the Soviet leadership was quick to 
warn the UN not to authorise any violation of Iraq's 
sovereignty by military intervention on behalf of the 
Kurds. 47 
46 B Rajini and A Baloramiah'India's Policy towards the Persian Gulf Region' Iranian Journal of 
International Affairs Vol IV No 3-4, Fall Winter 1992. 
47 See Page 225, below. 
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The consensus is that Soviets felt compelled to comply 
with the Western states' policy towards Iraq in 1991. 
The approaching political and economic crisis in the 
USSR - shown by the August 1991 coup against Gorbachev 
and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet state 
later that year - made it impossible for the Soviets 
to create an independent policy towards Iraq. 
The UK delegate, also supporting the resolution, 
reminded the Council that the treatment of South 
Africa in the past had established a precedent for the 
mass abuse of human rights to be considered as a 
legitimate issue for consideration - and if necessary, 
enforcement action - by the Council: 
[Article 2(7)], an essential part of the Charter, 
does not apply to matters which, under the 
Charter, are not essentially domestic, and we 
have often seen human rights - for example in 
South Africa - defined in that category.... 
Thirdly there are Iraq's international 
obligations, under Article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention of 1949, to protect, in the case of 
internal armed conflicts, all innocent civilians 
from violence of all kinds to life and person. 
The UK delegate also disclaimed any intention to 
create a Kurdistan: such an act would have contravened 
the Treaty of Lausanne, to which the UK was a party. 48 
It was `an intervention not to change borders but to 
save lives. 149 
Belgium accused Iraq of not complying with its 
international obligations of the most basic principles 
of humanitarian law and human rights. It also cited 
apparent violations of the Geneva Convention 
provisions. 
48 The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) is considered to be part of the Versailles Settlement. It followed the 
armistice after the Turkish War of Independence and largely resolved the borders of modern Turkey. The 
final decision - whereby the vilayet of Mosul became part of Iraq - was made by the League of Nations in 
1925. See p 78, above. 
49 This was an apparent reference to the US' announcement of its air-drop plan, not a statement about the 
subsequent military intervention onto the territory of Iraq. The subsequent intervention had, at this stage, 
neither been proposed nor even considered at a high level. 
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The delegate from Germany stated his view that it was 
the right of the international community to call for 
respect for human rights. 
The international community bears the 
responsibility for ensuring that the human rights 
of all Iraqis, of all ethnic and religious 
communities, including the Kurds, are observed. 
The Irish delegate concluded his remarks by stating 
that all states must respect Iraqi sovereignty and 
that: 
the resolution just adopted makes this clear. At 
the same time respect for the territorial 
integrity of Iraq does not take away from its 
obligations. 
COMMENTARY 
The text of the resolution and the opinions voiced in 
the debate represent two broad points of view. The 
common ground is a formal acceptance of the importance 
of human rights (however defined) and the preservation 
of international peace and security. All would support 
efforts to maintain stability in the international 
community. 
For the first group - those who emphasise the rights 
of states and the `domestic jurisdiction' - the 
erosion of sovereign rights guaranteed by A 2(7) of 
the Charter is a threat to national identity, even the 
state itself. Separatism for minorities in other 
states should not be encouraged; national unity should 
be protected by a principle of `non-intervention'. The 
interests of justice would be served not so much by 
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the imposition of `Western' political concepts but by 
more equitable distribution of global resources and 
the end of exploitation of poor by the rich, the South 
by the North. 
For the second group - whose members emphasised the 
brutality of the Iraqi regime's repression - the 
interests of justice demand action to prevent the 
repression of minorities, if necessary by 
disinterested acts of intervention. 
From the record of the debate and the voting on 688 it 
is clear where each participating state stood on these 
issues. The points of interest on the positions taken 
by the US and the USSR have already been considered 
(in Chapter 6). It also appears that there was no 
enthusiasm amongst Council members for these sensitive 
and divisive matters to be revisited, at least for a 
while. This would explain why, despite the events of 
the intervention (which was not foreseen at the time 
of the debate) there was no further formal 
consideration of this crisis in the Security Council. 
Similarly there appears to have been no enthusiasm to 
pursue the issues raised in the debate in the months 
which followed. After R 688 the Security Council would 
not debate `intervention' until the Somalia crisis 
demanded attention, in January 1992. 
Chapter 10, below, contains an assessment of the 
significance of R 688: a resolution which has been 
much debated. John Packer notes that 688 imposed a 
`standard of performance' on Iraq in its demands that 
Iraq cease its attacks on civilians and allow access 
to the aid agencies. But R 688 did not impose an 
`enforcement' provision, nor did it nominate an agency 
to impose that enforcement if required. As R 660 
needed R 678 so R 688 required an `executive' 
resolution (as well as an unequivocal and explicit 
finding under A 39, or reference to a previous A 39 
finding) for it to have been a clear mandate for 
enforcement action. R 688 should therefore be 
discounted as a complete legal precedent for 
humanitarian intervention in future. Jost Delbruck 
also doubts the significance of the intervention to 
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protect the Kurds as a precedent. He points out that 
the absence of an A 39 finding in R 688, and the 
subsequent action of the Secretariat in obtaining 
Iraq's consent to the presence and operations of the 
aid agencies, the UN workers (and Guards) undermines 
the proposition that 688 was in all respects 
authoritative. The MOU signed by the Secretary- 
General's representative expressly recognised the 
organisation's `respect for the territorial integrity, 
the political independence, the principle of non- 
intervention' . 50 If, after 688, the Secretary-General 
still believed he needed the consent of the Iraqis to 
carry out his mandate, then in his eyes, at least, 688 
did not amount to an authorisation, and therefore 
cannot be a precedent, for a new `right' of 
humanitarian intervention. 51 
Moving away from the strictly legal interpretation of 
R 688 to a statement on the Kurdish crisis as an 
indication of a political precedent, Jarat Chopra and 
Thomas Weiss argue that the safe havens operation 
signaled a new willingness in the international 
community to legitimise humanitarian intervention. 52 To 
look beyond 1991 for a proof of this assertion, or 
indeed to forecast states' future responses to crises, 
is beyond the scope of this study. Clearly it will be 
in the future practice of states that the political as 
well as the legal status of intervention will be 
determined. 
When considering the narrative of events in the crisis 
(below) it is important to note the timing of R 688. 
The Resolution came as the full dimensions of the 
humanitarian crisis became clear and press demands for 
intervention were reaching their height. But by 5 
April there were no positive indications that an 
intervention using ground forces would take place, nor 
did 688 specifically address the legal or political 
50 For an account of how this MOU came to be signed see pp 217-219, below. 
51 Delbruck'A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the UN' 67 Indiana 
p 885-6. 
52 Jarat Chopra and Thomas G Weiss 'Sovereignty is no longer Sacrosanct; Codifying Humanitarian 
Intervention' Ethics and International Affairs Vol 6 1992 pp 100-1. 
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questions of such an intervention in the particular 
case. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Conclusions of this chapter are: 
" The text of R 688 and the majority vote in its 
favour amounted to a development of the Council's 
practice. Since 688 intra-state conflict may be 
identified as a `potential threat to international 
peace and security'(and may therefore be a legitimate 
target for forcible intervention) under certain 
conditions. (This strengthened the precedent set in 
the anti-apartheid resolutions (221 and 417) which 
identified a threat to international peace and 
security arising from the abuse of human rights. The 
dissenting opinions expressed in the debate - as well 
as the abstentions and negative votes - indicated, 
however, that even the conditional endorsement of this 
opinion was barely tolerable to a number of member- 
states and was unacceptable to others. 
" The Council's majority vote in favour of the need 
for some action - not amounting to forcible 
intervention - despite the `domestic jurisdiction' 
provisions of the Charter may have been due to the 
special circumstances surrounding the events in Iraq 
in the early months of 1991. 
" The text of R 688 neither mentioned A 39 nor did it 
specify that the action mandated should be taken under 
Chapter VII (enforcement). It therefore implied that 
action should be taken under Chapter VI (peaceful 
settlement of disputes). R 688 invoked the `good 
offices' of the Secretary-General to investigate and 
take action through humanitarian agencies. Thus the 
Council preferred to pass the responsibility for 
handing the crisis to other UN agencies rather than to 
resolve the crisis under its own powers. (As it turned 
out the initiative passed to a `coalition of the 
willing' who took enforcement action under the 
somewhat flimsy pretext that they were acting in a way 
`consistent with 688'. ) 
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" The fact that the Council did not resume discussion 
of the crisis after the military intervention took 
place suggests that Council members did not want to 
pursue the controversial matters raised, at that 
stage. 
RESOLUTION 688 (1991), 5 APRIL 1991 
Adopted at the 2982nd meeting by 10 votes in favour, 3 
voting against (Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabwe) China and 
India abstaining. 
The Security Council, 
Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the 
Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, 
Recalling Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter of the 
United Nations 
Gravely. concerned by the repression of the Iraqi 
civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including 
most recently the Kurdish populated areas which led to 
a massive flow of refugees towards and across 
international frontiers and to cross border 
incursions, which threaten international peace and 
security in the region, 
Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human 
suffering involved, 
Taking note of the letters sent by the representatives 
of Turkey and France to the United Nations dated 2 
April 1991 and 4 April 1991 respectively S/22435 and 
S/22442, 
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Taking note also of the letters sent by the Permanent 
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the 
United Nations dated 3 and 4 April 1991, respectively 
S/22436 and S/22447, 
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of Iraq and of all States in the area, 
Bearing in mind the Secretary-General's report of 20 
March 1991 (S/22366), 
1. Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian 
population in many parts of Iraq, most recently in the 
Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which 
threaten international peace and security in the 
region; 
2. Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to removing 
the threat to international peace and security in the 
region, immediately end this repression and expresses 
the hope in the same context that an open dialogue 
will take place to ensure that the human and political 
rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected; 
3. Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by 
international humanitarian organizations to all those 
in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make 
available all necessary facilities for their 
operations; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his 
humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to report forthwith 
if appropriate on the basis of a further mission to 
the region, on the plight of the Iraqi civilian 
population and in particular the Kurdish population, 
suffering from the repression in all its forms 
inflicted by the Iraqi authorities; 
5. Requests further the Secretary-General to use all 
the resources at his disposal, including those of the 
relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently 
the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi 
population; 
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6. Appeals to all Member States and to all 
humanitarian organizations to contribute to these 
humanitarian relief efforts; 
7. Demands that Iraq cooperate with the Secretary- 
General to these ends, 
8. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE DECISION TO IMPOSE THE SAFE HAVENS 
OUTLINE CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
24 Feb Coalition land offensive begins 
25 Feb Iraq publicly orders its land forces in the 
KTO to begin withdrawing into Iraq 
28 Feb Coalition offensive action ceases 
3 Mar Cease fire signed at Safwan on the border of 
Kuwait and Iraq 
5 Mar First reports of fighting between dissident 
Iraqis (Kurds and others) and the Iraqi army 
in the north and south east 
15 Mar Presidents Bush and Mitterand meet on 
Martinique 
21 Mar High point of revolt in the north: main towns 
of Kirkuk, Irbil, Dohuk, Suleimaniyeh and 
Zakho under rebel control. 
25 Mar Iraqi army counter-attack in the north 
begins 
28 Mar Iraqi army regains control of main towns in 
the north. Flight of Displaced Persons (DPs) 
north and east begins 
3 Apr UN Security Council adopts R 687 
5 Apr UN Security Council adopts R 688 
6 Apr US forces in Germany alerted for humanitarian 
mission 
7 Apr President Ozal states need for `havens' 
inside Iraq 
Secretary of State Baker views DPs' plight in 
the mountains 
8 Apr EC summit in Luxembourg; Prime Minister Major 
proposes `safe havens' inside Iraq 
First international military relief air-drops 
to DPs in mountains 
10 Apr President Bush continues to rule out military 
intervention by ground troops from Turkish 
bases and territorial waters 
16 Apr Field recce by DCINC EUCOM (McCarthy) and 
DCINC USAEUR (Shalikashvili) and a DART team 
from Washington 
18 Apr UN signs `framework agreement' with regime 
for civilian relief operations inside Iraq 
19 Apr US Marines arrive on Turkish border near 
Zakho 
Coalition forces arrive in mountains and 
begin supervising distribution of relief to 
DPs 
Construction of tented camps at Zakho begins 
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27 Apr First DPs arrive in tented camps UNHCR and 
NGOs assume responsibility for provision and 
distribution of all relief supplies 
2-8 May Coalition forces extend security zone to the 
east 
5 May Tented camps handed over to UNHCR 
8 May Last DESERT STORM coalition units depart 
southern border area 
19 May First deployment of UN Guards to Iraq 
21 May Coalition forces further extend security zone 
to include the (demilitarised) town of Dohuk 
High point of coalition troop numbers in 
Turkey and Iraq. First withdrawal of 
coalition units 
23 May Iraq gives formal consent to the deployment 
of UN Guards (annex to the 18 April 
agreement) 
8 Jun Gulf War Victory Parade in Washington(10th: 
New York) 
27 Jun First date set for completion of withdrawal 
from 
Northern Iraq (later extended) 
4 Jul Second date set for withdrawal 
15 Jul Coalition forces withdraw from northern Iraq 
This chapter provides an account of the Revolt of the 
Kurds (in outline) followed by an account of the 
decision-making and events which led to the commitment 
of multinational air, then land, forces to the relief 
and protection operation. 
The main themes of the account will be: 
" the action of the DPs 
" the decisions taken by the Turkish government 
" the initial reaction of the Western states 
" Western states' decision-making on the commitment of 
forces to an intervention operation and the 
significance of media pressure on those decisions 
" the reaction of the UN Secretariat 
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The analysis of these events will throw light on the 
conduct of the main actors: the Kurdish leadership and 
the governments of Turkey, the US, the UK and France. 
This study confirms many of the conclusions of earlier 
accounts of the crisis and the action taken to resolve 
it. But it also provides evidence and analysis of 
decision-making pressures which were not noted by 
previous authors. In Turkey and in the US leaders had 
even stronger reasons to oppose intervention than those 
described in earlier studies. The voices of public 
opinion and the international media - well described by 
other authors - was all the more significant as they 
overcame stronger official resistance than first 
thought. 
THE INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS 
By the end of March it became clear that the flight of 
so many terrified people would soon amount to a 
humanitarian disaster. The international media, 
especially the British Sunday papers on 31 March, 
predicted a crisis. Disregarding the first calls for 
international action to deal with the crisis, 
Presidents Mubarak and Assad met and warned that 
intervention would risk fragmenting Iraq. They said: 
`What is happening in Iraq is an internal matter. " 
The media continued to publish harrowing accounts of 
the Kurds' plight: 
"Hundreds of thousands of Kurds are on the move, 
cramming their families and whatever they could 
carry into lorries, tractor-trailers, cars, taxis, 
and any other vehicles they could find" 
said Jim Muir, a BBC correspondent, reporting from 
northern Iraq. 2 Another reporter recorded this scene: 
In the bitter wind of the summit I saw a legless man 
being bumped along in a wheelchair; a woman, her 
1 Youssef M Ibrahim The New York Times 2 April 1991, p A4. 
Z Rupert Cornwell International Herald Tribune 1 April 1991. 
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face twisted in the agony of childbirth, crouching 
for shelter among the rocks; old women dressed only 
in the nighties and dressing gowns they had left 
in. 3 
The UN Security Council's main effort in the first days 
of April was the adoption of R 687, the Gulf War `cease 
fire resolution'. After weeks of discussion in closed 
sessions4 of the Security Council, the resolution 
elaborated the cease-fire agreement reached by the 
opposing military commanders in the field. 5 R 687, 
adopted on 3 April, confirmed the cease fire and 
imposed new controls on post-war Iraq. The British had 
succeeded in inserting the `hard' language into the 
draft resolution to provide close supervision on Iraq's 
future conduct. 6 
On 2 April former prime minister Mrs Thatcher appeared 
on British TV having tea with a Kurdish refugee family 
in London. She spoke in favour of an international 
military effort to assist the Kurds. 7 On 3 April 
President Bush was interviewed on TV during a golf game 
in Florida, stating that the US should avoid military 
involvement in factional fighting in Iraq. In Turkey 
the government refused journalists' and foreign NGOs' 
requests to go to the Iraqi border; none of their staff 
members was permitted to travel beyond Diyarbakir. 8 
3 The BBC's Tom Carver, quoted in Brown and Shukman p 180. 
4 Closed sessions are properly called 'consultations of the whole' or 'informal consultations'. 
5 The armistice terms agreed at Safwan on 3 March. 
6 It was the was the British who persuaded the other Security Council members of the need for a boundary 
commission and a weapons Inspection regime (UNSCOM) In Iraq. Source: Senior former UKMis official, 
Interview with the author on 7 December 1993. 
7 Only days before the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London had been warning the public about the 
consequences of the Shia and Kurdish revolts being victorious in Iraq: 
'We must never forget the terrible crimes committed by the fundamentalist regime of Ayatollah 
Khomenei when it came to power in Tehran. The Shias of Iraq revere the memory of Khomenei and 
almost certainly if a fundamentalist regime took over in Baghdad it would be as ruthless as that In 
Tehran was. Also there would be a Tehran-Baghdad axis of fundamentalism. The dangers of that do not 
bear thinking about. ' 
An official quoted in John Laffin The World In Conflict War Annual No 6 (London: Brassey's, 1994) p 132 
Note 1. 
It was later revealed that Mrs Thatcher had given John Major 'an earful' over the telephone on 3 April. 
George J Church 'The Course of Conscience' Time 15 April 1991 p 22. 
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In London on 4 April the government reacted to public 
alarm by announcing that it would contribute £20m in 
aid to the relief effort. 
In the US the New York Times, in a front-page article 
on 4 April, set out the concerns of the Administration 
as follows. On the one hand the US saw the danger that 
intervention might fuel the hopes of Kurdish 
separatists and thus increase instability throughout 
the northern tier. 9 The fragmentation of Iraq might have 
followed. There was also concern that a unilateral 
intervention onto the territory of a sovereign state 
might alienate important allies and set an unhelpful 
precedent. Finally there was the risk of deploying US 
ground forces into a `quagmire'. On the other hand US 
officials recognised the inadequacy of the UN and other 
relief agencies in the face of a humanitarian crisis on 
such a huge scale, and in such inaccessible territory, 
and the risk that inaction would lead to the 
destabilisation of Turkey. '() Other writers" referred to 
the threat of `fragmentation' in Iraq and increased 
instability in the `northern tier'. Opportunities for 
Iran to exploit divisions in Iraq would have threatened 
the interests of the US and its allies in the region, 
particularly the many Sunni Arab rulers in the Gulf. 
On 4 April President Bush and Prime Minister Major 
spoke by telephone. They discussed R 688 but there was 
no mention of the `safe havens'. 12 On the same day the 
8 Griffiths interview. From 2 April all hotel rooms on Diyarbakir were occupied and the hire rate for taxis had 
soared to £ 200 per day. He also revealed that his recommendation that STCF should take part In the 
imminent humanitarian operation was not accepted immediately. Many of his colleagues took the view that it 
would be unwise to get involved in what was evidently a military operation, and one which would take place in 
an unfamiliar country (STCF operates mainly in Africa). Others protested that STCF should not take part in 
emergency 'relief - their organisation's expertise was in long-term 'development' projects. 
9 The US Administration was unwilling to have any official contact with the Kurdish leadership during the war 
or during the revolt. As Freedman and Boren have noted 'only when the Kurds were refugees was the US 
prepared to assist them'. Freedman and Boren p 48. 
10 Thomas L Friedman New York Times 4 April p 1. 
11 Jane M Davis 'Introduction' in Jane M Davis (ed. ) Politics and International Relations In the Middle East: 
Continuity and Change (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Press, 1995. ) 
12 Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New 
World Order (Princeton New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1 993) p 423. 
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EC presidency (Luxembourg) wrote to the UN Secretary- 
General (S/22443) `to condemn the brutal repression. ' 
On 5 April the UN Security Council adopted R 688 from 
a draft prepared by France. Officials in New York 
attributed 688 to Madame Mitterand13; it was, 
apparently, her insistence14 that something should be 
done for the Kurds which drove the French government 
to act. 15 Mme Mitterand's concern for the Kurds was by 
then well established. In May 1989, after the Anfal 
migration of Iraqi Kurds to Turkey, she had visited 
Diyarbakir to meet Kurdish leaders. 16 In October of that 
year, in Paris, she had chaired a France-Libertes 
`International Conference on the Kurds' which had 
discussed Kurdish rights. '' She went on to visit the US 
where she lobbied Mrs Barbara Bush and members of the 
US Administration on behalf of the Kurds. Claiborne 
Pell, the majority leader in the US Senate, had given 
his support. 18 In France another leading supporter of 
the Kurdish cause was Bernard Kouchner, the French 
minister for Overseas Aid, and a co-founder of the 
NGO Medicins Sans Frontieres. 19 
The Turkish press was aware of Mme Mitterand's concern 
for the Kurds: 
13 Zurcher p 315. 
14 UKMis official. Also, Dannreuther p 74 
15 The vehement French response was in contrast to France's conciliatory diplomacy between the adoption 
of R 678 and the start of the Gulf War. In January 1991, to the annoyance of the other Western coalition 
members, the French government sent the Vauzelle delegation to Baghdad to negotiate with the Iraqi regime. 
This time the French government led the international effort to condemn Iraq. 
16 Nicole and Hugh Pope Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and After (London: John Murray, 1997) p 265. 
17 Seven Kurdish members of the Turkish parliament attended this conference. On their return to Turkey 
they were expelled from their party, the SDPP. 
18 In late February Senator Pell invited an Iraqi Kurd delegation to call on him, at the US Senate, to discuss 
post-war conditions in Iraq and the likelihood of a Kurdish revolt. The meeting took place on 28 February, the 
day after the land war ended in Kuwait. Nevertheless the Administration refused to permit these Kurdish 
representatives to meet officials from the State Department or the Pentagon. Randal 'After Such Knowledge' p 
95-6. 
19 A recent study has examined the rationale of France's response to the crisis. It confirms Mme Mitterand's 
influence on decision-making and attributes her sympathy, In part, to the advice of Bernard Doran. Doran had 
been so shocked by reports of the Anfal that he had abandoned his diplomatic career In1989 to become a full- 
time advocate for the Kurds. Jonathan C. Randal After Such Knowledge what Forgiveness ? My Encounters 
with Kurdistan (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1997) Chapter 4. 
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Mme Mitterand for her part is yet again on her 
missionary tours designed to shed tears in the 
presence of Kurds and level accusations at 
Turkey. 20 
At the Security Council meeting on 5 April, after less 
than 24 hours of discussion21, R 688 was adopted by a 
majority vote. 22 Rodley notes the special political 
circumstances which led the Council to act quickly. 23 
The international condemnation of Iraq following the 
invasion of Kuwait, the exertions of the Gulf War, the 
sense of responsibility felt by many, especially in the 
West, for the plight of the Kurds, the unease felt 
after the `incomplete' victory of the coalition, the 
history of Iraqi repression of the Kurds at Halabja and 
before, the emergency created by the refugees in 
neighbouring states: all these recent events encouraged 
the Council to act decisively. 
On the same day President Bush announced that the US 
would contribute relief supplies to the aid agencies 
preparing to operate in Turkey's border region. Between 
5-10 April twenty-one plane-loads of supplies arrived 
in Turkey from abroad. 24 By 6 April the US, the UK and 
France had decided, but not announced, their intention 
to air-drop relief supplies to the DPs in the 
mountains. 
On 6 April, in his adopted home town, Houston, Texas, 
President Bush attended the first of a succession of 
local Gulf War victory celebrations. 25 Meanwhile in 
20 Briefing 29 April 1991 'Turkey plays cautiously as the West seeks to rid itself of guilt. ' 
21 R 687 was under discussion for five weeks before it was adopted. 
22 For the text of R 688, and a discussion of its significance, see Chapter 7, above. 
23 Rodley 'To Loose the Bands of Wickedness' p 10. 
24 Frances Williams The Independent 12 April 1991 p 10. 
25 These continued throughout the period of the Kurdish crisis, culminating in the Washington DC victory 
parade on 8 June and the New York City 'ticker-tape' parade on 10 June. The parades In June coincided with 
serious disagreements between the PROVIDE COMFORT coalition allies on the date for the withdrawal for 
land forces from northern Iraq. The US wanted an immediate withdrawal. The Europeans preferred the troops 
to remain, for a while longer. 
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Germany the US European Command (USEUCOM) alerted its 
Special Forces(SF) units to prepare to deploy to south- 
east Turkey, in a CSAR26 role. USEUCOM also alerted a 
composite air force construction unit (later named 
PRIME BEEF)to prepare to deploy to improve facilities 
in the forward airfields in Turkey. USEUCOM then 
appointed Major General James L Jamerson USAF, the 
former commander of Operation PROVEN FORCE, to command 
the relief operation from Incirlik. Jamerson 
immediately flew to Turkey, arriving in Incirlik on 
7th 27 
On 8 April the first relief flights parachuted supplies 
to the DPs in the mountains. The same day US, British 
and French military representatives met at HQ USEUCOM, 
Patch Barracks, Stuttgart to discuss the details of the 
air relief operation. 
At this time (8-9 April) the first public proposals for 
an international military intervention in northern Iraq 
appeared in the press. The Administration's policy of 
non-intervention was already under attack in the US 
media. Some critics accused the DESERT STORM coalition 
leaders of encouraging an Iraqi revolt and then 
refusing to assist the rebels overthrow Saddam Hussein. 
One reporter compared the inaction of the White House 
to the deliberate non-intervention of Stalin and the 
Red Army during the Warsaw Uprising in August 1944.28 
Other writers advised caution. 29 In a later statement, 
26 Combat Search and Rescue 
27 Jamerson's mission was to provide relief through airdrops. The forces assigned to him were USAF airlift, 
USN CH-53Es and US Army and USAF Special Forces (SF) detachments. The SF component was 10th 
Special Forces Group US Army and the 39th Special Operations Wing USAF - both commanded by Brigadier General Richard W Potter Jr, US Army. (General Potter had been the second-in-command of the failed US SF 
'EAGLE CLAW' mission to rescue the US Embassy staff in Tehran in 1981. ) 
28 'America stands on the Vistula without even the excuses the Russians put forward. ' AM Rosenthal (New 
York Times) quoted in International Herald Tribune 10 April 1991. See also: George J Church 'Keeping Hands 
Off Time 8 April 1991, pp 10-13, and, as an example of hostile comment In the international press 'Es wird 
noch Asche sein' (Only ashes will be left) Der Spiegel 8 April 1991 pp 168-176. 
29 Professor Shibley Telhami of Cornell University argued that US encouragement for the Iraqi Kurds would 
only end in disillusion and recriminations. The US: 
'cannot shape the Iraqi political system. US involvement will only excite the Kurds enough to make 
their fight bloodier and they would be let down later - their lot for decades. ' 'Stay out of Iraq's Civil War' New York Times 5 April 1991 pA 15. 
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replying to the charge that he would have abandoned the 
Kurds to Saddam's vengeance, President Bush said: 
Do you think that the United States should bear guilt 
because of suggesting that the Iraqi people take 
matters into their own hands with the implication 
being given that the United States would be there to 
support them militarily? That was not true. We never 
said that. 3o 
In the UK Mrs Thatcher called for multinational 
military action to protect the Kurds. 31 The government 
still resisted this appeal (and criticism in 
Parliament), however, citing the sovereignty of Iraq. 
John Major insisted that he had never encouraged the 
Kurdish uprising. He could not `recall asking the Kurds 
to mount this particular operation' . 
32 He added: 
What is happening in Iraq is disturbing and 
malignant. But it is also within the borders of 




President Ozal of Turkey was the first international 
figure to propose `intervention' rather than `aid'. He 
made his remarks on US TV on 7th. He said: 
We have to get [the Kurds] better land under 
UN control and to put those people on Iraqi 
territory and take care of them. 34 
30 Bush news conference USMIA 16 April 1991. For an example of the statements he made during the Gulf 
War, calling for Saddam's overthrow, see International Herald Tribune 16 February 1991. See also James 
Mayall's judgement that it would have been 'better for all concerned' if Saddam had been overthrown by coup 
d'etat at the end of the war. 'Nonintervention, self determination and the 'New World Order' International 
Affairs 67,3,1991 p 426. 
31 John Bulloch and Harvey Morris No Friends But the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds (London: 
Viking, Penguin, 1992) p 33. 
32 Robert Fisk 'After Victory Comes Betrayal' The Independent 10 April 1991. 
33 Edward Mortimer'Safe haven is not enough' The Financial Times 10 April 1991. John Major might have 
had in mind the harsh assessment of Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine (the UK-based commander of the 
British contingent in the Gulf War) who reportedly said after the crushing of the Kurdish and Shia revolts: 
'The Shiites and the Kurds chanced their arm; they thought the Iraqis were weaker than they were - 
and got their come-uppance. ' This was apparently stated in support of the opinion that coalition 
military support should not be given to the Kurds (or the Shia) because a successful intervention 
might have brought about the fragmentation of Iraq. This would have been, from the coalition point of 
view, highly undesirable. 
Brown and Shukman p 180. 
34 Donald Macintyre The Independent On Sunday 14 April 1991. Özal may have been thinking of another 
vulnerable group in Iraq, not just the Kurds. He would have been keen to protect the 2.5 million Turcoman 
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President Bush's reaction to the Ozal 
issue a statement: 
When you have refugee problem of 
consequence [it] comes under the 
business .... Now I would like ti 
peacekeeping activated. 36 
speech35 was to 
this enormous 
heading of UN 
see that 
On 7 April Baker arrived in Turkey, en route to 
Israel. 37 In Ankara he called on President Ozal, 
ostensibly to thank him for the part Turkey had played 
in the Gulf War. 38 The following day Baker visited the 
border area and witnessed the suffering of the Iraqi 
Kurdish DPs. Due to security officials' concern for his 
safety in the melee Baker spent only 7 minutes on the 
ground. Speaking to reporters at the scene he said: 
[I have] witnessed the suffering and desperation 
of the Iraqi people [sic]39, experiences of cruelty 
and human anguish that defy description.... these 
people must be free from the threat of persecution 
and harassment... any threat of interference or 
actual interference with the international relief 
efforts should be dealt with by the United 
Nations... (But the US would not] go down the 
slippery slope of being sucked into a civil war. 90 
We cannot police what goes on in Iraq and we 
cannot be the arbiters of who shall govern Iraq. 4' 
population in northern Iraq from the consequences of government reprisals after the uprising. Cumhurriyet 12 
and 23 January 1991. 
35 Nicola and Hugh Pope state that Ozal telephoned Bush and threatened that Turkey would Invade northern 
Iraq to set up 'safe havens' if the international community failed to react. Turkey Unveiled: Ataturk and After 
(London: John Murray, 1997) p 230. This version of events is not supported by other sources. 
36 'Bush looks to UN for protecting of Iraqis' The Times 9 April 1991. 
37 This was the second of Baker's seven visits to the region between March and November 1991. It was part 
of the US peace initiative designed to reconcile Israel and its neighbours. Its first achievement was the Madrid 
conference on 31 October. See p 137 above. 
38 Turkey had permitted the US to conduct Operation PROVEN FORCE, its'northern front' in the air 
campaign of DESERT STORM, from Incirlik Air Force base, Turkey. 
39 At this stage US officials were still carefully referring to the DPs as 'Iraqis', rather than Kurds, to avoid 
giving offence to Turkey. 
40 Staff Dispatches International Herald Tribune 9 April 1991 
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Baker telephoned the State Department in Washington, 
and the president, to alert them to the humanitarian 
crisis and the political problems it would bring. 42 
At Diyarbakir James Baker and Turkish foreign minister 
Ahmet Alptemocin issued a joint statement calling for 
more international relief aid for the DPs. They said 
that the amount raised to date had been $67m. 43 
THE LUXEMBOURG SUMMIT 
On 8 April British Prime Minister John Major proposed 
his `safe haven'44 solution45 to the Luxembourg EC 
special summit. 96 The plan (originally: `safe 
enclaves') was drawn up in the 24 hours preceding the 
summit. He said47: 
We cannot confine our efforts to mitigating this 
tragedy. We cannot just treat the wounds of the 
Iraqi people. We have to put a stop to the blood- 
letting of Saddam Hussein. If we cannot get rid of 
him we can at least provide some protection for 
the most vulnerable of the Iraqi people. 48 
In a separate statement he referred to the impact of 
public opinion as a: 
41 Brown and Shukman. They quote one of Baker's aides: We wrote the civil war off; but we can't write off 
the refugees' p 183. See also Bulloch and Morris p 33. See James A Baker III with Thomas DeFrank The 
Politics of Diplomacy (New York: Putnam, 1995) pp 431-435. 
42 Ibid pp 431-435. 
43 The Times 9 April 1991. 
94 See Hella Pick'Major Worked Out the Project on the Hoof The Guardian 10 April 1991. 
John Major was said to have been annoyed by the Inference in White House statements claiming credit for 
the 'safe havens' idea. In fact the earliest reference to safe havens in the context of the Kurds was in fact a 
radio broadcast made by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheyney on 30 March. Freedman and Boren p 53. 
45 This proposal was made against Foreign Office advice. Nik Gowing Real-time Television Coverage of 
Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises: Does It Pressure or Distort Foreign Policy Decisions Working Paper 
94-1, John F Kennedy School of Government, June 1994 p 38. 
46 This summit had been called at the request of France to discuss the 'inadequate' response of the EC to 
the Gulf Crisis. In the words of Belgian Foreign Minister Marc Eysens, during the Gulf War: 'Europe has 
shown itself to be an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm. ' Die 125 January 1991. 
47 Martin Griffiths believes that Major was determined to 'move beyond' Mrs Thatcher's concern. He 
therefore proposed the 'safe havens' plan, partly in order to seize the domestic political initiative from his 
predecessor. Interview Wiston House 20.6.94. 
48 Quoted in Bulloch and Morris 'No Friends' p 35 
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tidal wave of outrage that has swept the world as 
we have become aware of Saddam Hussein's cruelty 
to his own people. 49 
This proposal was made without consultation with other 
ministers. 50 As he was speaking Foreign Office 
officials in London were briefing that the Kurds 
deserved no special treatment: 
The Iraqis are exceptionally brutal and vengeful 
people, as are the Kurds, who have a record of 
violence and unpleasantness second to none. 51 
Britain's EC partners and the US Administration were 
not consulted in advance. 52 During the summit, however, 
Douglas Hurd spoke to James Baker by telephone and 
informed him of the British proposal. Baker replied 
that the US would not consent to any intervention 
into Iraq's domestic affairs. 53 Stephen Wall, the 
prime minister's foreign affairs advisor tried to 
contact Brent Scowcroft, the US National Security 
Advisor, by telephone to inform him of the British 
plan. Failing to reach Scowcroft he left a message 
for him. 54 One of the prime minister's aides also 
telephoned the UK Permanent Representative at the UN, 
Sir David Hannay, who was due to lunch with the UN 
Secretary-General later that day. 55 Later that day 
John Major telephoned President Bush. 
49 Mark M Nelson 'EC Leaders Demand Kurds be Given Safe Haven in Iraq. Plan to Send Aid' Wall Street 
Journal 9 April 1991. A less complimentary version was that John Major, in the opinion of one of his senior 
advisors, 'was being panicked by the newspaper headlines'. Ben Brown and David Shukman All Necessary 
Means (London: BBC Books, 1991) p 183. For a further discussion of the impact of media reports on UK 
government decision-making see Nik Gowing 'The Media Dimension 1: TV and the Kurds' The World Today 
47(7) pp 111-112. 
50 Brown and Shukman quote a 'No 10 official' as saying that Major took resolute action after being 'panicked 
by the media'. Brown and Shukman p 183. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Boris Johnson and George Jones 'Major calls for UN-protected Kurdish enclave' Daily Telegraph 9 April 
1991 p 11. 
53 Freedman and Karsh The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991 p 423. 
54 Brown and Shukman p 185. 
55 Christopher Bellamy Best Witness: A Defence Correspondent's Gulf War 1990-1 (London: Brassey's) p 
185. 
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Sir John Weston, the political director at the British 
Foreign Office, who had accompanied John Major to 
Luxembourg, was then instructed to approach Britain's 
other allies to obtain international support for the 
plan. Specifically Weston's task was to remedy what 
might have been an important oversight: the failure to 
consult the US before making the `safe havens' 
announcement. At this time the Foreign Office in London 
was still referring to the `havens' as `a safe 
environment' for the Kurds. 56 
At the end of the meeting Luxembourg's foreign minister 
Jacques Poos justified the decision to provide a 
sanctuary for the Kurds inside Iraq on the grounds that 
providing a refuge in a neighbouring country would 
create `another Palestinian problem'. 57 The proposal was 
endorsed unanimously. The summit also pledged £104m as 
the EC's immediate contribution to the aid effort. 58 
The `safe havens' proposal was immediately attractive 
to the EC heads-of-government. First it was low 
cost/low risk. 59 Second it allowed the Europeans to 
seize the diplomatic initiative from the US. 60 Third it 
meant that the leaders could avoid an acrimonious 
discussion on the EC's diplomatic `failures' during the 
Gulf crisis. 61 For the French and Germans this display 
of unity was a promising forecast for CFSP62, scheduled 
56 Bulloch and Morris'No Friends' p 35. 
57 Agence Euroge 10 April 1991 p 6. 
58 David Gardner, David Buchan and Andrew Hill'UK urges haven for Kurds' The Financial Times 9 April 
1991. In June the EC allocated a further £21.5m. Germany made an additional contribution of £148m. John 
Eisenhammer 'German troops join relief effort' The Independent 24 April 1991. 
59 Furthermore the 'humanitarian' nature of the operation avoided many of the dilemmas on the use of force 
which had inhibited the EC states from contributing to the coalition effort in the Gulf crisis. Philippe Lemaitre 
'Les Douze se mobilisent en faveur des Kurdes irakians' Le Monde 10 April 1991. 
60 On this occasion the [EC] rose to it. Something had to be done and it did something. It acted swiftly, 
collectively and independently. ' Peter Jenkins 'Major puts the UN on the spot' The Independent 10 April 1991. 
61 The first 'failure' of the EC states was their lack of concerted diplomatic action during the early months 
of the Gulf crisis: the French and the Germans, in particular, had insisted on single nation 'missions' - the 
Brandt and the Vauzelle missions - to negotiate with the Iraqis. (Michael Knipe and Ian Murray'Hurd protests 
to Bonn and Rome at Brandt Mission' The Times November 2,1990. ) The other 'failure' was the comparatively 
meagre military contribution to the operation. 
62 Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
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for discussion in October. 63 President Mitterand called 
the initiative `a major advance for the political 
dimension of the community. '64 The leaders could now 
claim that the EC had taken the lead in international 
action to assist the Kurds. In the words of one EC 
official: `The Kurds have saved the summit, so we had 
to save the Kurds'. 65 
The EC summit also decided to send Jacques Santer 
(Prime Minister of Luxembourg and President of the 
Council of Ministers) and Jacques Delors (the President 
of the Commission) to Washington to urge the US 
Administration to begin a `peace initiative' to attempt 
to resolve the long-standing disputes between Israel, 
the Palestinians and the neighbouring Arab states. They 
were also to urge that the EC should have a voice in 
such discussions. If not, the EC would `not play its 
part in providing aid and security guarantees' . 66 
The unity and optimism of the EC summit did not spill 
over into the WEU, however. At a WEU meeting, held in 
the margins of the EC conference on the same day, and 
in follow-up meetings on 9 and 10 April, there was no 
agreement that the WEU should coordinate member states' 
contributions to the resolution of the Kurdish crisis. 
In a clear reference to the UK and the Netherlands a 
WEU report later attributed this to `certain countries 
who prefer to organise their participation in affording 
humanitarian assistance under their national flag'. 67 
When he made his proposal John Major had in mind a UN 
`blue beret' protection force for the `havens'. The UN 
63 Laura Guazzaone 'Italy in the Gulf Crisis' In Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper (eds) The Western 
European Union and the Gulf Crisis (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, WEU, 1992) p 74. 
64 Quoted in Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh The Gulf Crisis 1990-1991 (London and Boston: Faber 
and Faber, 1993) p 423 and David Usborne 'EC's war wounds start to heal' The Independent 10 April 1991. 
65 David Buchan and David Gardner'EC leaders unite in response to Kurdish crisis' The Financial Times 10 
April 1991. 
66 A senior EC official quoted in David Buchan and David Gardner Financial Times 10 April 1991. 
67 European Securi and Threats outside Europe - the organisation of peace and security In the 
Mediterranean region and the Middle East WEU Document 1271,13 May 1991, In WEU Assembly of WEU 
Proceedings (37th session Pt 1) p 248. 
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rejected the idea of a `blue beret' operation, however. 
The UN had neither a mandate from the Security Council 
nor the consent of the Iraqis. There was, furthermore 
the question of cost: if the operation had been under 
the UN flag the UN would have had to fund the 
operation. 68 
Press reports from London suggested that John Major 
took these actions because he saw the British public's 
reaction to the evidence of the DPs' distress69 and also 
because it gave him a chance of achieving a foreign 
policy success. In the words of one report he saw the 
Kurdish crisis as an opportunity to refute the charge 
of `dithering "0 and `to emerge from Mrs Thatcher's 
shadow' . 71 By 8 April the UK had already delivered 6000 
individual rations and 10 tons of plastic sheeting to 
Incirlik. '2 
The US Administration's reaction to the Major plan was 
cool. 73 White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater described 
the proposal as `at least worthy of consideration' and 
having some merit in terms of a possible solution' . 74 
This reaction may have been influenced by opinion polls 
in the US. 75 
68 In fact some recent UN peacekeeping operations have been funded by special contributions, not from the 
UN peacekeeping budget. But this funding method takes time to organise. 
69 Nik Gowing'The Media Dimension: TV and the and Kurds' The World Today Vol No 7, June 1991 pp 111- 
112. Sir Anthony Parsons, the former UK Permanent Representative at the UN, agrees: 
'Had it not been for the heart-rendering television pictures, there would have been no coalition 
Intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991' 
A Parsons From Cold War to Hot Peace': UN Interventions 1947-1994 (London: Michael Joseph, 1995) p 186. 
70 Boris Johnson and George Jones 'Major calls for UN-protected Kurdish enclave' Daily Telegraph 9 April 
1991 p 11. 
71 Alan Philps and Ben Rooney'A Rough Path for the Thin Blue Line' Daily Telegraph 10 April 1991, 
72 Bellamy p 150. 
73 The US Administration was apparently annoyed that John Major had made the'safe havens' proposal 
without prior consultation with Washington. Sarah Helm 'US and UK argue over who saved the Kurds' The 
Independent 19 April 1991. 
74 Martin Fletcher and James Bone 'Majors enclave plan for Kurds runs into trouble' The Times 10 April 
1991 p 1. 
75 A poll in the US before the announcement of the'safe havens' proposal Indicated 45% of respondents 
wanted aid to be sent to the DPs in Iraq but only half of these were in favour of the deployment of US forces 
into Iraq on a humanitarian mission. International Herald Tribune 6-7 April 1991. 
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It is likely that this reaction was caused by the 
Administration's fear that a new intervention might 
lead the American public to question the success of 
DESERT STORM, amid the on-going national 
celebrations. If the Gulf War had been such a success 
why was a further operation necessary? Had the 
president made a mistake in terminating the war 
before Saddam had been overthrown? Was the US 
justified in claiming its first real military victory 
since its defeat in Vietnam ? Such doubts, if left to 
fester, might produce a negative political reaction. 76 
Another worry for the Administration was the impact 
of a further military intervention onto the territory 
of an Arab state to influence an internal conflict. 
Even the governments of states friendly to the US 
(such as Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman) would 
question the legitimacy of such an act. Those same 
governments (and the Turkish leadership) would oppose 
a US action which although humanitarian in intent 
served the political interests of the Kurds. The US' 
new allies (such as Egypt and Syria) would certainly 
have objected to US intervention in such a 
controversial cause. These concerns probably explain 
the refusal of the Arab members of the Gulf War 
coalition to participate in PROVIDE COMFORT. ) No 
state in the Middle East had (or has) any sympathy 
for the Kurdish cause. 
President Bush's reluctance to approve intervention 
using US ground forces also had to take wider 
regional objectives into account. It is likely that 
he foresaw the negative impact of a further 
intervention on the planned Middle East peace 
process. 
In April the Administration weighed these questions: 
how could it respond to growing public pressure and 
76 For example President Bush's last request to Congress for aid for Turkey, months before he left office In 
1992 was for $ 543 m as a straight gift. This sum was reduced to $ 40 m during discussions with Congress 
and was offered as a loan. 
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also avoid a second - and perhaps more prolonged and 
`political' - intervention inside Iraq, with all the 
risks involved? Once it had decided to intervene a 
second question arose: how could the intervention be 
made least damaging to US interests and diplomatic 
operations elsewhere in the region? 
On 9 April USEUCOM expanded Major General Jamerson's 
mission. He was ordered to position US SF teams on the 
ground in the mountain passes to assist the reception 
of the air-delivered aid supplies. " 
As soon as the EC had approved the British `safe 
havens' plan a debate began on the need for UN Security 
Council to provide a mandate for action enforcing R 
688. The UN Secretary-General was cautious: he wanted 
to forestall criticism that he had accepted the US-UK 
solution too readily, instead of formulating a 
distinctive UN approach. 78 He was concerned that 
forcible intervention into Iraq without a Security 
Council mandate, would contravene international law. In 
all his dealings with Iraq Perez de Cuellar had striven 
to find solutions based on consent. Nine months later, 
in his final report as Secretary-General he struck a 
bolder note: 
The principle of non-intervention with the 
essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot 
be regarded as a protective barrier behind which 
human rights can be massively or systematically 
violated with impunity.... 
We need not impale ourselves on the dilemma 
between respect for sovereignty and the 
protection of human rights.... What is involved 
is not the right of intervention but the 
collective obligation of States to bring relief 
and redress in human rights emergencies. 
But his successor, Boutros-Ghali returned to caution 
in `Agenda for Peace'. He supported an `even handed' 
approach to sovereignty and human rights, confident 
77 The SF component had previously been on stand-by for CSAR tasks. 
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that `the independence of the UN' would allow it to 
satisfy both principles in any future crisis. 
On 9 April, in accordance with the mandate in R 688, 
the Secretary-General appointed Prince Sadruddin Agha 
Khan to draw up a plan for humanitarian relief in 
Kuwait, Iraq and Iran . 79 The Secretary-General also sent 
Eric Suy, a former Belgian diplomat and UN official", 
on a fact-finding mission to Iraq. Suy told reporters 
that `setting up a special zone on Iraqi territory 
would create a very dangerous precedent'. 81 In an 
interview for Belgian TV he said: 
Iraq's consent to a UN sanctuary would be a 
fundamental principle ... such a zone ... will 
likely not be attainable. 82 
The case for carrying out international action based 
on consent, rather then compulsion, was strengthened 
by the armistice agreed by the Kurdish leadership and 
the Baath regime on 11 April. It could be argued that 
the coalition had no grounds for intervening forcibly 
where the parties had already reached some sort of 
agreement. Gen Shalikashvili recognised this. He used 
to say that agreement between the parties could 
undermine PROVIDE COMFORT. On one occasion he 
reminded his staff - 
The Iraqis might turn to us and say "What are you 
turkeys (sic) doing in the north of our country ? 
The fighting is over and we are now at peace with 
the Kurds". 83 
78 UKMis official. 
79 Prince Sadruddin was to be the Executive Delegate for the UN Secretary-General for the UN Humanitarian 
Programme for Iraq, Kuwait and the Iraq/Iran and Iraq/Turkey Border Areas. See comment on the Ahtissari 
mission, p 169 above. 
80 Suy was the former head of the UN office in Geneva. He was to be the Secretary-General's Personal 
Representative, tasked with inquiring into the facts of the humanitarian crisis and In negotiations with Iraq. 
81 Edward Lucas, Leonard Doyle and Sarah Helm The Independent 10 April. 
82 James Bone The Times 10 April 1991. 
83 Remark made in the presence of the author in May 1991. 
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Turkey announced that there were several hundred 
thousand DPs waiting to cross the border from Iraq, in 
addition to the 300,000 Iraqi refugee Kurds already in 
the country. Media reports put the figure of refugees 
in Iran at 900,000. To follow its agreement with the 
Kurdish leadership the Iraqi regime extended, for a 
further week, its amnesty for those of its Kurdish 
citizens who had fled to the mountains or into 
neighbouring states. 84 
In the UK Sir Anthony Parsons, a former British 
permanent representative at the UN, wrote that, 
ideally, a new resolution would be required before any 
act of intervention by ground forces. He added however 
that R 688 taken together with the earlier `Gulf War' 
resolution (678) might be a sufficient mandate for 
intervention. 85 
Western diplomats at the UN were reported as saying: 
it would be easier to get Security Council 
approval for UN humanitarian workers being sent 
into the Kurdish areas via Baghdad ... rather than 
a vote to send in a peacekeeping [sic] force. 86 
Answering reporters' questions on the likelihood of a 
UN mandate for the `safe havens' plan, the Secretary- 
General said: 
I don't think it would be impossible, but it would 
be on Iraqi territory, which would raise problems 
of sovereignty. I don't know if we can impose a 
special area on Iraq. That would be complicated. 
He added later: 
We would wish in the first place to be in touch 
with the Iraqi authorities. We would need to see 
what their reaction would be to this sort of 
military presence on their territory. If there is 
to be a military presence under the aegis of the 
UN consent would have to be obtained from the 
84 Gerald Butt 'Saddam uses Western inactivity to make gains on two fronts' Daily Telegraph 12 April 1991 p 
11. 
85 No barrier to protecting the Kurds' The Times 10 April 1991 p 14. 
86 James Bone The Times 10 April 1991. 
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Security Council. If the countries concerned do 
not require the UN flag, that is quite different. 87 
The Secretariat's difficulty arose from two factors. 
First, the Security Council's mandate for action (R 
688) was critical of Iraq's repression but failed to 
provide clear authority for the UN (or individual 
states) to take forcible action. Second it was clear 
that the Council was unlikely to authorise forcible 
action as R 688 had already stretched the available 
consensus to the limit. 88 The Secretariat already had an 
urgent and a wide-ranging relief task to complete in 
Iraq, a state where the regime was hostile to the UN. 
Now it was proposed that a forcible intervention should 
take place in the north of the country while, at the 
same time, the relief operation would proceed 
throughout Iraq. 
Perez de Cuellar recognised that he would have the best 
chance of accomplishing his mandate if he dealt with 
the regime on the basis of consent, not compulsion. The 
MOU negotiated by his representatives (and later 
amended to incorporate an agreement on the `guards') 
achieved this consent. The consent of the Iraqis came 
at the price of some concessions, however. The 
international community therefore spoke with two 
voices: one demanded Iraqis' compliance, the other 
sought their consent. 89 The multinational military 
forces would intervene forcibly claiming that their 
action was `consistent with R 688'- to vehement Iraqi 
87 Bulloch and Morris p 36. 
88 See Chapter 7, above. Analysis of R 688 suggests that the Security Council had made as strong a 
statement on the situation in Iraq as the majority of members would support. A further statement or resolution 
would have overstretched the limited consensus which had approved 688. The potential objections of the 
USSR and China, as permanent members, could not be disregarded. 
'China and the Soviet Union intimated that they would not support [a new and stronger] resolution. For 
them and the other members of the Security Council [R 688] represented the limits of their willingness 
overtly to support UN intervention in the internal affairs of another country. ' 
Roland Dannreuther The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis Adelphi Paper 264, (London: 
Brassey's for the IISS, 1992) p 66. 
China had abstained in the vote on R 688, as it had In all previous resolutions imposing Chapter VII 
measures involving the use of force. Michael Yahuda's analysis is that China was prepared to support the 
status quo in the Gulf Crisis - that is to support the restoration of the legitimate government to Kuwait - but not 
actively to promote 'democratic' government in Kuwait, nor endorse the punishment of Iraq, nor to support any 
(West-led) attempt to bring down the Iraqi regime. Source: interview at the LSE 9 June 1993. 
89 For a further discussion of the UN Secretariat's conduct in the crisis see pp 219, below. 
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protests9° - while UN sponsored aid workers (and later 
guards) entered Iraq by permission of the regime, in 
accordance with the MOU. 
At this stage the US Administration was prepared to 
assist the relief operation but not to commit ground 
forces to an intervention on Iraqi territory. On 9 
April President Bush despatched a USAID DART91 team to 
Turkey, and with it $ 869,000 for UNICEF for child 
immunisation and a further $ 131,000 for the ICRC for 
water purification. He also sent $ 275,000 to US 
Ambassador Morton I Abramovitz in Ankara92 as a 
discretionary fund for relief work. 
On 10 April the Administration announced that White 
House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater had `warned Iraq this 
weekend not to interfere with the humanitarian relief 
efforts under way in Iraq'. 93 
On the same day the US Administration announced that 
coalition aircraft had already delivered 150 tonnes of 
relief supplies to people in need and that the US had 
allocated $ 25m in aid. 94 It also gave details on the 
relief supplies now awaiting delivery, or awaiting 
transport into the operational area. 95 On the same day 
the US Administration told Iraq not to fly its 
helicopters north of the 36th parallel. 96 Iraq made it 
clear that it tolerated - under duress - the daily 
violation of its airspace by coalition aircraft. 97 On 11 
90 UN documents S/22459 (8 April), S/22513 (22 April), S/22531 (25 April) listed in Oppenheim 9th edition, 
p 443. 
91 Disaster Aid Relief Team. 
92 USIA 10 April. 
93 Dian Macdonald USIA 12 April 1991. 
94 USIA 10 April 1991. 
95 130,000 blankets, 13,000 tents, 89,000 cases of MREs. Coalition sources had also acquired hundreds of 
thousands of blankets, thousands of tents and sleeping bags, with food for 300,000 people for 30 days. 
96 At the negotiations at Safwan the US had ordered the Iraqis to cease all military aircraft flights south of 
Baghdad. Christopher Bellamy Knights In White Armour (London: Hutchinson, 1996) p 97. 
97 Iraqi prime minister Sadoon Hamadi, speaking in Nicosia, said, 
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April the UNHCR appealed for $ 400m for relief work in 
Turkey Iraq and Iran. 98 
On 11th the EC delegation (Santer and Delors) met 
Administration leaders in Washington. The Americans 
repeated their reluctance to involve the US in 
intervention by ground forces. As an indication of the 
weakening US resolve on this point, however, some time 
at the meeting was taken up on the best word to be used 
to describe the `havens'. The US preference was for 
`sanctuary', rather than `enclave'. On the same day as 
the meeting in Washington there were reports of new 
Iraqi attacks on Kurdish people in Irbil and 
Suleymanieh. 99 
In Washington on 11 April the US Senate10° passed 
Resolution 99 which spoke of `a moral obligation to 
provide sustained humanitarian relief for the Iraqi 
refugees' and called upon the President of the United 
States 
immediately to press for the [United Nations 
Security Council] to adopt effective measures to 
assist Iraqi refugees as set out in [R 688] ... 
and the demand in [R 688] that Iraq end its 
repression of the Iraqi civilian population. '°' 
On 13 April President Bush stated : 
[he did] not want a single soldier or airman 
shoved into a civil war that has been going on for 
'The proposal to set up a zone under United Nations supervision inside Iraq to deal with the so-called 
refugee problem'. 
98 Frances Williams The Independent 12 April 1991 p 10. 
99 Rupert Cornwell and Christopher Bellamy'Bush drowns enclaves in semantic sea' The Independent 12 
April p 10. 
100 In 1988 the US Senate investigated the Iraqi CW attack on Halabja. As a result the Republican leader of 
the Senate, Claiborne Pell, introduced the 'Prevention of Genocide Bill'. Pell and Mme Mitterand had lobbied 
the Administration, unsuccessfully, on behalf of the Kurds. For earlier action in Congress on behalf of the 
Iraqi Kurds see p 120 above. 
101 '... a moral obligation to provide sustained humanitarian relief for Iraqi refugees ... land called on the President] immediately to press the United Nations Security Council to adopt effective measures ... as 
set forth in Resolution 688 and to enforce ... the demand that Iraq end 
Its repression of the Iraqi 
civilian population' 
International Herald Tribune 7-8 April 1991 
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ages [but he would not] tolerate any interference 
in the massive international relief effort. 102 
He continued: 
I have said that the United States is not going to 
intervene militarily in Iraq's internal affairs 
and be drawn into a Vietnam-style quagmire ... 103 
On the same day President Bush confirmed that the 
north-of-36°N `air exclusion zone' was already in 
force. The cease fire agreement between the coalition 
and the Iraqis signed at the end of the Gulf War had 
imposed a condition that no Iraqi military aircraft 
would fly in Iraqi airspace until further notice. The 
`air exclusion zones' relating to Iraqi airspace north 
of 36°N (to protect the Kurds) and south of 36°N (to 
protect the `marsh Arabs') forbade the operation of all 
non-coalition aircraft (ie civil as well as military) 
in those areas. (Coalition forces did shoot down two 
Iraqi fixed wing combat aircraft over Iraq in March. ) 
Later the coalition did make a controversial concession 
to Iraqi requests that their helicopters should be 
allowed to fly on their own humanitarian missions in 
the no-fly zones. 
The coalition `no fly zones' were imposed by the 
coalition but never endorsed by the security Council. 
In later incidents the US was to justify its armed 
action against Iraqi aircraft, or missile batteries, as 
`consistent with' to R 688. The UK justified the action 
it took as self-defence. 104 
Answering questions on coalition policy on the 
intervention John Major denied that the entry of 
coalition ground forces was an `intervention in 
102 Speech at Maxwell Air Force Base 13 April 1991 USIA 15 April 1991. 
103 Bush News Conference 16 April, USIA 18 April 1991. This statement is consistent with remarks made 
by US Administration spokesmen when, during and immediately after, the Gulf War the coalition was accused 
of failing to 'finish the job' of overthrowing the Baath regime. In the same meeting the President denied that he 
commited forces to protect the Kurds out of guilt at having incited the revolt in March. 
104 Ian Johnstone Aftermath of the Gulf War: Assessment of UN Action (New York: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, for the International Peace Academy, 1994) p 38. 
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Iraq's domestic affairs'105: `No. It is protection of 
the population from persecution'. This was an 
apparent reference to the duty of the international 
community to prevent genocide. 106 This theme was also 
to be found in the telegram the Iraqi Kurdish leader 
Massoud Barzani sent to the British prime minister on 
the same day: `It is therefore the duty of every 
government in the world to support this 
initiative. '107 
A8 of the UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide (1948) allows 
competent organs of the United Nations to take 
such action under the Charter ... as they consider 
appropriate for the prevention and suppression of 
genocide. 
Adelman notes that the Convention makes no provision 
for unilateral action, only action by the `organs of 
the UN'. All the coalition states (and Iraq) are 
parties to the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention of 
the Crime of Genocide. But, as Adelman has observed: 
To have an obligation to protect without a right 
of intervention would be like insisting that a 
State was sovereign without giving it a the 
monopoly of the use of coercive power. Hence Major 
by claiming an obligation to protect implied his 
belief in a right of intervention, in this case if 
not generally. 108 
Summing up the policies of the US, Russia and China at 
that stage in the crisis Bulloch and Morris assessed 
the situation as follows: 
In Washington the post-war euphoria showed no 
signs of abating with the president and his 
105 The British response was dominated by a desire to see the authority of the UN effectively exercised and 
to see the European states act together in diplomacy and, if it became necessary, in military operations. 
Trevor Salmon p 240. 
106 Howard Adelman 'Humanitarian Intervention; The Case of the Kurds' IJ Refugee Law Vol 4 No 1p 23. 
107 Michael Littlejohn Financial Times 10 April 1991. 
108 Adelman p8 Note 10. 
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officials all apparently content to let the 
Europeans take the lead in providing aid to the 
Kurds and taking very little notice of John 
Major's idea of safe havens. It may not only have 
been euphoria and self interest: just as China was 
afraid of the idea of a UN-protected enclave in 
Tibet, and the Soviet Union in respect of the 
Baltic states, so the US may have had in mind the 
situation in the Israeli-occupied territories. For 
years Palestinian leaders had been pressing for 
the UN to send observers and troops to the West 
Bank and Gaza to protect their people against what 
they said was the brutality of the Israelis; the 
plan for the Kurds might have been seen as a trial 
run for what they had in mind. '09 
On 15 April the Secretary-General received a letter 
from the Iranian government protesting about further 
incursions by Iraqi forces into its territory, near 
Gasr-e-Shirin. llo 
On 16 April, however, the US declared that it was 
prepared to deploy ground forces to assist the 
humanitarian operation. "' President Bush made no 
reference to his previous opposition to US military 
involvement in the safe havens plan: 
109 Bulloch and Morris 'No Friends' p 37. Also Alan Philp and Ben Rooney 'A Rough Path for the Thin Blue 
Line' Daily Telegraph 10 April 1991. 
110 The Iranians accused Iraq of sending a brigade to occupy an area 3 km2 on Iranian territory. This was 
the latest in an exchange of accusations between Iraq and Iran both accusing the other of territorial violations. 
The UN received letters from Iraq (S122371) on 21 March quoting a speech by Saddam Hussein (delivered on 
16th) accusing Iraq of sending 'armed groups into Iran to undertake arson, murder and sabotage. ' Iran denied 
this in a letter on 23rd (S/22379) and in turn accused Iraq of atrocities towards its own population: 'armed acts 
by government forces against innocent civilians as well as reported desecration of holy shrines and prominent 
religious personalities'. 
On 3 April Iraq reported (S/22439) that there had been an Iranian Incursion onto its territory and that Iraq 
had taken 50 'Iranian elements' prisoner. 
111 For an interesting analysis of the deeper reasons behind the US decision to commit land forces to 
PROVIDE COMFORT (and DESERT STORM) see Stephen John Steadman 'The New Interventionists' 
Foreign Affairs 72: 1, pp 1-16. Steadman argues that the end of the Cold War brought about the reunification 
of the two wings of US public and political opinion on foreign policy: the'Wilsonian liberals' (who emphasise 
self-determination and human rights for all) and the 'Cold War liberals' (who emphasised support for US 
interests and the need to confront challengers), who had been divided since the time of the Vietnam War. 
The two groups found common ground in their respect for human rights, their belief that the internal 
character of regimes has implications for international peace, and their support for international 
organisations to reform, [or] ... remove, rogue regimes. ' Both wings, argues Steadman, saw the Gulf War as a model for future collective security. Hence 'the new 
world order' interventions. 
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If we cannot get adequate food, clothing and 
shelter to the Kurds living in the mountains, then 
we must encourage them to move to an area in 
northern Iraq where the geography facilitates such 
a large-scale relief effort. I can well appreciate 
that many Kurds have good reason to fear for their 
safety if they return to Iraq. Let me reassure 
them that adequate security will be provided at 
these temporary sites by US, British and French 
air and ground forces. We'll have the air power 
around there if needed. We'll be able not only to 
protect our own people but the people we are 
setting out to protect. Iraq has underestimated 
the United States before. They shouldn't do so 
again. 112 
On the same day, 16 April, President Bush announced 
that the temporary sites would have to be (tented) 
transit camps in northern Iraq, in the foothills of the 
mountains where the DPs were seeking shelter. He said: 
Consistent with [UNSC] Resolution 688113 and 
working closely with the [UN] and other 
international relief agencies and our European 
partners I have directed the US military to begin 
immediately to establish several encampments"' in 
northern Iraq.... adequate security will be 
provided at these temporary camps by US, British 
and French air and ground forces, again consistent 
with UN Security Council Resolution 688.... I want 
to underscore that all we are doing is motivated 
by humanitarian concern. . . We intend to turn over 
112 Bulloch and Morris'No Friends' p 39. 
113 Coalition political and military leaders used this 'consistent with' formula thereafter. But they also referred 
to an 'overwhelming humanitarian need' in the sense that a perceived moral duty might in this case overtake 
any deficiency in legal authority. 
114 The term 'camp' caused coalition leaders and spokesmen constant difficulty. They were determined to 
avoid giving the impression that they were about to build 'refugee camps'. The term 'refugee camp' called to 
mind the permanent squalor of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. On the contrary the 
coalition wanted to stress the temporary nature of the accommodation, and to show a determination that these 
tented areas would provide high standard living conditions for the residents. The term 'enclave' was also seen 
as being misleading. Dick Cheyney: 'And we are not Interested in creating enclaves from which Kurds can 
attack the Iraqis. We are not interested in doing that' Quoted in Prados p 30. 
The UN also hesitated over the term 'enclave'. To international lawyers this expression suggested the 
establishment of a zone in which the sovereign rights of the state had been removed or set aside. See 'Kurds 
Plight under Discussion with Europeans' USIA, 18 April 1991. 
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the administration and security of these sites to 
the United Nations as soon as possible ... 115 
President Bush also stated that the intervention would 
be temporary and last only as long as it took to turn 
the situation over to the UN. He confirmed that the US 
had obtained permission for stationing and overflights 
from Turkey (and overflight rights from Iran). Despite 
the positive public reaction to this decision some 
commentators continued to raise questions about 
`quagmire' and `fragmentation' . 116 
The Administration's change of heart over intervention 
has been attributed to pressure exerted by James Baker, 
Congressional leaders and the media. 117 Baker's own 
account runs as follows : 
My experience on that rugged hillside was not the 
only catalyst for a huge expansion for American 
and international relief to the Kurds that came to 
be known as Operation Provide Comfort: it also 
galvanised me into pressing for a new policy, 
announced by the President on April 16th, of 
establishing safe havens for the Kurds in northern 
Iraq - refugee camps secured by US forces and 
administered by the United Nations under the 
command of the then Lt Gen Shalikashvili, the 
deputy commander of US Army forces in Europe. 1'8 
General Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff and Dick Cheney, the Secretary of Defense 
argued against further US involvement in Iraq. James 
115 New York Times 17 April 1991, p A7. Also the Bush News Conference 16 April, USIA 18 April 1991. 
Answering questions afterwards President Bush replaced 'as soon as possible' with 'the sooner the better'. 
116 Martin Fletcher The Times 10 April. 
117 Martin Shaw'The Kurds: TV's Finest Hour New Statesman and Society 19 April 1996 pp 22-23. 
118 Baker 'The Politics of Diplomacy' p 434. 
Morton Kondrake, a former State Department official has written a more general account of Baker's modus 
operandi and priorities : 
'Baker is interested in only two subjects-East-West relations and Arab-Israeli relations-and takes up 
others (such as Japan) only intermittently. One official sees Baker's operating style as "classic 
Machiavellian politics in a bureaucratic setting. " 
Morton Kondracke 'What foreign policy? [Part] V The New Republic 24 February 1992. 
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Baker, who had been the director of the Bush 
presidential campaign in 1987, and who was advising the 
president on strategy for the approaching 1992 
campaign, apparently persuaded Bush to agree to US 
military participation in the `safe havens' plan 
because of domestic political pressures. 119 Randal 
attributes the change of heart to the `telegenic' 
qualities of the Kurds120 and the pressure felt through 
the Congress as a result of energetic lobbying by well- 
placed individuals like Peter Galbraith. 121 Finally, 
despite Administration denials, it may be that leaders 
and officials were influenced, in part, by a sense of 
responsibility for the plight of the Kurds after the 
alleged US call for Iraqis to rebel after the Gulf War. 
Also on 16 April General McCarthy USAF (DCINC EUCOM), 
Lt Gen Shalikashvili (DCINC USAEUR) and a DART team 
from OFTA, Washington, made a field reconnaissance of 
the border area. 122 Following the reconnaissance the US 
made a request to the Turkish authorities for 
permission for the leading elements of the intervention 
force to land in Turkey. 123 
THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT 
On 18 April Sadruddin Aga Khan signed a `framework' 
agreement with the regime in Baghdad. Sadruddin was 
anxious to obtain a legal basis for the international 
aid workers about to enter Iraq. The agreement - later 
formalised in an `MOU' - signed at this meeting 
119 Strobe Talbott 'Status Quo Ante; The United States and its Allies' in Joseph S Nye and Roger K Smith 
(eds. ) After the Storm: Lessons from the Gulf War (New York: Madison Books, 1992) p 27. 
120 Randal quotes CBS reporter Alan Pizzey: 'The children are beautiful, the men fierce ... and the women proud and unveiled' p 60. 
121 Galbraith was the co-author of the report of the US Senate's investigation Into the Halabja massacre in 
1988 (see p 120 above). He was in northern Iraq at the time of the Kurdish revolt, as a guest of Jalal 
Talanbani. Randal p 61-2. 
122 PROVIDE COMFORT's DART resources were controlled from HQ EUCOM, Stuttgart, by DART's 
national director, Fred Cuny, a former US marine. 
123 Official approval, on behalf of the Turkish General Staff, for the entry of coalition forces In Turkey was 
given, it is said, by a middle ranking duty officer who had not cleared the decision with his superiors. It 
appears that the duty officer was unwilling to disturb his superiors as they enjoyed the traditional post- 
Ramadan public holiday. If this is correct it may explain in part the resentful manner of Turkish staff officers 
towards coalition officers throughout the crisis. 
The TGS later confirmed that the authorisation for the presence of additional US and coalition personnel 
and equipment would last only 30 days, from 11 April. The term of the authorisation was later extended to a 6- 
month period, which was itself extended several times. Source: Interview with Brigadier Robin Greenwood, 
Defence Attache, British Embassy, Ankara, in May 1991. [Turkish military sources have refused to comment 
on this point. The subsequent fate of the duty officer is not known. ] 
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established the basis on which the UN and its agencies 
dealt with the regime for the rest of the crisis: 
" the UN would establish UN Humanitarian Centres 
UNHUCs) in Zakho, Mosul, Basra, Irbil, Suleymaniyeh and 
Dohuk. In addition to the staff at the UNHUCs there 
would be 8 mobile relief teams. 
" the Iraqis would contribute $ 500,000 per month to 
the relief operation. 124 
" all UN activities in Iraq would be financed in local 
currency, exchanged at the official rate. 125 
" all NGOs and the UN would use Baghdad as the port of 
entry - there would be no travel into Iraq through the 
northern border. 
" internal visa restrictions would apply to the UN 
officials and NGOs. 
" the regional Red Crescent organisations would play a 
prominent part in relief work and, crucially for 
Baghdad, the Iraqi Red Crescent Society would in time 
become the conduit for all relief aid coming into the 
country. 
The `framework' agreement began with a statement in 
which Iraq rejected R 688. Sadruddin's signature 
suggested that the UN acknowledged this rejection. It 
also confirmed that the UN action was on the basis of 
`consent' rather than by the authority of the Security 
Council. This agreement (and its subsequent `UN Guards' 
amendment) would expire on 28 December 1991, if not 
renewed. 
John Packer126, a Canadian international lawyer working 
at that time for UNHCR and based in Geneva, states that 
the Suy-Sadruddin support staff personnel were on loan 
from the UN Development Agency: they were used to long- 
term consensual `development' projects. They did not, 
124 The Iraqis' payments were erratic and never amounted to the sums due. Source: Packer Interview, 25 
June 1994. 
125 As the official rate was forty times more than the 'street' rate (1 dinar =$3 rather than 13 dinars -$ 1) the operation proved to be very expensive for the UN. UN officials often made as much as $ 10,000 per month 
by exploiting the exchange rates on their allowances. Packer interview. 
126 Source for all details on the MOU: John Packer. 
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furthermore, have in their delegation legal advisors 
experienced in adversarial negotiations. The draft MOU 
was not submitted to the Office of the UN Legal Advisor 
in New York before it was signed. The Iraqi side, in 
contrast, fielded twelve legal experts in the 
negotiations. 
Iraq's acceptance of the UN MOU came immediately after 
the US announced it was to participate in the safe 
havens intervention. 127 It may be that the Iraqis saw 
advantage in coming to terms with a UN-led humanitarian 
operation, based on consent, so they could more easily 
criticise the forcible intervention being prepared by 
the coalition. 
The signing of this MOU complicated the legality of the 
coalition operation. If R 688 was authoritative, and if 
the coalition operation was acting in a way which was 
`consistent' with it, it may have been compromised by 
the MOU which specified that it had been drawn up in 
accordance with a `request from Iraq' and was in other 
respects clearly based on `consent'. The MOU, 
furthermore, confirmed a role for the Iraqi military in 
the distribution of aid provided by the UN and the 
NGOs. It specified the need for `personal' safety 
(rather than collective safety) of Iraqi citizens. 128 
Later Perez de Cuellar's expressed his concern about 
the tension between the public expectations of the role 
of the UN in response to crises and the realities of 
international politics. In his report for the year 1991 
he wrote: 
The Secretary-General cannot be expected to use 
powers that are not vested in him and deploy 
resources that are not available. For large-scale 
field operations, the Secretariat needs clear 
mandates, with assured financing, in accordance with 
127 Dannreuther p 65. 
128 That is, as individuals, not as members of distinctive ethnic-religious groups. See Howard Adelman 
'Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurds' International Journal of Refugee Law Vol 4 No 1 pp 20-22. 
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the provisions of the Charter and under established 
procedures. 
Bulloch and Morris are critical of Secretary-General's 
caution: 
The Secretary-General was, at least, consistent. 
Faced with the Kurdish problem he seems to have done 
all he could to avoid UN involvement, dragging the 
organisation's heels in all possible ways, perhaps 
in retaliation for what many saw as the hijacking of 
the UN by the US in the Gulf War, perhaps anxious 
not to get involved in new difficulties in his last 
months in office. 129 
The two operations for providing international relief 
for the victims of the crisis were therefore based on 
separate, and arguably contrary, legal foundations. The 
coalition military operation in the north was based on 
the implied Chapter VII authority of R 688 and took 
place despite its explicit rejection by the Iraqi 
regime. The UN relief plan for the whole of Iraq took 
place at the same time as the coalition operation, but 
was based on the MOU and therefore on the consent of 
the Iraqis. Ramsbotham and Woodhouse follow Garigue in 
proposing that the combination of 688 and MOU created a 
fundamental precedent: `by linking the right to 
intervene on humanitarian grounds to the with the 
internal policies of nation states'. For these authors 
to postulate a synthesis between two actions which were 
in fact contradictory shows more ingenuity than sound 
legal analysis. 130 
The two concurrent operations - based on different 
legal foundations - exemplified the central ambiguity 
over the question of intervention. It provided two 
points of departure for future crises. The first was 
the traditional `only by consent' principle of 
humanitarian intervention. The second was the emerging 
129 Bulloch and Morris 'No Friends' p 36. 
130 p Garigue 'Intervention-sanction and droit d'ing6rence in international humanitarian law' International 
Journal 48(4) pp 668-86. 
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concept of an `international right and duty to 
intervene', a political-legal notion which has not yet 
been fully accepted by the international community. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Conclusions of this Chapter are: 
" The US was at first reluctant to intervene. It feared 
`quagmire' and accusations of `incomplete victory' in 
the Gulf War. It wanted to avoid destabilising the 
`northern tier'. It may also have been reluctant to 
risk offending Arab states - by another intervention on 
to the territory of an Arab state - as it prepared to 
initiate the `Middle East peace process'. But it 
decided to despatch forces nonetheless because of the 
pressure of domestic and world public opinion. It may 
be that leaders and officials were influenced, in part, 
by a sense of responsibility for the plight of the 
Kurds after the alleged US call for Iraqis to rebel 
after the Gulf War. The relative importance of all 
these factors in the decisions taken cannot be assessed 
at this stage. 
" The Europeans decided to intervene as an opportunity 
to redress the perceived inadequacy of their own 
contribution to the Gulf crisis. They were also 
influenced by domestic public opinion. The `safe 
havens' formula provided an attractive low-cost/low- 
risk solution to meet the public demand. 
" The Turks first refused entry to the DPs because they 
wanted to prevent Iraqi Kurds becoming an economic 
burden and a stimulus for Turkish Kurd unrest inside 
Turkey. They cooperated with the intervention because 
the coalition forces would encourage the DPs to return 
to northern Iraq. They also wanted to encourage the 
`Western' states to strengthen the strategic and 
economic ties with them for the future. 
" The UN Secretariat decided to fulfil its mandate 
(688) to establish relief programmes with the consent 
of the Iraqi authorities, even though this was contrary 
to the posture taken by the coalition. The Secretariat 
made this decision because it wanted to provide aid to 
people throughout Iraq and in the medium term, i. e. for 
a longer period than the coalition forces were likely 
to stay. The UN guards plan was an attempt to mask the 
contradictions between the two approaches. 
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CHAPTER 9 
THE INTERVENTION OPERATION 
This chapter continues the account of the humanitarian 
crisis and the military intervention which followed. It 
describes the conduct of the relief operation. It also 
examines the decision-making over, and the execution of, 
the withdrawal of coalition land forces from northern 
Iraq. 
The main themes of the account will be: 
" The coalition leaders' preference for a short 
operation. 
" The concerns of the Turks. 
" Coalition forces' relations with the aid agencies. 
" The reluctance of the DPs to return home. 
" The possibility of an Iraqi attack on the coalition 
forces in the security zone. 
" The UN guards plan. 
" Decision-making on the timing of the troops' 
withdrawal from northern Iraq. 
" The post-withdrawal arrangements, including the role 
of the `residual force'. 
AID IN THE MOUNTAINS 
By the time of the first airdrops (8 April) the crowds 
of DPs at the Turkish border were concentrated in 9 
mountain passes in barren terrain, without supplies and 
in night-time conditions of intense cold. At the outset 
the passes contained the following estimated populations 
of DPs: 
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Aoma Kopru 30,000 
Pirinciken 8,000 
Total: 413,000 plus 100,000 scattered in the mountains. 
Turkey refused to permit such numbers of Kurds to cross 
into and settle in Turkey, even temporarily. So the task 
facing the PROVIDE COMFORT coalition was to bring relief 
to the DPs in the mountains and then assist them to 
return to their towns and villages in northern Iraq in 
safety. 
The first priority was the delivery of food and other 
necessities to the people in the mountains. Supplies 
loaded on pallets were dropped by parachute from 
transport aircraft. A fleet of 50 C-130 aircraft 
provided by the US, the UK, France, Italy, Belgium and 
Germany carried out this task. German military 
aircraft operated in Turkish and Iranian airspace 
only, they did not fly over northern Iraq. In all 
other respects they cooperated with PROVIDE COMFORT. 
(Germany was not a formal coalition partner. ) 
Military air operations from Incirlik began on 8 April. 
These were aid-delivery and escort flights, plus Special 
Forces' CSAR operations. Fighter aircraft (A-10A 
THUNDERBOLT II and F-15 EAGLE) escorted the transport 
aircraft. Although the assessed risk of attack from 
Iraqi air defence forces was low precautions were still 
required. When, as often occurred, the cloud base was 
close to the altitude of the mountain peaks the fighters 
assisted the transports by finding gaps in the clouds. 
The larger aircraft used the gaps to identify their 
drop-zones. ' 
Other combat aircraft formed force packages in support 
of the air-delivery operation. Electronic Warfare (EW) 
support required a variety of systems. These were EF- 
111A SPARK VARK and EC-130 COMPASS CALL (jammers), F-4G 
WILD WEASELS (radar suppression and attack). Airborne 
surveillance assets coordinating the coalition air 
' Christopher Bellamy Expert Witness: A Defence Correspondent's Gulf War 1990-91 (London: Brassey's, 
1993) p 153. 
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effort included RC-135W RIVET JOINT (reporting of enemy 
air defence activity on the ground) and EC-3 SENTRY 
AWACS (airborne early warning of threats in the air). 
To provide additional accommodation for personnel at 
Incirlik and the airstrips at Diyarbakir and Batman 
closer to the border, military engineers constructed 
tent cities beside the runways. This activity was known 
as Operation PRIME BEEF. As soon as the tent city at 
Diyarbakir was built the Turkish military authorities 
fenced it off, using barbed wire. This was not a measure 
designed to protect the foreign troops so much as a 
measure to restrict their movements on-base and to 
prevent them from leaving the base. Moreover the Turks 
continued to use the air gunnery range situated less 
than 100 meters from the tent city sleeping area. With 
the noise of the firing, and the more distant noise of 
coalition aircraft landing and taking off, the air and 
ground crews involved in the round-the-clock aid 
delivery flying operations found it difficult to sleep 
by day. Bellamy recorded the following scene at 
Diyarbakir: 
On the airfield a tented town was springing up 
which reminded me of scenes from Henry V. Brown 
American and British olive-green tents mushroomed 
across the airfield. The American camp was still in 
some disorder, Half a mile on, the British camp had 
a Union Flag flying ... The following day the Union 
Flag had gone. The Turks, very particular about 
their sovereignty, had told them to take it down. 2 
The airdrops successfully delivered food and clothing to 
some of the DPs. But the delivery of supplies by 
parachute was haphazard: many of the two-ton pallets 
fell onto rocky areas inaccessible to the DPs, others 
fell onto the people themselves, causing injury. 
Flying 3,500 feet above the peaks the first drops 
from the transport aircraft landed amongst the 
DPs. Later the aircraft released their parachute 
loads so as to hit designated drop-zones (DZ) 
2 Ibid p 155. 
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twenty minutes walk from the centres of 
population in the valleys. 3 
Coalition commanders therefore decided to deploy troops 
in the passes, amongst the DPs. The mission of these 
units was to coordinate the air-drops and organise the 
DPs to ensure a fair distribution of supplies. Soldiers 
were also able to assist with first aid. On 9 April the 
US 10th Special Forces Group (two battalions) received 
the order to deploy into the mountain passes. On 16 
April the first SF arrived on site, at Isikveren. In due 
course these units established themselves in all the 
passes occupied by the DPs. 
US SF battalions operate in 12-man `A-teams', with 18 
such teams in a battalion. The 10th SF Group - of which 
one battalion was normally stationed at Bad Tolz, 
Germany and the other two battalions at Fort Devons, 
Massachusetts - was augmented for PROVIDE COMFORT by 
medics and linguists from the Army National Guard's 20th 
SF Group based in the US. The 10th SF Group personnel 
were joined - on 24 April - by the Winter Warfare Cadre 
of 40 Commando RM. 4 
Iraq condemned the airdrops as a violation of its 
sovereignty. On 8 April the Iraqi Permanent 
Representative at the UN wrote to the Secretary- 
General (S/22460) protesting that R 688 had followed R 
687 in condemning Iraq: `once again, in the course of 
48 hours, the Security Council has seen fit to adopt 
another tendentious and biased resolution against 
Iraq'. Foreign Minister Ahmet Hussein al-Khodair told 
the Secretary-General that the relief operation 
`proves the evil intentions of the US and the British 
towards Iraq' .5 The Iraqi prime minister Sadoon Hamadi 
promised that Iraq would resist with `all its means'. 6 
On 21 April the Iraqis informed the UN that `foreign 
3 Ibid p 151. 
See pp 229-230, below. 
'Aid Teams Struggle to Get Aid to Kurds' The Times 9 April 1991. 
6 Washington Post 18 April 1991. Hammadi, a Shia, was the chief casualty of the Baath Party's 10 
Congress in September 1991. He was replaced by another Shia, Mohammed Hamza Zubaydi. 
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forces' had entered Iraq illegally. There was also a 
statement from Soviet Foreign minister Vitaly Churkin 
that the imposition of the `haven' inside Iraq without 
the consent of the government was an `undesirable 
precedent'. As the operation proceeded, however, the 
' Soviet government ceased its critical comments. 
IRAN 
The Iranians excluded the international media from their 
border with Turkey. There were 1.5m refugees entering 
Iran (compared with the 500,000 DPs on the Turkish-Iraqi 
border. ) These refugees were concentrated in camps set 
up in Western Azerbaijan province and the area around 
Bakhtara. According to Iranian government reports to the 
UN (S/22447) by 4 April 110,000 Iraqis refugees had 
crossed into Iran and a further 500,000 were expected to 
cross in the next few days. There was a queue of people 
and vehicles at the border stretching back 60 Km into 
Iraq. On 8 April Iran updated its report (S/22463) 
giving the total of Iraqi refugees in Iran as 771,750. 
On 11 April a further Iranian report (S/22482) gave the 
total as 900,000. By 12 June the total number of Iraqi 
refugees in Iran was given as 539,000.8 The Iranians 
were later to complain that their efforts to alleviate 
the suffering of DPs from Iraq received little 
publicity, and minimal financial aid, from the West. On 
17 May 1991 UNDRO gave the following figures for aid: $ 
128.9m to Iran, $ 248m to Turkey (including $ 57m plus $ 
140m DoD contributions plus $ 31.6m from the Food for 
Peace programme. 9) 
The Iranians and the Turks had been cooperating 
quietly ever since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Their 
cooperation was further developed, immediately after 
the Gulf War, when Egypt, Syria and the six GCC states 
excluded Turkey and Iran from their collective 
consultations over security in the region. Another 
Entessar p 154. 
8 Sadruddin Agha Khan's 'Updated Appeal' sent to the Secretary-General and presented to the donor nations 
at Geneva on 12 June. 
9 Quoted in Sheri Laizer Martyrs. Traitors and Patriots: Kurdistan after the Gulf War (London: Zed Books, 
1996) p 25. 
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unifying factor was concern over Kurdish issues. Both 
states were adamant that Iraq's integrity had to be 
upheld; fragmentation would assist the cause of 
Kurdish nationalism and would destabilise the region. 
President Rafsanjani visited Turkey 29 April-2 May and 
signed a pipeline agreement. His visit was praised in 
Turkish government communiques, even though he refused 
to pay his respects at the Atatürk mausoleum. [All 
official visitors to Turkey are normally expected to 
lay a wreath at this memorial. ] 
TURKEY 
The Turks allowed the international media to view the 
scene at the border. Because of this access the media 
concentrated on the scene at the Turkish border even 
though there were many more DPs at the Iranian border. 
But the reports' emphasis was on Turkey's refusal to 
admit the DPs into Turkey: accusations of `an inadequate 
response from Turkey"° followed. Even after the Turkish 
authorities reversed their earlier decision and allowed 
the fugitives to cross into the immediate border area 
media reports were still largely critical of the conduct 
of Turkish troops and officials. " Attempts were made to 
put the Turkish government case. Bellamy reports an 
interview given by Hayri Koziakoglu, the Turkish 
super-governor of the south-east region, at Diyarbakir 
on 15 April. Koziakoglu insisted that the Turks were 
treating the `persons seeking asylum' humanely and 
drew attention to Turkey's record in providing shelter 
for many other refugee groups. He cited the presence 
of the recently-arrived Bulgarian and Romanian 
refugees in Turkey, the 300,000 Iranians as well as 
the `Iraqis' then receiving aid from Turkish agencies 
on the border. Bellamy and his fellow-journalists were 
then taken to Silopi to see the camp where 30,000 of 
the 300,000 Iraqi Kurds who had fled to Turkey in 1988 
were still accommodated. 12 (Koziakoglu was 
10 Briefing 6 May 1991 'Realism proves the keynote for Rafsanjani's visit'. 
11 Leonard Doyle The Independent 4 May 1991. 
12 Bellamy p 155-6. 
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replaced later that year by Necati Cetinkaya13, the 
governor of Konya. ) 
Following reports critical of the Turks' conduct 
towards the DPs Robert Fisk of The Independent and all 
other Independent journalists were ordered to leave 
Turkey. " Robert Fox of The Daily Telegraph was also 
expelled because he was mistaken for Fisk. " The 
British Government later denied the truth of Fisk's 
report. These criticisms were relayed to the Turkish 
public through their own media. 16 Media reports told of 
Turkish troops' brutal conduct towards the DPs and 
pillaging supplies intended for them. A leading 
Turkish newspaper commented: 
Countries which have not offered shelter to even 
one displaced Iraqi [sic] are now slandering Turkey 
and the Turkish people. What is most regrettable is 
that the accusations come from countries friendly 
to Turkey. May God protect us from such 
friends ... ' 
17 
Turks also objected to the alleged `subliminal' bias 
of US media news reports: the publication of maps and 
TV graphics showing a region called `Kurdistan' 
spanning the border areas of Turkey, Iraq and Iran. 
Turkey accused Iraq, furthermore, of instigating the 
flight of Iraqi Kurds so that it would be rid of an 
unwanted minority. '8 
Later, on 1 May, a confrontation between British troops 
and a Turkish official caused further Turkish protests. '9 
The Guardian described an incident when British Royal 
Marines supervising a kitchen supplying DPs in a 
13 A close colleague of the central figure coordinating the counter-terrorist campaign, Onal Erkan. Erkan is, 
like Koziacoglu a former MIT officer but with reputed associations with the ultra-Right 'Grey Wolves' death- 
squads. Laizer Martyrs p 75. 
14 'Turkish Troops Steal Food and Blankets from Refugees' Independent 30 April 1991. 
1s Bellamy p 158. 
16 Bulloch and Morris 'No Friends' p 31. 
17 Phil Reeves The Independent 16 April 1991. 
is Clyde Haberman The New York Times 12 April 1991. 
19 'Ankara Fed Up' Turkish Daily News 4-5 May 1991. 'Relief Delayed Amid Turkish Resentment' The 
Guardian 4 May 1991. 
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mountain valley `manhandled' the deputy provincial 
governor who was inspecting conditions there. The 
British said the official had not identified himself. 
The Turkish press exploded. A normally pro-western 
correspondent, Haluk Sahin, writing in Gunes: 
it was Britain which had sought to divide the 
Middle East and [was] thus the root of all evil in 
the region, that it was London which had always 
kept the Kurdish issue on he agenda, that the 
architect of the Treaty of Sevres was none other 
than the UK ... and that the strongest criticisms and 
claims as regards the treatment of refugees had 
emerged in the British press. ' 
[This was the view of a Western-orientated columnist. 
The terms used in the popular dailies, Turkiiye and 
Zaman were more severe. 20] Eventually the row subsided 
but bad feelings remained on both sides. Much later, 
when the coalition forces prepared to withdraw from 
northern Iraq, the Turkish press reported British 
troops' disparaging remarks about the quality of Turkish 
forces. These reports were publicised in the Turkish 
press. 21 
The sensitivity of the Turkish authorities over media 
criticism further hindered the distribution of relief 
aid. Turkish officials reacted by ordering Customs 
officials to examine relief stores arriving in Turkey. 
When PROVIDE COMFORT's ground combat forces began to 
arrive in Iraq, the incoming military equipment was 
examined with equal care. 22 The coalition forces were 
required to submit multiple inventories, with each 
item identified by serial number. With a force of 
22,000 men with all their military equipment this was 
a daunting task, made worse by the requirement that 
all who had entered Turkey in or with a vehicles had 
to exit in, or with, the same vehicle at the end of 
the operation. This was to allow Turkish Customs to 
20 Briefing 6 May 1991 'Semdinli row highlights doubts over foreign troops'. 
21 Briefing 8 July 1991 'Poised Hammer plan meets sceptical public reaction'. 
22 This problem was most acute at the ports of Mersin and Iskanderun and at the airstrip at Diyarbakir. See 
John Murray Brown The Independent 10 April 1991. 
229 
check that `no equipment had been left behind'. 
Restrictions on air movements have been described in 
Chapter 8. The actions taken by officials can be 
attributed, in part, to the central and provincial 
authorities' unwillingness to compromise when faced 
with unusual situations. The tradition of public 
service in Turkey is one of rigid obedience, not 
flexibility. The coalition military forces and the aid 
agencies, intent on the humanitarian task, could not 
understand the officials' desire to follow 
regulations. They did not appreciate the Turks' 
`sovereignty' concerns. 
The Turks insisted on negotiating a new, and more 
restrictive, MOU in respect of the additional US, and 
non-US personnel, present for the duration of PROVIDE 
COMFORT. By insisting on a new MOU the government showed 
its own people that it was exercising Turkish 
sovereignty. In the event the new MOU was never signed. 
PROVIDE COMFORT came to an end before the negotiations 
were concluded. 
THE OPERATION 
The airdrop operation built up quickly. By 23 April 875 
airdrops had taken place and a total of 5,915 tonnes of 
supplies had been delivered. 23 By 26 April US aid 
amounted to $ 500m. 24 
International aid agencies played a major part in 
relieving the crisis, providing most of the 600 tonnes 
(average) of supplies delivered by air per day in the 
period 19 April -5 May. When the coalition ground 
forces moved into northern Iraq the aid agencies 
immediately followed. Although the 500 aid agencies 
present were making a great contribution they were not 
willing to coordinate their efforts, despite UNHCR 
officials requests. They valued their independence and 
needed to publicise their own achievements to the media 
to maintain donations from the public. Furthermore, 
23 Freedman and Boren p 51. 
24 Sandra Charles, Director Near East and South Asia Affairs, NSC. Reported by USIA 29 April 1991. 
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awkward relations between the military and the aid 
agencies caused concern. Gen Shalikashvili attributed 
this to mutual misperceptions. 25 With the arrival of the 
US Army Civil Affairs units in May, however, relations 
between the military and the aid agencies improved 
quickly. 26 
By the end of the operation some aid workers were 
prepared to praise the military for their contribution. 
Ronald Roome (CARE): 
What was incredible to me was how the military set 
up all the detailed and complicated systems at such 




The first method of delivering relief supplies to the 
people in the mountains was by parachute air-drop. When 
the SF teams were in place in the mountains it became 
possible to use helicopters and to make up consignments 
according to need, not just in `standard loads'. 28 
Locally-purchased bulk food29, cooking utensils and 
firewood, shovels (for burying the dead), specialist 
medical supplies and materials for building latrines 
replaced loads of MREs and plastic sheeting. 
The limited payload of the helicopters made these air- 
delivery methods expensive. Coalition logisticians 
wanted to replace both methods of air delivery with 
deliveries by truck as soon as possible. As soon as the 
SF teams established secure storage facilities in the 
mountain passes it became possible to deliver bulk food 
by truck and then break it down into family ration 
allotments in situ. Due to international sanctions 
against Iraq Turkey's large national fleet of trucks was 
25 Source :a succession of interviews with the author throughout the operation. 
26 UNHCR's problem in coordinating the work of many aid agencies was repeated In Bosnia. As a result the 
UN established its Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in April 1992, specifically as a coordinator of 
relief efforts. (The DHA has been faced, in its turn, with the reluctance of the aid agencies to submit to any 
form of coordination. ) 
27 Bolger p 258. 
28 Helicopters delivered supplies from Diyarbakir, and with a forward refuelling bases at Silopi and 
Yuksekova (both in Turkey). These were UH-60 BLACKHAWK, CH-53 SEA STALLION, CH-46E FROG, CH- 
47 CHINOOK and SUPER-PUMA helicopters from the US, the UK, Italy and France. 
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underemployed. 30 The aid agencies hired trucks with 
drivers to transport loads from central or western 
Anatolia31 to the border region for US$ 1000 for the 
round trip. By 25 April coalition trucking contracts had 
produced the first deliveries of supplies by road. By 
mid May 90% of all relief supplies were delivered by 
truck. 
As well as supplying the DPs the coalition states had 
also to supply their own forces. The quantities of 
gasoline and stores consumed were prodigious. The 
military logistic base was established at Silopi on the 
border. Commanded by Col (shortly afterwards Brigadier 
General) Harold E Burch, US Army, this base was the 
centre piece of the sustainment of the military force. 32 
Its success depended on state-of-the-art long distance 
communications. At the height of the operation in 
northern Iraq the base at Silopi required communications 
facilities capable of handling the equivalent of 10,000 
long distance telephone calls per week. 
After the immediate danger of mass starvation had been 
averted the death-rate amongst the DPs began to rise 
due to disease. 
There are sometimes up to 40 people living under 
the same tent but these are not even tents, they 
are stretched blankets. People are too ashamed to 
relieve themselves during the day so they do it at 
night-time, between the tents. There is no hygiene 
anywhere. Every day 20 children are buried between 
the tents. Older people are dying too, so are the 
younger adults. They are dying even as I speak and 
one doctor serves 100,000 people. 33 
-' Rice, oil, vegetables, meat (lamb), flour, tomato paste, tea and sugar. 
30 John Murray Brown Financial Times 10 April 1991. 
31 The local economy in south east Anatolia could not provide the extra food required by the DPs. 
32 The non-US allies also had specialist requirements ranging from the preferred rations of the different 
nationalities to the spares required to maintain national equipments. The UK contingent drew stores from an 
RFA supply ship anchored off the Turkish coast. 
33 Dr Gerard Salerio of Medecins du Monde. Reported by George Church Time 22 April 1991. 
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The insanitary conditions caused widespread diarrhoea 
and thereby dehydration. Before long medical staff 
reported the first cases of typhoid, and then of 
cholera. On 15 April reported deaths amongst the DPs had 
fallen to 50 per day. By 25 April there were 200 DP 
deaths per day. " Military engineers piped clean water to 
the mountain areas to avert the danger of epidemic. 
THE SAFE HAVENS 
DEPLOYMENT AND PLANNING 
On 8 April, anticipating future requirements, HQ USEUCOM 
had assigned the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), 
US Marine Corps, 35 to PROVIDE COMFORT. Accordingly the 
Marines moved by sea from their exercise area near 
Sardinia. 36 Two companies of men from the 2/8 BLT 
(Reinforced) 3' arrived by helicopter at Silopi on 15 
April. USEUCOM also assigned the USS Theodore Roosevelt 
(CVN-71) then in the Red Sea, to join Operation PROVIDE 
COMFORT. The carrier battlegroup joined the command on 
20 April. 38 
On 16 April USEUCOM appointed Lieutenant General John M 
Shalikashvili US Army, deputy CINC US Army Europe, as 
commander PROVIDE COMFORT. Major General James Jamerson 
US Air Force became his deputy. Major General Jay Garner 
US Army, the deputy commander of US Army's V Corps in 
Germany, was appointed as the senior subordinate ground 
forces commander. General Garner took command of all 
ground forces assigned to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, 
including 3 Command Brigade RM. (The detachments of SF 
and the Mountain Warfare Cadre of 40 Commando formed a 
separate subordinate command, Task Force ALFA, under 
Brigadier General Potter's command. These units were 
already at work in the mountains. ) The Dutch contingent, 
34 Author's own record of events. 
's A MEU is an amphibious force, embarked in specialist shipping. It comprises a marine Infantry 'battalion 
landing team' (BLT) with organic reconnaissance, artillery and engineers and with Its own support helicopter 
force (4 CH-53,12 CH-46). The 24th MEU is designated 'Special Operations Capable' (SOC). In June the 24th 
MEU's deployment to the European theatre was completed. It was replaced in situ by the 27th MEU. 
96 With the rest of the US 6th Fleet Marine Amphibious Readiness Group (MARG). 
37 218 BLT was commanded by LTC Tony Corwin. 
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1 ASG (Amphibious Combat Group), the French Seme 
batallion paramarine and the Italian special forces 
battalion from the Folgore Brigade arrived shortly 
afterwards. Other national contingents continued to 
arrive throughout the operation. On 17 April General 
Shalikashvili activated these units (Task Force Bravo) 
under General Garner's command. 
HQ USEUCOM then handed a mission to Lt Gen 
Shalikashvili: 
Combined Task Force PROVIDE COMFORT conducts 
multinational humanitarian operations to provide 
immediate relief to displaced Iraqi civilians until 
international relief agencies and private voluntary 
organisations can assume overall supervision. 
The mission therefore had three parts: 
" provide humanitarian relief to the DPs in northern 
Iraq 
" handover the relief work to the UN and the aid 
agencies as soon as possible 
" `redeploy' the coalition forces to their home bases. 
Gen Shalikashvili's concept of operations first required 
the delivery of aid by air and truck to the mountains. 
At the same time troops would start to build a safe area 
on lower ground to the south. When the DPs had recovered 
sufficiently they would be encouraged to move to the 
safe area (in the foothills) and thereafter travel to 
their own homes. 39 The forces would then hand over the 
operation to civilian agencies and return to base. 
IMPOSING THE SECURITY ZONE 
As the Turks would not allow the DPs to take refuge in 
Turkey the coalition's objective was to persuade and 
facilitate the people to return to their own homes in 
northern Iraq. The DPs, for their part, insisted on 
security guarantees before they would return to Iraq. On 
38 The USS Theodore Roosevelt remained assigned to PROVIDE COMFORT until June when her role was 
taken over by the USS Forresfat. 
39 Cushman p 81. 
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18 April, therefore, the coalition announced the 
intention to create a `security zone', cleared of all 
Iraqi ground forces, and build tented camps to house the 
DPs until they were ready and able to return to their 
homes. The first plan was for the creation of six 
`zones of protection', each designed to accommodate 
60,000 DPs. Later the plan was modified to the 
creation of three tented camps near Zakho, each 
designed to accommodate 20,000 DPs. 40 
Coalition leaders were concerned that the intervention 
should not be seen as a partisan intervention to assist 
a Kurdish revolt. US officials expressed the hope that 
the rebels would not use the areas protected by 
coalition forces as bases from which to conduct raids 
against Iraqi units: 
We are hoping that based on the mandate of [R 6881 
that all sides would abide by this humanitarian 
aspect, the Iraqi government as well as the Kurdish 
rebels that may be operating in the sector. 41 
ZAKHO 
The town of Zakho, the centre of population in the 
security zone, normally has a population of 50% Kurd, 
50% Iraqi Arab. Two battalions of Iraqi mechanised 
infantry42 supported by several hundred policemen, 
including some members of the Iraqi secret police formed 
the garrison. 
Coalition commanders believed that there were then the 
equivalent of five Iraqi divisions, and other units, in 
northern Iraq. These were later identified as the 10th, 
33rd, 44th and 54th Divisions plus three independent 
brigades, the 66th (Republican Guard), the 121st and the 
701st. Great efforts were made to assess the threat 
posed by these units to the coalition forces in Iraq. 
40 In the event only two camps were built. The second was never fully occupied. 
41 White House Deputy Press Secretary Roman Popadiuk, quoted in USIA 18 April 1991. Also Middle East 
International 19 April 1991. Interview with Major General Robin Ross, Commander, British Forces PROVIDE 
COMFORT. 


































Coalition commanders were keen to establish contact with 
the Iraqi military authorities. They therefore set up a 
liaison unit to conduct regular meetings with Iraqi 
military representatives to warn the Iraqis of any 
coalition action they might misinterpret (such as 
practice firing of artillery). The liaison officers 
would also coordinate joint action in the event of 
clashes between coalition forces and Iraqi units. After 
a while this liaison activity was formalised into a 
`military mission' tasked with liaison with the Iraqis. 
The Chief of the Military Coordination Centre (MCC) was 
Colonel Dick Naab, formerly Chief, US Mission to 
Headquarters The Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. As 
soon as the MCC was organised as a military mission 
British and French officers were assigned to it. Turkish 
officers were excluded from the MCC until Op PROVIDE 
COMFORT was reconfigured in mid-July. " 
On 19 April Gen Shalikashvili met Brigadier General 
Nashwan Danoon in Zakho and demanded that Iraqi forces 
should withdraw to a distance of 30 km from Zakho within 
48 hours. " This 30 km circle was called the `security 
zone'. 45 Nashwan asked for time to consult his 
superiors. 46 The following morning US Marines landed on 
the outskirts of Zakho. On 22 April, Maj Gen Garner 
entered the town and ordered the Iraqis to withdraw. 
45 Commando RM, reinforced by two companies of Royal 
Netherlands marines, occupied the town. 2/8 BLT of 
24th MEU followed soon afterwards. 
" Turkish officers viewed their exclusion with concern. See p 240, below. Source: author's conversations 
with Turkish officers during the operation. 
44 According to Bellamy, p 150, coalition forces' observation of Iraqi military actions during and after the 
Kurdish and Shia revolts led to intelligence assessments that the Iraqis had retained 800 tanks (according to 
Brown and Shukman, p 180,3700 out of a pre-Gulf War total of 4280) and 800 artillery pieces (according to 
Brown and Shukman, p 180.2600 out of a pre Gulf War total of 3110). 
's The 30 km circle covered the Zakho plain, to the east of the town, where the camps were to be built. It also 
covered the roads to the north-east leading to the passes where the DPs were located. Later coalition 
demarches extended the exclusion zone to the east to a distance of 150 km, creating a lozenge-shaped zone 
which covered all the passes occupied by DPs and the'green' routes running south, and west from them. 
i5 Nashwan continued to act as the regime's chief liaison officer with PROVIDE COMFORT until early June. 



















The Iraqi forces obeyed the order to withdraw but 200 
members of the Iraqi secret police (the Amn-al-Amm") 
remained behind in the town. 
On 24th after several incidents, coalition commanders 
ordered the secret police to remove themselves from 
Zakho. They allowed 50 `ordinary' policemen to remain in 
town, operating under coalition military supervision. 48 
Having secured Zakho, the home of many of the DPs in the 
mountains, coalition engineers began to build tented 
camps outside the town. Several concurrent actions were 
then in progress: the delivery of supplies to the 
mountain passes, the building of the tented camps and a 
public information campaign to persuade the DPs in the 
mountains to return to Zakho, or to their own villages. 
Engineers began clearing the roads south from the 
mountain passes and stockpiling petrol and spares for 
the thousands of vehicles abandoned by the DPs on their 
flight north. Finally coalition forces extended the 
security zone from Zakho in the extreme north west, 
eastwards to cover the foothills and the routes leading 
south from the mountain passes. Coalition spokesmen (and 
troops on the ground) called these the `green routes'. 
At UN briefings these `green routes' established, manned 
and protected by coalition forces, were invariably 
described as `blue routes' to imply that the UN (the 
`blue' organisation) had set up these safe corridors. 
Such claims irritated coalition personnel. Indeed there 
was always a measure of friction between UN and 
coalition leaders on the ground when UN spokesmen 
claimed the credit for actions taken by coalition 
forces. 
PKK units under the command of a `General Ali' in the 
area of Quasrok obstructed the route to be taken by the 
DPs from the mountains to Zakho99. A US Marine commander 
" The secret police organisation in Iraq was then commanded by Brigadier Omar Khartib, like Saddam 
Hussein a member of the al-Tikriti clan. Saddam's nickname for this man Is reputed to be 'Al Muz'abib' (the 
Tormentor). The secret police is not to be confused with the Iraqi counter-intelligence service, the Mukharabat, 
then commanded by Brigadier Hassan Rahmani. Source: author's own record. 
19 This reduced police presence was allowed to remain in Zakho at the request of the Iraqi representative to 
the United Nations, Abdul Amir al-Anbari on 25 April. Coalition commanders decided that a token force of Iraqi 
police (not secret police) would be helpful In maintaining order. 
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persuaded the PKK to allow the DPs' transit. Even with 
this successful negotiation completed the escorting of 
the DPs south from the mountains was a massive 
operation. The routes south from the mountain passes 
were blocked by thousands of abandoned vehicles. The 
troops assigned to escort the DPs south opened the 
routes, assisted with mechanical repair, refuelled (or 
removed) broken-down or abandoned vehicles, provided 
transport for the feeble, as well as food, water and 
medical aid. At many `way-stations' on the `green 
routes' troops worked for six weeks on escort duty. 
Lieutenant King, of 40 Commando, later wrote of his 
experiences at Kani Masi, a track junction chosen as the 
site of a way-station. 
We began in Kani Masi where we set up a way station 
just 10 miles from the Turkish border.... Over 
210,000 [DPs] moved through our location. We 
subsequently fed, watered and transported 100,000 
of these to their homes, in 3000 truck loads. The 
refugee camp around us grew from 200 to 29,000 in a 
period of four weeks.... Over 10,000 [DPs] were 
treated [by our medical staff]. The majority of 
patients were under 4 years of age mostly suffering 
from malnutrition but included problems varying 
from cholera to gunshot wounds. 5° 
EXTENDING THE SECURITY ZONE TO THE EAST 
In addition to 24th MEU, 45 Commando RM and the 
Netherlands marines in Zakho Maj Gen Garner had under 
command the newly arrived 3-325 Airborne Combat Team 
(ACT) US Army51, a unit of US Navy SEALS, 40 Commando RM 
and the Brigade troops of 3 Commando Brigade RM, a 
Spanish parachute battalion, an Italian SF battalion and 
a battalion of French marine infantry. 52 Amongst the 
`° PKK activity in the border area increased as soon as the coalition established Its security zone. Three 
senior Turkish officials were assassinated in Sohal on 28 April. The PKK also intensified its propaganda 
attacks on Talabani and Barzani, accusing them of collaboration with Turkey. 
S0 Lt DCM King RM 'Crisis, What Crisis ? 'The Globe and Laurel September/October 1991 p 278. 
sl A parachute-trained battalion group of 1100 men, with an organic artillery field battery and a fleet of 
wheeled vehicles sufficient to carry the whole unit in a single lift. The commander of the 3-325 was Lt Col John 
P Abizaid. US Army. 
52 A seasoned observer, retired Lt Gen Cushman has noted the unusual cooperation between the units of the 
US Army, Marines and Air Force on PROVIDE COMFORT. Under normal circumstances, even on active 
service, inter-Service rivalry shows itself In doctrinal wrangling, if not in other forms. There was almost none of 
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supporting troops was an Italian field hospital. Maj Gen 
Garner re-ordered his command as follows. He transferred 
40 Commando to Task Force Alfa (Brigadier General 
Potter), the SF group operating in the passes. 53 He 
replaced 40 Commando in Zakho with 2/8 BLT from 24th 
MEU, supported by a 250-strong US Army military police 
unit. He placed the Italian SF battalion under command 3 
Commando Brigade and gave orders that the brigade should 
prepare to extend the security zone eastwards by 
occupying the villages of Batufa, Sirsenk, Al-Amadiyah 
and Suri, the last being the farthest to the east, 120 
km from Zakho. These operations were carried out by 
helicopter. In order to provide additional surveillance 
to the south Task Force Bravo covertly deployed the SEAL 
units to concealed observation posts south of Dohuk, in 
territory occupied by Iraqi forces. Batufa (Netherlands 
marines) was secured on 27 April, Sirsenk (3-325 ACT) on 
2 May and Al-Amadiyah (45 Commando) on 3 May. The French 
marines, with an Italian SF platoon under command, 
occupied Suri on 8 May. 
The security operations on the ground were supported at 
all times by coalition air forces. The US air forces 
comprised two fighter wings and the air wing embarked on 
the carrier in Turkish waters in the eastern 
Mediterranean. These units were supported by UK 
(JAGUAR)54, French (MIRAGE 2000) and Italian combat 
aircraft based in Incirlik. The 4th (Aviation) Brigade, 
3rd Division US Army provided additional combat air 
support with its 18 APACHE attack helicopters. 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CAMPS 
The military engineer contingent in Operation PROVIDE 
COMFORT comprised the (US) 18th Engineer Brigade, 
SEEBEES55, a USAF ordnance clearance unit as well as 
this on PROVIDE COMFORT. Cushman also marvels at the informality of the command and control 
arrangements between the US commander and the coalition contingents. No MOUs were negotiated - 
Shalikashvili's orders were carried out without concern for legal forms. Cushman p 82. 
" 40 Commando's task would be to escort the DPs on their routes south from the passes to the tented camps 
being built at Zakho or to the other villages in the security zone. 
" The JAGUAR detachment joined PROVIDE COMFORT in July, after several false starts. 
55 These were detachments from the 133rd SEEBEE Battalion and the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 
113, both based at Rota, Spain. 
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British, Dutch and French field engineers. The commander 
of 18th Brigade (Colonel A Winsor) took on the task of 
coordinating the construction project for the tented 
camps at Zakho. 
In less than 2 months these engineers built two camp S56 
with a total capacity of 40,000. Other tasks included 
the handling of heavy containers at the port of 
Iskanderun and ordnance disposal throughout the security 
zone. 57 Engineers also renovated the airfield at Sirsenk, 
60 km east of Zakho. 
DOHUK 
The first 250 DPs made their way from the mountain 
passes towards Zakho, arriving on 27 April. 58 By 3 May 
4000 DPs were resting in the first camp at Zakho and 
perhaps 80,000 had made their way direct to villages and 
towns elsewhere in the security zone. Between 200,000 
and 300,000 still remained in the mountains. As many of 
these people intended to return the town of Dohuk 
coalition commanders decided to extend the security zone 
southwards, to include Dohuk, without further delay. 
It became clear, however, that the Iraqis were unwilling 
to withdraw their forces from Dohuk, a regional capital 
and a town with a substantial Arab population. It was 
assessed that a coalition occupation of Dohuk might 
provoke an Iraqi attack on coalition forces. 
The remaining Iraqi offensive military capability was of 
great concern to coalition commanders. They estimated 
that there were three full-strength Iraqi army divisions 
and one Republican Guard brigade in the region (out of a 
total of five divisions assessed to be in the north of 
the country. ) 
56 Several authors refer to 'six zones' or 'six camps' (Freedman and Boren p 54-58). The 'six camps' plan 
existed only in the pre-deployment phase of planning. From 20 April the coalition considered the security zone 
as one entity and only constructed two camps, both outside Zakho. By the end of Operation PROVIDE 
COMFORT (1) these camps had assisted 250,000 DPs as they passed through. Bolger p 258. 
67 By agreement in the MCC the Iraqis provided engineers to clear ordnance in northern Iraq, under coalition 
supervision. 
59 John Sweeney The Independent 28 April 1991. 
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The Iraqi capability in weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) caused particular concern. On 18 April Iraq had 
ratified the Biological Weapons Convention declaring 
that Iraq `did not possess any WMD or related devices'. 59 
Nevertheless this concern constrained the coalition 
military activities in northern Iraq throughout PROVIDE 
COMFORT, even though commanders never took the step of 
immunising troops, as they had during the air war phase 
of the Gulf War. 
Coalition ground force units were light troops, with 
minimal combat support. Air support depended on bases 
hundreds of miles to the west. 60 Ground force units were, 
furthermore, dispersed (to reassure civilians), not 
concentrated for combat. Furthermore the posture of 
nearby Iraqi forces posed the threat of an infiltration 
attack on coalition positions, especially at night. If 
such an attack had closed with coalition infantry, 
coalition air forces would have had difficulty in 
supporting their own ground forces. Coalition 
governments were unwilling to consider retaliatory air 
strikes on Iraqi targets of value elsewhere in the 
country as a deterrent to, or punishment for, an attack 
on their ground forces in the security zone: they 
perceived a risk of re-starting the Gulf War. 
On 5 May coalition forces confronted Iraqi units on the 
high ground 5km to the north of Dohuk. On 7 May an all- 
night planning session in HQ Operation PROVIDE COMFORT 
considered the need urgently to concentrate coalition 
forces in the security zone to withstand an Iraqi 
attack. The indications were evenly balanced. Some 
pointed to an imminent attack. Others suggested that 
Iraqi commanders were still weighing their options. 
Coalition commanders were reluctant to order a 
concentration in case the troops' movements alarmed 
civilians. A scare might cause another migration to the 
59 Quoted in Tucker p 251. 
60 The air support problem was in the resupply of 'weapons' for use in air operations. Whereas aircraft could 
refuel using AAR they could not re-arm without returning to base many miles away. 
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mountains. On 13 May coalition forces identified patrols 
of the Iraq's 66th Special Forces brigade and elements 
of the Iraqi armoured units present in the area. 
Republican Guard tanks were detected moving into Dohuk 
from the south. 
The Dohuk operation paused while political discussions 
continued in capitals. Reporters soon recorded coalition 
troops' impatience at the delay in `taking Dohuk'. In 
meetings at the MCC the Iragis61 negotiated with greater 
and greater confidence. Despite the assessed risk 
coalition forces remained dispersed. on 20 May the 
Iraqis agreed to withdraw their forces and secret police 
from Dohuk. The coalition agreed that only non-combat 
coalition troops would enter when they left. These 
troops would provide reassurance for Kurds intending to 
return. They would also would repair municipal 
facilities. Days later the final Kurdish exodus from the 
mountains via the `green routes' and way-stations began; 
all the DPs had left the passes by 6 June. 62 The non- 
combat coalition troops remained in Dohuk till 20 June. 
To summarise the movement of the DPs from the mountains 
to their homes the UNHCR recorded the numbers of persons 
receiving aid on 12 May, 20 May and 6 June: 
Location 12 May 20 May 6 June 
Isikveren & Kayadibi 1000 0 0 
Yekmal 60,000 12,000 0 
Umzulu 28,000 6,600 0 
Cucura 100,000 78,000 0 
Narli Bridge 19,750 0 0 
Pirinciken 3,500 0 0 
Semdinli & Yesilova 15,000 6,500 5,200 
Aoma Kopru 5,000 0 0 
On 6 June there remained 13,400 DPs unwillina to 
return home. These were concentrated at Semdinli and 
Silopi. 
HANDOVER TO THE UN AND THE AID AGENCIES 
61 Under the auspices of the MCC. 
Lt Col GL Kerr'Operation HAVEN' Journal of the Royal Artillery Vol CXIX March 1992, pp 12-23. 
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On 15 April the UN representatives, Sadruddin Aga Khan 
and Eric Suy, received a clear signal that Iraq would 
consent to the UN humanitarian plan. Sadruddin signed a 
`memorandum of understanding' (MOU) on 18th. This 21- 
point agreement allowed 100 UN civilian staff to enter 
the country and coordinate aid agencies' relief 
activities wherever they were required. 63 From that point 
on the UN was committed to a consensual approach in its 
humanitarian work in Iraq. The coalition, in contrast, 
acted despite Iraq's objections but relied, in part, on 
the UN to take over their activities when they chose it 
right to terminate their operation and depart. 
PROVIDE COMFORT's mission foresaw a transfer of 
responsibility for the `safe havens' tented camps from 
the military to the UN just as soon as the UN (and the 
aid agencies) were willing and able to administer them 
effectively. On 19 April, White House spokesman Marlin 
Fitzwater had said: 
The UNHCR is preparing to take over the camps and 
to run them. They are getting the necessary 
assurances from Iraq. Our troops are in there now 
surveying sites and getting ready to build the 
camps... the US, British and French personnel will 
be involved in helping to run them and get them 
established. Iraq essentially has agreed to all of 
that and not to interrupt in any way. 64 
It was understood that there would be a 
period when the UN controlled the camps 
coalition continued to provide security 
workers and the DPs. Nonetheless the UN 
camps would mark the high-water mark in 




for the aid 
take-over of the 
the military 
)uld return to 
Most of the coalition states had been reluctant to 
commit their forces to the intervention operation. For 
63 For details of the 'framework' (and later MOU), see pp 217-219 above. 
64 White House report 19 April, USIA 22 April 1991. 
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the same reasons they looked ahead to the `end-game': 
the return of their forces after the accomplishment of 
the mission. The coalition's `exit strategy' required 
the following: a handover of humanitarian activities to 
UNHCR and the aid agencies and the handover of the 
security activities to some other international force. 
Commanders wanted to transfer responsibility for 
humanitarian relief just as soon as the UN and the aid 
agencies would take them over. But the aid agencies made 
it clear that they would withdraw their workers - and 
cease their relief work - when the military protection 
was withdrawn. The Kurds also made it clear that they 
would be ready to flee again to the border if there was 
no protection for them from the Iraqis. So the coalition 
states and the UN set about forming a replacement 
security force to protect the aid workers and reassure 
the former DPs. 
As described above65 the UN Secretariat was reluctant to 
take responsibility for any part in the intervention 
operation. First, there appeared to be no likelihood of 
the Security Council going beyond the limited mandate of 
R 688. There was therefore a question over the legality 
of any intervention enacted without Iraqi consent. 
Second, the Iraqis might have seen the UN's taking over 
on the work of PROVIDE COMFORT as endorsement of the 
forcible intervention. They might have refused to allow 
the aid agencies' humanitarian efforts in the south. 
Their consent would also be needed for humanitarian work 
in the north after the military intervention there came 
to an end. In order to achieve effective and lasting 
relief efforts throughout the country, therefore, the UN 
preferred to seek Iraq's agreement, even if this brought 
constraints on its activities. To obtain that consent 
the Secretariat and the aid agencies distanced 
themselves from the coalition's forcible, limited- 
duration, action in the north. 
The `other international force' which would continue to 
protect the Kurds and the aid agencies was to be the `UN 
Guards'. This was a British proposal. The Secretariat 
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raised two early objections. The first was the mandate: 
officials saw no likelihood of a new Security Council 
resolution authorising such a deployment. There was also 
concern that the cost of such a force should not fall on 
the already overstretched UN budget. Later the 
Secretariat found a precedent for a deployment of peace- 
keepers without an authorising resolution66 and obtained 
agreement that the costs of their operations would be 
met by a special fund. 67 Iraq agreed to admit the Guards, 
but only after it had secured concessions on the 
operations of that unit. 
The UNHCR, although involved in northern Iraq from the 
outset, was unwilling to assume responsibility for the 
`safe haven' tented camps as early as coalition states 
would have wished. This approach was determined first by 
the reluctance of the other aid agencies to accept 
`coordination' of their efforts and second by the 
concern that responsibility would bring additional 
financial burdens to UNHCR itself. 68 Finance was a 
persistent problem: Sadruddin Aga Khan's appeal for 
funds - updated on 12 June - struggled to achieve its 
targets. By 1 May the UN had only received $ 185m of 
the $ 414m - the budget for the first 4 months - it 
had been seeking since the launch of its appeal on 11 
April. Mrs Ogato warned: 
At a time when governments are urging the United 
Nations to take over and coordinate an emergency 
aid programme of such dimensions it is vital that 
adequate resources be put at our disposal... . If 
further special allocations are not made 
immediately the entire humanitarian effort will 
be in dire jeopardy. 69 
The UNHCR was also reluctant to take full charge of the 
tented camps because it did not have the management in 
65 See pp 219-221, above. 
66 In 1964 the UN had deployed a 35-strong contingent of CIVPOL as an additional element of the existing 
UNIFCYP by the authority of the Secretary-General. There was no Security Council formal endorsement in a 
Resolution. This decision had never been challenged. 
67 Senior former UKMis official. 
68 UNHCR's full-time chief representative in Iraq was Mr Stefan di Misura. His subordinate at Incirlik was 
Miss Isumi Kawasaki. Another UN important official in Iraq was Mr Max van der Stoel, the Special Rapporteur 
on Human Rights. 
0 Staff Dispatches International Herald Tribune 4-5 May 1991. 
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place to run the operation effectively. The aid 
agencies, loosely coordinated by UNHCR, took charge of 
the distribution of food in the camps from 6 May. 
Provision of supplies and services remained a military 
responsibility till 7 June. 
At this time, in accordance with the MOU, UNHCR aid 
workers and `international volunteers' began to enter 
Iraq, through Baghdad. UN officials appeared content to 
see the military and the aid agencies continue to take 
the lead in the humanitarian tasks - and to continue to 
bear the costs of those tasks. 
The military, for their part, were increasingly aware of 
the contradictions between the forcible intervention 
policy taken by the coalition in the north and the 
consensual policy taken by the UN elsewhere in Iraq. 
They wondered if the UN would ever be able to take 
charge of both initiatives. Coalition commanders were 
also concerned about the expense of the operation to 
their military budgets. 70 Another concern was fatigue 
amongst the troops: many of the non-combat troops 
involved had been on detachment since their deployment 
for the Gulf War71 the previous autumn. 
In the coalition there was also concern over the 
attitude of the Kurds. Kurdish leaders clearly wanted to 
delay the departure of the coalition forces until they 
had secured Iraqi agreement on some form of autonomy. In 
the shorter term Kurdish clans and families made it 
clear that they had no confidence in the protection 
offered by any civilians - including `UN guards' - 
against the Iraqi security forces and secret police. 
Many Kurds refused to move south from Zakho while the 
Iraqis were able to threaten their intended routes and 
destinations. 
'° A support helicopter costs on average £ 4000 an hour in the air. But commanders were not only concerned 
about financial cost. Many coalition equipments, especially the support helicopters, were overdue on 
maintenance. Helicopter unit commanders estimated that the consumption of spares resulting from the high 
altitude flying with heavy on-board loads would mean minimal flying training for their units on return to base, for 
the following two years. 
71 In contrast few of the ground combat force units employed in PROVIDE COMFORT had taken part In 
DESERT STORM. 
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While these negotiations continued the first `guards' 
arrived in Baghdad on 3 May and began training. These 
men had been recruited from among the uniformed 
employees of the UN in Geneva: they were normally 
responsible for the security of the UN Palais des 
Nations building. Others later joined from elsewhere. 
Some had previous military or police experience but they 
came together for the first time in Iraq. Apart from a 
designated `chief' and a `deputy chief' They were all of 
the same military rank or grade: there were no other 
`officers' or `NCOs'. 
The agreement authorising the presence of the `guards' 
in Iraq was signed on 24 May and was attached to the UN- 
Iraq MOU of 18 April. The Secretary-General was later 
(12 June) to describe the points of agreement as 
`extremely innovative'. 72 The agreement provided for 500 
`guards', armed with handguns but with no power of 
arrest, to operate in Iraq. The regime insisted, 
however, that the 500 should not concentrate in one 
area: no more than 150 were to be allowed to serve in 
any one of Iraq's five administrative areas. The weapons 
73 were issued by, and remained the property of, Iraq. 
The UN (and the coalition) first tried to reassure the 
Kurds and the aid workers that the guards would 
guarantee their security. Statements were also made to 
reassure international opinion that a competent force 
would guarantee security after the departure of the 
military contingents. Spokesmen embellished the guards' 
task for a second reason: in order to persuade 
potential donor nations to provide the funds. The UN 
struggled to raise of the $ 35m required for the 
74 Guards first 9 months of operations. 
In early June, however, Sadruddin described a more 
restricted role for the guards. In his 12 June `Updated 
Appeal' he confirmed that force would provide security 
for the 1000-2000 UN personnel, their equipment and 
722 Address to the Donor Nations in Geneva. 
73 Source: John Packer 
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relief aid supplies, the `precious human and material 
assets deployed in the humanitarian operation' in Iraq. 
The guards' would not attempt to protect the Kurds or 
any other minority group. 75 The Secretary-General 
described the guards, on 12 June, as `a contingent of 
veritable humanitarian witnesses'. 76 
UN HQ had authorised and obtained diplomatic clearance 
for 500 guards. Of these 60 were already in country. 
Small detachments had deployed to all the major towns of 
northern Iraq by mid-June. (By 1st July there were only 
150 in Iraq, deployed in small groups in the north and 
the south of the country, and in Baghdad. ) The Co- 
ordinator of relief work, the Chief of the Guards 
Contingent (and his deputy) were at work in a 
headquarters located in Baghdad. It was planned that the 
guards would be organised into five regional sectors, 
with each sector staffed by ten `teams', each of eight 
guards. The equipment requirement was for 100 vehicles 
(of which 20 were to be radio-equipped) 15 5-ton trucks, 
1 30-seat bus, 5 observation and 2 support helicopters 
(with crews) 6 long-distance HF radio sets, 6 SATCOM 
transceivers, 200 hand-held VHF radios. 
IRAQI-KURD NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WITHDRAWAL 
OF COALITION FORCES 
The negotiations between Kurdish representatives" and 
Iraqi officials began in Baghdad on 20 Apri 178 and soon 79 
announced `agreement in principle' . 
80 The seventeen-party 
74 Sadruddin Aga Khan 'Give the United Nations Guards a Chance in Iraq' Fu l 13 June 1991 p4 
75 In fact Sadruddin was fighting his own battles with UN Secretariat in New York. Officials close to the 
Secretary-General were determined to present the UN and its contribution In the best possible light. Faced with increasing media scepticism Sadruddin refused to continue to "talk up" the guards' mission. 'UN police ride out 
on mission impossible' The Sunday Times 23 June 1991. 
" The Secretary-General's statement to donor nations, in Geneva. 
" Talabani's delegation included representatives of other opposition parties - but not from Shia groups. Rasoul Mahmand (Secretary-General, Kurdish Socialist Party), Sami Abdul Rahman (Secretary-General, 
Peoples' Party of Kurdistan), and Nashirwan Barzanl (representing the KDP). 
78 One report indicates that the Kurds and the Iraqi regime were in official contact since late March. John 
Simpson 'The Voices Against Saddam' The Observer 28 April 1991. 
79 Kurds in Teheran held hostages nominated by the Iraqi government during the talks. The Independent 23 
April 1991. 
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anti-Saddam opposition front, formed in Damascus in 
December, immediately collapsed. The Shia opposition 
leaders denounced Talabani for his 'betrayal'. 81 A mass 
meeting of Kurdish elders and notables then met at 
Shalaqwa and rejected the Iraqi terms: the Kurdish 
leadership could not accept anything less than full 
control of Kirkuk. Barzani argued that the objective 
for the next round of negotiations was a plan to bring 
genuine democracy to the whole of Iraq. In his view in 
a truly democratic Iraq the Kurds would have nothing 
to fear, even if they did not control Kirkuk. Talabani 
- despite his earlier confidence - insisted on the 
importance of an autonomous region, as had been agreed 
in the 1970 `Manifesto Agreement'. 82 The meeting then 
drew up a mandate for the next round of negotiations. 
It appointed Barzani to be the chief negotiator. 83 
Talabani would concentrate on international diplomacy. 
When the negotiations resumed the Kurds argued that the 
autonomous region should run from Sinjar (west of Mosul) 
as far south as Khaneqin. (This is a larger area than 
the zone provisionally established in the 1970 
agreement. 84) A second point of contention was the Baath 
regime's insistence that the Kurds should assist them in 
putting down Shia unrest in the south of the country. 85 
According to one account the KDP, at least, was willing 
to fight the regime's Iranian enemies. British 
journalist David Hirst reported an incident when Kurdish 
peshmerga killed 57 Iraqi and Iranian Shia, after they 
had been captured. " In June the Iranians announced the 
formation of a new Kurdish Islamic Movement, to be led 
by Ahmed Barzani. It would have no dealings with the 
so The Iraqis offered to create an autonomous Kurdish region and to allow the Kurds to return to the lands 
from which they had been driven in 1987-8. There was provision for free elections and a free press in that 
region. Talabani then had to persuade the KDP to accept the deal. Bulloch and Morris p 41. 
el Victor Mallett Financial Times 26 April 1991. 
Allan Cowell International Herald Tribune 18 April 1991. 
83 The Kurds' decision to continue negotiating was unpopular with many of the non-Kurd partners In the 
'front'. 
94 McDowell p 119. 
$5 Entessar p 149. 
$6 Guardian Weekly 28 April 1991. 
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Iraqi regime nor would it cooperate with Iraqi Kurdish 
groups. 7 8 
From the 11 April cease-fire onwards the Kurdish 
leadership was determined to exploit international 
sympathy to obtain an advantageous and lasting 
settlement with the Iraqi regime. Later the Kurds were 
determined to exploit the presence of coalition forces 
and the international disrepute of the Iraqi regime to 
achieve a lasting political settlement. The strength of 
the Kurds' position was that the coalition forces were 
engaged on their behalf, providing protection in a part 
of the Kurdish territory and exerting political 
influence on Baghdad through economic sanctions. The 
weakness of the Kurds' position arose from the lack of 
coalition protection for many of their areas. 88 The 
largely-Kurdish cities of Mosul, Suleymanieh and Kirkuk 
were outside the zone. 
In May the UN and the NGOs began to assume 
responsibility for the humanitarian programme and the UN 
guards began to arrive in Iraq. Inside the coalition a 
dispute began to develop on the timing of the forces' 
withdrawal. 89 For the US Administration a speedy 
withdrawal was highly desirable. The domestic public 
pressure for intervention had began to subside. The 
celebrations of the Gulf War victory were about to take 
place. Political and military leaders wanted to 
terminate the follow-up humanitarian action in northern 
Iraq. The Administration therefore sent General Powell, 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (30 May) to 
visit Operation PROVIDE COMFORT to discuss the timing of 
the withdrawal. One week later, on 8th, Gen Powell was 
present at the Washington parade for the returning Gulf 
War veterans. The New York `ticker-tape' parade followed 
on 10 June. 9° 
87 Entessar p 149. 
89 The forced absence of Iraqi ground and air forces and secret police only applied in the 'security zone' in 
the north west border region, in Zakho and 120 km to the east. More limited protection was offered by the air 
exclusion zone north of latitude 36°N (which crosses Iraq south of Mosul and just north of Kirkuk). 
8' The number of military personnel taking part in PROVIDE COMFORT in Turkey and Iraq reached its high 
point - 21,700 - on 21 May. 
9° 'Americans dither over the future of troops in Iraq' The Times 22 June 1991 p 11. 
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The Kurds were still negotiating with the Iraqi regime, 
however, and expressed alarm at the prospect of the 
troops' withdrawal. Hosni Zebari, the KDP spokesman in 
London, warned: 
The US is sending the wrong signals, encouraging 
Baghdad to harden its position in the belief that 
allied forces are about to withdraw. Humanitarian 
assistance alone will not solve the issue, there 
has to be a political solution. By pulling out 
before a political solution [is reached] they are 
inviting disaster. 91 
Jalal Talabani also protested: 
I think if they leave without achieving democracy 
in Iraq or before a final agreement between the 
Kurds and the Iraqis [is concluded]... the people 
92 will again leave their towns for the mountains. 
The European coalition partners supported the Kurds: 
they recognised that the achievements of the 
intervention would be lost by a premature withdrawal. 
There was also a risk that the Iraqis - or the Kurds - 
might create an incident to coincide with the 
93 coalition forces' withdrawal. 
The media was also alert to the policy question: 
coalition political leaders found themselves accused of 
either `abandoning' the Kurds, or being sucked into the 
`quagmire': 
Every reporter I meet out here has written two 
articles before he meets me: one under the headline 
`Allies Abandon the Kurds', the other `Allies 
Bogged Down in Kurdistan'. They don't mind which 
they file with the paper back home. If they're 
lucky they may get to file both. 94 
91 Kathy Evans and Chris Stephen 'Allies Pullout worries Kurds' The Guardian 1 June 1991 p 1. 
92 Hugh Pope 'Kurds hit hurdles in Talks with Saddam' The Independent 11 June 1991. 
93 On 9 June the media reported a major Iraqi offensive against the 'marsh Arabs' in the south east. Phil 
Davidson 'Iraqi soldiers trap 850.000 Shia refugees' Independent on Sunday 9 June 1991 p 13. 
94 Lt General John Shalikashvili. Remark made in the presence of the author, June 1991. 
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Turkey wanted the coalition operation to cease in the 
near future. It was keen to begin rebuilding its 
relations with Iraq and to regain full control of 
cross-border movements in its Kurdish areas. But it 
was also determined to avoid a renewed exodus of Iraqi 
Kurds. On 16 June in Ankara President Özal and several 
Western diplomats met Jalal Talabani. Speaking for the 
coalition Ozal told Talabani that the forces' 
withdrawal would be postponed until the Kurds had 
reached agreement with the regime. The planning date 
for the withdrawal was first set (in mid-May) for 27 
June, then 95 , postponed to 4 July and then 15 July. 
The Western states were in favour of greater democracy 
in Iraq and autonomy for the Kurds. But they did not 
wish to endorse any particular formula for democratic 
government nor did they want to give the Kurds the right 
to call on their assistance at any time in the future. 
They preferred the idea of Security Council endorsement 
of the future settlement. 
Also in mid-June there was disagreement between Kurdish 
groups. Massoud Barzani continued to express confidence 
in the bargaining with Saddam. Talabani, on the other 
hand, was increasingly insistent on a favourable outcome 
of the negotiations on the status of Kirkuk. He was 
openly sceptical of the regime's good faith. 
The Baghdad regime then made several concessions: over 
Kirkuk (joint control), amnesties for Kurdish refugees 
abroad, compensation to the families of dead Kurdish 
fighters and elections for a body to govern the new 
autonomous zone. In return the Baath demanded that the 
Kurdish parties should publicly endorse the regime and 
its policies. The Iraqi Kurds should cease their 
independent foreign diplomacy, should close down their 
two broadcasting stations and hand over their heavy 
weapons. 96 Kurdish negotiators indicated optimism97 and 
travelled north to report to the wider KPF leadership, 
95 On 14 June coalition personnel in theatre (Turkey and Iraq) numbered 18,000. Sarah Helm and 
Christopher Bellamy 'Pull out from safe havens speeds up' The Independent 15 June 1991. 
96 McDowell p 120. 
Annika Savill 'Kurds reach draft agreement pact with Saddam' The Independent 22 June 1991 p 10. 
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again at Shalaqwa. But there, on 24 June, the leadership 
decided it could not accept the terms. 98 
On 16 June thousands of Kurds marched through Dohuk to 
protest at the imminent departure of the coalition 
forces from the security zone. 99 On 17 June coalition 
spokesmen gave the number of coalition troops in 
northern Iraq as 8,000, including 3,000 British and 
3,117 Americans. " On the same day British, French, 
Italian and Dutch foreign ministers met in Luxembourg 
and announced after their meeting that `no firm date' 
had been fixed for the coalition forces withdrawal from 
northern Iraq. '°' They would not authorise the withdrawal 
of their forces until the situation in northern Iraq had 
become more stable. Douglas Hurd said: 
We went into northern Iraq in order the persuade 
the Kurds to come down from the mountains - to save 
lives. We don't want the operation to end in a way 
that will merely re-create the same problem. '°2 
On 19 June at a CSCE meeting in Berlin Douglas Hurd and 
James Baker discussed the timing of the final 
withdrawal. Hurd told Baker that his conditions for the 
withdrawal were the presence of effective `UN security 
forces', the successful termination of the Kurdish-Iraqi 
autonomy talks, and a clear threat of the return of 
coalition forces if the Kurds were harassed in the 
future. 103 
On 20 June the coalition forces in Turkey numbered 
5,800; 3,000 (mostly British, French and Italian troops) 
remained in northern Iraq. 104 At this point commanders 
98 Patrick Cockburn The Independent 25 June 1991. [In October 1992 the Iraqi Kurds held an election and 
afterwards proclaimed, unilaterally, the formation of an autonomous zone in northern Iraq, with its parliament In 
Irbil. ) 
99 Andrew Roche The Daily Telegraph 17 June 1991. 
goo Boris Johnson and Peter Almond 'Hurd says troops must stay' The Daily Telegraph 18 June 1991 p 9. 
30' The foreign ministers were resisting US pressure for early withdrawal. 
102 Sarah Lambert, Leonard Doyle and Stephen Goodwin The Independent 18 June 1991. 
703 Michael Binyon 'Hurd sets conditions for allied pullout from Kurdish havens' The Times 20 June 1991. 
Annika Savill 'Kurds reach draft autonomy agreement with Saddam' The Independent 22 June 1991 p 10. 
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were still planning to withdraw their remaining ground 
forces from northern Iraq by 27 June. 
On 22 June the steady withdrawal of coalition units from 
northern Iraq was halted. In the same month the civil 
war in Yugoslavia began. 105 
The US Administration approved a new planning date for 
withdrawal: 4 July. Then a further delay was approved 
and the final withdrawal took place on 15 July. Maj Gen 
Garner, commander of Task Force Bravo, was the last 
coalition soldier to leave Iraq. The departure of the 
troops was marked by friendly demonstrations in the 
towns inside the coalition security zone. Relieved that 
there had been no adverse reaction from ordinary Kurds 
Gen Shalikashvili said: `We'll be just a phone call 
away'. 106 
In order to show the coalition's continued support for 
the Kurds the US sent other high-level visitors to the 
region. In early July Paul Wolfowitz (US Deputy 
Secretary of Defense) and US Congressman Steven Solarz 
visited Turkey. '°7 
On 21-22 July President Bush visited Turkey immediately 
after he had visited Greece-108 His purpose did not 
concern PROVIDE COMFORT; he was travelling in the 
Eastern Mediterranean to launch his new initiative on 
Cyprus. His visit succeeded in upsetting Turkish 
official and public opinion. Before leaving Washington 
for the region the president gave an interview in which 
he praised Özal, Mitsotakis and Vasiliou as `outstanding 
leaders'. But his failure to mention the Turkish Cypriot 
leader, Ralf Denktash, at the same time infuriated 
opinion in Turkey: 
pos On the author's return to UK after his service with coalition forces on PROVIDE COMFORT a senior 
officer told him on 3 October that UK military planners were concerned that a new coalition force, comprising 
British as well as other nations' forces, might soon be required for duty in Yugoslavia. 
106 Comment made in the presence of the author. 
lo' Mr Solarz was one of the leading Middle East experts in the US House of Representatives. Briefing 8 July 
1991. '"Poised Hammer' plan meets sceptical public reaction'. 
1''e This was the first presidential visit since Eisenhower came to Turkey in 1959. 
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In the days leading up to Bush's visit the Turkish 
press was full of articles expressing suspicion of 
the goals of US foreign policy. 
The new initiative was seen as hostile to Turkey. The 
same source continued: 
[The US maintains] what is seen as an anti-Turkish 
line on Cyprus [ever] since the Johnson letter. 109 
On the president's arrival in Istanbul his US Secret 
Service team insisted on examining the rifles of the 
Turkish guard of honour before they would allow the 
welcome ceremony to begin. This check was made in view 
of the TV cameras during a live nation-wide broadcast. 
The same film was shown in all national TV news 
bulletins that day. Turkish opinion was outraged by the 
suspicion that members of the Turkish Armed Forces might 
assassinate the American president. Later parents of 
schoolchildren who had been obliged to line the route 
from the airport to welcome the president wrote letters 
to the newspapers protesting that they had not been 
consulted beforehand. 
JUSTIFYING THE WITHDRAWAL 
The coalition governments presented the withdrawal of 
forces as a safe and honourable act. On 12 July the 
Foreign Office in London issued a statement saying: 
The refugee camps have been closed and the 
transit stations are almost deserted. Towns 
and villages are returning to normal. With our 
help water and power supplies have been 
restored, food distribution and basic 
sanitation systems established and health care 
brought to those in need. Many lives have been 
saved. The aims of our deployment have been 
successfully achieved. 
Referring to the land and air forces remaining on alert 
in eastern Turkey the statement continued: 
109 Briefing 22 July 1991 'Poised Hammer; questions answered and unanswered' and 'Ozal and Bush 
broaden links but public doubts remain'. The reference to the 'Johnson Letter' (see Note 8p 88 above) was 
meaningful to every Turkish reader, but would have been incomprehensible to all but a few coalition officials 
and commanders. 
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R 687 remains in force. These troops will be 
prepared ... to go back in ... to protect the 
safety of the refugees and the UN personnel. llo 
Earlier, after discussions amongst the coalition 
states, and despite the US Administration's 
reservations"', a plan emerged for a 2000-strong 
`residual' air-land force to remain in theatre after 
the withdrawal of forces from northern Iraq. 
THE RESIDUAL FORCE 
To reassure the Kurds and the aid agency personnel it 
was eventually agreed that the `residual force' would 
remain in-theatre ready to re-enter Iraq if the Iraqis 
renewed their attacks on the Kurds. The Turks, for their 
part, opposed the idea that coalition forces should 
remain in Turkey after the withdrawal from northern 
Iraq. The most vocal opponents of PROVIDE COMFORT 2 were 
on the Left of Turkish politics. BUlent Ecevit voiced 
suspicions that the operations was merely a cover for 
`great power' manoeuvres, a `revitalisation of Sevres'. 
This accusation of `anti-Turkish' feeling in the US 
revived the memory of the Senate resolution favouring 
(Christian) Armenia over (Turkic) Azerbaijan. 112 Despite 
these pressures the Turkish government gave a 
(renewable) six-month authorisation for the force to 
operate from Turkey. This plan, initially called POISED 
HAMMER, was officially named PROVIDE COMFORT 2.113 
The coalition commander of the `residual force' was 
Major General James Jamerson. The Turks insisted, 
however, that he be joined by a Turkish `co-commander' 
or equal rank. (This was Major General Ibrahim Uyanik, 
Turkish Air Force. ) 
llo Bulloch and Morris p 44. 
1'1 Michael Smith 'US Pressed on rapid reaction force for Kurds' The Daily Telegraph 21 June 1991 p 13. 
112 In 1990 the US Senate had passed a resolution supporting Armenia In its confrontation with Azerbaijan. 
Turkish public opinion had been aroused. 
113 POISED HAMMER was a HQ USEUCOM name. Its adoption was ruled out by the Pentagon on the 
grounds that the message it conveyed was 'too tough' and that it suggested a change of Intent on behalf of the 
coalition. Accordingly PROVIDE COMFORT 2 was adopted, to stress the continuity of the commitment of the 
coalition states. 
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The Turks were determined to control the activities of 
the `residual force'. 114 On 18 July the Turkish 
government sent a diplomatic note to PROVIDE COMFORT 2 
troop-contributing states declaring that it would 
authorise any future deployment of the force into Iraq. 
This arrangement would apply not only to the ground and 
air forces based in Turkey and aircraft operating from 
ships at sea. 
The Turks also insisted on continuing the negotiations 
on the new MOU, designed to clarify the legal status of 
the additional forces. For the coalition commanders 
these discussions were tortuous. The task had earlier 
distracted commanders and staff from the planning for 
the withdrawal of many units from Turkey. These 
distractions continued. In the event these negotiations 
were never completed. Both sides tacitly agreed to allow 
them to continue until the problem was overtaken by the 
withdrawal of all coalition ground forces in late 
September. 
The land based air component of the residual force, 
comprising a squadron of F-15s and one of A-10 fighters, 
operated from Incirlik. Support helicopters were 
stationed at Incirlik and at Batman. A US Navy carrier 
group (USS Forrestal) was to remain in the eastern 
Mediterranean to provide extra air support if required. 
The ground forces and attack helicopters were stationed 
at Silopi near the Turkish-Iraqi border, 5 Km from 
Zakho. This component was known as the Allied Ground 
Combat Force (AGCF). This force was a composite infantry 
battalion with strong companies of British (B Company 40 
Commando RM), French, US, and Dutch infantry. The AGCF 
was commanded by Lt Col John Kidder of the 6/502 
Infantry, US Army. Attached, but under national command, 
was a mechanised infantry company from the Turkish Army. 
The total strength of the `battalion' was 1750. Attack 
and support helicopters were allocated to support this 
force. The coalition commander in Silopi was Col Butch 
11' Briefing 29 July 1991 'Turkey sets Ground Rules for Poised Hammer'. Also Bulloch and Morris p 46. 
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Whitehead, US Army. He also worked with a Turkish `co- 
commander', of equivalent rank. 
Conditions inside the camp at Silopi were not ideal. The 
space available for so many men to live and take 
exercise was limited. The Turks would not allow 
coalition soldiers to leave the base except on duty. 
With temperatures reaching 120°F at noon, and the 
suffocating dust, most soldiers spent much of their time 
under canvas. The air conditioned US `temper-tents' were 
essential. Members of the AGCF frequently watched 
Turkish military posts exchanging fire with PKK 
guerrillas on the high ground 3 miles away. 
Coalition air forces continued to fly daily combat air 
patrols north of the 36th parallel in Iraq, and conduct 
helicopter reconnaissance flights over the security 
zone. At times the helicopters would land and soldiers 
would enter villages and question local people on 
conditions in their area. The MCC continued to operate 
from its house in Zakho and its base in Silopi. Its 
members carried out separate reconnaissance patrols in 
wheeled vehicles and in helicopters to meet Iraqi 
officials and Kurdish leaders and to monitor 
conditions. 
The UN plan for monitoring conditions in northern Iraq 
centred on the `UN Guards' detachments in the north of 
the country and the R 687 weapons inspection regime 
(UNSCOM) elsewhere in Iraq. Officers of the `residual 
force' in Turkey received reports originating from these 
UN sources. 
The Turks had carried out several `seek and destroy' 
expeditions directed against PKK `training camps' on 
Iraqi territory - to the east of the PROVIDE COMFORT 
security zone - in May and early June. In late June the 
Turkish military forces had conducted a major cross- 
border operation against the PKK in north-east Iraq. 
20,000 men took part and the operation lasted four days. 
The Turks also announced that they were imposing a 10- 
mile wide `buffer zone' on the Iraqi side of the border 
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and that Turkish forces would patrol that zone to 
prevent unauthorised border crossing and smuggling. 
The KDP in Iraq publicly supported these moves and 
promised the Turks military support against the PKK. 
(Talabani criticised the Turks for carrying out the 
raid. ) Mohsen Dizai, the KDP spokesman in Ankara, warned 
the PKK that they should `either go to your own region 
[country] or cease the attacks'. The Turkish authorities 
then promised to send 10,000 tonnes of food and medical 
supplies to the Kurds in northern Iraq. 
From 4-15 August the Turkish armed forces conducted a 
second large air-land operation against the `guerrilla 
camps' in Iraq, this time in the remote `three 
borders' in the north east. 132 air sorties were flown 
20,000 troops reportedly took part in the attacks. 
Further Turkish attacks on alleged PKK bases in 
northern Iraq took place in October 1991, January 1992 
and thereafter. 115 
US AND SOVIET POLICY DURING THE KURDISH CRISIS 
As stated above" the Soviets cooperated with the Western 
states in the actions taken against Iraq during the Gulf 
crisis and in the months that followed. They nonetheless 
presented their policy as independent of the Western 
states, the measured response of a super-power rather 
than the compliance of a weakened adversary. Their show 
of independence was seen in opposition to certain 
proposals for the treatment of Iraq after the Gulf War. 
They opposed the idea that Saddam should be prosecuted 
for war crimes. They also opposed the use of force to 
achieve Iraqi compliance with the Ekeus mission 
(UNSCOM). 
In voting in favour of R 688 the USSR continued its 
policy of cooperating with the US to restrain Iraq. At 
the time of 688, however, there was no indication that 
the next move would be a military intervention into 
northern Iraq. When that intent became clear the Soviet 
115 Laizer Martyrs p 44. 
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leadership was quick to warn the UN not to authorise any 
violation of Iraq's sovereignty on behalf of the 
117 Kurds 
. 
The consensus is that Soviets felt compelled to comply 
with the Western states' policy towards Iraq in 1991 
because of the grave political and economic crisis in 
the USSR. Domestic and international political interests 
led the government to demonstrate the remnants of 
superpower independence: this was seen in Soviet 
insistence that the terms imposed on Iraq after the war 
should not be too harsh. (It was only when Saddam hailed 
the coup attempt against Gorbachev (August 1991) that 
the Soviets ceased to offer any resistance to US policy 
on Iraq. ) 
The US sought Soviet cooperation on the wider regional 
peace process. Again the Soviets felt bound to comply 
but nevertheless took occasional opportunities to give 
discreet support to local actors who might oppose, or 
delay, any US plans. The most obvious of these was 
Syria, a long-standing opponent of Iraq's Baath 
regime. Syria had benefitted economically and 
diplomatically from its membership of the coalition 
against Iraq. Syria's priority was to counter Israel's 
strong, and uncompromising, diplomatic position over 
the occupied territories, including the Golan Heights. 
Syria withheld its support for the US initiative until 
it had received assurances on the outcome of the 
process. One key development was Syria's provisional 
agreement, in mid July, to participate in a conference 
even though there was no pre-agreement of `land for 
peace'. The Soviets achieved the final confirmation of 
Syria's participation at Madrid during Foreign 
Minister Pankin's visit to Damascus on 18 October. '" 
The US - keen to encourage Soviet cooperation - gave 
the Soviets the credit for achieving Syria's support 
for the process. 
116 Chapter 6. 
117 See Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh's 10 April letter to the Secretary-General of the UN. 
lie Pankin p 220. 
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Shamir's Likud government was committed to the 
building of new settlements in the occupied 
territories. One of the consequences of greater Soviet 
cooperation with the West after 1985 was the loosening 
of the restrictions on the emigration of Soviet Jews 
from the USSR. The flow of immigrants into Israel - 
185,000 in 1990 and 145,000 in 1991 - produced a housing 
shortage. The Likud housing minister was the former 
general Ariel Sharon. The development of new residential 
settlements in the occupied territories brought Israel 
into conflict with the US during 1991. Israel was also 
opposed to a comprehensive approach, preferring a 
plenary conference lasting a single day followed by 
direct bi-lateral negotiations with the Arabs. Israel 
objected to a prominent role for the UN in the 
exchanges and would make no pre-conference commitment 
to exchange `land for peace' . 119 
Later in the year Gorbachev conceded three long-resisted 
US demands: support for the US in its campaign to repeal 
the 1974 UN General Assembly's `Zionism is Racism' draft 
resolution, authorisation for direct flights for 
emigrants from Soviet airports to Israel, and the USSR's 
resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel, 
previously terminated during the 1967 16-Day War'. 120 
Soviet compliance with US foreign policy objectives was 
not confined to the Gulf. There was also cooperation 
over Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal of its 
military forces in 1989. In 1991 the US and the USSR 
agreed to cease arms supplies to the rival factions from 
January 1992, and jointly appealed to other states to 
cease supplying the factions with military hardware and 
supplies. 
In the months of March, April and May US diplomacy in 
the Middle East concentrated on achieving a 
rapprochement between Israel and its neighbours. "' 
There were distractions and interruptions. 
119 Robert E Hunter 'US Policy after Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait' in Robert0 Freedman pp 66-7. 
3'9 Robert 0. Freedman p 117. 
Marvin Feuerverger'Israel, the Gulf War and its Aftermath' in Robert 0 Freedman p 245. 
261 
The Kurdish crisis was one such early distraction. But 
it did not prove to be an obstacle to US-USSR 
cooperation in Middle East diplomacy, nor to the 
results of that diplomacy. Indeed that cooperation on 
the larger issues ensured that events such as the 
Kurdish crisis were managed consensually. Later these 
efforts developed into preparations for a peace 
conference to be held later in the year. (This became 
the Madrid conference held in October. ) 
Despite its own lead in the diplomatic effort the US 
Administration was anxious to encourage and strengthen 
cooperation of the USSR. From April to October 1991 
the US made great efforts to be seen consulting the 
Soviets, as it had before the Gulf War. The Soviets 
responded by adopting a `balancing' policy: 
cooperation with the US in major issues but presenting 
an `independent' position on certain details. They 
welcomed the international humanitarian efforts on 
behalf of the victims of the fighting in northern 
Iraq. They also took pains to remind the international 
community of the importance of Iraqi sovereignty. '22 
Above all the Soviets encouraged the Kurdish leaders 
and the Baath regime to come to a negotiated 
settlement so that the US-led intervention would be 
terminated as soon as possible. The Soviets could not 
prevent the establishment of PROVIDE COMFORT 2, but 
they did not support it. The prospect of the permanent 
presence of US land and air forces, poised on the 
border of Iraq, was not attractive to the Soviet 
leadership 
. 3t3 During the late summer the efforts of 
both states, working to similar but not identical 
objectives, brought the different parties to a point 
where a comprehensive conference could be held, under 
their joint chairmanship. '2' 
122 See Vitaly Churkin's comment p 226, above. 
123 Aykan p 349. 
124 For an account of the US-Soviet diplomatic cooperation over Madrid see Pankin The Last Hundred Days' 
pp 212-213. According to this account the future co-chairmen of the Madrid conference - Pankin and Baker - 
worked closely together, and on an equal basis. Soviet participation was much more than a face-saving effort. 
The US-USSR Summit held in Madrid on 28 October was the culmination of this joint diplomacy. Pankin p 225. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of this chapter are: 
" The humanitarian relief operation was successful: it 
showed flexibility, economy and (eventually) good 
coordination between coalition forces and the aid 
agencies. 
" There was an anomaly in the international response 
to the crisis. The coalition undertook a humanitarian 
intervention in northern Iraq, despite the protests of 
the Iraqis. The UN launched a humanitarian operation 
throughout Iraq, based on the consent of the 
authorities. 
" The UN Secretariat sought the consent of the regime 
in order to secure Iraq's cooperation in a longer-term 
humanitarian operation, designed to assist victims of 
repression throughout Iraq. The UN accepted the 
coalition states' proposal for the UN guards scheme to 
provide protection after the coalition forces' 
withdrawal. 
" The coalition's exit strategy eventually had 3 parts: 
the on-going humanitarian programme, the UN guards unit 
and the `residual force'. The guards plan was presented 
as a guarantee for the future safety of the Kurds (and 
other minorities). In fact the UN guards had a very 
restrictive mission. 
" The coalition forces' handover of facilities and 
activities was delayed by the reluctance of the UNHCR 
(and the NGOs) to accept full responsibility for the 
humanitarian part of the mission. 
" The Kurds' dealings with the Baath also threatened to 
undermine the intervention operation. As it turned out 
the Kurdish groups could not reach a settlement with the 
regime. Notwithstanding Kurdish disunity, shown at 
Shalaqwa, the coalition forces were able to extract 
themselves from northern Iraq when their governments 
decided that the limited mission had been accomplished. 
" The Turkish authorities had an ambivalent attitude to 
PROVIDE COMFORT 1 AND 2. The operation achieved several 
useful purposes. It persuaded the Kurds to remain inside 
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Iraq and not cross into Turkey. It showed Turkey's 
willingness to cooperate with the Western states. But it 
had several drawbacks. It encouraged Turkish Kurds to 
assert their own rights and made it easier for the PKK 
to establish camps in the Iraqi border area. It tempted 
Western states to pursue their own interests versus Iraq 
from Turkish soil. It threatened Turkey's good relations 
with Iran and the Arab states. It exposed the unpopular 
Özal administration to accusations of subservience to 
the West. 
" For the US the end of the Gulf war and the weakness 
of the USSR provided an opportunity to launch a Middle 
East `peace process'. The Kurdish intervention was an 
unavoidable interruption which had to be managed 
alongside the higher-priority (and regional) `peace 
process' policy. For the Soviets the Kurdish 
intervention was an opportunity to demonstrate a measure 
of independence from the US policy while actively 





Part 3- Analysis 
CHAPTER 10 
THE INTERVENTION - ANALYSIS OF LEGAL AND MILITARY 
SIGNIFICANCE 
This Chapter continues the discussion of the status of 
these events as a precedent in the development of 
international law and politics in the area of 
`intervention'. Specifically it identifies what new 
ground, if any, was broken in the international 
response to the Kurdish Crisis. The areas under 
consideration are international law and the conduct of 
military `humanitarian' operations. This analysis may 
assist those who wish to predict the relevance of 
methods and outcomes in this crisis for subsequent and 
future crises. This study does not, however, address 
those questions directly. 
This Chapter also provides a limited military analysis 
of the intervention operation. 
SOME POINTS ON R 688 
The analysis of the text of R 688 (Chapter 7, above) 
identified several points of interest: 
" no determination, under A 39, of a `threat' 
" neither Chapter VI nor Chapter VII invoked 
" mandate to the Secretary-General was to investigate 
suffering and coordinate the work of the aid 
agencies 
" majority, not unanimous, decision in the Security 
Council, with evident reservations from some leading 
states 
" no authorisation for intervention but no subsequent 
discussion of the intervention which occurred. 
As argued in Chapter 7 above the Security Council 
decided to treat the Kurdish crisis as an exceptional 
case, even before there was any indication of a 
coalition intervention operation. The conduct of the 
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Secretariat after the intervention took place supports 
this conclusion. So does the decision of the Council 
not to resume formal consideration of conditions on 
the northern borders of Iraq after the intervention. 
The Security Council members' intention to deal with 
the crisis as a pragmatic response did not necessarily 
succeed, however. The practice of states ( i. e. 
`custom') is an essential element in the development 
of international law. Whatever representatives and 
political leaders may have said (and hoped) at the 
time, the international response to this crisis has 
left a mark. Even after the passing of more than six 
years no one can say, definitively, what significance 
will be attributed to these events and decisions; 
their status as a precedent for the future is still 
the subject of active debate. 
EXPERTS' COMMENTS ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE KURDISH CRISIS 
The text of the Resolution and the debate in the 
Security Council reflected a near-consensus that Iraq 
should be condemned for the brutality of its 
repression of the Iraqi Kurd population. But 
representatives were divided on the other issues: some 
demanded international action against Iraq for its 
human rights abuses and for intervention to deal with 
the alleged spill-over of the conflict into 
neighbouring states. Others emphasised Iraq's right to 
act as it wished inside its own borders. 
The same division is found in the interpretations of 
legal experts, some of whom argue from a normative 
perspective, some from a value-free position. The more 
liberal commentators argue that the actions taken to 
protect the Kurds were part of a shift towards a 
greater importance for human rights in the development 
of international law. More conservative authorities 
note that the international response did nothing to 
disturb the primacy of sovereignty. A middle group saw 
the matter as unresolved at that time: international 
law might move in either direction. 
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The majority of those states represented at the 
Security Council debate was prepared to approve some 
form of action against Iraq - the coalition military 
operation had not been devised at that stage - as an 
`exception' to the normal respect for sovereignty. The 
formula adopted was the authorisation for the 
Secretary-General to mobilise international aid 
agencies (and diplomatic pressures) to deal with 
humanitarian crisis and defuse the transborder 
effects. The difference lies between in the 
expectations reflected in the opposing views: will 
this exception become the legal norm or will it remain 
as a pragmatic episode, with limited significance for 
the future ? Do the commentators expect that the 
Security Council will authorise subsequent operations 
- perhaps on the basis of further ambivalent, 
`exceptional' mandates, or not ? 
The intervention operation itself has attracted 
additional comments. Political comment on the 
significance of the intervention varied between 
cautious enthusiasm (from Western leaders) to outright 
opposition (from a number of Non-Aligned states). The 
G7 states issued a statement after their heads-of- 
government meeting in July 1991 explicitly endorsing 
the conduct of the PROVIDE COMFORT coalition and 
`urged to UN to support similar action wherever the 
circumstances require it'. ' Legal commentators observed 
that at the time of the intervention the international 
community was prepared to give tacit consent to this 
operation. But there is disagreement on the 
implications of these events and of actions taken (or 
not taken) in the Security Council and in the 
operational area of northern Iraq. 
The weight of academic opinion on R 688 and the 
intervention which followed was that neither of them 
1 Freedman and Boren in Rodley p 83. This statement, therefore, went beyond 'endorsement' of the on- 
going operation. The G7 proposed that humanitarian Intervention should be seen as a legitimate tool for the 
international community to use, when appropriate, in future crises. 
This idea is also found in the use of variants on the 'safe haven' formulation - viz safe areas, 
humanitarian protection zones, safe zones - declared by the UN in subsequent crises. K Landgren 'Safe 
zones and international protection; a dark grey area' International Journal of Refugee Law Vol 7 No 3,1995. 
See also R Gardner International Relations and the Use of Force (London: Brassey's for the RIIA, 1991-2) 
Adelphi Paper 266 and Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst 'Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian 
Intervention' Foreign Affairs Vol 75 No 2 March/April 1996. 
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is the care taken, even by the US, to assert the 
exceptional nature of the case. 
The opinions of the opposing groups of commentators 
are as follows. Their starting points vary: some 
restrict themselves to a legal interpretation of 
decisions and events, others mix legal assessments 
with more `political' predictions. 
For the liberals the intervention does represent a 
shift in international practice, notwithstanding the 
`exception' language. This forecasts that intervention 
will become - in selected cases -a legally acceptable 
means of averting the abuse of human rights deserves 
careful consideration. It forms part of a body of 
opinion which foresees (and welcomes) a controversial 
`world society' agenda for international law and 
politics. 
The traditionalist, non-interventionist school of 
opinion is long-established: it denies that there is 
(or should be) any right for the UN (or any state) to 
intervene in a state's internal affairs, even to 
protect human rights. It rests its case on A 2(7), on 
the declarations of the UN General Assembly2 and on the 
practice of states, before and since 1945. 
Adherents of the traditional view also cite the 
practice of states, even Western states, over time: 
I submit that there is not a single case in the 
entire post-war era where one state has 
intervened in another for the exclusive [emphasis 
added] purpose of halting mass-murder, much less 
any other gross violation of human rights .... 
Precisely because state practice is at best 
ambiguous, it provides very flimsy support for 
any claim that the restraints of the Charter have 
been superseded by a new consensus concerning the 
use of force to protect human rights.... Even 
liberal democratic states have seemed reluctant 
2 For example GA R 1514 restates the prohibition on intervention, except in cases where a people Is denied 
self-determination (i. e. is under 'colonial or alien rule'). 
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openly to impute legitimacy to humanitarian 
intervention. 3 
Other authorities go farther, denying the development 
of a right of intervention and identifying apparent 
departures from the non-intervention norm as 
`exceptional'. A leading conservative wrote as 
follows, following the Grenada operation in 1983: 
Human rights violations are just not considered 
as serious enough by the majority of states and 
the principle of territorial sovereignty ... 
takes preference in the views of most. This is 
because human rights violations are all too 
common a phenomenon in most states and to admit a 
right of humanitarian intervention would be far 
too precarious for the independence and security 
of such states. A blind eye turned to such 
advantageous interventions such as those in East 
Bengal (neither the SC nor the GA pronounced on 
the legality of India's intervention and SCRs 307 
and GAR 2793/71 both limited themselves to 
calling for a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops, 
actions for the refugees, and exhortations for 
the well-being of the civilian population) and 
Uganda (the SC did not debate this at all)... is 
not the same as admitting a right in law to 
intervene... and those actions were defended by 
the perpetrators as self-defence... The repression 
of a minority (even a majority) is so common and 
openly practised that it cannot be taken as 
contrary to customary international law. 4 
Some traditionalists oppose even altruistic 
`interventions' on the grounds that such acts have 
often been motivated by self-interest. 5 
3 Tom Farer'An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Humanitarian Intervention' In LF Damrosch and DJ Scheffer 
(eds. ) Law. Force and the New International Order (Boulder: Westview 1991), pp 192-3,195,198. 
4L Ooswald-Beck 'The Legality of the United States' Intervention In Grenada' 31 LLBj pp 355-385. 
5 BS Chili 'Towards a Third World Approach to Non-Intervention: Through the Labyrinth of Western 
Doctrine' 20 Indiana JIL (1980) 243 et seq. and Sohail H Hashemi'Is There an Islamic Ethic of 
Humanitarian Intervention' Ethics and International Affairs Vol 7 1993. 
Despite Chili's accusation that 'humanitarian intervention' is often a disguise for great power imperialism 
it is well to recall that Indonesia's occupation of East Timor in 1975 is an example of a Third World state 
using this as a pretext for aggression. RS Clark 'Humanitarian Intervention: Help to your Friends and State 
Practice' 13 Georgia J Int & Como Lp 213. 
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Objections to any `right' of intervention are made on 
practical as well as legal grounds. A notable 
proponent of this view, Ian Brownlie, based his 
argument on custom, and particularly on state practice6 
and centuries-old historical precedent. Writing in the 
1970s his objection to the emergence of a `right' was 
that it would be abused: 
My position is that humanitarian intervention, on 
the basis of available definitions, would be an 
instrument wide open to abuse... as a matter of 
degree, the definitions of humanitarian 
intervention are woefully slack. Moreover, the 
safeguards attached to the definition seem 
unworkable. Does a force sent in to halt racial 
oppression or the practice of slavery remain 
until the legislative and administrative 
structure maintaining the particular condition 
have changed ?7 
The sticking point for non-interventionists is the 
insistence that the equality and sovereignty of states 
are not subject to tests of legitimacy, however the 
states behave. To admit a right of intervention on the 
basis of a judgement about `legitimacy' of rule would 
be to introduce a normative and cultural element which 
is, arguably, indefensible and impracticable. A 
normative formula for legitimacy incorporated into 
international law would transform the international 
system. States' legitimacy would depend on their 
delivery of `good government'. It is hard to see how 
states could agree on criteria. 
There is, however, a significant body of legal opinion 
which take a more permissive view of intervention, 
predicting that a `right' exists, or will soon exist. 
This view is appears to be gaining support. 
6 'It is clear to the present writer that a jurist asserting a right of forcible humanitarian Intervention 
has a very heavy burden of proof. Few writers familiar with modern materials of state practice and 
legal opinion on the use of force would support such a view... ' 
Ian Brownlie 'Humanitarian Intervention' in JN Moore (ed) Law and Civil War In the Modern World 1974. 
Ian Brownlie 'Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen' In Lillich p 146. 
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Howard Adelman8 agrees that `humanitarian 
intervention" conducted under the authority of the UN 
can escape the prohibition under A 2(7). Serious 
abuses of human rights, on a large scale are, he 
argues, increasingly seen as outside `essential 
domestic jurisdiction'. But he notes that there can be 
no specific UN authorisation for the use of force 
unless there is a finding of a threat to international 
peace and security. 10 If these conditions exist, he 
argues, there is no need for any special category of 
`humanitarian intervention'; the existence and 
recognition of a threat is sufficient for action under 
the established practice, and is unquestionably 
faithful to `the purposes and principles of the 
Charter'. He further argues that the `interdependence' 
of states makes strict observance of sovereignty 
obsolete. Thus the reinterpretation required is not A 
2(7) but what consists a `threat to international 
peace and security'. If the Council is prepared to 
declare a threat to exist in every case (or nearly 
every case) where there is mass abuse of human rights 
- and irrespective of trans-border effects - and if it 
will authorise forcible intervention in such cases, 
then a right of intervention will have been created. 
Still more permissive is the interpretation offered by 
Fernando Tes6n. 11 He finds a justification in law for 
humanitarian intervention - defined as an action to 
protect human rights - for any significant breach of 
human rights inside a state. Basing his argument on 
`natural right' theory he defines any state which 
abuses human rights as `illegitimate' and as such can 
no longer claim the rights of sovereignty: `government 
that engages in substantial abuses of human rights 
betrays the very purpose for which it exists and so 
8 'Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurds' IJ Refugee L Vol 4 No 1, January 1992, pp 4-38. 
9 In this study the term 'humanitarian intervention' can mean action to relieve famine and disease (i. e. a 
response to a problem of welfare) OR an action to protect human rights (i. e. a response to a problem of 
violence: from discrimination through intimidation to genocide). Adelman uses the term restrictively to mean 
'action to protect human rights'. Howard Adelman 'Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurds'. 411 
RefL(1992). 
10 Adelman p 25. 
11 Fernando Tesbn Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law and Morality (Dobbs Ferry, 1988) p 4. 
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forfeits not only its domestic legitimacy but its 
international legitimacy as well. ' 
Christopher Greenwood13 takes the view that before Rs 
221,417,418 and 688 sovereignty and non-intervention 
were firmly established in customary law: human rights 
were under `domestic jurisdiction'. Even systematic 
abuse of human rights would not have been regarded as 
grounds for intervention inside a state. Today it is 
academics, not politicians or diplomats, who claim 
that the protection of human rights justifies 
intervention. He notes that states undertaking 
unilateral intervention have invariably justified 
their actions on the grounds of self-defence, citing 
trans-border clashes and migrant flows. '' They have not 
chosen to justify their actions on humanitarian 
grounds, At the same time it is clear that 
international public opinion is showing more support 
for human rights issues and less respect for the 
validity of a strict interpretation of `sovereignty'. 
Furthermore Greenwood says it is possible to trace a 
pattern from R 221 through to R 688 in which the 
Security Council has, selectively, endorsed 
interventions. These endorsements were at times tacit, 
at times explicit. In the multinational intervention 
in northern Iraq Greenwood says that the Council went 
to the brink of declaring that systematic abuse of 
human rights (accompanied by trans-border effects) 
created a threat to international peace. 15 Nevertheless 
the change he identifies is within a restricted area: 
it is `intervention, not to change borders but to save 
lives'. 16 Greenwood does not see a trend towards a 
broader legitimising of intervention, to promote `good 
government' or `democracy', as the most liberal 
commentators argue. 
13 Christopher Greenwood 'is there a right of humanitarian Intervention T The World Today March 1993. 
14 The exception to this generalisation is the ECOMOG intervention in Liberia. The participating states 
justified their action not only on 'self-defence' but also on humanitarian grounds. See p 49, above. 
15 This pattern can also be traced in the Security Council's response to the later crises in Somalia and 
Haiti. Rs 792 and 940 contain even clearer language stating that systematic abuse of human rights, or 
serious disorder causing widespread misery to a population, justifies intervention, especially where, as in 
Haiti, there are significant trans-border effects. 
16 Words used by Sir David Hannay (UK Permanent Representative) In the Security Council debate on R 
688. Seep 168, above. 
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Richard Gardner says that the state of international 
law regarding `intervention', following the Kurdish 
crisis, is that the right of [forcible] intervention 
has been recognised in the absence of Security Council 
authority. Furthermore the Council is more likely to 
act against a state which conducts a systematic 
programme of repression against all or part of its 
population if it can find a "threat to international 
peace and security" arising out of the repression. A 
finding of this kind would be required for the Council 
to the full range of Chapter VII enforcement measures. 
But he predicts that the Council will not regard the 
"international threat" as an essential requisite for 
action. Neither is the Council likely to take, or 
authorise, action involving the use of force on human 
rights grounds alone. 17 
It may be that it was the special circumstances which 
made the international community act to end the 
repression in northern Iraq. These circumstances 
include not only Iraq's international status as a 
rogue state but also the guilt felt by political 
leaders (and sections of public opinion) at past 
neglect of the legitimate rights of the Kurdish 
people. Wheeler follows Mayall in attributing the 
decision to intervene to `circumstances' rather than 
`human rights abuse': 
had the repression of the Kurds taken place in 
any circumstances other than as a result of the 
Gulf War it is inconceivable that Western 
governments would have responded to pressures 
from public opinion for humanitarian 
intervention. 18 
17 Richard Gardner Adelphi Paper 266 p 72. 
18 Nicholas J Wheeler 'Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society; Bull and Vincent on 
Humanitarian Intervention' Millenium: Journal of International Studies 1992, Vol 21 No 3p 483. 
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ESCAPE FROM THE RESTRICTIONS OF A 2(7) 
Richard Lillich19, a determined advocate of a right of 
intervention, has also drawn attention to what he 
called the `steady recognition' of such a right. He 
claims that the Security Council has accepted, through 
a succession of resolutions, that some recent 
humanitarian interventions were justified by 
circumstance even when they were not justified in law. 
He argues that although A 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN 
Charter made it `very doubtful' that a right of 
forcible intervention could be said to exist, reason 
dictated that there were limits to the rule of non- 
intervention, as laid down by the UN Charter to 
protect state sovereignty. 20 He went on to propose 
`objective criteria' which could guide states 
considering an act of humanitarian intervention. 21 In 
his view a right of intervention had been established 
in customary law pre-1945 and that it had `survived 
the Charter'. 22 Adding to Greenwood's list he cites the 
Council's decisions with regard to the Lockerbie 
suspects23 and in Somalia. 24 Lillich describes 
humanitarian intervention as a `permanent exception' 
to the rule of non-intervention. In his view the 
Council has moved forward, carefully describing each 
breach of the rule of non-intervention as 
19 Richard B Lillich Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations (Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, 1973). 
20 Other authorities who argue for a more permissive interpretation of a right of humanitarian Intervention 
are: D'Amato International Law: Process and Prospect 1987, Michael Reisman 'Coercion and Self- 
Determination: Construing Article 2(4)' JII 1984, Luban 'Just War and Human Rights' Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 169 1979-80, Lea Brilmeyer Justifying International Acts (Ithaca: Cornell Univ Press) 1989. 
21 Lillich lists the following: the immediacy of the violation of human rights, the extent of the violation, 
invitation from the de jure government, degree of coercive measures employed by the Intervening forces, 
relative disinterest of the intervening state. R Lillich 'Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights' 
(1967-8) 53 Iowa p 325. 
22 Dixon and McCorquodale Note on p 495. 
23 The 'traveaux preparatoires' of the UN founding conference in San Francisco clearly show that provision 
for judicial review of the actions of the Security Council were specifically ruled out in 1945. There is, 
however, a possibility that the ICJ will be called on to rule on the legality of an 'Interventionist' resolution. 
The Court has already issued a preliminary judgment on just such a challenge, by Libya, over the 
requirement to extradite the Lockerbie suspects. A case would rest on first, establishing the jurisdiction of 
the ICJ over Security Council resolutions, and then on the duties of the Security Council under A 24(1) set 
against the obligation of the Council, In A 39, to take Chapter VII action 'In accordance with the purposes 
and principles of the [UN]'. Arguably 'intervention' is not'in accordance'. 
24 See R 792. In the debate at the time of the adoption of this resolution the US delegate made It clear that 
his government saw the terms of 792 as a pattern for future actions: 'the international community is taking 
[steps to provide a] strategy for conflicts in the post Cold War world'. 
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"exceptional. 1125 Lillich believes that the Council is, 
in effect, redefining A 2(7) step-by-step. He also 
notes the increasing practice of the Council in 
imposing more control and referral measures as a 
safeguard against `exceptional' measures being 
misused. 26 
Sydney Bailey and others have noted the existence of a 
body of international law which complements and 
arguably extends the human rights provisions of the 
Charter. International Humanitarian Law(IHL) - for 
example Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions - addresses the rights and duties of those 
caught up in war and specifies the rights of access of 
impartial humanitarian bodies to the war zone. IHL is 
based on treaties, some of which pre-date the Covenant 
of the League (and the UN Charter); they therefore 
represent a source of law which may be regarded as 
independent of, albeit supportive to, the Charter. 27 
The Security Council and the ICJ have both commended 
the standards set by IHL and quoted its legal 
principles with approval. The treaties themselves are 
now widely regarded as having the status of custom. It 
is possible that the internationally agreed standards 
of treatment of individuals caught up in war might, by 
degrees, be used to set standards for the humanitarian 
treatment of individuals under conditions of peace. 28 
There is already considerable Security Council 
practice to support this line of development, even 
25 This caveat is also found in R 688 and In R 940, which authorised the Intervention to restore the 
Aristide government to Haiti. 
26 It is also of interest that the later 'interventionist' resolutions - especially R 940 - have Imposed timetables, reporting requirements and other control measures whereby the Council exercised Its right of 
oversight of the operations it authorised. This reassure the non-interventionist majority of the UN's member- 
states. 
27 The 'Nicaragua' judgment referred to the body of IHL which pre-dated the UN Charter. It stated that the 
earlier treaties were the foundations of IHL and were complimented by subsequent International agreements 
since 1945. Whereas IHL undoubtedly applies to UN peacekeeping forces operating In war zones the UN 
has not so far agreed to give a formal undertaking that its peacekeepers will abide by IHL.. Sydney D Bailey 
The UN Security Council and Human Rights (London: Macmillan, 1994) p 59. 
28 The argument is strengthened by the knowledge that consideration of UN intervention on the basis of a 
threat to peace arising from a mass abuse of human rights often occurs when the state concerned Is torn by 
civil war. All wars, Including civil wars (and the forcible operations carried out by UN 'blue helmet' forces) 
are bound by the rules of IHL. In the Kurdish crisis, for example, the rules of IHL were applicable throughout 
the fighting between Iraqi government forces and the mostly-Kurdish forces which opposed them. 
Judge Richard Goldstone, the chief prosecutor in the recently established International Tribunals on 
Rwanda and Former Yugoslavia has spoken in support for the extension of international judicial competence 
into the field of IHRL. The proposed International Criminal Tribunal would allow multi-national authorities to 
prosecute those guilty of greater or lesser 'crimes against humanity' which were committed In a time of 
peace. (Interview with Judge Goldstone, Vienna, June 1995. ) 
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though the actions taken by the Security Council have 
not always been consistent. 29 
Rodley goes on to discuss principles, found elsewhere 
in International Law which might serve as a useful 
guide to consideration of future interventions. These 
are conditions of `necessity' and `proportionality' 
which are the long-established guides to what is, and 
is not, legitimate in acts of self-defence. Although 
first laid down in the pre-Charter era they have 
always been used to interpret A 51.30 Further 
conditions could be that forcible intervention 
operations should be multi-national, should be 
specifically authorised and supervised by the Security 
Council and should involve the use of force only after 
a `trial of all other methods'. Finally Greenwood 
proposes that `limited means, limited objectives' 
should be the rule: participant states should 
concentrate on relief of suffering. Forcible 
intervention to protect human rights should not extend 
to overthrowing governments or re-drawing state 
borders. 31 
INTERVENTION - THE FUTURE ? 
Looking ahead and sounding a more assertive note, Adam 
Roberts has suggested that the Western states, 
confronted by manifest abuse of human rights, may soon 
be faced with a stark choice of standing idly by, 
entering the fray on highly restrictive rules of 
engagement, or making `humanitarian war'. He quotes ex- 
President Reagan: 
the world's democracies must enforce stricter 
standards of international conduct. Is this not a 
moral cause and a great undertaking as profound 
as the struggle against totalitarianism ? What I 
propose then is nothing less than a humanitarian 
29 The observation refers to the willingness of the Security Council to Impose enforcement measures on a 
state like Libya and its refusal to do so in the case of South Africa or Israel. Bailey pp 88-99. 
30 The importance of necessity and proportionality were first recognised In the early 19th century Caroline 
case and subsequently in the Nicaragua judgement of the ICJ: '... well established In customary International 
law ... whereby self defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and 
necessary to respond to it' Nicaragua vs United States of America, Merits, Judgement, ICJ Reports 1986, 
para 176. 
31 Greenwood'New World Order p 177. 
277 
velvet glove backed by a steel fist of military 
force... 32 
Roberts speculates that Western states may take 
advantage of opportunities presented by future crises 
to deal with rogue states: `after PROVIDE COMFORT came 
POISED HAMMER; after UNOSOM came the US Marines'. He 
summarises his conclusions thus: 
" The Security Council did not recognise any right of 
unilateral intervention on humanitarian grounds. 
" The Security Council did recognise that there was a 
[potential] threat to international peace and security 
from the refugee flows. 
" As the repression followed directly from a war the 
victors might have felt some responsibility - 
recognised in customary law - for security within the 
defeated state. 
" Whereas the intervention was multi-national, the key 
decisions [after 688] were made by states, not the UN. 
The US, Britain and France created the safe havens and 
did so by `stretching the elastic of the Security 
Council resolutions to breaking point'. 33 
" It allowed the victors to avoid answering the 
question of what form of government should be set up 
in northern Iraq. 
It gave comfort to the countries which organised it 
.... Subsequent events showed it to be more than an 
isolated episode. 
He concludes by warning against too much academic 
speculation. What John Vincent called `the empire of 
circumstance' will probably determine future events, 
more than anyone's prescription. 
Then there is the more challenging view, expressed by 
Stanley Hoffmann and others, that leading states have 
an obligation to persuade the rest of the 
international community to take `every opportunity for 
morally justified intervention'. 34 He argues that such 
32 Speech to the Oxford Union 4 December 1992. Quoted in Adam Roberts p 448. 
33 Roberts p 438. 
34 Stanley Hoffmann p 49. 
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initiatives will create legal and political precedents 
and, despite the inevitable failures (like Somalia), 
the result will be a shift in international practice 
in favour of humanitarian interventions to stop 
genocide and lesser catastrophes, natural and man- 
made. Fred Halliday concludes that International 
Relations needs to redefine its understanding of 
sovereignty and develop its analytical concepts. 35 
There are, on the one hand, many voices calling for 
the international community to act more decisively to 
defend people against their own repressive governments 
or when their government appears unable or unwilling 
to protect its citizens. The essential element of such 
interventions would be the use of force: that is, a 
proportional and necessary degree of force. This 
applies in particular in states ruled by regimes which 
came to power, or hold power, by force alone. No 
government should terrorise its citizens. Thus a moral 
case can be made for repressive and unrepresentative 
regimes to be open to external, forcible measures and 
not have protection from the rights of sovereignty. 
The next step would be to proclaim `a right of good 
government'. Intervention to protect human rights 
accords with the many international declarations, 
charters and commissions which have proclaimed the 
existence of certain `inalienable' rights. 
On the other hand there is a fundamental problem in 
the attachment of so many states to non-intervention, 
a concept which is firmly established in customary 
law. This contradiction was evident in the policy of 
the Western powers towards Iraq in 1990 and 1991. As 
Adelman has pointed out, the US, the UK and France 
created a coalition to defend Kuwait's sovereignty 
against Iraq and then formed another to violate Iraq's 
sovereignty in order to protect a dissident minority 
of Iraqis. 36 
35 'There are some elements of discomfort and anomalies In what occurred for all three IR 
paradigms, as there are also for feminism and even more so, for post-modernism. In a whole 
range of issues of analysis, ethics, the [Gulf War] provided a major challenge to IR: nowhere 
more so than on the ethical question of sovereignty, the new precedent for intervention, and the 
need to redefine our conception of just intention'. 
Fred Halliday Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East (London: IB 
Tauris, 1996) p 103. 
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As a tentative prediction, however, it is possible to 
say that International Law appears to be evolving in 
the direction of providing protection for those 
suffering from the mass abuse of human rights. At best 
there is the beginning of consensus on a limited right 
of intervention, (or a `permanent exception' 
permitting intervention) but only `in very qualified 
ways and by properly legitimised actors37 . Even so the 
necessary conditions for multinational intervention 
are unclear and, as already discussed, controversial. 
Perhaps a likely course of events is the emergence, 
through practice, of some conditions which will come 
to be regarded as sufficient to permit intervention 
(including the use of force), as tacitly acceptable 
exceptions to the principle of `non-intervention' as 
found in international law. Clearly the significant 
body of opinion which emphasises `non-intervention' 
would ensure that the conditions were restrictive. 
These conditions would reassure those who are 
suspicious of granting `rights' of intervention where, 
arguably, none existed before. Furthermore it would go 
some way to satisfy proponents of the narrow 
interpretation of A 2(7). But what should these 
conditions be? 
The first possible condition appears to be that the 
abuse of human rights must be serious and affecting 
many people, perhaps all or a significant proportion 
of the population, not small groups. 38 Greenwood 
distinguishes the slaughter of the retreating Kurds in 
1991 from the violations of individual rights by the 
Noriega regime in Panama. 39 
36 Adelman p4 et seq. Adelman also points out that Allan Gerson, Chief Counsel to the US Mission to the 
UN, for a time tried to justify the military intervention into Iraq as a matter of right as 'occupying powers' 
after the end of the Gulf War. Adelman refutes this by noting that R 687 in early April effectively ended the 
state of belligerency and with it any rights of occupation. He goes on to give an opinion that humanitarian 
intervention needs to be conducted to protect the rights of Individuals (that Is, to safeguard their physical 
welfare) rather than the rights of 'minorities' (which suggests action to guarantee political or human rights). 
37 Adelman p 28. 
38 This assessment distinguishes between the practice in support of states acting to assist their own 
nationals from threat or harm in a foreign country from the possibility of a state Intervening In the affairs of 
another to protect the human rights of persons who were not nationals of the Intervening state. 
39 Greenwood 'New World Order' p 177 
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Another possible condition for legitimate forcible 
intervention is that of `trans-border effects'. By 
this test the abuse of human rights in a state is a 
subject for international concern and action if the 
abuse leads to adverse consequences for neighbouring 
states: those consequences would `internationalise' 
the situation. But this condition might not be 
essential. The spread of international standards into 
many areas once considered `sovereign' makes any 
objective trans-border threshold unsustainable. 40 The 
argument runs that deprivation or suffering inside a 
state may become intolerable to the international 
community even if there is no trans-border effect. 
Furthermore international frontiers often fall across 
territories occupied a single ethnic group, or lie so 
far from their territories as to make cross border 
migration almost impossible. Furthermore states 
bordered by uncrossable obstacles, such as impassable 
mountain ranges or the sea, might be protected from 
intervention just because the victim population cannot 
flee across a border. It is likely therefore that the 
`trans-border effect' will be a powerful stimulus to 
intervention but it is also true that some will reject 
it as an essential pre-requisite for action. 41 Rodley 
says that the trans-border element cannot be ruled 
out' as a necessary condition justifying intervention. 
It is clear that many states would require an 
international dimension -a weaker condition than a 
(measurable) trans-border effect - to a crisis in 
order to see it as a matter of `international peace 
and security', as required by A 39. As Rodley puts it 
`[t]here can be no doubt that the refugee problem 
created by the post-Gulf War situation made it easier 
40 Perez de Cuellar, the former Secretary-General, has asked whether the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights has not called into question the inviolability of A 2(7). Speech of 22 April 1991 University of 
Bordeaux, UN press release SG/SM/4560 24 April 1991. 
'... whether certain other texts ... In particular the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights do not 
implicitly call into question this inviolable notion of sovereignty... while the principles of sovereignty 
cannot be radically challenged without international chaos rapidly ensuing .... we 
have reached the 
stage in the ethical and psychological revolution of human civilization in which the massive and 
deliberate violation of human rights will no longer be tolerated.... forge a new concept, one which 
marries law with morality. ' 
See also'SG Perez de Cuellar Sees Change in Basic Non-interference Doctrine', Diplomatic World Bulletin, 
vol 22, May 1991, p 1. 
41 It was not until R 794, adopted in 1992, that the Security Council first authorised Chapter VII 
enforcement action involving the use of force, inside the state concerned, soley on the basis of human 
rights violations. H McCoubrey and ND White International Law and Armed Conflict (Dartmouth, 1992) p 
24. 
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for some Security Council members to vote for 
resolution 6881.42 He concludes that trans-border 
effects may become a necessary prerequisite for 
intervention. Indeed this condition may be seen as a 
necessary threshold to avoid the interference with 
domestic affairs - the domaine reserve - which many 
states, quoting A 2(7), are determined to maintain. 
This analysis of the legal and political questions 
raised by 688 and subsequent events in the Kurdish 
Crisis shows that the international community is 
willing to take forcible action, not only in the face 
of the familiar threat of international aggression, 
but also in certain selected cases where order within 
a state has broken down. International law is not yet 
fully attuned to the question of forcible intervention 
in intra-state conflict, however. Where international 
aggression occurs the UN Charter provides the means 
for concerted action by the international community. 
But the Charter does not explicitly provide the means 
for action against threats to international security 
arising out of a civil war. Indeed the Charter rules 
out intervention in state's `domestic' jurisdiction 
and this has been the legal basis for the refusal of 
some Council members to cast an affirmative vote for 
intervention. 43 
So what can be said of the state of international law, 
and the practice of states in diplomacy, in the fields 
of peacekeeping and intervention, at the end of the 
Kurdish Crisis? Paul Fifoot completes his review of 
the state of international law on `humanitarian 
intervention' by defining three main conclusions. 44 
Drawing on those conclusions, and restricting the 
coverage to go no further than April 1991, the 
following statements can be made about the state of 
international law at the start of the crisis: 
" The UN does take up, consider and pass judgement on 
serious violations of human rights in states and will 
42 Rodley p 34. 
43 Greenwood infers the Gulf War coalition partners chose not to seek an explicit Security Council authority 
for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in order to avoid testing the willingness of some Council members to 
abandon their adherence to A 2(7) In cases of humanitarian crises within states. New World Order p 177 
44 Fifoot p 159-61. 
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continue to adopt resolutions in support of human 
rights. 
" Whereas the UN was prepared to authorise enforcement 
action - amounting to some use of force but not `all 
necessary means' - to pressurise Southern Rhodesia it 
is likely that UN member-states from the Developing 
World, and others, will resist the use of `legal 
fictions' to allow enforcement in the form of `all 
necessary means'. There will be reluctance to endorse 
armed intervention into civil wars, unless there are 
unmistakable and serious `trans-border' effects. 
" The UN has never forcibly intervened inside a state, 
nor authorised others to do so, with a sole mandate of 
the protection of human rights. Even after many 
Chapter VII resolutions against Iraq in the Gulf 
Crisis (and Kurdish Crisis) the UN felt obliged to 
conduct its humanitarian work in Iraq with the consent 
of the host state, and subject its personnel and 
activities to restrictions imposed by that state. 
Looking back at the Kurdish crisis Howard Adelman 
offers a list of necessary conditions for acts of 
(non-consensual and forcible) humanitarian 
intervention to be legal: 
" The right is to be used to provide relief and 
protection, but for no other purposes; 
" The right is to be used when the coercive use of 
force by a sovereign authority is so extensive as to 
induce mass flight; 
" The right is only to be used when that mass flight 
is so extensive as to threaten the peace and security 
of neighbouring states; 
" The right should be exercised as a last resort, or 
in conditions of extreme urgency, together with non- 
forcible sanctions; 
" The right is to be exercised only when it is claimed 
either by the adjacent state whose security is 
threatened by the mass exodus (as a matter of self- 
defence) or when it is explicitly endorsed by the 
Security Council; 
" The intervening forces should use minimal force, 
should not `alter the regime' of the target state and 
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single-nation forces should be replaced by 
`multinational' forces without delay. 
The boldness of the coalition action in those early 
months of 1991 did not stem from the clarity or 
decisiveness of R 688. On the contrary 688 was a 
cautious statement. The coalition effort went ahead 
because it was clear that, despite the caution in the 
Security Council, several leading states (more-or-less 
supported by rest of the international community) was 
prepared, under the exceptional circumstances, to 
condemn Iraq and permit forcible intervention onto its 
territory as the best solution to the crisis. The 
clamour for military action, in the press if not in 
688, made PROVIDE COMFORT a political, if not a legal, 
necessity. 46 But the international community was not 
ready to declare a general shift in favour of 
intervention in support of human rights. This 
reluctance to carry forward a human rights agenda 
stemmed not just from an `anachronistic preference for 
the old statist order47 but also from an awareness 
that a precedent for intervention might be even more 
dangerous and destabilising. It might even undermine 
the order it was created to support. 
The issues raised by the question reach back into the 
origins of modern international law, and indeed, into 
the fundamentals of political philosophy regarding 
inter-state relations. They bring together the 
opposing strands of `order' and `justice', 
`sovereignty' and `human rights'. Maybe the 
international community is poised to recognise that 
Vincent's `basic rights' can no longer be ignored. The 
cultural and political obstacles to realising such an 
ideal in the practice of states are formidable, 
however; it may be that recent crises in Bosnia, Haiti 
and Rwanda will lead to greater caution still in 
forging new instruments for the forcible protection of 
human rights, especially the rights claimed by 
religious or ethnic minorities. The international 
community may come to accept forcible intervention as 
46 Such as the G7 endorsement of PROVIDE COMFORT p 268, above. 
47 Dannreuther p 75. 
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a legitimate weapon - albeit one of last resort - 
which may only be used in exceptional circumstances, 
and with a significant risk of failure. Perhaps the 
next time a crisis like the Kurdish Crisis occurs - if 
the conditions are ever repeated - we shall see 
another Resolution such as 688, passed to enable where 
it cannot command. 
No one can say how states will react to a subsequent 
crisis which will occur in different circumstances. 
Certainly the international community has now 
witnessed - and may be said to have tacitly endorsed - 
an effective intervention operation. In the case of 
the Kurdish crisis states were prepared to set aside 
their normal respect for sovereignty in a manifestly 
just cause. To that extent a precedent has been set in 
political, if not in legal, terms. 
A MILITARY ANALYSIS 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERVENTION 
The narrative of events in earlier chapters set out 
the scope and scale of the operation. The analysis 
below identifies the reasons for success as well as 
the obstacles and problems which had to be overcome. 
It offers some lessons which may assist commanders in 
future humanitarian operations. 
PROVIDE COMFORT brought together air, ground and 
maritime forces from seven countries48 in an unplanned 
and suddenly executed operation which entailed 
humanitarian and combat activities. The territory was 
unfamiliar to most participants. The mission was 
unusual; it developed in rapidly developing political 
scene. The ground forces, in particular were working 
alongside agencies - NGOs as well as Turkish and Iraqi 
officials - which had their own objectives and methods 
and which were not under central control. The 
successful completion of the military mission was a 
notable achievement. 
THE MISSION 
48 There were seven main contributing nations in the coalition. 
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The mission assigned to the coalition forces consisted 
of three objectives: 
" aid the DPs 
" hand over to the humanitarian agencies 
" withdraw 
The brevity of this mission and its endorsement by the 
participating states allowed the operational activity 
to be focused and well-coordinated. This unity of 
purpose survived, even when there was disagreement 
over the withdrawal date of the forces deployed inside 
northern Iraq. In contrast to the multifarious 
mandates issued to recent UN peacekeeping operations, 
and the associated `mission creep'99, the PROVIDE 
COMFORT coalition states were able to set themselves a 
simple, `achievable' mission. 
THE PROBLEM AREAS 
This section will not repeat the details given in the 
earlier narrative. But this military analysis needs to 
recall the most significant threats to the success of 
mission: 
" the scale of humanitarian suffering 
" the inhospitable weather and terrain 
" the difficulties of multinational cooperation: 
language, doctrine, intent 
" the threat from the Iraqis 
" the possible disruption of the coalition plan by the 
Kurds 
" the early problems of coordination with the aid 
agencies 
" the difficulties with Turkey, the `host nation' 
" the inter-governmental dispute over the timing of 
the withdrawal. 
49 Complex missions typify UN operations. They arise from the varied Interests and attitudes of the 15 
Security Council members and other UN member-states. They also come about through the Security 
Council's revisiting its earlier resolutions and 'updating' its mandates. 
By the end of UNPROFOR's mission, after three and a half years, commanders were expected to 
implement a mandate comprising no less than 70 Security Council resolutions. This mirrored the mission- 
creep found in UNTAC. 
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COMMAND 
For commanders the multifarious nature of the task 
produced significant problems of command and control. 
After a fast deployment the forces needed to make an 
intense effort in the reception, delivery and 
distribution of supplies, using a variety of transport 
resources. There was, moreover, a demanding tactical 
situation with a threat which was difficult to judge. 
The force consisted of many nationalities with ad-hoc 
staff teams and with significant language problems. 
Operations were conducted in the constant gaze of the 
international media who were given every assistance. 
Reporters criticised Turkey's contribution and 
increased tensions between the `host' state and the 
coalition partners. The need for frequent press 
statements describing complex activities - over an 
extensive operational area - distracted commanders. 
The problems of command were overcome thanks to the 
professionalism of the formation commanders and their 
staffs, all the members of which were officers of wide 
experience and well practised in NATO procedures. The 
senior staff officers in the multinational 
headquarters were, with one exception, American. 50 The 
planning effort and command decisions were well- 
judged, well-timed, decisive and comprehensive. A 
significant contribution was made by the availability 
of state-of-the-art communications. The overall 
commander, Lt Gen Shalikashvili, showed great skill. 51 
THE IMPORTANCE OF A LEAD-NATION 
The US as the lead nation on PROVIDE COMFORT provided 
two essential components for the success of the whole 
mission. First, the US provided whatever military 
assets were not supplied by the other coalition 
members. Second the massive US contribution allowed 
the other participants to concede that the US- 
appointed commander should take the lead in day-to-day 
50 The only exception was the Chief of Operations at HQ PROVIDE COMFORT, who was a British officer. 
51 He subsequently became SACEUR and then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Armed Forces. 
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decision-making. The endorsement of all participants 
was only required for major policy decisions. 
THE OPPOSING FORCES AND OPERATIONAL RISK 
Despite the Iraqi forces' recent defeat in the Gulf 
War they had retained significant military forces, as 
seen from their success in suppressing two separate 
armed revolts in the space of a few weeks. At least 
two divisions of ground forces, fully manned and 
equipped, were located within five miles of the 
coalition forces' outposts. Iraq's potential advantage 
in the number of units available was compounded by the 
coalition forces' reliance on `light' troops (marines, 
paratroops and SF) with minimal organic combat 
support. (There were less than thirty artillery pieces 
in support of 12,000 men. There were, furthermore, 
less than two specialist companies of men available to 
perform combat engineering tasks. ) These light forces 
were especially vulnerable to CW attack. 
Whereas the coalition forces included powerful air 
forces - 70 fixed wing combat aircraft and 18 attack 
helicopters - the great distances between bases and 
operational area limited their combat effectiveness. 
Operating some 300 miles from their bases (at Incirlik 
and, for the carrier air wing, from the sea) they 
could replenish fuel by AAR but they had to return to 
base to re-arm. 
One of the greatest concern of coalition commanders 
was the vulnerability of the ground forces to Iraqi 
units, perhaps by infiltration at night. This was 
due in part to the lack of tactical air 
reconnaissance available to the coalition forces. 
The prime means of tactical air reconnaissance was 
the US Navy's F-14, fitted with the `wet film' recce 
pod. `Real time' provision of the surveillance 
product - typically by instantaneous download to a 
ground terminal at the operational headquarters - 
was not available to the coalition forces. These 
aircraft were part of the carrier air wing and 
operated over northern Iraq at extreme range. The 
responsiveness of the air recce was limited by the 
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time taken to task recce missions and to interpret 
the results. The capability was, furthermore, 
limited to good visibility. Other recce assets, 
including coalition helicopters and ground recce 
units, were only tasked to survey terrain within 
visual range from outposts. They did not overfly 
Iraqi positions to the south of the security zone. 
(Coalition commanders were careful not to offer the 
Iraqis slow-moving air targets. ) Another limitation 
was the sensitivity of the photography; the 
photographs could not be relied on to detect 
infantry on foot, especially if under overhead 
cover. The limited effectiveness of coalition 
information systems compounded the threat presented 
by nearby Iraqi forces. PROVIDE COMFORT forces 
operated, therefore, not under conditions of 
dominance associated with DESERT STORM - as is 
generally assumed - but under significant 
operational constraints and disadvantages. 
The tactical problem was compounded by the dispersal 
of the ground forces. In order to maximise combat 
power light forces need to concentrate. ('Concentrate' 
does not necessarily mean `co-locate'. It is 
sufficient that units should be close enough to 
support one other by fire. ) This is especially 
important when the threat is infiltration by large 
numbers of enemy infantry, approaching in cover or in 
darkness. The dispersal of the coalition forces was 
nevertheless deliberate and necessary: it was an 
essential confidence-building measure designed to 
reassure the Kurds. Coalition forces needed to show 
themselves throughout the security zone (and in the 
air to create a visible presence throughout the wider 
air exclusion zone) to reassure the local people. The 
Kurds' suspicion of security conditions in northern 
Iraq made dispersal essential. When the assessed 
threat increased52 this requirement had to be balanced 
against the risk of attack. 
The dependence on heavy usage of long distance 
communications and the parallel national lines of 
communications also created vulnerabilities. An 
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operational emergency would have provided severe tests 
to both and compounded other inter-operability 
problems. 
The logistic problems faced by the coalition were 
significant. The multinational force units were 
deployed far from their normal operational areas. Huge 
quantities of stores had to be transported over great 
distances. Logistic requirements in support of the 
humanitarian mission constantly changed: emergency 
supplies of food, medical and shelter stores were 
replaced by more palatable foods, clothing, vehicle 
parts and bulk containers. Soon afterwards the 
requirement shifted to building supplies and stores 
for the reconstruction or renovation of 
infrastructure. Logisticians also had to sustain the 
military force and prepare for the logistical 
requirements of combat. A logistic operation of this 
kind can produce rapid results but it is a relatively 
expensive method of providing services to people in 
need. 
By the end of the operation it was clear that Iraqi 
mines and unexploded ordnance had presented the 
greatest risk to coalition forces. Seven members of 
the coalition forces were killed and over 100 wounded 
by these devices. 
The units were well chosen for their humanitarian role 
but lacked the punch which would have been required 
for decisive air-land combat operations. PROVIDE 
COMFORT therefore operated without the doctrinally- 
essential capabilities of `escalation dominance', the 
strength to withstand attack by one or all of the 
hostile, or potentially hostile, forces and the 
ability to regain the military initiative after such 
an attack. (This conclusion is based on an assumption 
that coalition forces would have been constrained - 
by overarching political considerations of 
`proportionality' - from using long-range weapons 
systems based outside the immediate operational area 
to inflict overwhelming damage on targets of value 
throughout Iraq. ) Despite the impressive appearance of 
52 During the decision-making over occupying Dohuk. 
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the force it was vulnerable in many respects. It was 
this knowledge which lay behind the hesitation and 
caution of coalition military conduct, at certain 
times. Operational risk was a constant topic of 
discussion amongst commanders and staffs. 
It is possible that the success of the threat of 
massive punishment deterred the Iraqis from attacking 
the relatively vulnerable coalition forces, at 
critical points in the operation. It is also possible 
that the US authorities attributed the success of Op 
PROVIDE COMFORT, in immediate retrospect, to the 
`humanitarian' mission and the operational qualities 
of the light-forces-supported-by-air-power force mix. 
The effect of the post Gulf War trauma - and the wider 
deterrent presented by massive US forces in-theatre - 
on the Iraqis may have been discounted. According to 
this hypothesis the result was a reliance on a 
humanitarian mission and light forces to produce 
success in the next `intervention' crisis involving 
the US: Somalia. It appears that these, less obvious, 
lessons from PROVIDE COMFORT were disregarded in that 
operation. 
RELATIONS WITH THE HOST NATION 
It is clear that the coalition states underestimated 
the political tensions in Turkey over the aid 
operation. The impact of those tensions on the 
operation itself also took them by surprise. Where 
future humanitarian intervention operations are 
dependent on the cooperation of a host nation the 
coalition should make every effort to understand any 
questions of principle or presentation which may annoy 
the local authorities. This should include a media 
policy whereby due credit is constantly given to the 
efforts of the host nation. Furthermore coalition 
commanders need to ensure that any sensitivities on 
the part of the host nation are fully understood by 
all ranks. Transparency, honesty, and the anticipation 
of host nation objections may be as critical to 
success as military efficiency. 
DOCTRINE 
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The increase in multinational `peace support' 
operations since the end of the Cold war has led to 
developments in military doctrine in several states. 
Recent doctrinal writings provide a means of analysis 
of this operation, and will in turn be influenced by 
this operation. In a perceptive article written two 
years before the Gulf Crisis Richard Connaughton laid 
out the principles of successful military 
intervention. 53 Drawing on the examples of allied 
intervention in Siberia in 1918-20 he identified the 
following : 
" Select, and maintain, a coherent Aim for the 
operation 
" To operate under the auspices and coordination 
of a valid and supportive international 
organisation 
" To establish a simple and agreed unified 
command, control, communications and intelligence 
organisation 
" Plan the force extraction concurrently with the 
planning of the force insertion 
" Establish an effective cordon sanitaire around 
the target area 
" Maintain consensus 
" Agree and adhere to national contributions 
" Military intervention should be the last resort 
of a collective security policy. 
As he showed in a later article54 these principles form 
an excellent framework for analysis of multinational 
military cooperation, not just in the military 
intervention of DESERT STORM but also in the 
humanitarian intervention response to the Kurdish 
Crisis which followed it. 
This operation might suggest the addition of two 
further principles: 
53 Richard Connaughton'The Principles of Multinational Intervention' British Army Review No 97, Summer 
1987. 
54 Richard Connaughton 'The Principles of Multinational Military Intervention and the 1990-1 Gulf Crisis' 
British Army Review, No 102, Autumn 1991, p 4-11. 
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" assign forces capable of defeating any likely 
opposition55, and 
" assign forces capable of rapid deployment (and 
return). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The conclusions of this Chapter are: 
" International law is still founded on the concept of 
sovereignty. The international community is only 
prepared to authorise intervention under exceptional 
circumstances. The few precedents which do exist pre- 
1990 are predominantly for non-forcible action. In the 
case of ECOWAS intervention of 1990 (and now, 
arguably, the intervention on behalf of the Kurds in 
1991) the international community was prepared to give 
tacit approval to a forcible intervention, in even 
more `exceptional circumstances'. (In the case of 
ECOWAS the endorsement was explicit but 
retrospective. ) 
" The contribution of the Kurdish intervention to the 
development of international practice in intervention 
is a matter of debate. A limited consensus has emerged 
in the years since the crisis. It can be described as 
follows. R 688 and the Kurdish intervention itself did 
not establish a `right' of humanitarian intervention 
nor did the agreements the UN negotiated with the 
Iraqis add any weight to the argument that such a 
right should be adopted by the international 
community. All but a few commentators will agree, 
however, that there is now greater `elasticity' in the 
concept of sovereignty, especially where the abuse of 
human rights is found inside a state. Similarly a 
looser definition of conditions amounting to a `threat 
to international peace and security' can now be said 
to exist. 
" Commentators are divided on the future prospects of 
a `right of intervention' to avert the mass abuse of 
human rights. But there is general agreement that 688 
provided some expansion of the legal justifications 
55 This principle captures the useful concept of 'escalation-dominance", the capability to match and if 
necessary exceed, the enemy's ability to escalate the use of force in any confrontation. 
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" Commentators are divided on the future prospects of 
a `right of intervention' to avert the mass abuse of 
human rights. But there is general agreement that 688 
provided some expansion of the legal justifications 
for intervention and may have the longer-term effect 
of providing a strengthened political precedent for 
future interventions. Politics and law are not 
entirely separate, however. They are connected by 
`custom'. 
" With hindsight the military success of the operation 
seems to have been assured from the start. That was 
not the perception of the participants at the time. 
Success was due to the following factors: 
- the simplicity of the mission and its 
endorsement by the participating states. 
- the professionalism of the coalition forces, 
and their commanders and staffs in particular. 
- the cooperation between the multinational air, 
land forces and marines. 
- the initiative achieved for the coalition by 
the earlier defeat of the Iraqi forces in the 
Gulf War, providing a workable deterrent which 
prevented Iraqis attacks on a comparatively weak 
force. 
- international opinion supported PROVIDE COMFORT 
and the forces deployed benefitted from the 
support of the public in their own countries. 
- the operation showed effective decision-making 
and command at all levels, largely because of the 
`lead-nation' concept whereby the US contingent 
provided the coordination and took day-to-day 
command responsibility. 
- the resources brought by the US to the 
operation made good the shortfalls of smaller 
contingents. 
- the responsiveness of the coalition force 
derived from its combat aircraft, its airlift 
resources and its specialist light infantry 
forces; clearly the quality of the forces 
employed contributed to the overall success 
- the logistics specialists in the multinational 
force overcame great obstacles in the provision, 
distribution and control of a great quantity and 
great variety of relief supplies. They also 
provided economical and well-designed support for 
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- the sense of purpose and enthusiasm of all 
concerned for the humanitarian mission. 
" The effort made by the multinational forces, and 
the costs borne by their governments, over the first 9 
weeks of the operation, and then in the conduct of the 
`residual force' were significant. This suggests that 
unusually powerful motives were driving the effort. It 
would be unwise to imagine that the resources involved 
would be committed on subsequent occasions as a matter 
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